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ABSTRACT	
“THE	WHOLE	NATION	WILL	MOVE”:	GRASSROOTS	ORGANIZING	IN	HARLEM	
AND	THE	ADVENT	OF	THE	LONG,	HOT	SUMMERS		SEPTEMBER	2018		PETER	D.	BLACKMER,	B.A.,	WAGNER	COLLEGE		M.S.Ed.,	WAGNER	COLLEGE		M.A.,	UNIVERSITY	OF	MASSACHUSETTS	AMHERST		Ph.D.,	UNIVERSITY	OF	MASSACHUSETTS	AMHERST		Directed	by:	James	Smethurst			 “The	Whole	Nation	Will	Move”	provides	a	narrative	history	of	grassroots	struggles	for	African	American	equality	and	empowerment	in	Harlem	in	the	decade	immediately	preceding	the	era	of	widespread	urban	rebellions	in	the	United	States.	Through	a	street-level	examination	of	the	political	education	and	activism	of	grassroots	organizers,	the	dissertation	analyzes	how	local	people	developed	a	collective	radical	consciousness	and	organized	to	confront	and	dismantle	institutional	racism	in	New	York	City	from	1954-1964.	This	work	also	explores	how	the	interests	and	activities	of	poor	and	working-class	Black	and	Puerto	Rican	residents	of	Harlem	fueled	the	escalation	of	protest	activity	and	demands	for	human	rights	and	self-determination	that	pushed	local	and	national	civil	rights	organizations	in	new,	more	radical	directions	with	the	advent	of	the	1964	Harlem	Rebellion.		Though	the	body	of	scholarly	work	focused	on	the	Civil	Rights	and	Black	Power	movements	beyond	the	South	has	grown	exponentially	in	the	past	decade,	
		ix	
struggles	for	rights	and	power	in	Harlem	have	been	underappreciated	for	their	far-reaching	influence	upon	this	era.	As	an	international	hub	of	Black	political	thought	and	cultural	production,	Harlem	was	home	to	organizers,	artists,	intellectuals,	and	local	people	whose	contributions	to	Black	Freedom	Struggles	throughout	the	African	diaspora	complicate	popular	narratives	of	the	Civil	Rights	Movement,	and	challenge	the	geographies	and	periodization	of	the	Black	Power	Movement.		By	closely	analyzing	local,	national,	and	global	trends	in	grassroots	struggles	for	human	rights	and	self-determination	in	the	ten-year	period	preceding	the	Harlem	Rebellion,	this	dissertation	frames	the	outbreak	of	the	rebellion	as	the	result	of	a	collective	disillusionment	with	the	repressive	limitations	of	liberal	governance	in	an	era	of	global	revolution.	This	analysis	issues	a	fundamental	challenge	to	the	popularly	accepted	narrative	that	explains	urban	rebellions	as	consequences	of	an	oppressive	“powder	keg,”	thereby	denying	conscious	political	agency	to	Black	communities	who	sought	to	resist	oppression	and	reform	government	in	the	years,	months,	and	days	leading	up	to	these	uprisings.		 	
		x	
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CHAPTER	1		
INTRODUCTION	On	a	cold	January	night	in	1964,	hundreds	of	Harlem	residents	crowded	into	a	small	gymnasium	on	West	118th	Street,	where	James	Baldwin	sat	alongside	Jesse	Gray,	John	O.	Killens,	and	John	Lewis	at	a	long	table	at	the	end	of	the	room.	The	makeshift	speakers’	platform	was	surrounded	on	all	sides	by	local	people	and	community	leaders	who	had	come	to	show	their	support	for	a	massive	rent	strike	that	was	underway	in	Harlem.	Rising	from	his	seat,	Baldwin	explained	to	the	audience	that	he	had	come	as	a	witness,	to	testify	against	those	responsible	for	establishing	and	maintaining	the	cruel	housing	conditions	in	Harlem	that	had	fueled	such	community	resistance.	The	housing	crisis	in	Harlem	was	not	a	local,	isolated	issue,	Baldwin	contended,	but	rather	symptomatic	of	broader	systems	of	racial	oppression	in	the	urban	north.	“It	is	a	more	complex	situation	in	the	North,”	explained	the	internationally	renowned	author,	essayist,	and	playwright.	Compared	to	the	Southern	states,	where	the	perpetrators	of	racism	were	easy	to	identify,	those	responsible	for	exploitative	housing,	segregated	schools,	and	economic	inequality	in	the	urban	North	were	harder	to	distinguish.	“It’s	hard	to	find	the	landlord,”	Baldwin	continued,	“it’s	hard	to	know	where	the	enemy	is.”		Much	more	than	a	lament	of	racial	inequality	in	Harlem,	Baldwin’s	comments	at	the	rent	strike	rally	offer	critical	insights	into	the	institutional	nature	of	racial	oppression	in	the	urban	North.	“There	is	a	contradiction	between	the	lives	white	people	live	and	the	lives	we	live,”	Baldwin	observed,	“The	landlords,	the	city	and	the	state	are	responsible.”	Through	this	statement,	Baldwin	issued	a	fundamental	
		2	
challenge	to	one	of	the	most	popular	perceptions	of	American	Jim	Crow	society	in	the	20th	Century.	For	decades,	this	popular	analysis	has	held	that	two	distinct	forms	of	racial	subjugation	existed	in	the	United	States:	one	de	jure,	the	other	de	facto.		This	enduring	understanding	of	de	jure	subjugation	explains	the	system	of	southern	racial	oppression	as	one	defined	and	codified	by	laws	and	regulations	that	gave	legal	credence	to	the	personal	and	cultural	racism	inherent	in	white	southern	society.		Conversely,	this	popular	analysis	suggests	that	a	de	facto	system	of	racial	subjugation	existed	in	the	North,	in	which	racism	existed	and	was	practiced	on	a	personal	and	cultural	level	within	white	society,	but	not	officially	sanctioned	by	governing	structures.	By	naming	the	city	and	the	state	as	responsible	parties	in	establishing	and	enforcing	racial	oppression	in	Harlem,	Baldwin	not	only	threw	down	a	fundamental	challenge	to	these	flawed	perceptions,	but	gave	voice	to	what	many	Harlem	residents	had	believed	all	along.		While	offering	a	useful	explanation	of	Jim	Crow	society	in	the	urban	North,	this	1964	address	also	illuminates	the	nature	of	the	fight	waged	by	Black	communities	to	resist	and	transform	these	complex	systems	of	oppression.	“This	is	a	revolution,”	Baldwin	declared,	adding	that	such	a	struggle	would	become	“harder	and	harder	because	the	revolution	has	to	revise	the	entire	system.”1	Such	an	appraisal	of	the	freedom	struggles	waged	by	Black	and	Puerto	Rican	communities	in	Harlem	was	hardly	romantic	or	hyperbole.	By	the	time	Baldwin	delivered	this	analysis,	thousands	of	Harlem	residents	had	come	to	similar	conclusions	after	
																																																								1	Fred	Halstead,	et	al.,	Harlem	Stirs	(New	York:	Marzani	&	Munsell	Publishers,	Inc.,	1966),	62.	
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nearly	a	decade	of	confrontations	with	various	levels	of	the	city’s	power	structure.	Through	these	experiences	in	organized	grassroots	struggles	for	Black	rights	and	power	in	Harlem,	local	people	not	only	developed	a	systemic	critique	of	racial	oppression	in	the	urban	North.	This	radical	analysis	developed	in	the	streets	of	Harlem	informed	a	militant	grassroots	political	movement	that	threw	down	a	challenge	to	the	largest	city	in	the	United	States	and	inspired	communities	in	other	American	cities	to	do	the	same.	In	the	decades	since	Baldwin’s	address	in	Lower	Harlem,	histories	of	the	Black	Freedom	Struggles	of	the	1950s-1960s	have	focused	largely	on	campaigns	against	segregation,	racial	violence,	and	disenfranchisement	in	the	rural	South,	contributing	to	a	popular	narrative	that	has	painted	racial	oppression	and	the	Civil	Rights	Movement	as	uniquely	southern	phenomena.	Histories	of	concurrent	struggles	for	rights	and	power	in	the	urban	North	have	much	to	contribute	to	present	popular	discourse	around	systemic	racism	and	institutional	inequality,	organized	resistance	and	urban	rebellions—topics	which	remain	murky	at	best	in	popular	knowledge—yet	these	histories	have	only	recently	begun	to	receive	a	similar	level	of	scholarly	interest	as	those	in	the	South.	Though	the	body	of	scholarly	work	focused	on	the	Civil	Rights	and	Black	Power	movements	beyond	the	South	has	grown	exponentially	in	the	past	decade,	there	remains	a	dichotomy	in	popular	perceptions	of	the	Civil	Rights	Movement	in	the	South	and	the	North.	Whereas	popular	narratives	of	the	Southern	movement	are	routinely	characterized	by	discourse	about	nonviolent	resistance,	Black	Freedom	Struggles	in	the	urban	North	have	long	been	painted	as	byproducts	of	the	southern	movement	and	characterized	
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by	urban	“riots”	that	erupted	by	the	mid-1960s.	Consequently,	decades-long	grassroots	struggles	for	rights	and	power	in	Harlem,	long	considered	a	Black	Mecca,	have	been	underappreciated	for	their	far-reaching	influence	upon	this	era.			In	recent	years,	scholars	of	African	American	history	have	produced	several	notable	works	that	prominently	locate	the	contributions	of	Black	communities	in	New	York	City	within	more	expansive	histories	of	the	Civil	Rights	and	Black	Power	movements.2	New	scholarship	has	also	focused	on	the	forces	of	systemic	racial	oppression	that	spawned	the	oft-overlooked	1964	Harlem	Rebellion,	and	the	ways	in	which	this	uprising	influenced	national	policies	on	crime	and	policing.3	Despite	these	recent	publications,	however,	little	work	has	been	done	to	comprehensively	analyze	the	significant	struggles	waged	by	Harlem	communities	for	civil	rights,	human	rights,	and	self-determination	during	the	ten-year	period	of	the	Black	Freedom	Struggle	preceding	the	1964	Harlem	Rebellion.		As	a	result,	present	scholarship	largely	maintains	the	problematic,	yet	popularly	accepted	narrative	that	explains	urban	rebellions	as	consequences	of	an																																																									2	Adina	Back,	“Up	South	in	New	York:	The	1950s	School	Desegregation	Struggles,”	(PhD	diss.,	New	York	University,	1997);	Martha	Biondi,	To	Stand	and	
Fight:	The	Struggle	for	Civil	Rights	in	Postwar	New	York	City	(Cambridge:	Harvard	University	Press,	2003);	Peniel	E.	Joseph,	Waiting	‘Til	the	Midnight	Hour:	A	Narrative	
History	of	Black	Power	in	America	(New	York:	Holt	Paperbacks,	2006);	Brian	Purnell,	
Fighting	Jim	Crow	in	the	County	of	Kings:	The	Congress	of	Racial	Equality	in	Brooklyn	(Lexington:	The	University	Press	of	Kentucky,	2013);	Barbara	Ransby,	Ella	Baker	
and	the	Black	Freedom	Movement:	A	Radical	Democratic	Vision	(Chapel	Hill:	The	University	of	North	Carolina	Press,	2003);	Thomas	Sugrue,	Sweet	Land	of	Liberty:	
The	Forgotten	Struggle	for	Civil	Rights	in	the	North	(New	York:	Random	House,	2008);	Clarence	Taylor,	ed.,	Civil	Rights	in	New	York	City:	From	World	War	II	to	the	
Giuliani	Era	(New	York:	Fordham	University	Press,	2011).			3	Michael	Flamm,	In	the	Heat	of	the	Summer:	The	New	York	Riots	of	1964	and	
the	War	on	Crime	(Philadelphia:	University	of	Pennsylvania	Press,	2017).	
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oppressive	societal	“powder	keg,”	thereby	denying	conscious	political	agency	to	Black	communities	which	sought	to	resist	oppression	and	reform	government	in	the	years,	months,	and	days	leading	up	to	these	uprisings.	This	absence	of	a	street-level	analysis	of	the	ten-year	period	of	community	activism	preceding	the	Harlem	Rebellion	marginalizes	the	significant	roles	played	by	local	people	and	grassroots	leaders,	including	Ella	Baker,	Jesse	Gray,	Mae	Mallory,	and	Malcolm	X,	in	organizing	Harlem	residents	to	fight	against	racial	oppression	and	demand	a	more	equitable	society.	These	narratives	are	essential	for	explaining	the	outbreak	of	urban	uprisings	in	the	1960s	not	as	“race	riots,”	but	as	rebellions	against	American	Apartheid	in	the	nation’s	cities.			“The	Whole	Nation	Will	Move:	Grassroots	Organizing	in	Harlem	and	the	Advent	of	the	Long,	Hot	Summers,”	addresses	this	gap	by	closely	analyzing	local,	national,	and	global	trends	in	grassroots	campaigns	for	African	American	human	rights	and	self-determination	in	Harlem	in	the	decade	immediately	preceding	the	era	of	widespread	urban	rebellions	in	the	United	States.	This	project	traces	the	development	of	a	collective	radical	political	consciousness	in	Harlem	and	analyzes	how	poor	and	working-class	Black	and	Puerto	Rican	residents	fueled	an	escalation	of	protest	activity	that	pushed	local	and	national	civil	rights	organizations	in	more	assertive,	imaginative,	and	radical	directions	in	the	early	1960s.	Forged	through	school	boycotts,	rent	strikes,	economic	picket	lines,	and	protests	over	police	brutality,	this	popular	consciousness	and	political	action	reflected	frustrations	over	the	limitations	of	racial	liberalism	in	New	York	City	and	was	mobilized	to	fight	for	self-determination	and	a	more	progressive	form	of	urban	governance.	Through	
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participation	in	local	organizing	efforts	to	improve	living	conditions	and	combat	institutional	racism,	some	of	the	most	marginalized	communities	in	New	York	City	developed	a	radical	critique	of	urban	power	structures	that	challenged	the	legitimacy	of	an	inherently	oppressive	society.		These	trends	also	reveal	a	continuous	resistance	on	the	part	of	the	city	government	to	concede	any	demands	of	civil	rights	organizations	for	an	equitable	share	in	the	city’s	economic,	political,	and	social	power	structures	beyond	superficial,	reformist	political	maneuverings.	In	turn,	this	dogged	resistance—which	included	violent	police	repression	of	organizers,	activists,	and	local	people—spurred	grassroots	organizers	to	adopt	more	militant	rhetoric	and	tactics	as	they	fought	to	secure	human	rights	and	self-determination	for	African	American	communities	in	Harlem	and	throughout	the	city.	This	increasingly	militant	and	radical	organizing	had	profound	influences	on	the	political	consciousness	of	local	people	in	Harlem	and	shaped	the	political	climate	of	the	area	in	the	early	1960s.	The	project	thus	frames	the	outbreak	of	the	1964	Harlem	Rebellion	as	the	result	of	a	collective	disillusionment	with	the	repressive	limitations	of	liberal	governance	to	meaningfully	address	systemic	racial	oppression.	Though	a	spontaneous	act	of	police	brutality	provided	the	impetus	for	the	1964	Harlem	Rebellion,	the	fatal	shooting	of	15-year-old	James	Powell	that	July	occurred	within	a	volatile	political	climate	charged	by	increasingly	repressive	state	violence	that	was	employed	to	maintain	the	racial	status	quo	as	radical	and	revolutionary	analyses	were	inspiring	mass	mobilization	in	Harlem	and	throughout	the	city.	
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Building	upon	the	current	historiographical	trend	of	utilizing	“local	studies”	of	the	Civil	Rights	Movement	to	examine	a	range	of	nationally	significant	themes	and	concepts,	this	project	centers	the	experiences	of	local	people	in	Harlem	as	a	means	of	analyzing	histories	of	racial	oppression,	community	organization,	and	political	movements	in	the	urban	north.	My	interdisciplinary	research	draws	from	extensive	archival	collections,	along	with	existing	and	original	oral	history	interviews,	to	illustrate	how	Black	communities	in	the	urban	north	shaped	national	debates	around	integration,	direct	action,	human	rights,	community	organization,	self-determination,	nonviolence,	nationalism,	and	political	power	during	the	modern	Civil	Rights	era.	Through	a	close	examination	of	the	political	education	and	activism	of	grassroots	organizers,	such	as	Ella	Baker,	Jesse	Gray,	Jack	O’Dell,	Mae	Mallory,	Malcolm	X,	and	many	others,	the	dissertation	analyzes	how	Harlem	leaders	influenced	these	fundamental	national	debates	through	local	campaigns	for	tenant	rights,	educational	equality,	economic	empowerment,	and	police	reform.		Though	a	local	study	of	the	Movement	in	Harlem,	“The	Whole	Nation	Will	Move”	also	situates	these	struggles	for	rights	and	power	within	the	national	and	global	political	contexts	that	they	were	fundamentally	connected	with.	As	an	international	hub	of	Black	political	thought	and	cultural	production,	Harlem	was	home	to	organizers,	artists,	intellectuals,	and	local	people	whose	contributions	to	Black	Freedom	Struggles	throughout	the	diaspora	complicate	popular	narratives	of	the	Civil	Rights	Movement,	and	challenge	the	geographies	and	periodization	of	the	Black	Power	Movement.	Pan-African	political	thought	was	a	significant	aspect	of	popular	political	consciousness	and	organizing	in	Harlem,	and	by	the	early	1960s,	
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African	nationalism	and	independence	movements	had	inspired	a	revolutionary	consciousness	throughout	the	diaspora	and	helped	to	fuel	a	surging	radicalism	in	Harlem.	By	locating	grassroots	struggles	for	rights	and	power	in	Harlem	within	this	broader	context,	this	project	analyzes	the	ways	in	which	national	and	global	liberation	struggles	informed	local	political	action.	Thus,	“The	Whole	Nation	Will	Move”	again,	frames	the	outbreak	of	the	rebellion	in	Harlem	not	as	a	“race	riot,”	but	as	a	radical	political	expression	in	an	era	of	global	revolution.		Chapter	Two,	“A	‘Rising	Tide’	Coming	In,”	analyzes	the	social	forces	in	Harlem	and	beyond	that	contributed	to	the	evolution	of	an	insurgent	Black	political	consciousness	in	the	mid-1950s,	and	how	that	consciousness	translated	into	political	action.	Through	an	examination	of	the	various	strands	of	national	political	thought	and	action	that	coalesced	in	Harlem	in	the	early	20th	Century,	this	chapter	analyzes	the	era	that	laid	the	groundwork	for	movements	for	Black	rights	and	power	during	the	Civil	Rights	Era	of	the	1950s-60s.		Chapter	Three,	“In	Harlem	With	A	Revolutionary	Dream,”	analyzes	how	Jesse	Gray,	Mae	Mallory,	and	Malcolm	X	built	upon	the	radical	traditions	of	the	post-World	War	II	era	to	shape	a	popular	organizational	shift	away	from	middle-class,	moderate	approaches	to	civil	rights	and	integration,	and	toward	radical	grassroots	organizing	for	human	rights	and	self-determination.	The	work	of	these	three	leaders	from	1958-1959	intersected	with	a	wide	array	of	influential	local,	national,	and	international	figures	and	demonstrated	the	ways	in	which	local	people	in	Harlem	were	mobilized	in	consciousness	and	empowered	through	action	to	engage	in	sustained	struggles	for	rights	and	power	in	Harlem	and	beyond	in	the	1960s.	
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Chapter	Four,	“An	Extremely	Dangerous	Luxury,”	analyzes	the	outcomes	and	impacts	of	a	confrontation	between	Harlem	residents	and	the	NYPD	outside	the	28th	Precinct	in	the	summer	of	1959.	This	brief,	yet	dramatic	demonstration	marked	the	apex	of	months	of	local	and	national	debates	around	nonviolence,	self-defense,	integration,	and	Black	nationalism	that	had	converged	in	Harlem	that	summer.	Described	as	a	“near	riot,”	this	confrontation	and	its	fallout	represented	a	growing	popular	disillusionment	with	liberal	approaches	to	addressing	issues	of	institutional	racism	in	New	York	City	and	helped	to	launch	radical	grassroots	organizers	into	more	prominent	leadership	roles	in	the	city.	Chapter	Five,	“Majestic	Lions	of	the	Valleys	and	Plains,”	examines	the	convergence	of	local,	national,	and	global	freedom	struggles	in	Harlem	from	1959-1963	and	the	emergence	of	what	Dr.	John	Henrik	Clarke	described	as	the	“New	Afro-American	Nationalism.”	Through	an	exploration	of	the	evolving	actions	and	ideologies	of	Mae	Mallory	and	Malcolm	X	during	this	period,	along	with	their	expansive	networks,	this	chapter	analyzes	the	formative	roles	played	by	local	people	in	challenging	racial	oppression	in	the	urban	north	and	pushing	the	national	Civil	Rights	Movement	in	more	radical	directions	in	the	early	1960s.		Chapter	Six,	“Talking	and	Acting	in	Our	Interest,”	traces	the	development	of	both	the	Congress	of	Racial	Equality	(CORE)	and	the	Northern	Student	Movement	(NSM)	in	Harlem	from	1960-1963	to	analyze	the	ways	in	which	local	people	shaped	the	emergence	and	evolution	of	national	civil	rights	organizations.	Beginning	as	interracial	organizations	dedicated	to	supporting	the	southern	Civil	Rights	Movement,	by	1963	these	organizations	shifted	their	focus	to	community-based	
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organizing	for	Black	equality	and	empowerment	in	the	urban	north.	Through	the	active	involvement	and	influence	of	grassroots	organizations	and	indigenous	leaders,	these	organizations	would	transform	their	positions	on	integration,	community-based	organizing,	self-determination,	nationalism,	and	nonviolence,	and	in	the	process,	emerge	as	leading	forces	in	northern	Black	freedom	struggles.	Chapter	Seven,	“Something’s	Gotta	Be	Wrong,”	examines	the	emergence,	evolution,	and	impacts	of	the	Harlem	rent	strikes	of	1963-64	within	the	context	of	escalating	demands	for	immediate	rights	and	power	in	New	York’s	Black	and	Puerto	Rican	communities.	Through	their	involvement	in	the	rent	strikes,	thousands	of	Harlem	residents	came	face	to	face	with	the	many	sides	of	institutional	racism	in	the	city	and	consequently	developed	a	more	radical	critique	of	the	city’s	power	structure.	This	chapter	thus	frames	the	outbreak	of	the	1964	Harlem	Rebellion	as	the	result	of	a	collective	disillusionment	with	the	repressive	limitations	of	liberal	governance	to	meaningfully	address	systemic	racial	oppression.		
		11	
CHAPTER	2		
A	‘RISING	TIDE’	COMING	IN:	THE	BLACK	MECCA	AS	URBAN	MOVEMENT	
CENTER,	1954-1957	
In	final	analysis,	Harlem	is	neither	slum,	ghetto,	resort	or	colony,	though	it	is	in	
part	all	of	them.	It	is—or	promises	to	be—a	race	capital.	–Alain	Locke	(1925)4			 Just	below	a	drawing	of	Roland	Hayes	on	the	front	cover	of	the	March	1925	issue	of	Survey	Graphic	magazine,	the	words	“Harlem:	Mecca	of	the	New	Negro”	were	printed	in	large,	bold	font.	The	Survey	Graphic,	which	mostly	appealed	to	a	readership	interested	in	topics	of	social	work	and	philanthropy,	was	inspired	to	publish	the	issue	after	the	magazine’s	editor	met	Alain	Locke	at	a	debutante	dinner	organized	by	Charles	S.	Johnson	to	honor	the	young	artists,	writers,	and	intellectuals	of	the	“New	Negro	Movement.”5	This	Movement	represented	the	expressions	of	the	social,	artistic,	and	political	consciousness	of	a	new	generation	of	African	Americans,	born	after	slavery,	that	converged	in	urban	centers	like	Harlem	and	later	Chicago	during	the	Great	Migrations.	In	his	preface	to	the	issue,	titled	“Harlem,”	editor	Alain	Locke	introduced	readers	to	the	social	intricacies	and	dynamics	of	the	neighborhood	that	provided	the	fertile	ground	for	the	development	of	this	new	generation	of	race	women	and	men.	“The	reformers,	the	fighting	advocates,	the	inner	spokesmen,	the	poets,	artists	and	social	prophets	are	here,”	Locke	wrote,	“and	pouring	in	toward	them	are	the	fluid	ambitious	youth	and	pressing	in	upon	them	the	migrant	masses.”	Though	surrounding	communities	may	have	been	aware	of	the	social	impacts	of	the																																																									4	Alain	Locke,	“Harlem,”	Survey	Graphic	53	(1925):	629.		5	Alain	Locke,	ed.,	The	New	Negro:	Voices	of	the	Harlem	Renaissance	(New	York:	Touchstone,	1997),	x-xi.	
		12	
Great	Migration	into	Harlem	and	other	urban	centers	around	the	First	World	War,	Locke	contended,	they	remained	“largely	unaware	of	the	psychology	of	it,	of	the	galvanizing	shocks	and	reactions,	which	mark	the	social	awakening	and	internal	reorganization	which	are	making	a	race	out	of	its	own	disunited	elements.”6	To	Locke	and	many	other	conscious	observers,	this	“social	awakening”	and	unifying	social	reorganization	that	was	taking	place	in	Harlem	signified	the	potential	of	the	neighborhood	as	a	“race	capital,”	a	Black	Mecca.		 	This	vision	of	Harlem	as	a	Black	Mecca	put	forth	by	Locke	and	others	of	the	Harlem	Renaissance	and	broader	New	Negro	Movement	was	not	merely	an	observation	of	contemporary	social	phenomena—it	was	a	proclamation	of	Black	survival,	achievement,	and	empowerment	made	possible	through	the	active	struggles	of	resilient	communities.	In	other	words,	through	the	struggles	of	Black	people	to	survive	(and	sometimes	thrive)	in	a	hostile	city	and	remake	a	section	of	New	York	in	their	image,	the	groundwork	was	laid	for	a	new	generation	of	race	leaders	to	emerge	and	struggle	to	remake	the	city,	nation,	and	world	in	their	image.	Though	there	were	certainly	political,	economic,	and	social	forces	unique	to	New	York	City	in	the	early	20th	Century	that	influenced	the	growth	and	development	of	Harlem’s	Black	communities,	this	same	growth	was	often	achieved	in	spite	of	various	forces	that	restricted	equal	access	to	prosperity	as	white	New	Yorkers.	It	was,	in	fact,	these	conflicting	forces	of	opportunity	and	repression	that	made	Harlem	unique	and	provided	the	backdrop	for	its	canonization	as	a	“race	capital”	of	the	world.	Giving	voice	to	this	unique	potential	that	Harlem	represented	for	the	Black																																																									6	Locke,	“Harlem,”	630.	
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world,	writer	James	Weldon	Johnson	predicted	in	the	same	1925	issue	of	Survey	
Graphic	that	“Harlem	will	become	the	intellectual,	the	cultural	and	the	financial	center	for	Negroes	of	the	United	States,	and	will	exert	a	vital	influence	upon	all	Negro	peoples.”7		 Johnson’s	words	proved	prophetic	as	Harlem’s	community	swelled	in	size,	reputation,	and	influence	in	the	following	decades.	New	generations	of	artists,	community	leaders,	scholars,	and	politicians	entered	into	the	fray,	each	influenced	by	the	cultural	and	political	milieu	of	the	Black	Mecca,	and	standing	on	the	shoulders	of	those	who	had	come	before.	By	the	1960s,	Harlem	had	fostered	the	development	of	a	wide	array	of	homegrown	and	migrant	race	leaders,	such	as	Marcus	Garvey,	Audley	Moore,	Adam	Clayton	Powell,	Jr.,	Ella	Baker,	Malcolm	X,	Mae	Mallory,	and	Jesse	Gray	whose	experiences	in	the	neighborhood	would	shape	political	movements	from	the	grassroots	to	international	arenas	for	generations	to	follow.	This	chapter	will	draw	upon	the	traditions	of	Black	political,	social,	and	economic	consciousness	and	struggle	in	the	Black	Mecca	that	laid	the	groundwork	for	the	emergence	of	new	directions	in	struggles	for	civil	and	human	rights	and	Black	empowerment	during	the	Civil	Rights	Era	of	the	1950s-1960s	in	New	York	City.	Much	like	Locke	in	“Harlem,”	this	chapter	narrates	and	analyzes	the	social	forces	in	Harlem	and	beyond	that	contributed	to	the	evolution	of	an	insurgent	Black	political	consciousness	in	the	mid-1950s,	and	how	that	consciousness	translated	into	political	action.	The	years	from	1954	to	1957,	particularly,	represented	a																																																									7	James	Weldon	Johnson,	“The	Making	of	Harlem,”	Survey	Graphic	53	(1925):	639.	
		14	
formative	period	in	Harlem’s	development	as	a	“movement	center”	in	the	burgeoning	Civil	Rights	Movement.		As	defined	by	sociologist	Aldon	Morris,	a	“movement	center	is	a	social	organization	within	the	community	of	a	subordinate	group,	which	mobilizes,	organizes,	and	coordinates	collective	action	aimed	at	attaining	the	common	ends	of	that	subordinate	group.”	Although	Morris’s	framework	was	constructed	to	analyze	and	explain	the	social	forces	that	contributed	to	the	development	of	“coordinated	collective	action”	in	a	particular	location,	such	as	Montgomery,	Alabama,	and	thus	does	not	strictly	apply	to	the	case	of	Harlem	with	the	neighborhood’s	amalgamation	of	generally	uncoordinated	ideologies,	organizations,	and	interests,	the	framework	provides	a	useful	starting	point	for	understanding	how	organizations	and	movements	developed	in	Harlem	and	the	neighborhood’s	place	within	the	Civil	Rights	Movement.		By	1964,	Harlem’s	grassroots	political	scene	would	more	closely	resemble	the	“movement	center”	framework	laid	out	by	Morris,	but	it	was	during	the	gestation	period	between	1954-1957	that	local	activists	drew	upon	the	Black	Mecca’s	traditions	of	resistance	and	liberation	struggles	to	confront	local	and	national	issues	and	lay	the	groundwork	for	the	transformative	social	movements	of	the	early	1960s.	
v 	Nearly	eleven	years	had	passed	since	Harlem’s	last	rebellion	when	Malcolm	X	returned	to	the	neighborhood	in	June	of	1954	to	lead	the	Nation	of	Islam’s	Temple	No.	7.	In	the	wake	of	the	Second	World	War,	white	hostility	to	Black	claims	of	equality	and	mobility	led	to	days	of	rebellion	in	1943	following	the	shooting	of	a	
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Black	veteran	by	a	white	police	officer	in	Harlem.	Malcolm	Little	had	born	witness	to	the	rebellion	as	a	young	waiter	and	hustler,	but	after	a	stint	in	prison,	returned	to	the	neighborhood	over	a	decade	later	as	Malcolm	X,	convert	to	the	Lost-Found	Nation	of	Islam.		An	Islamic	sect	born	of	the	Black	nationalism	of	the	early	20th	Century,	the	Nation	of	Islam	was	founded	in	Detroit	by	the	enigmatic	W.D.	Fard	in	1930.	Just	four	years	later,	however,	the	Nation	came	under	the	direction	of	Elijah	Muhammad	after	Fard	mysteriously	disappeared.		Born	Elijah	Poole	in	1897,	Muhammad	migrated	north	from	rural	Georgia	and	was	later	re-named	by	Fard,	who	proclaimed	himself	the	incarnation	of	Allah,	to	reflect	the	former’s	status	as	the	“messenger”	of	Allah.	Poole	had	been	born	into	the	time	period	that	historian	Rayford	Logan	coined	as	the	“nadir	of	American	race	relations.”	This	“nadir,”	spanning	from	roughly	1875-1920,	marked	the	most	harrowing	period	in	the	African	American	experience	since	the	conclusion	of	the	Civil	War.8	The	period	was	an	outcome	of	the	reactionary	overthrow	of	Reconstruction	in	the	South	that	violently	curbed	African	American	economic,	political,	and	social	advancement	and	paved	the	way	for	the	establishment	of	Jim	Crow	society.9	This	reactionary	war	was	waged	most	visibly	through	public	lynchings,	or	extra-judicial	killings,	meant	to	make	examples	of	Black																																																									8	Historian	Rhonda	Y.	Williams	uses	the	date	range	of	1875-1920	to	classify	the	nadir.	See	Rhonda	Y.	Williams,	Concrete	Demands:	The	Search	for	Black	Power	in	
the	20th	Century	(New	York:	Routledge,	2015).		9	In	1900,	three	years	after	Elijah	Muhammad’s	birth,	George	Henry	White	gave	an	address	to	Congress	in	support	of	his	anti-lynching	bill	in	which	he	claimed	that	“since	the	end	of	the	Civil	War,	fully	fifty	thousand	of	my	race	have	been	ignominiously	murdered	by	mobs.”	White	was	the	last	surviving	Black	congressman	elected	during	the	Reconstruction	era.	See	Benjamin	R.	Justesen,	George	Henry	
White:	An	Even	Chance	in	the	Race	of	Life	(New	Orleans:	LSU	Press,	2001),	286.	
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men,	women,	and	children	who	dared	to	defy	white-imposed	societal	norms	aimed	at	repressing	attempts	at	uplift.	According	to	statistics	from	the	Tuskegee	Institute,	between	the	time	of	Elijah	Poole’s	birth	and	the	time	he	first	met	Fard	in	Detroit	in	1931,	nearly	two	thousand	African	Americans	nationwide	had	been	victims	of	lynching.10		This	period	of	rampant	racial	terrorism	and	violence	had	profound	impacts	upon	a	young	Poole,	who	had	come	face	to	face	with	the	brutal	realities	of	southern	racism	as	a	child.	When	Elijah	Poole	was	around	10-years-old,	he	witnessed	the	lynching	of	an	18-year-old	African	American	man	in	Cordele,	Georgia.	According	to	biographer	Claude	Andrew	Clegg	III,	this	“traumatic	experience	stayed	with	Elijah	for	the	rest	of	his	life	and	certainly	made	him	more	susceptible	to	black	separatist	doctrines.”11	Furthermore,	the	young	Elijah	was	particularly	disturbed	that	this	murder	had	taken	place	within	a	predominantly	Black	section	of	Cordele.	Citing	Muhammad’s	own	remembrances	of	the	event,	Clegg	claims	that	“Elijah	could	not	understand	how	this	could	have	happened	to	a	young	man	‘in	the	midst	of	his	own	people,’	while	‘all	our	grown	men	right	there	in	the	section’	watched	and	dared	not	intervene.”12	After	witnessing	a	second	lynching	around	1920	when	a	Black	man	had	been	tied	to	a	pickup	truck	and	dragged	through	the	streets	of	Macon,	Poole																																																									10	The	exact	number	of	recorded	lynchings	that	occurred	between	1897-1931,	according	to	the	Tuskegee	Institute,	is	1,928.	“Lynchings:	By	Year	and	Race,”	University	of	Missouri-Kansas	City,	accessed	October	1,	2016,	http://law2.umkc.edu/Faculty/projects/ftrials/shipp/lynchingyear.html/.		 11	Claude	Andrew	Clegg,	An	Original	Man:	The	Life	and	Times	of	Elijah	
Muhammad	(New	York:	St.	Martin’s	Press,	1997),	10.		12	Ibid.	
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eventually	fled	the	South	with	his	family	in	1923,	lamenting	that	he	had	experienced	‘enough	of	the	white	man’s	brutality	in	Georgia	to	last	me	for	26,000	years.’13	Like	many	of	the	thousands	of	Black	Southerners	who	sought	reprieve	in	the	North	during	the	Great	Migrations,	what	Poole	and	his	family	found	upon	their	arrival	in	Detroit	was	merely	another	brand	of	the	oppression	they	had	suffered	through	in	Georgia.	Another	victim	of	such	violence	that	drove	Poole	from	the	South	was	Earl	Little,	whose	murder	in	East	Lansing,	Michigan	in	1931	demonstrated	that	there	was	no	sanctuary	from	racial	terrorism	to	be	found	in	the	North.	Little,	a	preacher	and	avid	follower	of	Marcus	Garvey	and	the	United	Negro	Improvement	Association	(UNIA),	was	no	stranger	to	the	types	of	physical	and	psychological	racial	violence	that	brought	Elijah	Muhammad	north	and	to	the	NOI	in	1931.	After	having	seen	three	of	his	brothers	killed	by	white	men	(one	by	lynching),	Little	risked	the	same	violence	to	promote	Marcus	Garvey’s	platform	of	liberation,	nationalism,	and	racial	pride	for	people	of	African	descent.	For	this	advocacy,	Little	met	the	same	fate	as	his	brothers	in	1931,	which	was	believed	to	have	been	at	the	hands	of	The	Black	Legion,	a	local	white	supremacist	and	terrorist	organization.	Though	he	paid	the	ultimate	price	for	his	militant	advocacy	of	racial	pride	and	independence	in	a	country	that	was	patently	hostile	to	these	notions,	Little	left	an	indelible	legacy	of	protest	and	resistance	for	his	progeny	to	embrace	and	build	upon.	Little’s	son,	Malcolm,	later	said	of	his	late	father’s	racial	advocacy,	“the	image	of	him	that	made	me	proudest	
																																																								13	Ibid,	13.	
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was	his	crusading	and	militant	campaigning	with	the	words	of	Marcus	Garvey,”	a	crusade	that	made	him	a	“tough	man”	in	young	Malcolm’s	mind.14		In	spite	of	the	immense	hardships	and	sufferings	of	millions	of	African	Americans	throughout	the	nation	during	the	nadir	that	Poole	and	Little	lived	through,	this	period	witnessed	a	flowering	of	Black	political	consciousness	and	militancy	that	would	influence	generations	of	race	leaders	to	follow.	In	New	York,	where	the	multifaceted	realities	of	Jim	Crow	society	assumed	the	form	of	urban	racial	ghettoes,	Black	communities	proved	particularly	receptive	to	political	ideologies	that	offered	views	of	alternative	possibilities	to	the	oppressive	conditions	under	which	they	lived.	One	of	the	most	influential	figures	in	promoting	race	consciousness	and	militancy	in	the	early	20th	Century	was	Marcus	Garvey,	a	Jamaican	migrant	who	settled	in	Harlem	in	1916.	In	Harlem,	Garvey	found	a	heterogeneous	Black	community	from	throughout	the	United	States	and	African	diaspora	who	brought	with	them	a	range	of	experiences	with	racial	oppression	and	ideas	for	how	they	could	get	free.15	Settling	within	the	invisible	walls	of	a	racial	ghetto	in	northern	Manhattan,	this	was	the	base	to	which	Garvey’s	Black	nationalist	approach	to	racial	uplift	was	tailored	and	drew	the	most	support	from.		In	1917,	with	the	help	of	Amy	Ashwood	and	Amy	Jacques,	Garvey	formed	the	Universal	Negro	Improvement	Association	(UNIA),	which	“built	its	following	by	regaling	black	working-class	people	with	nationalistic	language,	symbolism,	[and]																																																									14	Alex	Haley	and	Malcolm	X,	The	Autobiography	of	Malcolm	X	as	Told	to	Alex	
Haley	(New	York:	Ballantine	Books,	1992),	6.		 15	Rhonda	Y.	Williams,	Concrete	Demands:	The	Search	for	Black	Power	in	the	
20th	Century	(New	York:	Routledge,	2015),	22.	
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pageantry	of	racial	pride,”	according	to	Rhonda	Y.	Williams.	“When	Garvey	spoke	of	the	greatness	of	the	race,”	biographer	E.	David	Cronon	wrote,	“Negroes	everywhere	could	forget	for	a	moment	the	shame	of	discrimination	and	the	horrors	of	lynching.”16	Garvey’s	emphasis	on	psychological	empowerment	for	Black	people	was	an	imperative	precursor	to	economic	and	political	empowerment.	In	the	context	of	the	violence	of	Jim	Crow	society	and	the	racial	pogroms	that	were	taking	place	throughout	the	nation	in	the	early	20th	Century	(most	notably	in	East	St.	Louis	in	1917),	Garvey’s	preaching	of	racial	consciousness	that	called	Black	communities	to	transformative	action	must	be	understood	as	an	inherently	radical	intervention.		Although	Garvey’s	movement	crumbled	under	the	weight	of	organizational	shortcomings,	contentious	relationships	with	other	Black	liberation	groups,	and	government	repression,	his	meteoric	rise	had	formative	impacts	on	the	political	development	of	generations	of	Black	communities	in	Harlem	and	beyond.	As	Cronon	notes,	Garvey	“achieved	little	in	the	way	of	permanent	improvement	for	his	people,	but	he	did	help	to	point	out	the	fires	that	smolder	in	the	Negro	world.”17	Although	he	was	certainly	not	alone	in	his	efforts	to	fan	these	“smoldering”	flames,	his	rhetoric	and	praxis	of	Black	empowerment	inspired	a	generation	of	leaders	that	emerged	in	his	wake,	including	Audley	Moore	and	Malcolm	X,	and	is	indicative	of	the	relationships	between	political	rhetoric,	empowerment,	and	organizing	in	Harlem.18	
																																																								16	E.	David	Cronon,	Black	Moses:	The	Story	of	Marcus	Garvey	and	the	Universal	
Negro	Improvement	Association	(Madison:	The	University	of	Wisconsin	Press,	1955),	4.		 17	Ibid,	4.		
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Furthermore,	Garvey	and	the	UNIA’s	advocacy	of	“black	political	autonomy	and	building	an	independent	black	community”	foreshadowed	struggles	for	Black	self-determination	in	cities	in	the	1960s,	undergirded	by	the	notion	that	“the	city	is	the	Black	man’s	land,”	as	James	Boggs	put	it	in	1966.19	Although	Garvey’s	influence	waned	in	the	post-war	years,	his	legacy	was	rekindled	in	the	1950s	as	African	nations	fought	for	independence	from	colonial	powers	and	Black	nationalist	ideologies	resurged	in	Harlem	and	the	United	States.	Through	his	conversion	to	the	Nation	of	Islam,	Malcolm	X	seized	the	torch	for	a	new	generation	of	African	Americans	who	were	ready	to	be	“inflamed.”20	Though	Malcolm	had	great	successes	in	establishing	and	organizing	temples	in	Boston	and	Philadelphia	just	months	before	arriving	in	Harlem	in	1954,	the	opportunity	to	lead	the	storefront	Temple	on	the	corner	of	West	116th	Street	and	Lenox	Avenue	in	Central	Harlem	felt	different	to	him.	This	appointment	provided	the	young	minister	with	a	chance	to	return	to	Harlem,	where	he	had	come	of	age	as	a	young	hustler	and	learned	the	social	intricacies	of	the	neighborhood	and	its	peoples.	More	importantly,																																																																																																																																																																						18	For	extended	narratives	and	analyses	of	struggles	for	Black	empowerment,	equality,	and	liberation	in	New	York	City	during	the	Civil	Rights	era,	see	Williams,	
Concrete	Demands;	Peniel	Joseph,	Waiting	‘Til	the	Midnight	Hour:	A	Narrative	History	
of	Black	Power	in	America	(New	York:	Holt	Paperbacks,	2006);	Martha	Biondi,	To	
Stand	And	Fight:	The	Struggle	for	Civil	Rights	in	Postwar	New	York	City	(Cambridge:	Harvard	University	Press,	2003).		 19	Williams,	Concrete	Demands,	20;	James	Boggs,	Racism	and	the	Class	
Struggle:	Further	Pages	from	a	Black	Worker’s	Notebook	(New	York:	Monthly	Review	Press,	1970).			 20	At	a	May	1963	rally	in	Harlem	to	support	“Project	C”	in	Birmingham,	a	“moderate	black	minister”	told	the	crowd	of	2,000	chanting	for	Malcolm	X,	‘I	did	not	come	here	to	inflame	you,’	to	which	a	voice	from	the	crowd	responded,	‘We	want	to	be	inflamed!’	Thomas	Sugrue,	Sweet	Land	of	Liberty	(New	York:	Random	House,	2008),	291.	
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however,	this	specific	appointment	represented	to	Malcolm	a	unique	opportunity	to	grow	the	Nation	of	Islam	and	spread	its	teachings	of	Black	liberation	and	empowerment	in	ways	that	were	not	possible	in	any	other	single	temple.	Temple	No.	7	was	located	in	an	international	city	with	a	Black	population	that	would	grow	from	750,000	to	over	one	million	in	its	five	boroughs	in	the	decade	from	1950-1960.21		Moreover,	the	Temple’s	physical	place	within	the	Black	Mecca	situated	the	NOI	and	Malcolm	within	the	transformative	ideological	spaces	that	Harlem	had	historically	nurtured	and	sustained.	Upon	his	arrival	in	Harlem,	therefore,	Malcolm	was	stepping	into	a	grand	political	arena	that	would	profoundly	influence	his	ideological	and	political	development.		One	of	the	most	well-known	landmarks	in	Harlem’s	political	landscape	that	Malcolm	would	become	intimately	acquainted	with	was	“Speakers’	Corner.”	Just	ten	blocks	northwest	of	Temple	No.	7,	the	corner	of	125th	Street	and	Seventh	Avenue	served	as	an	informal,	open-air	classroom,	theatre,	and	church,	depending	on	the	orator	and	audience.	From	spring	to	fall,	speakers	called	out	to	small,	transient	crowds	from	stepladders	and	makeshift	platforms,	“raining	abuse”	on	Jim	Crow	society,	deconstructing	systemic	racial	oppression,	and	exhorting	potential	converts	to	nationalist	organizations.	The	common	sight	at	Speakers’	Corner,	reporter	Peter	Goldman	wrote,	was	“a	lone	man	on	a	wobbly	pine	platform	or	a	ladder…squalling	at	little	crowds	of	black	people	who	tend	to	get	bored	and	drift	on	unless	you	raise	
																																																								21	Ira	Rosenwaike,	Population	History	of	New	York	City	(Syracuse:	Syracuse	University	Press,	1972),	190.	
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some	hell.”22	Although	Goldman	painted	Speakers’	Corner	as	a	carnivalesque	scene,	these	orators	brought	Black	radical	thought	and	analysis	to	the	street-level	and	played	a	significant	role	in	popularizing	critical	political	consciousness	across	generations.	“Speakers’	Corner	made	it	easy	to	raise	critical	questions,	to	be	concerned	about	what’s	happening	locally	and	internationally,”	Harlem	native	and	author	Toni	Cade	Bambara	later	wrote.	“It	shaped	the	political	perceptions	of	at	least	three	generations.	It	certainly	shaped	mine.”23			Speakers’	Corner,	and	the	expressive	political	culture	that	it	characterized,	was	significant	not	only	for	helping	to	shape	the	racial	consciousness	of	Harlem	residents,	but	also	for	promoting	connections	between	different	generations	of	struggles	for	Black	liberation.	Longtime	residents	of	the	neighborhood	who	had	experienced	different	phases	of	struggles	for	equality	in	the	early	decades	of	the	20th	Century	served	as	bridges	to	connect	pre-	and	post-war	eras	of	organizing	with	the	burgeoning	Civil	Rights	Movement	in	the	mid-	to	late-	1950s.	At	Speakers	Corner,	these	generations	could	not	only	debate,	but	also	meet	and	connect	to	chart	new	directions	in	the	old	struggle	for	liberation.	Through	his	connection	with	a	former	Garveyite,	Lewis	Michaux,	Malcolm	X	gained	entrée	to	Speakers’	Corner	and	was	aided	in	his	rise	in	Harlem’s	competitive	street-speaking	scene.		Michaux,	whose	National	Memorial	bookstore	was	a	landmark	in	Harlem	and	key	site	for	the	dissemination	of	Black	radical	thought,	served	as	a	“gateway”	to																																																									22	Peter	Goldman,	The	Death	and	Life	of	Malcolm	X	(Champaign:	University	of	Illinois	Press,	1979),	53.		 23	Carter	A.	Mathes,"Scratching	the	Threshold:	Textual	Sound	and	Political	Form	in	Toni	Cade	Bambara's	‘The	Salt	Eaters’"	Contemporary	Literature	50,	no.	2	(2009):	363-96.		
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Harlem’s	past,	where	Malcolm	and	other	young	nationalists	expanded	their	knowledge	of	leaders	and	movements	in	the	neighborhood	and	cultivated	new	analyses	in	the	late	1950s.24	According	to	scholar	William	Sales,	though	Malcolm	“received	formal	exposure	to	Black	nationalism”	through	the	teachings	of	Elijah	Muhammad,	it	“was	tempered	and	altered	in	the	political	culture	of	Harlem	with	its	street	corner	debaters,	orators,	and	radical	intellectuals.”25	As	Malcolm	immersed	himself	in	Harlem’s	radical	political	scenes	while	organizing	Temple	Seven,	he	built	upon	his	personal	connections	to	Black	radical	traditions	to	develop	his	reputation	as	an	exceptional	orator,	intellectual,	and	leader.	In	the	following	years,	local,	national,	and	global	events	and	trends	would	coalesce	to	propel	Malcolm	and	his	brand	of	Black	political	empowerment	to	the	forefront	of	struggles	for	Black	liberation	in	the	Black	Mecca	and	beyond.	
The	Brown	Decision	and	the	Fight	for	Educational	Equality	in	Harlem	In	May	1954,	just	weeks	before	Malcolm	had	made	his	return	and	began	his	rise	in	Harlem,	the	Supreme	Court’s	decision	in	Brown	v.	Board	of	Education	altered	the	course	of	struggles	for	Black	liberation	in	the	city,	nation,	and	world.	Influenced	by	the	testimony	of	psychologist	and	Harlem	resident	Dr.	Kenneth	Clark,	Chief	Justice	Earl	Warren	and	the	United	States	Supreme	Court	ruled	that	the	doctrine	of	“separate	but	equal”	that	had	legally	sanctioned	racial	segregation	for	over	50	years	was	“inherently	unequal.”	The	Court’s	ruling	went	beyond	the	initial	intent	of	the	lawsuit	to	ensure	equal	educational	opportunity	for	African	American	children	to																																																									24	Goldman,	The	Death	and	Life	of	Malcolm	X,	53.		 25	William	W.	Sales,	Jr.,	From	Civil	Rights	to	Black	Liberation:	Malcolm	X	and	
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challenge	the	legitimacy	of	the	institution	of	racial	segregation	that	underwrote	the	segregation	of	schools.	For	this	reason,	an	editorial	in	the	New	York	Amsterdam	
News	referred	to	the	Brown	decision	as	a	“second	emancipation	for	the	Negro	in	America.”26	Though	formal	school	segregation	had	been	declared	unconstitutional	in	New	York	State	in	1938,	schools	in	the	city	remained	heavily	racially	segregated	and	unequal	well	through	the	1950s	and	beyond.	Several	factors	contributed	to	this	maintenance	of	school	segregation,	many	of	which	were	the	result	of	public	policies	sponsored	by	city	government.	Certainly,	residential	segregation	was	a	determining	factor	in	educational	segregation	and	was	driven	by	both	“de	facto”	and	“de	jure”	practices	and	policies.	Additionally,	public	policies	determining	the	drawing	of	school	district	lines	and	location	of	new	school	construction	served	to	effectively	maintain	and	enforce	segregated	schools.	Furthermore,	teacher	quality	and	assignment,	student	population	and	overcrowding,	and	the	physical	condition	of	school	buildings	all	impacted	the	quality	of	education	that	Black	students	received	and	were	heavily	influenced	by	public	policy.		Recognizing	governmental	culpability	in	the	quality	of	education	their	children	were	receiving,	Black	parents	and	civil	rights	activists	targeted	school	segregation	and	its	root	causes,	like	residential	segregation,	in	the	1950s.	As	historian	Martha	Biondi	explains,	“civil	rights	leaders	exposed	this	governmental	complicity	in	maintaining	racially	defined	schools,	calling	into	question	the	accuracy	
																																																								26	"The	Second	Emancipation,"	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	May	22,	1954.	
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of	the	phrase	de	facto	to	describe	racial	segregation	in	New	York	City	public	schools.”27	It	was	not	until	the	Brown	case,	however,	that	public	officials	recognized	a	sense	of	urgency	in	entertaining	the	complaints	of	parents	and	civil	rights	leaders	regarding	the	city’s	schools.	Contrary	to	popular	understandings	of	struggles	for	educational	equality,	as	Biondi	notes,	New	York	City	was	one	of	the	first	places	in	which	the	Brown	decision	“sparked	a	push	for	integration.”28	It	was	the	expert	testimony	of	Dr.	Clark	during	the	Supreme	Court	hearings	that	finally	persuaded	city	officials,	including	Mayor	Robert	Wagner,	to	take	interest	in	matters	of	educational	equality,	however	ineffectual	this	interest	would	prove	to	be.		Two	weeks	before	the	Supreme	Court	reached	their	decision	on	May	17,	the	Intergroup	Committee	on	New	York’s	Public	Schools	held	a	conference	titled	“Children	Apart,”	which	called	attention	to	the	adverse	affects	of	educational	segregation	and	inequality	in	the	city.29	Leaders	of	the	group,	which	represented	a	coalition	of	28	community	organizations,	included	influential	figures	including	Drs.	Kenneth	and	Mamie	Clark,	Judge	Hubert	Delany,	and	Ella	Baker,	an	NAACP	leader	and	fierce	advocate	of	grassroots	leadership	who	would	go	on	to	mentor	the	formation	of	the	Student	Nonviolent	Coordinating	Committee	(SNCC)	six	years	later.30	The	momentum	generated	by	the	conference,	which	was	attended	by	over																																																									27	Martha	Biondi,	To	Stand	And	Fight,	241.		 28	Ibid,	246.		 29	C.	G.	Fraser,	"Harlem	Students	Learn	Inferiority,"	New	York	Amsterdam	
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175	parents,	teachers,	and	civic	leaders,	coupled	with	the	Brown	decision,	spurred	the	Board	of	Education	to	heed	Dr.	Clark’s	calls	for	a	study	to	investigate	segregation	in	the	city’s	schools.	Ultimately	however,	like	many	government-sponsored	studies	or	investigations,	the	study	and	city’s	subsequent	formation	of	the	Commission	on	Integration	represented	little	more	than	a	token	concession	to	the	pressure	brought	upon	City	Hall	by	the	Brown	decision	and	Black	community	leaders.31		This	mobilization	did,	however,	provide	a	foundation	for	heightened	community	action	in	Harlem.	According	to	historian	Barbara	Ransby,	the	conference	“primed”	the	activists,	educators,	social	workers,	and	parents	in	attendance	for	action	in	the	wake	of	the	Brown	decision	and	“kicked	off”	several	years	of	protests	for	school	desegregation	and	reform.32	Among	those	who	were	“primed	for	action,”	was	a	group	of	Black	mothers,	including	Mae	Mallory	and	later	known	as	the	“Harlem	Nine,”	who	would	mount	their	attack	on	educational	inequality	and	institutional	racism	in	the	years	to	follow.33	Drawing	upon	the	rhetoric	of	activists	and	organizers	in	the	post-war	era,	these	parents,	teachers,	and	civic	leaders	in	Harlem	drew	explicit	connections																																																																																																																																																																						30	Adina	Back,	“Exposing	the	‘Whole	Segregation	Myth’:	The	Harlem	Nine	and	New	York	City’s	School	Desegregation	Battles,”	in	Freedom	North:	Black	Freedom	
Struggles	Outside	the	South,	1940-1980,	ed.	Jeanne	F.	Theoharis	and	Komozi	Woodard	(New	York:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2003),	69;	Biondi,	To	Stand	And	Fight,	246.			 31	Ibid.		 32	Barbara	Ransby,	“Cops,	Schools,	and	Communism:	Local	Politics	and	Global	Ideologies—New	York	City	in	the	1950s,”	in	Civil	Rights	in	New	York	City:	From	
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between	northern	and	southern	forms	of	racial	oppression	to	locate	their	struggles	for	equal	educational	opportunities	within	a	larger,	national	context	of	oppression	and	liberation	struggles.	Mae	Mallory,	for	instance,	argued	that	educational	inequality	in	the	city	exposed	the	fallacies	of	the	“whole	segregation	myth”	believed	by	white	audiences	that	understood	racial	segregation	to	be	the	exclusive	trademark	of	southern	states.34	By	invoking	southern	racism	within	this	context,	northern	organizers	like	Mallory	effectively	dramatized	the	forms	of	institutional	racism	that	they	faced	to	debunk	popular	myths	that	painted	northern	cities	as	beyond	the	purview	of	Jim	Crow	society.		Surely,	most	Black	residents	of	Harlem	needed	little	convincing	that	they	lived	under	a	northern	style	of	Jim	Crow	society;	the	contradictions	in	rhetoric	of	equality	and	progress	in	the	North	were	stark	to	anyone	who	headed	down	Fifth	Avenue	south	of	110th	Street	and	compared	the	quality	of	education,	housing,	employment,	and	law	enforcement	found	there	to	conditions	in	Harlem.	However,	by	drawing	connections	to	racial	oppression	in	the	South,	northern	organizers	brought	these	contradictions	into	popular	focus	and	caught	the	attention	of	media	outlets	and	public	officials	who	balked	at	comparisons	to	the	Jim	Crow	South.	In	the	post-war	era	and	beyond,	these	comparisons	that	Mallory	and	other	educational	activists	invoked,	were	also	frequently,	and	effectively,	drawn	to	address	the	functions	and	practices	of	the	police	in	Harlem.	
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Struggles	for	Police	Reform	in	the	Jim	Crow	North	As	historians	of	the	struggles	for	civil	rights	in	post-war	New	York	City	have	pointed	out,	northern	organizers	increasingly	came	to	identify	police	brutality	within	a	national	context	of	racial	violence	against	African	American	communities.	Additionally,	as	the	nation	held	up	the	banner	of	“democracy”	in	the	face	of	a	war	against	fascism	in	Europe	and	Japan,	African	Americans	and	their	allies	on	the	home	front	called	out	the	contradictions	evident	in	the	freedoms	they	were	denied.35	In	Harlem,	white	officers	of	the	NYPD	were	often	the	most	visible	representations	of	this	denial	of	freedom,	as	they	were	seen	as	the	enforcement	arm	of	white	supremacy	in	the	face	of	swelling	demands	for	Black	liberation	in	the	post-war	era	and	beyond.		The	underlying	factor	of	this	increased	Black	militancy,	as	Adam	Clayton	Powell,	Jr.	elaborated	upon	in	Marching	Blacks	in	1944,	was	“that	racial	prejudice	had	finally	come	under	the	attack	of	the	new	Negro	and	the	new	white	man.”	In	his	lyrical	style	forged	from	years	at	the	pulpit	of	the	Abyssinian	Baptist	Church,	Powell	referred	to	this	growing	consciousness	and	activism	as	a	“rising	tide”	that	“bigots	in	high	places	tried	to	hold	back.”	While	he	stopped	short	of	calling	the	police	by	name,	Powell	proclaimed	that	“it	is	they	and	men	of	their	kind,	interested	in	preserving	the	status	quo	of	dual	democracy,	who,	in	my	opinion,	stimulated…every	race	riot	in	America	in	1943.”36																																																									35	Biondi,	To	Stand	And	Fight,	72-73.	For	extended	analyses	of	post-war	police	abuses	and	struggles	for	reform	in	New	York	City,	also	see	Marilynn	S.	Johnson,	Street	Justice:	A	History	of	Police	Violence	in	New	York	City	(Boston:	Beacon	Press,	2003).		
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While	Powell’s	analysis	emphasized	the	institutional	nature	of	racist	repression	in	the	city	and	nation,	his	successor	as	Harlem’s	representative	on	the	City	Council,	Benjamin	Davis,	Jr.,	brought	that	analysis	to	a	concrete,	street-level	view	in	his	1947	pamphlet,	Lynching	Northern	Style:	Police	Brutality.	Davis,	a	lawyer	and	Communist	Party	member,	had	been	elected	to	fill	Powell’s	seat	when	the	latter	embarked	upon	his	first	congressional	campaign	in	1943.	As	a	response	to	the	inaction	of	NYPD	commissioner	Arthur	Wallander	in	26	cases	of	alleged	brutality	brought	to	his	attention,	the	pamphlet	decried	this	rampant	police	abuse	and	tactfully	put	forth	an	analysis	that	identified	the	functions	of	lynching	and	police	violence	within	the	context	of	institutional	enforcement	of	white	supremacy.	In	the	wake	of	increased	Black	demands	for	equality	in	the	post-war	era,	the	pamphlet	echoed	the	sentiments	held	by	many	Black	residents	of	Harlem	in	the	post-war	era	and	beyond,	that	police	violence	was	employed	to	“create	the	impression	that	Negroes	are	unworthy	of	the	full	citizenship	which	they	rightfully	demand.”	Put	more	simply,	the	pamphlet	argued	that	the	recent	escalation	of	police	violence	was	designed	to	“keep	the	Negroes	‘in	their	place.”37		Judge	Hubert	Delany,	member	of	the	NAACP	Legal	Defense	Fund	and	of	the	Intergroup	Committee	on	New	York’s	Public	Schools,	was	no	stranger	to	the	realities	of	northern	policing	that	many	residents	of	Harlem	lived	with.	In	1951,	three	years	before	the	Committee’s	“Children	Apart”	conference	and	the	Brown	decision,	white	NYPD	officers	savagely	beat	Delany’s	nephew	outside	of	his	home	on	Bradhurst																																																																																																																																																																						36	Adam	Clayton	Powell,	Jr.,	Marching	Blacks	(New	York:	Dial	Press,	1973),	158-159.		37	Biondi,	To	Stand	And	Fight,	72-73.	
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Avenue	in	Harlem.	William	Delany,	a	29-year-old	Black	man	who	had	been	left	crippled	by	the	polio	virus	as	a	child,	was	beaten	unconscious	and	kicked	in	the	face	after	the	white	officers	ordered	him	off	his	own	front	stoop.38	The	beating	of	William	Delany	came	during	a	five-year	period	from	1947-1952	in	which	46	unarmed	African	Americans	were	killed	by	police	in	the	state	of	New	York,	according	to	investigations	of	the	NAACP.39		In	response	to	the	brutal	beating	of	his	nephew,	Judge	Delany	penned	a	biting	statement	about	police	brutality	that	ran	on	the	front	page	of	the	weekly	Harlem	newspaper	the	Amsterdam	News.40	In	his	response,	Delany	charged	“police	in	Harlem	consider	that	they	have	the	God-given	right	in	a	poor	community…to	keep	the	peace	with	the	nightstick	and	blackjack	whenever	a	Negro	attempts	to	question	their	right	to	restrict	the	individual’s	freedom	of	movement.”	To	further	emphasize	the	weight	and	urgency	of	his	criticism	of	the	heavy-handed	practices	of	police	officers,	Delany	accurately	pointed	out	“such	actions	on	their	part	lead	to	riots.”	Far	from	hyperbole,	Delany’s	analysis	drew	from	a	knowledge	base	that	was	common	sense	to	many	Harlem	residents	who	had	born	witness	to	the	police-incited	rebellions	of	1935	and	1943.		
																																																								38	Ibid,	193;	“Justice	Delany	Raps	Brutality,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	June	2,	1951.		39	Biondi,	To	Stand	And	Fight,	60.		 40	Coincidentally,	the	article	ran	alongside	another	covering	Thurgood	Marshall	and	the	NAACP’s	challenge	to	segregated	schools	in	Clarendon	County,	South	Carolina	in	Briggs	v.	Elliot,	which	became	incorporated	into	the	Brown	case.	“Justice	Delany	Raps	Brutality,”	Amsterdam	News,	June	2,	1951.	
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Ten	years	after	the	1943	rebellion,	and	two	years	after	Delany’s	article,	a	1953	controversy	involving	the	NYPD	and	FBI	finally	gave	way	to	a	modicum	of	police	reform	in	New	York	City.	Following	an	investigation	into	the	brutal	beatings	of	Jacob	Jackson,	a	Black	truck	driver,	and	his	neighbor	Samuel	Crawford	in	Hell’s	Kitchen	in	1952,	word	got	out	of	a	secret	agreement	that	existed	between	the	NYPD	and	FBI	to	block	federal	oversight	of	police	brutality	cases	in	the	city.41	Protests	ensued	and	at	the	behest	of	a	coalition	of	19	community	organizations	known	as	The	Permanent	Coordination	Committee	on	Police	and	Minority	Groups,	which	included	the	NAACP,	ACLU,	National	Urban	League,	and	the	AFL,	the	NYPD	established	the	Civilian	Complaint	Review	Board.42		This	internal	panel,	staffed	by	three	non-uniformed	members	of	the	NYPD	who	served	in	administrative	roles	within	the	Community	Relations	Division	was	little	more	than	window	dressing	for	a	corrupt	and	inherently	oppressive	institution.	The	panel	conducted	no	hearings—its	members	simply	reviewed	reports	from	commanding	officers	and	recommended	actions	to	the	Police	Commissioner	on	the	basis	of	the	reports	they	received.43	Furthermore,	the	Police	Commissioner	was	not	mandated	to	implement	any	recommendations	of	this	advisory	panel.		From	its	inception,	the	internal	nature	of	the	CCRB	drew	the	ire	of	Black	and	Latinx	populations	who	felt	an	internal	review	board	could	not	possibly																																																									41	Johnson,	Street	Justice,	22-25.		42	Johnson,	Street	Justice,	224;	Vincent	J.	Cannato,	The	Ungovernable	City:	John	
Lindsay	and	His	Struggle	to	Save	New	York	(New	York:	Basic	Books,	2001),	156.		 43	James	R.	Hudson,	“Police	Review	Boards	and	Police	Accountability,”	Law	
and	Contemporary	Problems	36,	no.	4	(1971):	523.		
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be	impartial	in	handling	complaints	levied	against	the	NYPD.	According	to	Councilman	Earl	Brown,	the	new	review	board	was	nothing	more	than	“the	same	old	system	with	a	new	coat	of	whitewash.”44	As	tensions	continued	to	rise	with	the	growth	of	the	modern	Civil	Rights	Movement	in	the	mid-1950s	at	local	and	national	levels,	the	internal-review	structure	of	the	CCRB	came	under	increased	fire	from	Black	and	Latinx	populations	who	were	disproportionately	targeted	and	mistreated	by	an	overwhelmingly	white	NYPD.	However,	the	only	modification	of	the	CCRB’s	procedures,	prior	to	its	short-lived	reform	under	Mayor	John	Lindsay	in	1966,	came	in	May	1955	in	response	to	community	demands.	In	essence,	the	only	modifications	to	the	CCRB	made	in	this	concession	were	the	ability	of	complainants	to	file	a	claim	of	misconduct	at	any	precinct	and	the	shift	of	handling	of	complaints	to	the	Deputy	Commissioner	of	Community	Relations.45		It	took	less	than	a	week	for	complaints	to	flow	into	the	new	system,	one	of	the	first	of	which	came	from	nine-year-old	Elbert	Dukes,	a	Harlem	resident	who	filed	the	charges	with	the	assistance	of	the	New	York	Branch	of	the	NAACP.	Dukes,	an	honor	student	at	PS	181,	was	beaten	with	a	pair	of	handcuffs	by	officers	inside	the	28th	Precinct,	where	his	mother	found	him	handcuffed	to	a	steam	pipe	with	blood	on	his	head,	face,	neck,	and	chest.46	While	Dukes’	case	drew	scant	attention																																																									44	Johnson,	Street	Justice,	227.		45	"Police	make	it	Easier	for	Public	to	File	Complaints	of	Brutality,"	New	York	
Times,	May	16,	1955.			 46	"Boy,	9,	Says	Cops	Brutally	Beat	Him,"	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	May	21,	1955.	
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from	media	outlets	and	civil	rights	organizations	in	New	York,	the	death	of	14-year-old	Emmett	Till	in	Money,	Mississippi	just	months	later	sent	shockwaves	through	the	city,	nation,	and	world.		
The	Murder	of	Emmett	Till	and	a	National	Awakening	On	August	20,1955,	Emmett	Till	boarded	a	train	from	Chicago,	Illinois	to	the	Mississippi	Delta	to	visit	his	relatives	in	the	town	of	Money.	Like	many	Black	northerners	whose	families	had	fled	the	south	during	the	Great	Migrations,	Emmett	Till	still	had	relatives	in	the	South	that	he	would	visit	on	occasion.	Over	a	forty	year	span,	this	mass	migration	from	the	South	brought	Chicago’s	Black	population	from	around	forty	thousand	to	half	a	million,	with	75	percent	of	these	migrants	coming	from	the	state	of	Mississippi.	Of	the	myriad	factors	that	drove	Black	communities	north,	one	of	the	most	pressing,	as	Elijah	Muhammad	testified,	was	the	widespread	terrorism	inflicted	by	reactionary	white	supremacist	organizations,	such	as	the	Ku	Klux	Klan	and	the	White	Citizens	Council.	With	an	intention	of	violently	curbing	efforts	at	Black	uplift,	this	reactionary	terrorism	was	particularly	evident	in	the	wake	of	the	Brown	v.	Board	decision,	as	multiple	politically-motivated	racist	murders	took	place	in	the	Delta	in	the	months	and	days	preceding	Till’s	arrival	on	August	21st.	This	string	of	violence	visited	the	14-year-old	one	week	after	his	arrival	when	he	was	kidnapped,	brutally	beaten,	and	shot	for	allegedly	saying	“bye,	baby”	to	a	white	woman	in	a	store	in	Money.	His	body	was	found	three	days	later	in	the	Tallahatchie	River	tied	to	the	heavy	metal	fan	of	a	cotton-gin.47	
																																																								47	Henry	Hampton	and	Steve	Fayer,	eds.,	Voices	of	Freedom	(New	York:	Bantam	Books,	1990),	1-15.	
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Echoing	the	sentiments	of	the	pamphlet	Ben	Davis	published	in	1947	regarding	police	enforcement	of	white	supremacy	in	the	North,	the	two	men	who	had	savagely	murdered	Till	believed	it	their	mission	to	uphold	herrenvolk	society	in	the	South.	According	to	reporter	William	Bradford	Huie,	a	white	journalist	who	had	interviewed	the	acquitted	murderers,	the	two	men	felt	they	“had	to	make	an	example	of	a	young	man	like	Emmett	Till.”	“They	were	told,”	Huie	said	when	asked	about	their	motives,	“that	with	the	beginning	of	the	Supreme	Court	decision,	this	was	a	war.”48	If	it	weren’t	already	clear	to	Black	communities	throughout	the	nation,	the	abdication	of	justice	in	the	face	of	Till’s	gruesome	murder	was	an	unmistakable	indicator	that	each	step	toward	Black	equality	would	be	met	with	potentially	lethal	pushback.	It	was	also	a	call-to-action	for	a	new	generation	of	young	African	Americans	who	were	both	terrified	and	enraged	by	Till’s	death.		Anne	Moody,	who	in	a	few	short	years	would	become	active	in	the	NAACP,	CORE,	and	SNCC,	was	also	14-years-old	in	Mississippi	at	the	time	of	Till’s	death.	In	her	1968	autobiography,	Moody	recollected,	“before	Emmett	Till’s	murder	I	had	known	the	fear	of	hunger,	hell,	and	the	Devil.	But	now	there	was	a	new	fear	known	to	me—the	fear	of	being	killed	because	I	was	black.”	Shortly	thereafter,	however,	this	fear	turned	to	anger.	“I	hated	the	white	men	who	murdered	Emmett	Till	and	I	hated	all	the	other	whites	who	were	responsible	for	the	countless	murders,”	Moody	reflected,	“But	I	also	hated	Negroes.	I	hated	them	for	not	standing	up	and	doing	something	about	the	murders.”49																																																									48	William	Bradford	Huie	interview	with	Blackside,	Inc.,	August	30,	1979,	Henry	Hampton	Collection,	Washington	University	Libraries.		
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The	psychological	impact	of	Till’s	murder	reached	young	African	Americans	far	beyond	the	state	of	Mississippi,	as	well,	and	inspired	many	to	action	when	they	came	of	age.	Frances	Beal,	who	grew	up	in	Binghamton,	New	York,	was	the	same	age	as	Till	and	Moody	in	1954	when	she	heard	of	Till’s	death.	“It	was…some	sort	of	awakening…like,	that	could	happen	to	me,”	Beal	later	reflected.	“It	created	in	you	a	feeling	that	something	needed	to	be	done	about	this.”	Beal	became	active	in	struggles	for	equality	three	years	later	as	a	student	at	the	University	of	Wisconsin-Madison.50	William	Strickland,	a	native	of	Roxbury,	Massachusetts	who	would	later	become	National	Director	of	the	Northern	Student	Movement	(NSM)	in	Harlem,	recalled,	“the	thing	that	I	think	struck	the	consciousness	of	everyone	and	subsequently	was	the	reason,	I	later	discovered,	why	many	people	of	my	generation	joined	SNCC	was	the	murder	of	Emmett	Till,	because	Jet	[magazine]	had	his	pictured	displayed.”51		
Jet’s	coverage	of	Emmett	Till’s	disfigured	corpse	left	indelible	impacts	on	the	consciousness	of	African	Americans	and	people	the	world	over.	Mamie	Till	Bradley	Mobley,	the	mother	of	the	slain	boy,	had	decided	to	have	an	open-casket	funeral	for	her	son	in	Chicago,	stating	that	she	“wanted	the	whole	world	to	see”	what	had	been	done	to	her	son.52	According	to	historian	Jeffery	O.G.	Ogbar,	these	images	“magnified																																																																																																																																																																						49	Anne	Moody,	Coming	Of	Age	In	Mississippi	(New	York:	Bantam	Dell,	1992),	127-147.		 50	Williams,	Concrete	Demands,	64.		51	William	Lamar	Strickland	interview	with	Joseph	Mosnier,	September	23,	2011,	Civil	Rights	History	Project,	National	Museum	of	African	American	History	and	Culture.		
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the	salience	of	racial	oppression	like	no	single	event	in	recent	times	had.”	Indeed,	the	hyper-visibility	of	racial	oppression	and	brutality	in	Till’s	murder,	and	its	tacit	acceptance	by	the	state	of	Mississippi	and	federal	government,	sounded	a	“clarion	call”	to	African	Americans	far	beyond	the	South	and	inspired	a	new	generation	of	activists	and	leaders	that	would	shape	the	Civil	Rights	Movement	in	their	image	in	the	following	years.53	In	New	York,	coverage	of	Till’s	murder	and	trial	was	carried	in	newspapers	for	months,	and	was	a	focal	point	of	sermons,	speeches,	mass	meetings,	and	rallies.	Crediting	northern	struggles	with	“stimulating”	awareness	of	racial	violence	and	mobilizing	protest	on	a	national	level	in	the	post-war	era,	Biondi	argues	that	the	agency	of	Till’s	mother	and	uncle,	and	the	interest	in	Till’s	murder	from	northern	Black	politicians	and	media	outlets,	“built	on…strategies	in	earlier	struggles.”54	While	the	influence	of	strategies	used	in	post-war	struggles	against	racial	violence	in	New	York,	such	as	the	NAACP’s	visible	anti-lynching	campaigns,	can	certainly	be	seen	in	the	ways	that	Till’s	murder	was	publicized	and	mobilized	around.	In	turn,	this	mobilization	energized	and	influenced	new	directions	in	local	and	national	struggles	for	Black	liberation.		In	analyzing	the	impacts	of	Till’s	murder	on	political	mobilization,	Rhonda	Y.	Williams	referred	to	1955	as	a	“year	of	responses.”	This	was	particularly	evident	in	Harlem,	as	individuals	and	organizations	were	spurred	to	action	in	ways	both	old																																																																																																																																																																						52	Hampton	and	Fayer,	Voices	of	Freedom,	5-6.		 53	Jeffrey	O.G	Ogbar,	Black	Power:	Radical	Politics	and	African	American	
Identity	(Baltimore:	The	Johns	Hopkins	University	Press,	2004),	39.		54	Biondi,	To	Stand	And	Fight,	206-207.	
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and	new	that	year.	In	the	days,	weeks,	and	months	following	Till’s	death,	advertisements	filled	newspapers	like	the	Amsterdam	News	promoting	voter	registration	campaigns.	Crowds	thronged	to	mass	meetings	and	rallies	in	Harlem	organized	by	established	organizations	like	the	Brotherhood	of	Sleeping	Car	Porters	and	the	NAACP.	Commenting	on	a	meeting	held	at	Williams	Institutional	(CME)	Church	in	early	October,	African	American	city	councilman	Earl	Brown	wrote	in	an	
Amsterdam	News	column,	“Never	before	in	Harlem’s	history	has	a	crowd	been	so	big	and	shown	so	much	determination	to	do	something	about	the	way	their	people	are	brutalized	in	their	own	country.	They	want	action.”55	At	another	early	October	rally	organized	by	the	New	York	Branch	of	the	NAACP,	3,000	people	packed	the	Lawson	Auditorium	on	125th	Street	while	another	5,000	reportedly	“pushed	against	police	lines”	outside.	Inside	the	auditorium,	New	York	Branch	president	Russell	P.	Crawford	reminded	the	crowd	that	“the	conditions	which	spawned	these	tragic	happenings	are	part	of	our	America’s	dilemma	and	exist	in	some	degree	throughout	the	country.”56	Crawford	went	on	to	reference	racial	discrimination	in	housing,	education,	and	employment	in	the	city	as	evidence	of	the	oppression	that	persisted	in	the	North	as	well.		Although	these	demonstrations	and	campaigns	were	carried	out	with	a	greater	sense	of	urgency	in	the	latter	months	of	1955,	they	represented	relatively	moderate	approaches	to	civil	rights	agitation.	As	Councilman	Brown	noted	in																																																									55	Earl	Brown,	“Aroused	Race,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	October	8,	1955.		56	T.J.	Sellers,	“Wave	of	Terror	Sweeps	Miss.!,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	October	8,	1955.	According	to	Sellers,	Mamie	Till	Bradley	was	scheduled	to	make	an	appearance	at	the	rally,	but	suffered	a	“nervous	collapse”	days	before	and	was	hospitalized.	
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response	to	the	October	meeting	at	Williams	Institutional	(CME)	Church,	“the	Negro	people	are	not	only	ready	to	follow	their	leaders	in	a	battle	for	equality…they	are	often	ahead	of	them.	This	is	the	situation	today.”57	Despite	the	large	turnout,	the	resolutions	passed	at	the	NAACP	rally	at	Lawson	Auditorium	the	same	week	were	indicative	of	the	relatively	conservative	nature	of	the	organization’s	approach	that	would	be	challenged	in	New	York	in	the	following	months.	The	gathering	voted	to:	send	resolutions	to	Mississippi	Governor	Hugh	White	and	President	Eisenhower	protesting	the	handling	of	the	Till	trial	and	the	“atmosphere	of	lawlessness	in	the	state;	appeal	to	New	York	voters	to	prevent	white	supremacists	from	being	elected	to	Congress;	and	call	for	federal	investigations	into	denial	of	voting	rights	in	the	recent	Democratic	Primary	in	Mississippi	and	the	recent	murders	in	the	state.58	Though	these	resolutions	were	noteworthy	for	their	approach	in	seeking	federal	intervention	in	matters	of	civil	rights,	which	would	become	common	practice	throughout	the	burgeoning	Civil	Rights	Movement,	it	was	becoming	clear	that	a	growing	number	of	Black	communities	were	anxious	to	explore	new	routes	toward	liberation.	In	Harlem,	this	was	particularly	evident	in	the	expanding	grassroots	organizing	efforts	of	Ella	Baker,	as	well	as	the	budding	popularity	of	Malcolm	X	and	the	Nation	of	Islam	in	the	late	1950s.	
Ella	Baker,	the	NAACP,	and	the	Struggle	for	Grassroots	Leadership	Though	the	New	York	branch	of	the	NAACP	had	been	active	for	decades	in	struggles	for	equality	in	education,	housing,	and	employment,	by	the	1950s	the																																																									57	Earl	Brown,	“Aroused	Race,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	October	8,	1955.		 58	T.J.	Sellers,	“Wave	of	Terror	Sweeps	Miss.!,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	October	8,	1955.	
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branch’s	influence	at	the	grassroots	had	significantly	waned.	This	trend	was	attributable,	in	part,	to	heightened	government	suppression	of	political	dissidents	in	the	late	1940s	and	early	1950s.	As	the	anti-Communist	repression	of	the	Cold	War-era	expanded	in	the	city	and	nation	under	the	influence	of	Senator	Eugene	McCarthy,	the	NAACP	was	mired	with	internal	turmoil	over	Communist	involvement	in	the	organization.	Many	of	the	organization’s	more	militant	members	and	leaders	were	consequently	ousted	as	Communists	and	those	remaining	tread	a	more	conservative	path	so	as	to	avoid	further	persecution.		This	turmoil	and	government	repression	soured	the	branch	and	organization	for	many	members,	leading	to	a	steep	decline	in	membership	from	1946	to	1952.	Even	before	the	affliction	of	McCarthyism	hit	the	branch,	though,	some	of	its	more	progressive	members	had	become	critical	of	the	branch’s	effectiveness.	Ella	Baker,	for	instance,	had	resigned	as	secretary	of	the	branch	in	1946,	citing	an	air	of	condescension	toward	local	people	and	a	general	antagonism	toward	grassroots	involvement.	59	Though	Baker	would	remain	involved	in	the	branch	for	several	more	years,	the	nature	of	her	disillusionment	was	an	early	indicator	of	a	trending	popular	movement	away	from	established	organizations	and	towards	grassroots	political	involvement	in	Harlem	in	the	mid-	to	late-1950s.	While	the	Branch	took	a	more	activist	and	grassroots	approach	to	civil	rights	agitation	under	Baker’s	leadership	from	1952-1953,	particularly	in	regards	to	demonstrations	for	educational	equality	and	police	reform,	this	heightened	mobilization	was	more	a	reflection	of	Baker’s	direction	than	a	sustained																																																									59	Biondi,	To	Stand	And	Fight,	168-169.	
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organizational	focus	at	that	moment.	That	Ella	Baker	moved	the	branch’s	headquarters	from	their	downtown	location	to	Harlem	is	indicative	of	the	organizational	philosophy	that	she	envisioned	for	the	branch.	Baker	sought	to	center	and	empower	local	people	in	organizational	direction,	decision-making,	and	action.	In	the	struggles	she	led	for	school	desegregation	and	police	reform	during	her	tenure	as	president	and	beyond,	Baker	emphasized	grassroots	participation	and	tactics,	while	also	building	coalitions	of	local	community	organizations.		After	playing	a	central	role	in	organizing	the	“Children	Apart”	conference	and	lobbying	city	officials	with	the	Intergroup	Committee	on	New	York’s	Public	Schools,	Baker	decided	to	change	her	focus	“from	debate	to	direct	action.”60		Certainly,	direct	action	campaigns	were	not	new	phenomena	in	struggles	for	civil	rights	in	New	York	City.	This	paradigm	shift	for	Baker,	however,	was	symptomatic	of	a	growing	trend	in	freedom	struggles	in	the	city	as	local	and	national	events	spurred	local	people	to	demand	and	organize	for	more	immediate	action.	For	Baker,	this	shift	in	focus	necessitated	a	shift	in	organizational	approach	from	established,	mainstream	civil	rights	organizations,	like	the	NAACP,	to	independent,	grassroots	political	organizing	capable	of	mobilizing	broader	populations	for	political	action.		In	response	to	reticence	from	City	Hall	to	address	educational	segregation	and	inequality	on	the	heels	of	the	Brown	decision	and	the	ineffectiveness	of	the	New	York	NAACP	in	demanding	enforcement	of	the	decision,	Baker	helped	to	found	an	organization	called	Parents	in	Action	Against	Educational	Discrimination.	A	grassroots	organization	of	primarily	Black	and	Puerto	Rican	parents,	Parents	in																																																									60	Ransby,	“Cops,	Schools,	and	Communism,”	37.	
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Action	employed	a	variety	of	tactics,	including	direct	action	confrontations,	to	fight	for	integrated	schools	and	greater	parental	involvement	in	educational	policy	making.	As	Ransby	argues,	Baker’s	formation	of	Parents	in	Action	represented	an	effort	to	“circumvent	the	NAACP’s	paralytic	bureaucracy	and	‘go	slow’	politics.”61		As	Ella	Baker	sought	to	connect	people	and	organizations	in	struggle	through	local	coalitions	in	Harlem,	she	also	sought	to	connect	local	and	national	struggles	for	civil	rights	in	ways	that	emphasized	grassroots	political	mobilization.	Just	months	after	the	murder	of	Emmett	Till,	Rosa	Parks	decided	that	she	“was	tired	of	giving	in”	to	white	supremacy	when	a	bus	driver	in	Montgomery	asked	her	to	give	up	her	seat	to	a	white	passenger.62	In	the	days	that	followed,	E.D.	Nixon,	Fred	Gray,	and	Jo	Ann	Robinson	and	the	Women’s	Political	Council	launched	a	boycott	of	the	bus	company	that	would	grow	to	last	381	days	and	signal	the	advent	of	a	sustained	national	Movement	for	Civil	Rights.	To	provide	support	for	the	boycott	from	the	North,	Baker	helped	to	organize	a	coalition	of	political,	labor,	religious,	and	civil	rights	groups	known	as	In	Friendship.	The	coalition	helped	to	organize	fundraising	events	in	New	York	City	in	1956,	including	a	May	rally	at	Madison	Square	Garden,	to	support	the	efforts	of	the	Montgomery	Improvement	Association,	along	with	lesser-known	struggles	for	civil	rights	in	Clarendon	County,	SC	and	Yazoo,	MS.	In	these	efforts,	Baker	was	determined	to	provide	much	needed	material	funds	for	southern	Black	communities,	as	well	as	to	foster	the	development	and	empowerment	of	indigenous																																																									61	Ibid,	38.		 62	Rosa	Parks,	“Tired	of	Giving	In’:	The	Launching	of	the	Montgomery	Bus	Boycott,”	in	Sisters	in	Struggle:	African	American	Women	in	the	Civil	Rights-Black	
Power	Movement,	eds.	Bettye	Collier-Thomas	and	V.P.	Franklin	(New	York:	NYU	Press,	2001),	61.		
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leadership.	This	emphasis	on	indigenous	leadership	was	reflective	of	Baker’s	work	in	New	York	with	the	NAACP,	as	well	as	her	travels	beyond	the	state	as	a	field	secretary,	and	contributed	to	the	flowering	of	grassroots	organizing	that	would	characterize	Black	freedom	struggles	in	the	early	1960s.63		
The	Grassroots	Organizing	and	Leadership	of	Malcolm	X	and	the	NOI	As	Ella	Baker	and	the	New	York	Branch	of	the	NAACP	struggled	to	adapt	to	the	repressive	political	climate	of	the	Cold	War	era	and	move	towards	a	grassroots	approach	to	civil	rights,	Malcolm	X	and	the	Nation	of	Islam	sought	to	mobilize	Black	outrage	in	new	organizational	directions	in	the	late	1950s.	Like	Baker,	who	drew	from	her	post-war	organizing	roots	to	influence	the	grassroots	trajectory	of	Black	freedom	struggles	in	the	mid-1950s,	in	the	wake	of	Emmett	Till’s	murder	the	Nation	of	Islam	found	fertile	ground	for	cultivating	the	Black	Mecca’s	traditions	of	militant	Black	nationalism	to	mobilize	local	people	in	ways	that	would	drastically	impact	the	evolution	of	the	Civil	Rights	Movement.	Influenced	by	the	nationalist	doctrines	of	Garvey,	the	Nation	of	Islam	fervently	critiqued	the	integrationist	approach	to	civil	rights	advocacy	that	undergirded	the	Brown	decision	and	Montgomery	Bus	Boycott.		Elijah	Muhammad,	who	claimed	a	causal	relationship	between	acts	of	lynching	and	increased	NOI	recruitment,	argued	that	the	murder	of	Emmett	Till	was	a	“lesson”	for	those	who	sought	integration	with	an	inhumane	white	society.64	The	NOI’s	critique	of	this	approach	rested	on	a	rejection	of	the	notion	of	integrating	into	a	morally	and	politically	corrupt	society	built	upon	the	subjugation	and	exploitation																																																									63	Ransby,	“Cops,	Schools,	and	Communism,”	50.		64	Ogbar,	Black	Power,	39.	
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of	Black	bodies	and	minds.	This	sentiment	was	later	poignantly	expressed	by	James	Baldwin	in	The	Fire	Next	Time,	as	he	queried	in	a	long-form	essay	on	the	NOI,	“Do	I	really	want	to	be	integrated	into	a	burning	house?”65			Through	another	seminal	question	raised	in	his	best-selling	inquisition	of	American	society,	Baldwin	urged	his	readers	to	consider	the	historical	context	of	the	NOI’s	emergence	as	a	national	force	in	the	late	1950s	and	early	1960s.	“Why,”	Baldwin	asked,	“were	[Harlem	audiences]	hearing	it	now,	since	this	was	not	the	first	time	it	had	been	said?”66	In	other	words,	what	factors	were	responsible	for	the	increasingly	popular	reception	of	the	NOI’s	message	at	the	dawn	of	the	1960s,	considering	that	Elijah	Muhammad	had	been	preaching	the	same	message	for	nearly	thirty	years	by	that	point?	In	a	response	that	foreshadowed	Martin	Luther	King	Jr.’s	later	proclamation	that	“the	arc	of	history	is	long,	but	bends	toward	justice,”	Baldwin	suggested	that	the	NOI’s	growth	in	organizational	size	and	influence	in	shaping	political	discourse	was	the	natural	result	of	a	historical	cycle.	Though	careful	to	not	“minimize	[Muhammad’s]	peculiar	role,”	Baldwin	argued	“in	a	way…it	is	not	he	who	has	done	it	but	time.	Time	catches	up	with	kingdoms	and	crushes	them…time	reveals	the	foundations	on	which	any	kingdom	rests,	and	eats	at	those	foundations.”		Citing	global	examples	of	imperialist	aggression	that	exposed	the	inherent	contradictions	of	Euro-centric	doctrines	of	“civilization,”	“Christianity,”	and	“morality,”	Baldwin	argued	“time	has	passed,	and	in	that	time	the	Christian	world																																																									65	James	Baldwin,	The	Fire	Next	Time	(New	York:	Vintage	Books,	1993),	94.		 66	Ibid,	50.	
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has	revealed	itself	as	morally	bankrupt	and	politically	unstable.”67	Though	Baldwin’s	analysis	explains	rising	opposition	and	resistance	as	a	natural	consequence	of	oppressive	actions,	the	agency	of	individuals	and	communities	in	organizing	and	propelling	this	resistance	must	also	be	given	consideration.	An	analysis	of	the	rise	of	Black	radical	thought	and	organizing,	generally,	and	the	NOI,	specifically,	in	the	late	1950s,	therefore,	also	necessitates	a	street-level	examination	of	how	ideas,	analyses,	and	resources	were	mobilized	to	empower	communities,	challenge	oppressive	institutions,	and	influence	the	direction	of	broader	social	movements.	Certainly,	time	brought	no	shortage	of	revelations	of	a	morally	and	politically	corrupt	American	society	in	the	1950s.	And	as	continuous	acts	of	racial	violence	demonstrated	a	white	backlash	to	major	gains	in	the	struggle	for	Black	equality,	the	Nation’s	critique	of	the	burgeoning	southern	Civil	Rights	Movement	became	increasingly	well-received	in	northern	cities.	Indeed,	a	growing	number	saw	the	NOI	as	a	useful	alternative	to	integrationist	organizing	as	Black	Americans	received	a	clear	message	that	steps	toward	their	advancement	would	be	met	with	violent	retribution	and	that	local	and	federal	governments	were	not	willing	to	intercede	for	their	protection.	Echoing	the	sentiments	of	Anne	Moody	in	response	to	Till’s	murder,	many	critiqued	the	futility	of	any	reliance	upon	local	and	federal	authorities	for	protection,	while	also	challenging	the	lack	of	initiative	within	Black	communities	to	protect	themselves,	and	thus	found	possible	recourse	in	the	theology	and	praxis	of	the	NOI.	
																																																								67	Ibid,	51.	
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As	Ogbar	notes,	however,	“stories	about	lynching	alone	could	not	convince	black	people	that…Islamic	black	nationalism	was	a	viable	alternative	to	Christianity	and	integration.”68	As	Muhammad’s	experiences	with	racial	violence	as	a	child	in	the	South	had	influenced	his	espousal	of	doctrines	of	separatism	and	self-defense,	the	harsh	realities	of	racial	oppression	experienced	in	northern	Black	communities	found	a	voice	in	Elijah	Muhammad	and	his	dynamic	minister,	Malcolm	X.	“One	did	not	need	to	prove	to	a	Harlem	audience	that	all	white	men	were	devils,”	Baldwin	wrote,	“they	were	merely	glad	to	have,	at	last,	divine	corroboration	of	their	experience.”69	Still,	however	compelling	many	found	the	rhetoric	of	the	NOI	to	be,	few	were	lining	up	outside	the	doors	of	Temple	No.	Seven	to	convert	in	the	mid-1950s.	According	to	Goldman,	Malcolm’s	early	years	with	Temple	No.	Seven	were	“a	Sisyphean	labor,”	characterized	by	the	young	minister	“begging	and	badgering”	Harlem	residents	to	“hear	the	word	of	God,”	but	rarely	able	to	assemble	more	than	a	handful	at	a	time	to	listen.70		Though	the	emergence	of	the	national	Civil	Rights	Movement	certainly	attracted	attention	to	the	NOI	and	influenced	its	growth	in	the	late	1950s,	this	growth	must	also	be	attributed	to	the	grassroots	organizing	efforts	of	Malcolm	X	and	his	fellow	ministers.	For	years,	the	Nation’s	primary	recruiting	base	was	the	American	carceral	system,	where	ministers	offered	visions	of	redemption	and	reclamation	to	these	hyper-marginalized	populations	through	racial	pride,																																																									68	Ogbar,	Black	Power,	40.		 69	Baldwin,	The	Fire	Next	Time,	50.		 70	Goldman,	The	Death	and	Life	of	Malcolm	X,	55.	
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knowledge-of-self,	and	a	strict	code	of	personal	conduct.	Beyond	merely	instilling	racial	dignity	and	personal	reform,	however,	ministers	guided	converts	in	developing	analyses	of	institutional	racism	that	made	sense	of	their	incarceration	and	social	marginalization.	Though	aspects	of	their	theology	and	analysis	may	be	considered	fantastic,	the	Nation	astutely	and	attractively	attributed	the	social,	economic,	and	political	marginalization	of	their	recruits	to	the	symptoms	of	systemic	racism	imposed	and	enforced	by	a	morally	deviant	white	society.		Not	only	did	the	Nation	offer	an	explanation	for	the	lived	experiences	of	potential	converts,	they	also	provided	a	tangible	avenue	to	challenge	the	very	systems	that	created	and	maintained	these	oppressive	symptoms.	By	adhering	to	a	strict	code	of	personal	and	moral	conduct	that	rebuked	these	symptoms,	converts	were	effectively	challenging	white	supremacy	in	tangible	ways	through	practicing	a	devout	lifestyle	and	abstaining	from	elements	of	crime,	vice,	and	“immoral”	practices	that	white	society	sought	to	impose	upon	them	and	thereby	maintain	social,	political,	and	economic	power.	Furthermore,	the	“morality”	that	the	Nation	promoted	and	instilled	in	its	converts	and	sympathizers,	though	expressed	in	theological	terms,	was	also	couched	within	a	sense	of	social,	political,	and	economic	responsibility	to	racial	advancement.		Poet	and	activist	Sonia	Sanchez,	a	Harlem	resident	in	the	1940s-50s	who	later	joined	the	NOI	in	the	1970s,	explained	this	aspect	of	Nation	ideology:	Here	was	this…organization	talking	about	resurrecting	and…	reordering	your	life.	And	not	just,	I	don't	mean	moral	in	terms	of	dress;	I	mean	moral	in	terms	of	responsibility	to	your	people.	It	was	that	kind	of	morality	that	they	were	
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talking	about.	‘You	are	responsible	to	your	people.	So,	therefore,	you	must	do	the	following.71		The	Nation	thus	promoted	the	notion	of	the	personal	as	inherently	political,	which	provided	an	accessible	vehicle	for	racial	consciousness	and	empowerment	amongst	populations	that	represented	an	“untapped	reservoir	of	Black	political	power.”72		These	were	the	messages	that	Malcolm	X	carried	to	the	streets,	pool	halls,	nationalist	meetings,	and	Christian	churches	as	he	worked	to	expand	the	Nation’s	recruitment	and	organizing	of	this	“untapped”	power	base	in	Harlem.	In	recognizing	the	competition	that	existed	amongst	nationalist	organizations	for	the	attention	and	loyalties	of	Harlem	residents,	Malcolm	sought	to	distinguish	the	NOI	through	aggressive	recruitment	campaigns,	which	he	described	as	“fishing,”	throughout	the	neighborhood.	By	Malcolm’s	estimation,	there	was	hardly	a	street	that	he	and	a	few	other	ministers	had	missed.	“We	would	step	right	in	front	of	a	walking	black	man	or	woman	so	that	they	had	to	accept	our	leaflet,”	Malcolm	later	told	Alex	Haley.	“And	if	they	hesitated	one	second,	they	had	to	hear	us	saying	some	catch	thing	such	as	‘Hear	how	the	white	man	kidnapped	and	robbed	and	raped	our	black	race.”73	It	was	through	this	blunt	rhetoric,	which	“made	it	plain,”	that	Malcolm	was	able	to	reach	and	engage	broad	audiences	by	breaking	down	complex	analyses	of	systemic	racism	in	“terms	that	people	could	understand,”	while	also	giving	public	voice	to	conversations	that	many	were	already	having	behind	closed	doors.	As	Malcolm	X																																																									71	Sonia	Sanchez	interview	with	Blackside,	Inc.,	March	7,	1989,	Henry	Hampton	Collection,	Washington	University	Libraries.		 72	Joseph,	Waiting	‘Til	the	Midnight	Hour,	13.		73	Alex	Haley	and	Malcolm	X,	The	Autobiography	of	Malcolm	X	as	Told	to	Alex	
Haley	(New	York:	Ballantine	Books,	1992),	218.	
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and	his	other	ministers	took	this	approach	to	the	fringes	of	nationalist	meetings	and	to	the	sidewalks	of	storefront	churches,	they	“began	to	get	visible	results	almost	immediately.”74	Eschewing	notions	of	respectability	politics	that	constrained	participation	in	established	civil	rights	organizations	like	the	NAACP,	as	Ella	Baker	critiqued,	Malcolm	reached	people	where	they	were,	and	captivated	them	with	his	engaging	rhetoric	that	inspired	not	only	a	heightened	critical	political	consciousness,	but	also	a	sense	of	racial	pride	and	empowerment.	According	to	Sanchez,	who	was	initially	skeptical	of	Malcolm’s	rhetoric	and	analysis,	…he	articulated	that	kind	of	oppression	and	what	we	needed	to	do	to	feel	good	about	ourselves	and	to	make	for	some	kind	of	movement…	he	said	it	in	a	voice	like	we	had	never	heard	before…	he	said	it	for	even	the	brothers	on	our	block	who	didn't	go	to	church,	so	couldn't	involve	themselves	in	the	Civil	Rights	Movement…who	were	hanging	out	on	corners.75		In	addition	to	reaching	out	to	the	“brothers”	on	street	corners	or	at	nationalist	meetings	attended	predominantly	by	men,	Malcolm	and	his	ministers	also	made	concerted	efforts	to	recruit	Black	women	to	the	Nation.	Recognizing	that	the	majority	of	the	“storefront	Christians”	they	“fished”	were	women,	Malcolm	tailored	his	after-church	messages	along	gender	lines.	Proclaiming	the	beauty	of	Black	women	in	the	face	of	an	oppressive	white	society	where	ads	for	skin-lightening	creams	and	hair-straightening	products	proliferated	in	Black	media	outlets,	Malcolm	promoted	a	gendered	sense	of	racial	pride	in	his	speeches	to	these	audiences.	In	these	same	speeches,	he	also	invoked	gendered	notions	of	“respect”																																																									74	Ibid,	221.		75	Sonia	Sanchez	interview	with	Blackside,	Inc.,	March	7,	1989,	Henry	Hampton	Collection,	Washington	University	Libraries.	
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and	“protection”	to	appeal	to	his	audience	when	he	preached,	“The	black	man	needs	to	start	today	to	shelter	and	protect	and	respect	his	black	women!”76	Indeed,	Malcolm’s	appeals	to	a	popular	desire	for	safety	and	protection	from	hostile	and	violent	oppression	in	Harlem	at	the	hands	of	the	police,	and	at	the	hands	of	lynch	mobs	in	the	South,	found	receptive	audiences	in	Harlem	in	the	late	1950s,	even	if	many	were	still	hesitant	to	formally	join	the	NOI.	
“No	one	man	should	have	that	much	power”	Malcolm’s	active	presence	on	the	streets	of	Harlem	finally	paid	off	in	1957,	as	an	incident	of	police	brutality	provided	the	necessary	platform	to	propel	he	and	the	Nation	into	the	public	eye	in	New	York	City.	On	a	late	April	night,	Johnson	X,	a	member	of	Temple	No.	7,	and	two	other	men	intervened	as	NYPD	officers	were	“working	over”	a	Black	suspect	with	their	nightsticks	at	the	corner	of	125th	Street	and	Lenox	Avenue.	Johnson	approached	the	officers	and	asked	them,	“Why	don’t	you	carry	the	man	on	to	jail?”	before	walking	back	into	the	small	crowd	that	was	beginning	to	grow	as	more	police	cars	arrived	at	the	scene.	Not	satisfied	with	the	rate	at	which	the	dense	crowd	was	receding,	the	responding	officers	began	swinging	their	nightsticks	to	speed	up	the	process,	cracking	Johnson	in	the	head	in	the	process.	As	Johnson	yelled	a	prayer	in	agony,	more	officers	rushed	at	him,	knocking	him	down	as	“blood	gushed”	from	his	head,	and	continued	to	attack	him	as	he	lay	
																																																								76	This	quote	comes	from	an	example	that	Malcolm	gave	to	Alex	Haley	of	the	types	of	statements	that	he	would	make	in	trying	to	appeal	to	audiences	of	women	outside	of	storefront	churches.	Alex	Haley	and	Malcolm	X,	The	Autobiography	of	
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bleeding	on	the	ground.	Johnson	was	then	taken	to	the	28th	Precinct	on	123rd	Street,	where	the	relentless	beating	continued	while	he	was	handcuffed	to	a	chair.77			 As	word	got	around	of	the	beating,	a	crowd	of	500,	including	members	of	the	Nation	of	Islam	led	by	Malcolm	X,	gathered	outside	the	precinct,	demanding	that	the	injured	Johnson	be	provided	medical	attention.	After	initially	being	told	that	there	was	no	such	man	in	the	precinct,	police	eventually	permitted	Malcolm	inside	to	examine	Johnson,	as	the	crowd	continued	to	swell	outside.	Upon	seeing	Johnson’s	condition,	Malcolm	demanded	that	the	man	be	taken	to	the	hospital	to	treat	his	head	injuries.	While	Malcolm	met	with	police	officials,	members	of	the	Fruit	of	Islam,	the	NOI’s	regimented	unarmed	security	detail,	formed	perimeters	outside	the	precinct	“arms	folded,	like	a	battalion	awaiting	orders,”	as	an	increasingly	volatile	crowd	continued	to	grow	behind	them.	Upon	hearing	of	Johnson’s	transfer	to	Harlem	Hospital,	the	crowd	marched	up	to	135th	Street,	where	2,000	assembled,	eager	to	catch	wind	of	the	man’s	fate.	After	being	treated,	Johnson	was	quickly	released	back	to	police	custody	and	returned	to	the	28th	Precinct,	where	the	crowd	continued	to	swell	to	an	estimated	4,000.	While	Johnson	remained	in	a	cell,	Malcolm	X	once	again	negotiated	with	“nervous”	police	officials	who	feared	that	situation	outside	the	precinct	was	teetering	on	the	edge	of	a	“riot.”78	Malcolm	was	assured	that	Johnson	would	continue	to	receive	medical	treatment,	and	in	return	agreed	to	calm	the																																																									77	Joseph,	Waiting	‘Til	The	Midnight	Hour,	9-11;	Williams,	Concrete	Demands,	68-69;	“Moslem	Victim’s	Own	Story	of	Cops’	Brutality,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	May	18,	1957;	James	L.	Hicks,	“Riot	Threat	As	Cops	Beat	Moslem,”	New	York	
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crowds	outside.	Upon	exiting	the	precinct,	according	to	Amsterdam	News	managing	editor	James	Hicks,	Malcolm	“gave	one	brief	command	to	his	followers	and	they	disappeared	as	if	in	thin	air.”79	Astounded	by	the	swift,	disciplined	dispersal	of	the	NOI	and	massive	crowd,	a	policeman	on	the	scene	infamously	commented,	‘no	one	man	should	have	that	much	power!”80		 The	“power”	that	Malcolm	demonstrated	outside	of	the	28th	Precinct	garnered	front-page	attention	in	the	Amsterdam	News,	under	the	sub-heading	of	“God’s	Angry	Men’	Tangle	With	Police.”	After	the	story	ran,	“for	the	first	time,”	Malcolm	later	recalled,	“the	black	man,	woman,	and	child	in	the	streets	was	discussing	‘those	Muslims.”81	The	standoff	on	123rd	Street	was	a	major	victory	for	the	NOI	and	Malcolm	in	Harlem.	Not	only	did	Johnson	X	receive	the	highest	police	brutality	settlement	in	city	history	at	the	time,	the	Nation	also	demonstrated	to	audiences	in	Harlem	and	beyond	that	they	wielded	the	power	to	confront	racist	forces	in	the	city—and	win.82	“What	Harlem	wanted	from	Malcolm	and	the	Muslims,”	Goldman	wrote,	“was	proof	that	they	were	as	big	and	bad	as	they	claimed	to	be.”83		At	a	moment	when	justice	for	victims	of	racial	violence	was	in	short	supply	locally	and	nationally,	the	Nation’s	offer	of	protection	against	a	police	department																																																									79	James	L.	Hicks,	“Riot	Threat	As	Cops	Beat	Moslem,”	New	York	Amsterdam	
News,	May	4,	1957.		 80	Ibid.		81	Haley	and	Malcolm	X,	The	Autobiography	of	Malcolm	X,	236.		82	Joseph,	Waiting	‘Til	The	Midnight	Hour,	11.		83	Goldman,	The	Death	and	Life	of	Malcolm	X,	55.	
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that	functioned,	as	many	believed,	to	“keep	the	Negroes	‘in	their	place,”	drew	many	new	converts	into	their	ranks.	One	such	convert	was	Benjamin	Goodman,	an	Air	Force	veteran	who	was	struck	by	…how	this	man	Malcolm	X	was	out	front	protesting	against	that	act	and	how	the	Muslim	brothers	and	sisters	reacted.	The	brotherhood	is	what	attracted	me.	The	unity.	How	a	Muslim	goes	to	the	aid	of	a	brother	when	he	is	mistreated.	It	seemed	like	unity	and	brotherhood	and—love.	So	I	went	there	to	seek	out	the	Muslims.84		Goodman,	an	underemployed	Black	man	self-described	as	having	been	“born	dissatisfied”	with	racism	in	America,	was	one	of	many	in	Harlem	who	found	in	Malcolm,	and	the	Nation,	a	sense	of	empowerment	and	a	way	of	confronting	the	oppressive	white	institutions	that	colored	their	lives.	In	the	wake	of	Johnson’s	beating,	the	Nation	grew	from	“a	few	hundred,”	to	an	estimated	two	thousand,	“with	a	presence	and	impact	far	larger	than	the	actual	number,”	as	Goldman	notes.85	Malcolm	had	effectively	proven	to	the	grassroots	bases	he	sought	to	reach	that	he	could	back	up	his	powerful	rhetoric	with	concrete	action,	and	from	these	populations	at	the	margins	of	urban	society	built	“an	army	of	people	nobody	wanted.”86	
Jesse	Gray	and	the	Radical	Roots	of	Tenant	Organizing	While	Malcolm	X	built	the	NOI	into	the	“fastest	growing	membership	organization	in	urban	areas”	in	the	late	1950s	after	his	showdown	with	the	NYPD,																																																									84	Ibid,	60.		85	Ibid.		86	According	to	Goldman,	a	“black	writer”	had	used	this	phrase	to	describe	the	underclasses	that	Malcolm	X	had	effectively	recruited	and	mobilized	following	Johnson’s	beating.	Goldman,	The	Death	and	Life	of	Malcolm	X,	59.	
		53	
the	grassroots	organizing	that	he	championed	was	bolstered	by	the	return	of	another	charismatic	leader	to	Harlem.	After	spending	two	years	in	the	South,	Jesse	Gray	returned	to	Harlem	in	1957	to	form	the	Lower	Harlem	Tenants	Council,	a	tenants’	rights	organization	that	advocated	for	poor	and	working-class	renters.87		In	many	ways,	Gray’s	history	as	an	organizer	was	reflective	of	major	trends	in	Black	liberation	struggles	in	the	post-war	period	through	the	Civil	Rights	Era.	Born	in	Baton	Rouge,	Louisiana	in	1923,	Gray	attended	the	historically	Black	Xavier	University	in	New	Orleans	before	joining	the	Merchant	Marine	during	World	War	II.88	Through	the	Merchant	Marine,	the	nation’s	only	nonsegregated	branch	at	the	time,	Gray	was	introduced	to	the	National	Maritime	Union	(NMU),	an	80,000-member	left-led	affiliate	of	the	Congress	of	Industrial	Organizations	(CIO).89	According	to	NMU	official	Josh	Lawrence,	who	would	later	join	Gray	in	the	Community	Council	on	Housing,	“in	the	thirties	and	even	the	early	forties	there	were	only	two	places	in	the	South	where	black	and	white	could	meet	together—in	the	black	churches	and	the	halls	of	the	NMU.”90		Indeed,	the	NMU	was	founded	upon	the	premise	that	racial	equality	was	an	essential	prerequisite	for	achieving	national	class	solidarity	and	empowerment.	During	the	war,	Ferdinand	Smith,	the	Black	vice	president	of	the	NMU,	had	worked																																																									87	Roberta	Gold,	When	Tenants	Claimed	the	City:	The	Struggle	for	Citizenship	
in	New	York	City	Housing	(Urbana:	University	of	Illinois	Press,	2014),	117.		 88	Ibid,	116-117.		89	Jack	O’Dell	and	Nikhil	Pal	Singh,	Climbin’	Jacob’s	Ladder:	The	Black	Freedom	
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alongside	Eleanor	Roosevelt	and	Paul	Robeson	to	successfully	advocate	for	Hugh	Mulzac,	a	former	Garveyite,	to	be	appointed	as	the	first	Black	captain	of	the	Merchant	Marine.91	Through	his	affiliation	with	the	NMU,	Jesse	Gray	“came	under	the	tutelage”	of	Communist	Party	leader	Harry	Haywood,	and	established	himself	as	part	of	a	cohort	of	Black	radicals,	such	as	Smith,	Lawrence,	Ewart	Guinier,	and	his	college	friend	Jack	O’Dell,	whose	experiences	at	sea	fostered	a	radical	political	consciousness	and	informed	their	struggles	for	rights	and	power	on	land.92	“Those	were	my	greatest	years,”	Gray	later	recalled.	Through	his	experience	in	the	Left-led	NMU,	Gray	“was	able	to	acquire	tremendous	experience;	organizationally,	politically,	and	everything	else…the	whole	Left	influence	on	trade	unions	was	a	tremendous	education.”93	Primed	for	off-ship	organizing	and	“intent	on	overthrowing”	Jim	Crow	society	after	the	war,	Gray	and	O’Dell	set	up	shop	at	NMU	headquarters	in	New	York	City.	While	O’Dell	attended	the	NMU	Labor	School,	Gray	continued	to	periodically	ship	out	of	port	until	the	anti-Communist	purges	of	the	Cold	War	era	struck	the	NMU	in	the	late	1940s,	effectively	purging	Gray	from	its	ranks	in	1952.94	Like	Ella	Baker,	who	took	charge	of	the	New	York	Branch	of	the	NAACP	that	year	on	the	heels	of																																																									91	Biondi,	To	Stand	And	Fight,	8.		 92	Gold,	When	Tenants	Claimed	The	City,	117;	O’Dell	and	Singh,	Climbin’	
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their	own	Communist	purge,	Gray	built	upon	his	political	education	and	organizing	experience	in	the	NMU,	as	well	as	traditions	of	organizing	in	Harlem,	to	chart	a	new	course	for	grassroots	organizing	in	the	neighborhood	and	beyond.		The	initial	vehicle	for	Gray’s	organizing	was	the	Harlem	Tenants	Council	(HTC),	a	tenants’	rights	initiative	of	the	American	Labor	Party	(ALP),	a	left-wing	subsidiary	of	the	Communist	Party.95	In	1952,	Gray	joined	the	Council	at	28-years-old,	and	by	the	following	year,	was	organizing	tenants	and	leading	demonstrations	against	slumlords,	deteriorating	housing	conditions,	and	city	housing	agencies	as	Director	of	the	organization.	Gray’s	early	demonstrations	with	the	HTC	from	1953-1954	focused	on	advocating	for	tenants	who	had	been	unjustly	evicted	from	their	apartments,	demanding	repairs	and	violations	be	addressed	in	housing	units,	petitioning	the	city’s	Housing	and	Rent	Commissions	on	behalf	of	tenants,	and	demanding	Black	representation	in	leadership	positions	in	housing	policy-making	bodies.96	Despite	these	early	efforts,	Gray	and	the	HTC	remained	relatively	weak,	and	by	the	end	of	the	decade,	only	51%	of	Harlem’s	housing	stock	would	be	classified	as	“sound,”	compared	to	85%	citywide.97	Additionally,	only	17%	of	nonwhite																																																									95	Navasky,	The	O’Dell	File,	Loc	458;	Gold,	When	Tenants	Claimed	The	City	117;	Sugrue,	Sweet	Land	of	Liberty,	403;	Biondi,	To	Stand	And	Fight,	209.		96	“Rent	Office	to	Help	Two	Evicted	Families,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	December	19,	1953;	Jesse	Gray,	“Defends	Work	of	the	Tenants	Council,”	New	York	
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households	in	the	city	and	suburbs	would	be	owner-occupied,	compared	to	40%	of	white	households.98	Furthermore,	the	agencies	charged	with	addressing	housing	conditions	in	the	city,	including	the	Housing	and	Rent	Commission	and	Robert	Moses’	Committee	on	Slum	Clearance,	had	no	Black	or	Puerto	Rican	representation.	To	many	of	Harlem’s	residents,	these	factors	of	racial	inequality	in	housing	and	representation	were	symptomatic	of	larger	systems	of	racial	oppression	in	Harlem	that	created	unequal	conditions	and	provided	little	recourse	for	redress.		By	the	end	of	the	1950s,	tenant	organizing	in	Harlem	would	become	emboldened	by	the	upsurge	of	the	Civil	Rights	Movement	nationally	and	locally,	and	apartment	buildings	would	become	a	hub	for	organizing	poor	and	working-class	Black	and	Puerto	Ricans	for	not	just	quality	housing,	but	also	for	political	empowerment.	Like	Malcolm,	Gray	saw	these	poor	and	working-class	residents	as	an	untapped	well	of	political	power	and	hoped	to	inspire	sustained	political	action	through	first	empowering	these	tenants	to	change	their	most	pressing	problems.	As	Jesse	Gray	later	said,	“People	ask	me	why	I	spend	all	my	time	on	heat	and	hot	water	and	I	say	heat	and	hot	water	is	the	biggest	organizing	tool	we	have;	it	may	even	kick	off	the	revolution	in	the	ghetto.”99	
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In	the	waning	days	of	the	year,	Amsterdam	News	editor	James	Hicks	declared	1957	to	be	the	“year	Negroes	fought	back.”100	In	the	South,	nine	Black	students	in	Little	Rock,	Arkansas	braved	crowds	of	intransigent	segregationists	supported	by	police	and	the	governor,	to	compel	federal	enforcement	of	the	Brown	decision	and	successfully	desegregate	Little	Rock	Central	High	School.	In	New	York,	Malcolm	X	and	the	Nation	of	Islam	faced	down	the	New	York	Police	Department	in	a	startling	display	of	power	to	signal	a	new	challenge	to	age-old	practices	of	racist	policing	in	Harlem.	Across	the	Atlantic,	Ghanaians	celebrated	their	independence	from	Britain,	elevating	Kwame	Nkrumah	to	international	acclaim	and	heralding	an	era	of	global	Black	empowerment.		Local,	national,	and	global	developments	in	the	three	years	following	the	
Brown	v.	Board	of	Education	decision	marked	a	new	chapter	in	the	long	struggle	for	Black	equality	in	Harlem,	during	which	communities	built	upon	traditions	of	radical	political	consciousness	and	action	in	the	neighborhood	to	engage	in	new	struggles	for	equality,	liberation,	and	empowerment.	Drawing	from	post-war	struggles	for	civil	rights,	along	with	nationalist	and	labor	movements	in	the	city,	the	surging	grassroots	organizing	efforts	of	Ella	Baker,	Malcolm	X,	Mae	Mallory,	and	Jesse	Gray	came	to	shape	the	Black	Freedom	Struggle	in	New	York	City	and	beyond	in	the	next	decade.	Largely	eschewing	the	middle-class	respectability	politics	of	older	civil	rights	organizations,	these	organizers	sought	to	build	their	bases	amongst	those	at	the	margins	of	political	society	as	a	way	of	mobilizing	an	untapped	well	of	potential	political	power.																																																									100	James	L.	Hicks,	“1957:	Year	Negroes	Fought	Back,”	New	York	Amsterdam	
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It	was	also	during	this	period	that	a	new	generation	of	future	activists	and	organizers	began	to	come	of	age	in	their	racial	and	political	consciousness.	With	the	murder	of	Emmett	Till	in	1955	broadcast	nationwide,	the	wonton	brutality	of	white	supremacy	in	the	face	of	Black	uplift	sounded	a	call-to-action	for	young	people	across	the	nation	who	saw	their	reflection	in	the	face	of	the	14-year-old.	With	the	guidance	of	veteran	organizers	like	Baker,	it	was	this	generation	of	Till’s	peers	who	would	take	to	the	streets	in	the	early	1960s	to	alter	the	trajectory	of	the	burgeoning	Civil	Rights	Movement	in	the	South,	as	well	as	the	North.		In	Harlem,	this	brief	yet	momentous	period	laid	the	groundwork	for	protracted	struggles	for	rights	and	power	in	New	York	City	that	would	have	profound	impacts	upon	the	nature	of	these	struggles	nationwide	in	the	following	years.	Though	Malcolm	X	would	rise	to	international	acclaim	in	the	1960s	for	his	piercing	rhetoric	that	awakened	and	empowered	people	of	African	descent	while	stripping	white	supremacy	to	its	core,	his	rise	in	Harlem	in	the	mid-1950s	was	characterized	by	his	dogged	organizing	efforts	at	the	grassroots	and	aided	by	local,	national,	and	global	political	climates.	Like	Malcolm,	the	successes	of	Gray,	Baker,	Mallory,	and	many	other	organizers	in	Harlem	were	grounded	in	their	mobilization	of	resources	that	were	“not	only	material	but	intellectual	and	emotional.”101	The	grassroots	organizing	of	these	leaders	during	an	era	that	represented	real	possibilities	for	fundamental	societal	change	empowered	local	people	in	Harlem	to	become	active	in	their	communities	and	build	movements	that	would	have	far-
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reaching	impacts	on	the	national	Civil	Rights	Movement	and	city,	state,	and	federal	politics	in	the	coming	years.			
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CHAPTER	3		
“IN	HARLEM	WITH	A	REVOLUTIONARY	DREAM”:	JESSE	GRAY,	MAE	MALLORY,	
MALCOLM	X,	AND	THE	FLOWERING	OF	RADICAL	GRASSROOTS	ORGANIZING	IN	
HARLEM,	1958-1959	
You	see,	Sir,	I	am	also	a	maladjusted	Negro	and	I	wonder	why	the	thousands	of	
other	maladjusted	Negroes	can’t	get	all	other	Negroes	to	become	maladjusted	
too.	All	the	progress	to	be	made	will	be	made	by	maladjusted	Negroes.	
-Mae	Mallory	(1956)1	
	
A	rebellion	is	not	a	revolutionary	movement	unless	it	changes	the	structural	
arrangements	of	the	society	or	else	is	able	to	project	programmatic	ideas	
toward	that	end.	The	Negro	movement	does	not	have	the	latter,	and	in	America	
neither	arms	nor	demonstrations	nor	protest	marches	mean	very	much	without	
such	ideas.	 	
-Harold	Cruse	(1964)2			 In	June	of	1960,	editor	James	Hicks	used	his	column	in	the	New	York	
Amsterdam	News	as	he	had	in	the	waning	days	of	1957—to	serve	notice	to	“white	people	downtown”	and	“misinformed	Negroes”	that	there	was	a	“New	Negro	in	Harlem.”	That	summer,	Adam	Clayton	Powell,	Jr.	geared	up	his	campaigning	machine	as	the	downtown	Tammany	Hall	Democratic	machine	mounted	a	challenge	to	Harlem	democrats	in	the	party	primary	elections	for	the	second	time	in	two	years.	Joined	by	Tammany-defectors	J.	Raymond	Jones,	a	political	veteran	in	Harlem	and	Powell’s	1958	campaign	manager,	and	Manhattan	borough	president	Hulan	Jack,	Powell’s	United	Democratic	Leadership	Team	swept	the	six	primary	contests,																																																									1	Mae	Mallory,	“Maladjusted	Follower,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	November	24,	1956.		 2		Harold	Cruse,	Rebellion	or	Revolution	(New	York:	William	Morrow	&	Company,	Inc.,	1968).	
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while	berating	their	Tammany-backed	opponents	as	“Uncle	Toms.”	This	decisive	victory	signaled	the	possibility	of	a	long-awaited	paradigm	shift	in	Black	participation	in	electoral	politics	in	Harlem	toward	an	open	rebuke	of	white	sponsorship	and	party	allegiance,	and	looked	toward	mobilizing	independent	political	power	more	broadly	in	future	elections.	To	Hicks,	the	results	of	the	primary	elections	were	indicative	of	one	of	the	most	telling	characteristics	of	this	“New	Negro”	in	Harlem—“he	does	not	want	any	white	person	downtown	telling	him	how	to	handle	his	affairs	uptown.”3		The	political	climate	in	1960	that	welcomed	the	emergence	of	this	“New	Negro	in	Harlem,”	as	James	Hicks	declared,	can	be	attributed	in	large	part	to	the	organizing	efforts	of	grassroots	leaders	Jesse	Gray,	Malcolm	X,	and	Mae	Mallory	and	their	organizational	networks	in	the	waning	years	of	the	1950s.	The	work	of	these	three	leaders	from	1958-1960	intersected	with	a	wide	array	of	influential	local,	national,	and	international	figures	and	demonstrated	the	ways	in	which	local	people	in	Harlem	were	mobilized	in	consciousness	and	empowered	through	action	to	engage	in	sustained	struggles	for	rights	and	power	in	Harlem	and	beyond	in	the	1960s.	The	demands	raised	by	these	leaders	for	Black	self-determination	at	the	grassroots	during	these	years	represented	a	radical	challenge	to	New	York’s	entrenched	white	power	structures	and	more	moderate	civil	rights	organizations,	
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and	shaped	the	course	of	looming	battles	over	rights	to	citizenship,	human	rights,	and	political	power	in	the	city.		As	the	national	Civil	Rights	Movement	continued	throughout	southern	states	in	the	late	1950s,	most	notably	in	Little	Rock,	Arkansas	in	1957,	African	American	communities	in	New	York	City	waged	struggles	of	their	own	for	desegregation,	equal	economic	and	educational	opportunities,	human	rights,	and	self-determination.	Building	upon	national	and	local	radical	organizing	efforts	during	the	post-World	War	II	era,	Jesse	Gray,	Mae	Mallory,	and	Malcolm	X	helped	to	shape	a	popular	organizational	shift	away	from	middle-class,	moderate	approaches	to	civil	rights	and	integration,	and	toward	grassroots	organizing	and	empowerment	for	human	rights	and	self-determination	in	ways	that	would	have	formative	impacts	upon	the	evolution	of	the	Black	Freedom	Struggle	both	locally	and	nationally.	By	1959,	the	growing	power	and	influence	of	this	swelling	grassroots	militancy	would	become	abundantly	clear	in	New	York	City	as	a	series	of	local	and	national	events	coalesced	in	Harlem	to	issue	a	challenge—and	a	warning—to	the	white	power	structures	of	the	nation’s	largest	city.	
v 	
“Black	workers	in	the	back	street”:	The	Post-War	Roots	of	Radical	Tenant	
Organizing	In	1958,	Jack	O’Dell	left	the	U.S.	Communist	Party	(CPUSA)	and	found	himself	back	in	New	York	City.	In	the	years	since	returning	from	his	service	in	World	War	II,	the	35-year-old	Detroit	native	had	cut	his	teeth	as	a	progressive	union	organizer	and	as	an	active	participant	in	burgeoning	struggles	for	civil	rights	in	the	South.	The	
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great-grandson	of	a	self-emancipated	slave	who	had	escaped	bondage	to	join	the	Union	Army,	O’Dell’s	racial	and	political	consciousness	was	shaped	at	an	early	age	through	his	family	legacy,	as	well	as	through	the	political	and	symbolic	presence	of	race	women	and	men	like	Paul	Robeson,	Marian	Anderson,	and	Joe	Louis	in	popular	culture.	Closer	to	home,	O’Dell	was	also	inspired	by	his	grandmother’s	resistance	to	northern	Jim	Crow	in	Detroit,	later	recalling	the	influence	that	her	boycott	of	a	downtown	soda	fountain	that	discriminated	against	Black	patrons	had	on	his	political	consciousness.4	To	O’Dell,	the	actions	of	these	familial	and	iconic	figures	“gave	one	optimism	despite	the	cold-bloodedness	of	the	insult	of	segregation”	and	inspired	him	to	follow	in	their	steps.5		O’Dell’s	entrée	to	the	Communist	Party	came	in	1950	when	he	joined	Jesse	Gray,	his	longtime	friend	and	fellow	seaman,	and	Ferdinand	Smith	and	Paul	Robeson,	two	of	his	personal	“heroes,”	as	a	member	of	the	CPUSA.6	Joining	the	Party	was	a	logical	outcome	of	O’Dell’s	experiences	during	World	War	II	and	in	the	years	following.	Like	Gray,	O’Dell	had	attended	the	historically	Black	Xavier	University	in	New	Orleans	and	joined	the	Merchant	Marine	during	World	War	II.	The	only	non-																																																								4	Jack	O’Dell	interview	with	James	Early,	May	13,	1997,	Box	2,	Folders	1-2,	Jack	O’Dell	Papers,	Schomburg	Center	for	Research	in	Black	Culture;	Jack	O’Dell	and	Nikhil	Pal	Singh,	Climbin’	Jacob’s	Ladder:	The	Black	Freedom	Movement	Writings	of	
Jack	O’Dell	(Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	2010),	14.		 5	Ibid.		 6	Though	there	has	been	scholarly	debate	surrounding	Jesse	Gray’s	affiliation	with	the	Communist	Party,	an	interview	between	him	and	Harry	Haywood	makes	Gray’s	affiliation	with	the	Party	a	matter	of	historical	fact.	See	Jesse	Gray	interview	with	Harry	Haywood,	April	6,	1975,	Box	6,	Folder	3,	Harry	Haywood	Papers,	Schomburg	Center	for	Research	in	Black	Culture	(henceforth	referred	to	as	Haywood	Papers).	
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segregated	branch	of	the	armed	services,	the	Merchant	Marine	provided	both	O’Dell	and	Gray	with	a	means	of	fighting	the	war	against	fascism	without	acceding	to	the	demeaning	treatment	Black	servicemen	were	subjected	to	in	the	other	branches.	Through	the	Merchant	Marine,	Gray	and	O’Dell	became	actively	involved	in	the	National	Maritime	Union	(NMU),	an	80,000-member	seafarer’s	union	and	left-led	affiliate	of	the	Congress	of	Industrial	Organizations	(CIO).	According	to	scholar	Nikhil	Pal	Singh,	the	progressive	CIO,	which	had	split	from	the	more	conservative	American	Federation	of	Labor	(AFL)	in	1935,	“possessed	a	legendary	status”	amongst	members	of	the	Black	working	class	in	the	1930s-40s,	“for	its	commitment	to	nondiscrimination	and	to	organizing	black	workers.”7	To	O’Dell,	this	reputation	was	earned	through	the	work	of	Communist	Party	members	in	the	NMU	and	CIO,	such	as	Ferdinand	Smith	and	Harry	Haywood,	whose	organizing	efforts	influenced	the	unions’	non-segregationist	policies	and	dedication	to	the	advancement	of	racial	equality.	“They	said	an	injury	to	one	is	an	injury	to	all,”	O’Dell	later	reflected,	“these	were	my	people	and	this	is	where	I	want[ed]	to	be.”8		The	Communist	Party	had	made	strong	inroads	in	Harlem	in	the	Great	Depression	era.	Recognizing	the	political,	cultural,	and	intellectual	significance	that	Harlem	possessed	within	national	Black	consciousness,	the	Party	focused	its	organizing	efforts	on	Harlem	during	this	period	as	a	means	of	mobilizing	support	from	the	political	base	of	Black	Americans.	Through	their	active	involvement	in	
																																																								7	O’Dell	and	Singh,	Climbin’	Jacob’s	Ladder,	12.		 8	Victor	S.	Navasky,	The	O’Dell	File:	A	Kindle	Single	(Victor	S.	Navasky,	2014),	Loc.	476,	Kindle.	
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causes	that	promoted	civil	rights	and	Black	equality,	including	their	defense	of	the	Scottsboro	Boys,	the	CP	earned	a	favorable	reputation	in	Harlem.	Furthermore,	the	Party	contributed	to	a	political	milieu	that	championed	direct	action	campaigns,	including	mass	marches,	rent	strikes,	and	economic	boycotts,	which	shaped	the	protest	landscape	in	Harlem	for	years	to	come.	9	The	Party’s	early	advocacy	of	civil	rights	also	attracted	the	membership	of	radical	black	women	in	Harlem,	including	Audley	Moore,	who	joined	the	Party	in	the	1930s,	and	later	became	a	revered	influence	within	Black	nationalist	movements.	Moore	was	born	into	the	post-Reconstruction	era	of	white	Southern	“Redemption”	in	Louisiana,	and	was	raised	on	family	traditions	of	self-defense	and	economic	nationalism	as	means	of	survival.10	These	traditions	attracted	her	to	the	program	of	Marcus	Garvey,	whom	she	first	heard	speak	in	New	Orleans,	and	she	became	active	in	the	U.N.I.A.	after	moving	to	Harlem	in	the	early	1920s.	In	Harlem,	Moore	became	involved	in	various	political	organizations,	demonstrating	a	continual	quest	for	a	political	program	that	effectively	synthesized	analyses	of	race,	class,	and	gender	oppression	into	an	operational	movement	for	Black	liberation	and	empowerment.	Finding	racial																																																									9	Mark	Naison,	Communists	in	Harlem	During	the	Depression	(New	York:	Grove	Press,	Inc.,	1983),	xvii-xviii.		 10	Moore’s	father,	a	deputy	sheriff	during	Reconstruction,	had	taught	his	daughters	not	to	work	for	white	men,	and	her	brother	had	once	broken	the	jaw	of	a	white	mill-owner	who	made	unwanted	advances	at	Audley	when	she	was	a	child.	“That	was	our	tradition,”	Moore	later	said,	“I	came	from	a	tradition	of	fighters.”	Queen	Mother	Audley	Moore,	Oral	history	interview,	1972,	Oral	History	of	the	American	Left	Collection,	OH.002;	The	Tamiment	Library	and	Robert	F.	Wagner	Labor	Archives,	New	York	University	Libraries.	See	also:	Queen	Mother	Audley	Moore,	Oral	history	interview,	December	23,	1981,	Oral	History	of	the	American	Left	Collection,	OH.002;	The	Tamiment	Library	and	Robert	F.	Wagner	Labor	Archives,	New	York	University	Libraries.	
		66	
segregation	alive	and	well	while	campaigning	for	the	Republican	Party	in	the	early	1930s,	Moore	was	drawn	to	the	Communist	Party	by	their	defense	of	the	Scottsboro	Boys	and	the	Party’s	position	on	Black	self-determination	and	nationalism	in	its	Black	Belt	thesis.	Though	crediting	the	Party	as	where	she	“really	learned	to	struggle,”	in	part	through	tenant	organizing,	Moore	eventually	left	the	Party	in	1950	when	it	became	apparent	to	her	that	they	lacked	the	radical	racial	consciousness	necessary	to	build	a	movement	for	Black	liberation	and	empowerment.11	Like	Moore,	the	organizational	training	and	experience	that	O’Dell	and	Gray	received	in	their	time	with	the	NMU	prepared	them	to	carry	the	lessons	of	left-labor-led	struggles	for	rights	and	power	in	the	pre-	and	post-war	periods	into	influential	positions	of	leadership	in	the	burgeoning	civil	rights	movement	in	the	late	1950s.	The	“most	advanced	workers	in	the	country	sailed	as	NMU	seaman,”	Gray	later	said,	adding	that	“Black	workers	in	particular	gave	leadership	to	the	NMU	[and]	arose	then	as	a	tremendous,	conscious	force.”12	In	addition	to	the	praxis	of	leadership	and	organizing	experiences	that	the	NMU	offered	through	the	union’s	various	committees,	the	educational	opportunities	that	the	union	afforded	were	critical	in	promoting	the	political	development	and	consciousness	of	Black	sailors	like	O’Dell,	Gray,	Smith,	and	Josh	Lawrence.	With	an	NMU	policy	requiring	each	ship	to	carry	a	library,	radical	sailors	in	leadership	positions	on	the	ship’s	committee	were	able	to	decide	what	texts	went	on	the	shelves	of	the	ship’s	library.	This	leadership	position	offered	the	significant	opportunity	to	influence	the	nature	of																																																									11	Ibid.		 12	Jesse	Gray	interview	with	Harry	Haywood,	April	6,	1975.	
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onboard	political	dialogue,	and	it	was	Gray,	as	ship	chairman	of	the	SS	Washington,	who	introduced	O’Dell	to	the	works	of	W.E.B.	Du	Bois,	including	Black	
Reconstruction	and	Black	Folks:	Then	and	Now,	the	latter	of	which	O’Dell	credited	as	one	of	the	most	influential	works	on	his	political	thought.13	Lengthy	excursions	with	workdays	of	only	5-6	hours	left	O’Dell	and	Gray	with	plenty	of	time	to	read	widely,	and	both	were	attracted	to	works,	like	those	of	Du	Bois,	which	provided	historical	analyses	of	the	ways	that	race	and	class	intersected	in	the	creation	and	maintenance	of	oppressive	power	structures.		Through	their	readings	and	travels,	O’Dell	and	Gray	also	found	inspiration	for	possible	means	of	challenging	these	structures.		Of	particular	significance	for	both	men	was	Friedrich	Engels’	The	Housing	Question,	a	discourse	on	the	correlation	between	capitalism	and	housing	conditions,	published	in	1877.14	In	this	series	of	articles,	Engels	argued	that	“the	housing	shortage	is	no	accident;	it	is	a	necessary	institution	and	it	can	be	abolished	together	with	all	its	effects	on	health,	etc.,	only	if	the	whole	social	order	from	which	it	springs	is	fundamentally	refashioned.”15	Though	careful	to	delineate	the	differences	between	landlord-tenant	and	employer-laborer	relationships	according	to	Marxist	theory,	which	he	helped	to	shape,	Engels	argued	that	housing	conditions	(shortage	and	poor	quality)	were	intrinsically	linked	to	capitalist	exploitation,	and	therefore,	required	the	overthrow	of	capitalist	society	
																																																								13	Jack	O’Dell	interview	with	James	Early,	May	13,	1997.		 14	Roberta	Gold,	When	Tenants	Claimed	the	City:	The	Struggle	for	Citizenship	
in	New	York	City	Housing	(Urbana:	University	of	Illinois	Press,	2014),	117.		 15	Friedrich	Engels,	The	Housing	Question	(India:	Leopard	Books,	2016),	58.		
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to	truly	eradicate.	Recognizing	the	lengthy	trajectory	inherent	in	this	proposition,	however,	Engels	conceded	that	“In	the	beginning…each	social	revolution	will	have	to	take	things	as	it	finds	them	and	do	its	best	to	get	rid	of	the	most	crying	evils	with	the	means	at	its	disposal.”16	Having	witnessed	the	harsh	realities	of	housing	conditions	faced	predominantly	by	Black	communities	in	Jim	Crow	Detroit	and	New	York,	though,	O’Dell	and	Gray	also	recognized	that	“the	housing	question”	was	an	inherently	racial	one	in	American	society.	Influenced	by	Engels’	analysis	and	their	subsequent	studying	of	housing	policy,	“the	housing	question”	became	for	O’Dell	and	Gray	an	undeniable	illustration	of	the	relationship	between	economic	and	racial	oppression	in	American	society,	seen	most	clearly	in	the	Black	ghettoes	of	the	urban	North.	“The	fact	is	that	housing	isn’t	just	another	issue,”	O’Dell	later	asserted,	“housing	is	like	bread	and	butter	and	a	job.”17	Of	even	greater	significance,	however,	this	“bread	and	butter”	issue	represented	a	possible	means	by	which	to	bring	a	social	revolution	to	pass.		The	“most	crying	evils”	of	housing,	Gray	and	O’Dell	believed,	provided	a	widely-identifiable	issue	that	poor	Black	communities	could	be	mobilized	around	to	mount	a	political	challenge	to	both	oppressive	housing	conditions	and	the	urban	power	structures	that	created	and	maintained	them.	It	was	during	a	shipment	to	Great	Britain	in	the	mid-1940s	that	the	two	found	inspiration	for	this	analysis.	While	in	port,	O’Dell	later	recounted	in	an	interview	with	scholar	Roberta	Gold,	he	and	Gray	learned	that	the	tenant	movement	in	Scotland	had	“made	a	breakthrough”	in																																																									16	Ibid.		17	Gold,	When	Tenants	Claimed	The	City,	117.	
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electing	representatives	to	Parliament.	Influenced	by	an	era	of	militant	labor	organizing	in	nearby	Glasgow,	poor	and	working-class	tenants	in	Clydebank	had	launched	a	widespread	rent	strike	in	1920	as	a	means	of	challenging	exploitative	housing	and	labor	conditions.	With	an	initial	goal	of	preventing	the	repeal	of	rent	controls	after	World	War	I,	tenants	fought	through	the	courts—and	through	acts	of	civil	disobedience—to	maintain	government	protections	for	renters,	and	fostered	the	political	empowerment	of	economically	and	politically	marginalized	populations	in	Scotland.	As	a	result	of	their	seven-year	rent	strike,	tenants	achieved	two	immediate	feats:	they	prevented	the	repeal	of	rent	controls	and	protected	their	standard	of	living	amidst	a	period	of	intense	economic	hardships	for	the	poor	and	working	classes.	Most	significantly,	though,	the	Clydebank	Rent	Strikers	were	able	to	form	a	political	base	amongst	the	poor	and	working	classes,	capable	of	electing	radical	representatives	to	Parliament.18	While	certainly	far	short	of	a	“fundamental	refashioning”	of	society,	the	successes	of	the	tenant	movement	in	Scotland	signaled	to	Gray	and	O’Dell	the	potential	political	power	that	lay	dormant	in	poor	and	working-class	Black	communities	in	the	United	States.	According	to	O’Dell,	the	two	men	“felt	that	[the	Glasgow	residents’	accomplishment]	was	our	goal	too,	to	develop	a	kind	of	tenants’	movement,	out	of	these	slums	and	ghettoes,	people	who	would	fight	for	a	national	housing	policy	that	guaranteed	that	working	people	had	decent	housing.”19	Gray,	
																																																								18	Charles	Johnstone,	“The	tenants’	movement	and	housing	struggles	in	Glasgow,	1945-1990”	(PhD	diss.,	University	of	Glasgow,	1992),	252-254.		 19	Gold,	When	Tenants	Claimed	The	City,	117.	
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however,	had	visions	of	more	expansive—if	romantic—possibilities	for	tenant	organizing.	The	housing	question,	to	Gray,	had	the	potential	to	“fuse”	and	mobilize	the	latent	political	power	of	poor	people	most	marginalized	by	urban	society.	“Rent	is	like	that;	housing	can	do	it,”	Gray	later	argued.	“We	can	base	a	party	in	the	ghetto,	we	can	bring	in	the	mass	of	people	of	unrest,	progressives	with	no	place	to	go.”20	Like	the	leaders	of	the	tenant	movement	in	Clydebank,	Gray	believed	that	poor	and	working	class	tenants	could	be	politically	mobilized	through	issues	of	housing	to	foster	collective	radical	consciousness,	with	the	ultimate	goal	of	fundamental	societal	transformation.		To	act	on	these	analyses,	however,	Gray	and	O’Dell	would	have	to	leave	their	beloved	NMU.	After	the	war,	the	federal	onslaught	of	McCarthyism	and	Communist	persecution	sweeping	the	nation	in	the	late	1940s	and	early	1950s	effectively	subverted	and	dismantled	left-labor-led	struggles	for	racial	equality	and	class	solidarity.	In	this	period,	the	influence	wielded	by	Communist	and	leftist	members	in	the	NMU	came	under	heavy	fire	in	racially	charged	attacks	from	anti-communist	forces	amongst	the	rank	and	file,	orchestrated	by	white	NMU	veteran	Joseph	Curran,	a	former	Communist	himself.21	The	ensuing	purges	of	CPUSA	members	and	fellow	travellers	from	the	NMU	led	to	the	ouster	of	Ferdinand	Smith	and	O’Dell	in	the	late	1940s,	and	Gray	around	1952.22	The	Jamaican-born	Smith	was	ultimately	deported,	
																																																								20	Untitled	newsclipping,	New	York	Herald	Tribune,	November	29,	1964.		 21	For	an	extensive	historical	analysis	of	the	NMU,	see	Gerald	Horne,	Red	
Seas:	Ferdinand	Smith	and	Radical	Black	Sailors	in	the	United	States	and	Jamaica	(New	York:	New	York	University	Press,	2005).		
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O’Dell	moved	into	organizing	in	the	South	with	the	CIO’s	Operation	Dixie	and	Southern	Negro	Youth	Conference,	and	Gray	slid	into	housing	activism	and	leftist	political	organizing	in	New	York	City.		Though	purged	from	the	ranks	of	the	organization	that	contributed	greatly	to	their	political	development,	O’Dell	and	Gray	left	the	NMU	well	prepared	to	put	their	analysis	of	systemic	racial	and	class-based	oppression	into	praxis	as	the	modern	Civil	Rights	Movement	emerged	in	the	mid-1950s.		Aware	of	the	limitations	that	communist	persecution	placed	upon	the	effectiveness	of	his	organizing	in	the	South,	O’Dell	left	the	Party	in	1958	and	reunited	with	Gray	in	Harlem.	Having	participated	in	some	of	the	opening	salvos	of	the	modern	Civil	Rights	Movement,	O’Dell	“saw	a	movement	was	emerging,”	but	after	numerous	run-ins	with	federal	and	local	anticommunist	forces,	understood	that	“the	sickness	of	the	country	was	not	going	to	let	people	who	presented	themselves	as	Communists…	participate,	and	I	had	to	participate.”23	While	O’Dell	had	been	organizing	throughout	the	South,	Gray	had	begun	working	in	Harlem	“with	a	revolutionary	dream,”	and	quickly	established	himself	amongst	New	York’s	radical	
																																																																																																																																																																					22	Although	Roberta	Gold	notes	that	Gray	was	purged	from	the	NMU	“around	1952,”	evidence	of	the	precise	date	and	nature	of	Gray’s	ouster	has	yet	to	be	presented.	The	last	available	record	of	his	affiliation	with	the	NMU	was	as	a	representative	of	the	Maritime	Peace	Committee	at	a	“mass	memorial	meeting”	held	for	the	Martinsville	7	and	John	Derrick	on	February	12,	1951.	Gray	appeared	alongside	the	likes	of	Paul	Robeson	and	Sidney	Poitier	at	the	meeting.	See	“Mass	Memorial	Meeting,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	February	10,	1951,	page	4.		 23	Jack	O’Dell	interview	with	James	Early,	May	13,	1997;	Navasky,	The	O’Dell	
File,	Loc.	497-502.	
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tenant	organizers	in	the	early	1950s.24	In	the	post-war	years	in	New	York	City,	tenant	councils	“became	one	of	the	most	raucous	elements	of	the	city’s	left,”	according	to	housing	scholar	Joel	Schwartz.25	Left-led	tenant	organizing	had	deep	roots	in	the	city,	and	the	American	Labor	Party	(ALP)	in	particular,	made	housing	a	central	issue	of	its	political	platform	as	a	means	of	building	a	voting	base	in	the	city’s	poor-	and	working-class	renters.26	Founded	in	1936	by	garment	trades	union	leaders,	and	later	coming	under	the	influence	of	the	Communist	Party,	the	ALP	established	strong	bases	in	Jewish,	Black,	and	Puerto	Rican	neighborhoods	in	New	York.	27	Gray	had	joined	the	ALP	around	1952,	and	immediately	became	involved	in	political	organizing.	That	year,	Gray	led	a	committee	to	run	former	Communist	City	Councilman	Ben	Davis—then	imprisoned	under	the	Smith	Act—for	State	Assembly	in	New	York	City’s	11th	Assembly	District	on	the	Freedom	Party	ballot.	Offering	a	glimpse	of	the	showmanship	and	revolutionary	rhetoric	that	he	would	come	to	be	
																																																								24	Mark	Naison,	“The	Rent	Strikes	in	New	York,”	Radical	America	1,	no.	3	(1967):	18.		25	Joel	Schwartz,	“Tenant	Power	in	the	Liberal	City,	1943-1971,”	in	The	
Tenant	Movement	in	New	York	City,	1904-1984,	ed.	Ronald	Lawson	et	al.	(New	Brunswick:	Rutgers	University	Press,	1986),	141.		 26	Schwartz,	“Tenant	Power	in	the	Liberal	City,	1943-1971”;	Thomas	Sugrue,	
Sweet	Land	of	Liberty:	The	Forgotten	Struggle	for	Civil	Rights	in	the	North	(New	York:	Random	House	Trade	Paperbacks,	2008),	403.		 27	Tamar	W.	Carroll,	Mobilizing	New	York:	AIDS,	Antipoverty,	and	Feminist	
Activism	(Chapel	Hill:	University	of	North	Carolina	Press,	2015),	61.	
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known	for	in	the	years	to	follow,	Gray	compared	the	Davis	campaign	to	“electing	Kwame	Nkrumah	from	a	Ghana	jail.”28		In	his	early	experiences	with	the	ALP,	Gray’s	organizing	efforts	clearly	demonstrated	his	analysis	on	the	intrinsic	relationships	between	race,	class,	and	the	housing	question.	In	addition	to	campaigning	for	Davis	that	year,	the	28-year-old	Gray	also	joined	the	ALP’s	Harlem	Tenants	Council	(HTC),	quickly	rising	to	lead	the	tenants	rights	organization	by	1953.	While	other	Party	members	had	gone	underground	during	this	period	to	escape	political	persecution,	Gray	remained	heavily	involved	in	mass	work.	“During	this	period,”	Gray	later	recalled,	“the	housing	movement	was	really	growing,	tenants’	struggles,	we	couldn’t	go	underground.”29	Like	Audley	Moore,	who	described	her	tenant	organizing	experiences	with	the	Communist	Party	in	Harlem	as	“one	of	the	great	struggles,”	the	HTC	under	Gray’s	leadership	clearly	identified	their	housing	advocacy	as	an	essential	component	of	broader	struggles	against	racial	and	class-based	discrimination.	In	a	leaflet	distributed	in	the	early	1950s	from	their	headquarters	at	306	Lenox	Avenue,	the	HTC	declared—in	both	English	and	Spanish—that	“THE	END	OF	DISCRIMINATION	IN	ALL	HOUSING	IS	THE	KEY	TO	THE	END	OF	DISCRIMINATION	IN	EVERYTHING.”30		
																																																								28	Gerald	Horne,	Black	Liberation/Red	Scare:	Ben	Davis	and	the	Communist	
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Though	the	HTC	clearly	defined	their	ideological	position	on	the	role	of	tenant	organizing	within	broader	liberation	struggles,	their	practical	approach	to	“the	housing	question”	in	the	early	1950s	was	much	like	that	of	a	neighborhood	service	agency.	Like	the	tenant	organizing	of	ALP	clubs	and	other	tenant	councils,	the	HTC	mainly	operated	within	the	city’s	prescribed	housing	policy	channels	by	facilitating	complaints	against	landlords	and	advocating	for	rent	control,	while	also	organizing	anti-eviction	campaigns.	Despite	the	limited	reach	of	this	advocacy,	the	political	significance	of	the	HTC’s	work	should	not	be	discounted.	In	addition	to	providing	needed	services	to	local	constituencies,	Gray	and	the	HTC	also	fought	for	representation	of	Black	tenants	in	policy-making	positions	and	campaigned	for	political	candidates	that	supported	the	interests	of	poor-	and	working-class	renters.	In	a	press	release	from	April	1954,	the	HTC	criticized	the	“complete	lack	of	any	Negroes	among	the	new	top	leadership	recently	appointed	by	Mayor	Wagner	to	head	the	City	Department	of	Housing	and	Building,”	under	the	headline	of	“LILY-WHITE	LEADERSHIP	HIT	BY	HARLEM	TENANT	COUNCILS.”31	While	the	early	efforts	of	Gray	and	the	HTC	did	incorporate	political	demands	for	representation,	self-determination,	and	grassroots	empowerment	within	a	service-based	framework,	the	organization	lacked	real	political	influence	or	power.	It	was	not	until	the	late	1950s	with	the	rise	of	the	national	Civil	Rights	Movement	that	demands	for	tenants	rights	and	political	power	escalated,	and	Gray	began	to	build	a	local	political	movement	around	housing.			
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“Maladjusted	Negroes”	and	“Hopeful	Followers”:	The	Harlem	Nine	and	Rising	
Black	Militancy	When	Jack	O’Dell	arrived	in	Harlem	in	1958	to	work	with	Gray	and	his	newly	formed	Lower	Harlem	Tenants	Council,	he	found	a	“community	that	had	a	rhythm	of	organization.”32	As	younger	generations	were	becoming	inspired	and	mobilized	through	escalating	local	and	national	struggles	for	rights	and	power,	older	residents	carried	their	knowledge	and	lessons	from	Depression-Era	and	post-War	organizing	into	a	new	national	political	climate.	The	successes	of	the	various	organizations	and	individuals	that	fought	for	Black	equality	and	empowerment	during	the	post-war	era,	including	Garveyites,	the	Communist	Party,	Adam	Clayton	Powell,	Jr.,	and	the	NAACP,	provided	valuable	experiences	for	a	generation	of	radical	organizers	who	would	bring	these	lessons	with	them	into	new,	yet	familiar	struggles	in	the	Civil	Rights	Movement.	Additionally,	the	shortcomings	of	these	organizations	provided	a	useful	foil	against	which	radical	Black	women	organizers,	like	Ella	Baker,	Vicki	Garvin,	and	Audley	Moore,	developed	their	own	analyses	of	the	intersections	of	race,	class,	and	gender	in	the	1950s	that	were	shaping	the	emergence	and	later	direction	of	the	Civil	Rights	and	Black	Power	Movements.	In	many	ways,	the	tempo	of	the	“rhythm	of	organization”	that	O’Dell	found	upon	his	arrival	in	Harlem	had	been	set	by	Black	women,	and	by	1958,	they	were	beginning	to	pick	up	the	pace.	That	September,	a	group	of	nine	Black	mothers	began	a	boycott	of	three	junior	high	schools	in	Harlem	to	protest	the	inferior	education	that	their	children	were	receiving	in	segregated	schools.	On	the	first	day	of	the	new	school	year,	Carrie																																																									32	Gold,	When	Tenants	Claimed	The	City,	117.	
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Haynes,	the	spokeswoman	for	the	Junior	High	School	Coordinating	Committee,	announced	that	the	parents	of	15	students	in	Harlem	would	be	keeping	their	children	out	of	school	to	protest	the	unequal,	segregated	schools	they	were	assigned	to.33	In	the	wake	of	the	Brown	v.	Board	decision	four	years	earlier,	parents	and	civil	rights	activists	in	New	York	City	had	emerged	on	the	forefront	of	national	struggles	for	school	desegregation,	and	the	emergence	of	the	boycott	marked	an	escalation	in	these	fights,	with	Black	women	at	the	helm.	The	efforts	of	these	women	activists,	according	to	scholar	Adina	Back,	“represented	the	growing	voice	of	black	parents,	independent	of	national	civil	rights	organizations	like	the	NAACP,	choosing	the	boycott	rather	than	the	boardroom	as	the	tactic	for	demanding	integrated	schools	in	New	York	City.”34	The	grassroots	approach	of	these	mothers	was	indicative	of	the	growing	impatience	amongst	poor	and	working-class	New	Yorkers	with	the	more	conservative,	middle-class	approach	to	civil	rights	organizing	that	the	NAACP	championed	in	the	late	1950s.		This	group	of	women,	whom	the	Amsterdam	News	dubbed	the	“Little	Rock	Nine	of	Harlem,”	had	begun	planning	the	boycott	a	year	earlier	when	they	formed	the	Junior	High	School	Coordinating	Committee	to	wage	a	campaign	for	“Freedom	of	Choice	of	Junior	High	Schools.”35	The	Coordinating	Committee	was	an	offshoot	of	
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Parents	in	Action	Against	Educational	Discrimination,	a	coalition	of	organizations	formed	to	organize	parents	to	fight	for	desegregated	schools	and	greater	parental	involvement	in	educational	policy	making.	Among	the	leaders	of	the	coalition	was	Ella	Baker,	who	sought	to	compel	action	from	the	apathetic	Board	of	Education	–and	to	sidestep	the	bureaucratic	approach	of	the	NAACP—by	organizing	a	more	militant	grassroots	base	to	carry	out	popular,	direct-action	campaigns	for	equality	and	self-determination	in	public	education.36	Though	chair	of	the	Education	Committee	of	the	New	York	branch,	Baker	recognized	the	limitations	of	the	NAACP	and	refused	to	allow	her	organizing	to	be	constrained	in	the	same	ways.		Calling	for	a	citywide	campaign	of	political	education	and	mass	action,	the	organizing	efforts	of	Parents	in	Action	demonstrated	a	concerted	grassroots	focus	on	training	and	mobilizing	parents	to	become	advocates	for	educational	and	racial	equality.	The	coalition	urged	parents	to	tune	into	a	weekly	radio	program	focused	on	educational	discrimination,	write	to	the	Board	of	Education	with	their	complaints,	and	sign	a	petition.	Additionally,	Ella	Baker	and	other	organizers	held	weekly	workshops	to	educate	parents	on	their	rights	and	organize	collective	action.37	Through	these	efforts,	Parents	in	Action	essentially	created	a	training	institute	for	mass	participation	in	grassroots	political	action,	culminating	in	a	rally																																																																																																																																																																						
Struggles	Outside	the	South,	1940-1980,	eds.	Jeanne	F.	Theoharis	and	Komozi	Woodard	(New	York:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2003),	72.		36	Barbara	Ransby,	“Cops,	Schools,	and	Communism:	Local	Politics	and	Global	Ideologies—New	York	City	in	the	1950s,”	in	Civil	Rights	in	New	York	City:	From	
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at	City	Hall	in	September	1957.	At	the	rally,	held	just	two	weeks	after	Governor	Orval	Faubus	used	the	Arkansas	National	Guard	to	physically	prevent	the	integration	of	Little	Rock	High	School,	Baker	warned	Mayor	Wagner	of	the	political	implications	of	his	malignant	neglect	in	allowing	the	city’s	schools	to	remain	separate	and	unequal.	In	concluding	her	address,	which	included	demands	for	an	open	transfer	policy,	greater	parental	power,	and	improved	services	in	predominantly	Black	schools,	Baker	called	Wagner’s	attention	to	a	statement	he	had	made	regarding	the	importance	of	the	upcoming	mayoral	election.	“It	is	with	this	fully	in	mind,”	Baker	cautioned,	“that	we	have	instituted	among	parents	of	the	subject	schools	a	registration	and	voting	drive.”38	If	Mayor	Wagner	were	not	willing	to	take	action	on	school	segregation	and	inequality	in	New	York	City,	Parents	in	Action	intended	to	supplant	him	with	someone	else	who	would.	Like	her	friend	and	NAACP	colleague	Daisy	Bates	in	Little	Rock,	Ella	Baker’s	decision	to	operate	outside	of	the	generally	bureaucratic	approach	of	the	NAACP	and	the	prescribed	channels	of	city	government,	affected	an	“increased	fervor	on	the	part	of	the	black	communities	to	make	some	changes,”	according	to	Baker.39	This	“increased	fervor”	can	largely	be	attributed	to	the	emphasis	placed	on	grassroots	
																																																								38	“Statement	Presented	to	Mayor	Robert	F.	Wagner	by	Delegation	of	Parents,	Thursday,	September	19,	1957,	Read	by	Ella	J.	Baker,”	Box	60,	Folder	691,	Hulan	Jack	Papers,	New	York	City	Municipal	Archives	(henceforth	referred	to	as	Jack	Papers).		 39	Back,	“Up	South	in	New	York,”	317.	
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empowerment	in	Parents	in	Action,	which	according	to	Adina	Back,	had	significant	impacts	on	the	“growing	militancy”	of	many	Black	parents	in	New	York.40		Mae	Mallory	was	one	such	parent,	though	the	roots	of	her	militancy	were	already	firmly	planted	in	the	soil	that	Parents	in	Action	cultivated.	Born	in	Macon,	Georgia	in	1927,	Willie	Mae	Range	was	raised	on	racial	pride	and	self-defense	from	an	early	age.	After	a	series	of	clashes	with	white	children	in	Macon—one	in	which	she	“bloodied”	the	heads	of	a	group	of	children	who	tried	to	stop	her	from	roller-skating	on	the	paved	streets	of	a	white	neighborhood—Mae’s	mother	sent	her	to	live	with	her	grandmother	in	Brooklyn	when	she	was	nine	years	old.41	After	a	brief	marriage	to	Keefer	Mallory	as	a	teenager	in	Brooklyn,	Mae	Mallory	moved	to	Harlem	in	the	late	1940s,	and	eventually	settled	in	an	apartment	at	27	Morningside	Drive.	42		As	a	single	Black	mother	to	two	children,	oscillating	between	employment	and	welfare	support,	Mallory	was	acutely	aware	of	the	ways	in	which	the	intersections	of	her	race,	gender,	and	class	identities	within	the	white,	patriarchal,	capitalist	urban	power	structures	of	New	York	City	limited	her	access	to	political,	social,	and	economic	empowerment.	Like	Queen	Mother	Moore,	Mallory’s	search	for	meaningful	ways	to	fight	for	Black	equality	and	empowerment	in	the	face	of	this	triple	oppression	had	led	her	to	the	Communist	Party	in	the	early	1950s.	“Every																																																									40	Ibid,	315.		41	Timothy	B.	Tyson,	Radio	Free	Dixie:	Robert	F.	Williams	&	the	Roots	of	Black	
Power	(Chapel	Hill:	The	University	of	North	Carolina	Press,	1999),	189;	Rhonda	Y.	Williams,	Concrete	Demands:	The	Search	for	Black	Power	in	the	20th	Century	(New	York:	Routledge,	2015),	66.		 42	Williams,	Concrete	Demands,	67;	Back,	“Exposing	the	‘Whole	Segregation	Myth,”	72.	
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time	I	raised	a	question	of	better	wages,	better	working	conditions,	and	equality	for	black	people,”	Mallory	later	said	in	an	interview	with	Timothy	Tyson,	“somebody	would	tell	me	that	was	communist…so	I	decided	I	better	seek	out	the	communists.”43	Also	like	Moore,	however,	Mallory	found	herself	disenchanted	with	the	Communist	Party	due	to	their	lack	of	a	genuine	dedication	to	Black	liberation.		After	leaving	the	Communist	Party	in	great	disappointment,	Mallory	tested	the	waters	of	Harlem’s	Black	nationalist	scene	in	the	mid-1950s.	Mallory’s	involvement,	however,	went	no	farther	than	attending	some	meetings	of	various	organizations.	Finding	these	organizations	to	be	militant	in	rhetoric,	but	lacking	in	praxis	and	gender	equity,	Mallory	decided	to	set	her	own	course	in	the	struggle	for	Black	liberation,	“to	work	with	this	group	and	with	that	group,”	free	from	the	doctrinaire	confines	of	the	Communist	Party	and	Black	nationalist	organizations.44		Mallory	did	not	limit	her	critique	of	civil	rights	leadership	to	the	CPUSA	and	Black	nationalist	organizations,	however.	In	a	letter	to	the	Amsterdam	News	in	1956,	Mallory	emphasized	the	necessities	of	independent	and	indigenous	grassroots	leadership	for	effectively	mobilizing	the	masses	for	political	action.	Proudly	declaring	herself	a	“maladjusted	Negro,”	Mallory	criticized	leaders	in	Black	communities	for	“being	followers	themselves	of	certain	groups	that	dictate	to	them,”	and	therefore,	not	being	“maladjusted	enough.”	In	the	letter,	Mallory	concerned	herself	with	the	daily	labors	of	organizing	at	the	grassroots,	placing	a	premium	on	educating	the	“stragglers”	in	Harlem	to	become	actively	involved	as	“hopeful																																																									43	Tyson,	Radio	Free	Dixie,	189-90.		 44	Ibid,	190.	
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followers”	in	the	struggle	for	Black	liberation	and	empowerment.	Like	Ella	Baker,	Jesse	Gray,	and	Malcolm	X,	Mallory	believed	that	this	vast	pool	of	“stragglers”	in	Harlem	represented	an	essential	wellspring	of	political	power	that	needed	to	be	tapped	into	for	effective,	sustained	action.	To	Mallory,	the	masses	needed	to	become	“maladjusted”	to	an	oppressive	society	through	education,	agitation,	and	organization.	“All	the	progress	to	be	made,”	Mallory	argued,	“will	be	made	by	maladjusted	Negroes.”45	By	the	time	Parents	in	Action,	of	which	she	was	a	member,	launched	their	September	rally	at	City	Hall,	Mallory	had	already	established	herself	in	the	fight	for	educational	equality	for	Black	children	in	Harlem.	Beginning	in	1956,	Mallory	led	a	year-long	charge	for	the	construction	of	a	new	school	after	the	death	of	a	Black	child	during	recess	at	PS	10	prompted	her	to	inspect	the	conditions	of	the	school	her	children	attended.	Finding	a	building	with	only	two	decrepit	bathrooms	for	1,700	children,	Mallory	organized	a	group	of	mothers	to	demand	a	new	school	be	built,	and,	after	battling	with	city	and	state	officials,	the	group	was	ultimately	successful	in	their	efforts.	“The	officials	in	Albany	were	not	quite	prepared	for	this	angry	Black	woman,”	Mallory	later	wrote.	46	Nor	were	local	media	outlets	prepared	to	recognize	her	efforts.	Like	many	of	the	efforts	of	Black	women	organizers	in	the	Civil	Rights	Movement,	male	members	of	the	group	were	given	credit	in	the	media	for	leading	
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the	fight.47	Regardless,	the	victory	was	a	formative	experience	in	Mallory’s	political	development.	“Getting	that	school	was	quite	an	achievement,”	Mallory	later	wrote,	“and	gave	me	so	much	confidence	in	the	fact	that	you	can	fight	City	Hall	and	win!”48		 On	the	heels	of	her	victory	at	PS	10,	Mallory	jumped	right	back	in	the	ring	with	city	officials	when	her	daughter	was	denied	registration	at	a	nearby	junior	high	school.	While	working	with	Parents	in	Action	that	July,	Mallory	filed	a	lawsuit	in	the	state	Supreme	Court	against	the	NYC	Board	of	Education	to	challenge	the	legality	of	the	Board’s	zoning	policy,	which	prevented	her	daughter	Patricia	from	enrolling	in	a	“substantially	better”	school	than	the	one	she	was	zoned	for.	Represented	by	Paul	Zuber,	a	young	Black	attorney	and	fellow	member	of	the	Parents	Committee	for	Better	Education,	the	suit	built	upon	the	legal	precedent	of	the	Brown	decision	by	arguing	that	the	zoning	policies	effectively	forced	parents	to	send	their	children	to	segregated	schools.49	At	a	public	hearing	held	by	the	Board	of	Education	earlier	that	year,	Mallory	stated	that	the	school	her	daughter	attended	in	Harlem	was	“just	as	Jim	Crow”	as	the	school	she	had	attended	as	a	child	in	Macon,	Georgia,	and	criticized	the	Board	for	not	providing	students	at	schools	in	predominantly	Black	
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neighborhoods	with	the	same	quality	of	education	as	those	in	predominantly	white	areas.50		Of	course,	the	Board	of	Education	was	not	responsible	for	the	de	jure	and	de	facto	patterns	of	housing	discrimination	and	residential	segregation	that	impacted	the	racial	demographics	of	neighborhood	schools.	Mayor	Wagner	acknowledged	that	segregated	schools	were	the	result	of	“old	established	housing	patterns,”	and	argued	that	the	solution	to	the	education	problem	lay	in	the	enforcement	of	fair	housing	practices	“in	order	to	eradicate	any	neighborhood	restrictions	based	upon	race	or	ethnic	origin.”51	The	Mayor’s	sentiment	was	echoed	by	Algernon	Black	of	the	New	York	Society	for	Ethical	Culture	in	his	support	of	the	Sharkey-Brown-Isaacs	Bill	of	1957,	which	extended	protections	for	fair	housing	practices	in	public	housing	to	include	privately-owned	dwellings	as	well.	Black	referred	to	the	bill	as	the	“Number	One	civil	rights	action	which	must	be	taken	in	the	North	if	we	are	to	implement	desegregation	in	the	schools.”52		Mallory,	however,	was	less	concerned	with	breaking	down	the	barriers	of	residential	segregation	than	she	was	with	ensuring	that	Black	children	received	quality	education,	regardless	of	where	they	lived.	Notably	absent	in	Mayor	Wagner’s	
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assessment	of	educational	inequality	in	the	city	was	any	mention	of	plans	to	resolve	problems	of	unqualified	teachers,	substandard	curricula,	and	hazardous	buildings.	The	mayor’s	rhetoric	advanced	the	position	that	the	desegregation	of	schools,	in-and-of	itself,	would	inherently	correct	the	issues	of	educational	inequality	plaguing	the	city’s	Black	communities.	To	Mallory,	however,	the	desegregation	of	New	York’s	public	schools	was	a	means	by	which	Black	students	could	gain	access	to	“substantially	better”	education,	and	therefore	better	employment	opportunities.	“I	don’t	want	my	child	to	just	sit	side	by	side	with	white	children,”	Mallory	said	in	a	television	interview,	“I	just	want	the	same	classrooms	with	equal	opportunity	for	my	child.”53	Mallory	essentially	saw	school	desegregation	as	a	tactic	that	had	the	potential	to	force	the	city	to	provide	equal	resources	to	all	schools,	because	the	fates	of	white	and	Black	students	would	be	bound	together.	Though	Mallory	lost	the	lawsuit,	her	efforts	set	the	stage	for	a	dramatic	confrontation	the	following	year,	when	“The	Harlem	Nine”	launched	their	boycott	of	New	York	City	public	schools.	When	the	new	school	year	began	in	September	1958,	Mallory	and	the	Junior	High	School	Coordinating	Committee	announced	their	boycott	of	three	junior	high	schools	in	Harlem.	Having	found	little	recourse	through	the	Board	of	Education	or	the	courts,	the	group	of	mothers	known	as	“The	Harlem	Nine,”	decided	to	escalate	their	tactics	by	engaging	in	this	collective	act	of	civil	disobedience.	Though	by	this	point	Ella	Baker	had	left	New	York	for	Atlanta	to	work	with	Dr.	Martin	Luther	King	Jr.’s	Southern	Christian	Leadership	Conference,	the	collective	action	of	the	boycott	
																																																								53	Jesse	H.	Walker,	“Theatricals,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	January	17,	1959.	
		85	
demonstrated	the	power	of	indigenous	leadership	that	she	had	championed	during	her	years	in	Harlem.	Indeed,	Carrie	Haynes,	Mae	Mallory,	Viola	Waddy,	and	the	other	poor	and	working-class	Black	women	of	“The	Harlem	Nine”	had	built	upon	the	organizational	foundation	that	Parents	in	Action	laid,	to	mount	a	direct	action	challenge	to	institutional	racism	in	the	City	of	New	York.	“Conference	upon	conference	has	procured	nothing,”	Carrie	Haynes	explained	to	a	reporter	in	defense	of	the	boycott,	adding	“we’re	going	to	see	this	through	to	the	bitter	end.”54		With	the	assistance	of	community	leaders,	including	Rev.	Eugene	Callender	and	Attorney	Paul	Zuber,	the	boycotting	parents	arranged	private	tutoring	sessions	for	their	children	in	order	to	comply	with	the	state’s	compulsory	education	law.	However,	when	the	Board	expressed	satisfaction	with	the	education	the	children	were	receiving	in	these	ad	hoc	schools,	the	mothers	cancelled	the	sessions	to	purposefully	violate	the	compulsory	education	law	and	force	a	confrontation	with	the	Board	of	Education	and	city	government.	To	up	the	ante,	the	parents	also	filed	a	$1	million	lawsuit	against	the	Board	of	Education,	Superintendent,	Board	of	Estimates,	and	Mayor	Wagner,	all	of	whom	they	accused	of	“sinister	and	discriminatory	purpose”	in	maintaining	racial	segregation	in	Harlem.55	These	actions	proved	successful	in	finally	provoking	a	response	from	the	Board	of	Education	when	Superintendent	John	Theobald	requested	a	state	investigation	of	the	schools—and	summoned	the	Harlem	Nine	before	the	Domestic	Relations	Court	for	violating	the	compulsory	education	law.																																																										54	Back,	“Exposing	the	‘Whole	Segregation	Myth,”	73.		 55	Ibid,	73-74.	
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The	ensuing	trials	of	the	Harlem	Nine	proved	momentous	for	Black	freedom	struggles	in	New	York.	In	the	first	wave	of	trials	brought	against	six	of	the	Harlem	Nine	that	December,	Judge	Nathaniel	Kaplan	ruled	that	the	mothers	were	guilty	of	violating	the	State’s	compulsory	education	law.	Two	of	the	women	folded	and	agreed	to	send	their	children	back	to	school,	but	the	other	four,	including	Viola	Waddy	and	Mae	Mallory,	were	steadfast.	“We	will	go	to	jail	and	rot	there,	if	necessary,”	Waddy	told	a	reporter,	“but	our	children	will	not	go	to	Jr.	High	Schools	136,	139,	or	120.”	56	Though	they	had	their	toothbrushes	packed	and	affairs	in	order,	the	women	avoided	jail	time	when	Justice	Justine	Polier	issued	a	landmark	decision	in	favor	of	two	of	the	other	boycotting	mothers	a	week	later.	In	her	decision,	which	Carrie	Haynes	later	praised	as	“one	of	the	great	historical	documents	of	our	nation,”	Judge	Polier	argued	that	though	the	Board	of	Education	was	not	responsible	for	the	conditions	of	residential	segregation	that	created	segregated	schools,	the	Board	had	“done	substantially	nothing	to	rectify	a	situation	it	should	never	have	allowed	to	develop.”57	Citing	the	stark	contrast	in	the	quality	of	education	provided	to	students	in	predominantly	Black	schools	compared	to	their	white	counterparts,	Judge	Polier	held	the	Board	of	Education	responsible	for	the	unequal	conditions	created	by	segregated	schools.	Whereas	the	Brown	decision	four	
																																																								56	Sara	Slack,	“We’d	Rather	Go	to	Jail’:	Defy	Court’s	Order	in	School	Boycott,”	
New	York	Amsterdam	News,	December	13,	1958.		 57	Ibid,	75.	
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years	earlier	had	ruled	de	jure	segregation	to	be	unconstitutional,	Judge	Polier’s	decision	was	celebrated	as	the	first	ruling	against	de	facto	segregation	in	schools.58		While	the	Polier	decision	was	lauded	by	the	Black	press	and	community	organizations,	the	reactions	it	elicited	from	the	Board	of	Education	and	white	city	residents	demonstrated	a	collective	desire	to	defend	the	city’s	racial	status	quo	from	forced	integration.	When	the	Board	decided	to	appeal	the	decision,	Black	community	leaders	and	organizations	rallied	in	opposition	to	the	primarily	white	body.	The	350,000-member	Empire	State	Baptist	Convention,	for	example,	called	for	Mayor	Wagner	to	dismiss	all	white	members	of	the	Board	and	threatened	a	mass	march	on	City	Hall	if	the	appeal	was	not	withdrawn.	Dr.	Gardner	Taylor,	a	Baptist	minister	and	lone	Black	member	of	the	Board,	asserted	that	by	appealing	the	decision	the	City	was	telling	Black	and	Puerto	Rican	students	“you	can’t	go	to	schools	that	are	equal,	you	can’t	have	equal	opportunities	here.”	Furthermore,	Dr.	Taylor	argued	that	with	the	appeal	“the	board	erased	the	last	line	of	differences	between	Little	Rock	and	New	York.”59		Mae	Mallory	could	certainly	attest	to	this	erasure,	judging	by	the	reprisals	and	threats	that	she	received	for	her	part	in	these	struggles	against	school	segregation.	During	her	struggle	with	the	Board	of	Education	the	previous	year,	Mallory	was	arrested	on	felony	charges	of	receiving	welfare	assistance	while	she	was	employed.	To	Mallory,	the	arrest	was	an	obvious	act	of	political	retaliation	for	her	outspoken	criticism	of	the	Board,	as	the	city	had	not	acted	against	her,	she																																																									58	Back,	“Exposing	the	‘Whole	Segregation	Myth,”	73-76.		59	Ibid,	77-78.	
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argued,	until	she	spoke	out	against	the	Board’s	zoning	policies.60	Mallory	also	received	several	threatening	letters	from	individuals	who	opposed	her	work	to	desegregate	the	public	schools.	One	anonymous	letter	she	received	from	a	former	resident	of	Alabama	read:	“You	should	have	lived	down	there	and	told	them	which	school	you	wanted	your	daughter	to	go	to.	They	would	have	hung	you	from	a	tree.”61	Though	Judge	Polier	had	ruled	in	favor	of	the	Harlem	Nine,	it	quickly	became	clear	that	their	struggles	for	educational	equality	would	continue	to	be	met	by	staunch	opposition	in	the	city.			The	struggles	for	educational	equality	these	Black	women	waged	in	Harlem	represented	a	formative	moment	for	the	Black	freedom	struggle	in	New	York	City.	In	the	long	run,	their	boycott	laid	the	groundwork	for	future	school	boycotts	in	the	city	and	forced	the	city	to	confront	its	complicity	in	establishing	and	maintaining	de	facto	segregation	and	institutional	racism.	In	the	short	run,	their	actions	won	immediate,	tangible	benefits	for	Black	children,	demonstrated	the	collective	power	of	Black	women	organizers,	and	contributed	to	broader	conversations	about	analyses	and	strategies	in	local	and	national	struggles	for	liberation.	Harry	Haywood,	a	Black	communist	leader	and	mentor	of	Jesse	Gray,	for	instance,	characterized	such	boycotts	as	“futile	protests	against	de	facto	segregation,”	that	merely	supplemented	the	“legalistic	and	legislative	approach	of	NAACP	with	
																																																								60	“Protests	School,	Arrested	on	Welfare	Charge,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	June	29,	1957.		61	Sara	Slack,	“Receives	Threats	in	School	Suits,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	August	3,	1957.	
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demonstrations”	and	avoided	“basic	economic	issues”	in	the	North.62	To	Mae	Mallory,	however,	her	educational	activism	was	inseparable	from	“basic	economic	issues,”	particularly	the	ability	of	Black	women	to	find	decent	employment	opportunities.	“I	wanted	both	my	children	to	get	the	best	possible	public	education	that	they	could,”	Mallory	later	recalled	in	an	interview,	“because	I	wanted	to	break	the	cycle	of	women	doing	days	work	or	factory	work.”63	Guided	by	the	influence	of	Ella	Baker’s	emphasis	on	grassroots	political	empowerment,	the	organizing	efforts	of	Mae	Mallory	and	the	Harlem	Nine	in	the	waning	years	of	the	1950s	represented	demands	for	indigenous	leadership,	the	empowerment	of	Black	women,	and	self-determination	that	would	come	to	typify	struggles	under	the	banner	of	“Black	Power”	in	the	years	to	come.		
“The	Vanguard	of	Racial	Liberation”:	The	1959	Rent	Strikes	and	the	“Negro	
Revolt”	While	there	were	many	organizations	that	sought	to	break	down	the	institutional	barriers	that	established	segregated	northern	ghettoes,	leaders	like	Mae	Mallory,	Jesse	Gray	and	Jack	O’Dell,	sought	to	mobilize	communities	within	these	confines	to	seize	control	of	the	social,	economic,	and	political	levers	of	power	in	“the	Black	[wo]man’s	land.”64	Though	Mallory	used	desegregation	as	a	tactic	for	educational	access	and	parental	empowerment,	her	primary	interest	was	Black	self-																																																								62	Harry	Haywood,	“Black	Political	Power:	The	Next	Stage	in	the	Afro-American	Liberation	Struggle,"	Haywood	Papers.		63	Back,	“Exposing	the	‘Whole	Segregation	Myth,”	81.		 64	James	Boggs,	Racism	and	the	Class	Struggle:	Further	Pages	from	a	Black	
Worker’s	Notebook.	New	York:	Monthly	Review	Press,	1970.	
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determination	and	economic,	political,	and	social	empowerment.	Likewise,	the	interests	of	Gray	and	O’Dell	in	tenant	organizing	were	as	a	means	to	an	end	of	Black	liberation	and	political	power.	Though	organizing	around	issues	of	discrimination	in	housing	had	deep	roots	in	Harlem,	the	experiences	that	informed	Gray	and	O’Dell’s	analysis	of	the	significance	of	“the	housing	question”	in	struggles	for	Black	liberation	differentiated	their	organizing	from	that	of	established	civil	rights	organizations	and	tenants	councils.	Unlike	the	more	bureaucratic	approach	of	the	newly	formed	Metropolitan	Council	on	Housing,	who	one	activist	described	as	“older	white	liberal	types,	social	worker	types	as	opposed	to	activist	types,”	Gray	adopted	strategies,	tactics,	and	rhetoric	that	were	more	reflective	of	growing	demands	for	Black	civil	rights	and	self-determination.65	To	O’Dell,	the	approach	of	Gray	and	the	LHTC	was,	in	essence,	that	of	“a	tenant	movement…trying	to	empower	itself,”	as	opposed	to	“a	social	service	thing,”	like	the	MCH	and	other	tenants	councils.66	Furthermore,	while	the	MCH	operated	on	a	citywide	basis,	the	LHTC	sought	to	grow	an	organization	from	the	grassroots	by	building	at	a	neighborhood	level	in	Harlem.67			 Though	Gray	had	built	a	reputation	in	Harlem	as	a	vocal	advocate	for	the	rights	of	poor	Black	renters	in	the	neighborhood,	building	a	movement	of	tenants	proved	to	be	a	difficult	task.	Operating	out	of	their	storefront	headquarters	on	116th	
																																																								65	Gold,	When	Tenants	Claimed	The	City,	130.		 66	Ibid.		 67	Though	some	ALP	clubs	had	toyed	with	the	idea	of	organizing	“block	groups”	in	the	late	1940s	and	early	1950s	to	promote	grassroots	political	mobilization,	the	idea	was	never	acted	upon.	See	Schwartz,	“Tenant	Power	in	the	Liberal	City,	1943-1971,”	144.	
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Street,	Gray	and	O’Dell	organized	from	110th	Street	to	150th	Street	as	the	Lower	Harlem	Tenants	Council	struggled	to	establish	a	substantial	base	of	indigenous	leaders	who	were	committed	to	taking	on	the	responsibilities	of	organizing.68	Despite	these	organizing	struggles,	Gray	and	O’Dell	did	manage	to	eek	out	some	minor	victories	in	achieving	rent	reductions	and	organizing	tenants	for	anti-eviction	protests.69	Although	their	successes	largely	came	in	the	form	of	concessions	from	city	agencies	and	court	orders	to	induce	landlord	responsibility,	Gray	and	the	LHTC	showed	signs	of	gaining	traction	as	a	burgeoning	tenant	movement	amongst	Harlem’s	poor	Black	renters.	In	April	1959,	Gray	and	the	LHTC	delivered	a	petition	to	New	York	City	Housing	Authority	Chairman	William	Reid,	demanding	improved	maintenance	services	and	increased	police	protection.	The	petition	was	signed	by	1,000	heads	of	families	in	the	Stephen	Foster	Houses,	a	1,500	family	public	housing	project	on	Lenox	Avenue	and	115th	Street.	The	swift	response	that	Gray	and	the	LHTC	received	from	Reid,	who	vowed	to	address	the	situation	within	a	week,	demonstrated	the	impacts	that	collective	tenant	action	could	produce.70		On	the	heels	of	the	victory	at	the	Stephen	Foster	Houses,	Gray	announced	plans	to	initiate	a	larger	tenant	movement	in	Harlem’s	public	housing	projects.71	
																																																								68	Jack	O’Dell		interview	with	James	Early,	May	13,	1997;	Gold,	When	Tenants	
Claimed	The	City,	118.		69	Joel	Schwartz,	“The	New	York	City	Rent	Strikes	of	1963-1964,”	Social	
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However,	after	the	initial	declaration	of	these	plans,	Gray	largely	turned	his	focus	to	organizing	tenants	in	privately-owned	tenement	buildings	who	suffered	from	some	of	the	worst	housing	conditions	in	the	city.	In	the	months	following	the	petition-drive	at	the	Foster	Houses,	Gray	and	the	LHTC	captured	the	attention	of	Harlem	and	the	city	as	they	brought	direct	action	tactics	back	into	the	playbook	of	the	growing	tenant	movement.	On	the	first	day	of	July,	tenants	from	four	dilapidated	apartment	buildings	down	the	block	from	the	LHTC	office	on	West	116th	Street	declared	a	rent	strike	to	force	their	landlords	to	repair	the	buildings.	Chanting	“No	repairs,	no	rent,”	a	group	of	fifty	tenants—primarily	women—walked	a	picket	line	in	front	of	the	four	six-story	brick	buildings	carrying	signs	that	read	“My	Child	is	Too	Pretty	to	Die,”	“Act	Like	Landlords:	They	Do	Nothing,	We	Pay	Nothing,”	and	“Restore	Law	to	Housing.”72	As	the	tenants	walked	the	picket	line,	Gray	patrolled	the	block,	giving	instructions	to	the	picketers	and	passing	out	leaflets	with	details	about	the	tenants’	case.	“The	charges	run	the	same	through	all	the	houses,”	he	told	a	reporter	at	the	scene.	“No	paint,	falling	ceilings,	no	hot	water	for	months	at	a	time	and	this	terrible	plague	of	rats.	Babies	can’t	sleep	at	night	for	them.”73	Though	Gray	was	the	leading	organizer	of	the	strike,	the	foot	soldiers	of	the	burgeoning	rent	strike	movement	consisted	mainly	of	poor	and	working-class	Black	women.	Gray’s	“militant,																																																																																																																																																																						71	Ibid.	An	article	from	the	New	York	Amsterdam	News	claimed	“Mr.	Gray	announced	that	within	two	weeks	[of	the	Stephen	Foster	Houses	protests]	he	will	call	a	joint	meeting	of	executive	board	members	of	all	city	projects	from	90th	Street	up.”		 	72	George	Barner,	“Angry	Tenants	on	Rent	Strike,”	New	York	Amsterdam	
News,	July	4,	1959.		 73	Ibid.	
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maternalistic	rhetoric,”	as	Thomas	Sugrue	put	it,	highlighted	the	oppressive	conditions	faced	by	Black	women,	which	not	only	made	for	dramatic	and	empathetic	headlines,	but	also	“mobilized	angry	mothers	to	demand	that	government	protect	their	families.”74	These	housing	conditions	that	the	tenants	of	West	116th	Street	protested	were	all	too	familiar	for	residents	of	Central	Harlem.	Statistics	on	housing	compiled	the	following	year	for	the	1960	census	showed	that	only	51	percent	of	housing	units	in	the	area	were	considered	“sound,”	while	38	percent	were	“deteriorating”	and	11	percent	were	“dilapidated.”	These	statistics	showed	a	stark	contrast	with	the	rest	of	New	York	City,	where	85	percent	of	housing	units	were	sound,	while	only	12	percent	were	deteriorating,	and	3	percent	dilapidated.75	The	impacts	of	these	conditions	for	tenants	were	far-reaching,	and	often	had	dire	consequences.	Deaths	from	“home	accidents”	in	Harlem	were	nearly	double	those	of	the	rest	of	New	York,	and	just	months	before	the	tenants	of	West	116th	Street	launched	their	rent	strike,	a	2-year-old	boy	died	in	a	fire	in	one	of	the	buildings.76	In	addition	to	the	collective	
																																																								74	Sugrue,	Sweet	Land	of	Liberty,	404.		75	In	the	1960	Census,	“deteriorating”	housing	is	defined	as	that	which	“does	not	provide	safe	and	adequate	shelter,”	while	“dilapidated”	housing	is	defined	as	that	which	“need	more	repair	than	would	be	provided	in	the	course	of	regular	maintenance.”	Harlem	Youth	Opportunities	Unlimited,	Youth	in	the	Ghetto:	A	Study	
of	the	Consequences	of	Powerlessness	and	a	Blueprint	for	Change	(New	York:	HARYOU,	1964),	107.		 76	The	1960	Census	showed	a	rate	of	2.3	“deaths	from	home	accidents”	per	10,000	population	count	in	Harlem,	as	compared	to	1.2	for	the	rest	of	New	York	City.	HARYOU,	Youth	in	the	Ghetto,	108.	
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trauma	and	outrage	the	child’s	death	induced,	tenants	also	complained	that	the	structural	damages	caused	by	the	fire	had	yet	to	be	repaired.77		Although	launched	with	the	relatively	conservative	goals	of	forcing	repairs	and	getting	rent	reductions,	the	emergence	of	the	July	1959	rent	strike	was	a	significant	development	in	ongoing	grassroots	struggles	for	rights	and	power	in	Harlem.	Coverage	of	the	strike	appeared	in	the	New	York	Times,	as	well	as	the	
Amsterdam	News.	The	July	4th	edition	of	the	latter	featured	a	story	on	the	strike	directly	below	a	headline	that	read	“Negro	Revolt,”	in	the	largest	font	the	weekly	newspaper	had.78	In	that	issue,	which	also	contained	coverage	of	NAACP	pickets	over	employment	discrimination,	backlash	from	white	parents	over	school	integration,	and	political	struggles	for	control	of	the	Harlem	Democratic	Party,	the	editorial	board	evoked	a	vision	of	impending	mass	mobilization	for	civil	and	human	rights	in	Harlem.	Citing	Gray’s	claims	that	the	LHTC	had	organized	6,000	tenants	in	40	other	buildings	that	were	prepared	to	join	the	rent	strike,	one	reporter	declared	that	their	actions	represented	“one	of	Harlem’s	first	major	rent	rebellions.”79		Although	the	paper	used	the	terms	“protest,”	“revolt,”	and	“revolution”	loosely	and	interchangeably	to	present	a	provocative	vision	of	a	potential	coordinated	mass	movement	in	Harlem,	the	editorial	board	also	acknowledged	that	
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the	“series	of	revolts”	were	the	result	of	“spontaneous	efforts”	from	various	uncoordinated	organizations.	These	simultaneous,	yet	uncoordinated	actions	represented	the	diversity	in	analyses	of	organizations	that	sought	to	mobilize	different	target	populations	in	Harlem.	While	the	economic	protests	waged	by	the	NAACP	that	week	scored	an	immediate	victory	for	Black	salesman	who	had	been	shut	out	by	white	liquor	stores,	Amsterdam	News	reporters	projected	the	branch’s	focus	on	civil	rights	agitation	for	the	rights	of	the	Black	middle-class	onto	the	economic	interests	of	the	larger	Harlem	community.	The	tenant	organizing	of	the	LHTC,	however,	was	informed	by	Gray’s	analysis	of	the	possibilities	for	liberation	through	a	mass	mobilization	of	the	underclasses	in	Harlem	who	were	impacted	in	dire	ways	by	the	intersections	of	institutional	oppression	based	on	their	race,	class,	and	gender	identities.	As	Sugrue	argues,	while	larger	civil	rights	organizations,	like	the	NAACP,	focused	on	middle-class	oriented	agitation	and	saw	“quality	of	life”	politics	as	“marginal,”	Gray	saw	organizing	around	these	issues	as	the	“vanguard	of	racial	liberation.”80	Despite	the	diversity	in	analysis	inherent	in	these	mobilizations,	there	existed	in	praxis	a	unifying	emphasis	on	direct	action	campaigns.	The	surge	of	these	campaigns	represented	a	general	coalescence	of	demands	for	justice,	and	promoted	a	popular	culture	of	struggle	for	rights	and	power	in	the	waning	days	of	the	1950s.	As	summer	arrived	in	1959,	Harlem	was	“seething	with	grim	unrest,”	and	residents	disillusioned	with	the	gradual	pace	of	established	civil	rights	organizations	were	taking	to	the	streets	in	greater	numbers	than	in	recent	years	to	protest	the	racial																																																									80	Sugrue,	Sweet	Land	of	Liberty,	404.	
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inequalities	that	bounded	their	daily	lives	in	various	ways.81	Though	this	uptick	in	civil	rights	agitation	was	not	unique	to	Harlem,	the	Black	Mecca	drew	the	national	spotlight	that	July	as	national	and	local	struggles	for	Black	liberation	intersected	in	the	nation’s	largest	city	in	a	nearly-explosive	manner.		
Mississippi,	Monroe,	and	Harlem:	The	1959	NAACP	Convention	and	the	
Question	of	Nonviolence	As	the	masses	were	beginning	to	mobilize	through	rent	strikes	and	boycotts	in	Harlem	in	the	spring	of	1959,	several	acts	of	racial	violence	rocked	the	South,	and	had	profound	impacts	upon	Black	political	consciousness	and	the	direction	of	national	freedom	struggles.	In	late	April,	a	lynch	mob	dragged	23-year-old	Mack	Charles	Parker	from	his	cell	in	a	Poplarville,	Mississippi	jail,	where	he	was	being	held	for	the	alleged	rape	of	a	white	woman.82	As	with	the	brutal	murder	of	Emmett	Till	four	years	earlier,	the	white	southern	justice	system—with	the	assistance	of	federal	agencies—allowed	Parker’s	killers	to	walk	free	after	his	body	was	pulled	from	a	nearby	river.	The	responses	of	southern	civil	rights	leaders	to	the	lynching	of	Mack	Parker,	according	to	scholar	Timothy	B.	Tyson,	“revealed	that	black	Southerners	were	far	from	committed	to	nonviolence,”	and	contributed	to	a	growing	national	dialogue	over	the	use	of	self-defense	in	freedom	struggles.83	When	the	news	of	the	lynching	reached	Jackson,	Mississippi,	NAACP	field	secretary	Medgar	
																																																								81	“Harlem	Is	Seething	With	Grim	Unrest,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	July	4,	1959.	 	82	Tyson,	Radio	Free	Dixie,	143.			83	Ibid.	
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Evers	told	his	wife	Myrlie,	“I’d	like	to	get	a	gun	and	start	shooting.”	In	Monroe,	North	Carolina,	where	members	of	the	local	NAACP	branch	had	formed	a	rifle	club	and	engaged	in	open	combat	with	the	Ku	Klux	Klan	two	years	earlier,	branch	president	Robert	F.	Williams	argued	that	the	tragedy	could	have	been	prevented	with	armed	self-defense.84	In	New	York	City,	readers	of	the	Amsterdam	News	followed	the	case	as	editor	James	Hicks	reported	from	Poplarville	in	weekly	installments	with	headlines	such	as	“Mississippi	is	Hell,”	and	editorials	sprung	up	in	support	of	armed	self-defense.	In	a	May	16th	column,	titled	“They	Lynched	Us	All,”	City	Councilman	Earl	Brown	charged	that	“the	only	way	to	break	the	chain	of	one-way	death	in	Dixie	would	be	for	the	Negroes	to	kill	when	attacked.”85	In	a	letter	to	the	editor	a	week	later,	a	Brooklyn	resident	writing	under	the	name	of	“Cousin	Mack,”	made	the	case	for	the	establishment	of	an	armed	organization	that	could	move	throughout	the	country	and	“take	reprisals	on	whatever	bigot	is	unfortunate	to	find	himself	within	our	reach.”86		The	sentiments	offered	by	Councilman	Brown	and	Cousin	Mack	demonstrated	not	only	the	national	reach	of	the	Parker	lynching,	but	also	the	reverberations	of	a	thunderous	declaration	made	by	Williams	the	day	after	Mack	Parker’s	body	was	found	in	the	Pearl	River.	On	May	5th,	two	cases	came	to	trial	in																																																									84	Ibid.		85	Interestingly,	each	of	the	four	times	that	Brown	argued	in	favor	of	armed	self-defense	in	the	short	editorial,	he	was	careful	to	explicitly	mention	its	application	to	the	southern	situation.	Earl	Brown,	“They	Lynched	Us	All,”	New	York	Amsterdam	
News,	May	16,	1959.		 86	“We	Printed	It,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	May	23,	1959.	Cousin	Mack	may	have	been	an	actual	cousin	of	Robert	F.	Williams.	
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Monroe,	both	involving	white	men	accused	of	brutal	assaults	upon	Black	women.	Prior	to	the	trials,	when	Black	women	and	men	in	Monroe	sought	to	bring	these	white	attackers	to	justice	through	violent	retribution,	Williams	urged	that	they	allow	the	cases	to	go	through	the	courts.	However,	when	charges	were	dropped	in	the	first	case,	and	a	verdict	of	not	guilty	reached	swiftly	in	the	second,	this	blatant	miscarriage	of	justice	brought	the	ire	of	Monroe’s	Black	women	down	upon	Williams,	whom	they	argued,	“was	responsible	for	this	man	not	being	punished.”87	“These	people	have	declared	open	season	on	Black	women,”	one	woman	told	Williams	outside	the	courtroom,	and	pointedly	asked	“what	are	you	gonna	say	now?”88	The	anger	of	these	women,	Williams	later	said,	“made	me	realize	that	this	was	the	last	straw,	that	we	didn’t	have	as	much	protection	as	a	dog	down	there,	and	the	Government	didn’t	care	about	us.”	At	that	point,	Williams	turned	to	reporters	on	the	scene	and	declared	that	the	time	had	come	for	Black	people	to	“meet	violence	with	violence,”	and	that	“we	must	be	willing	to	kill	if	necessary.”89	With	these	words,	Williams	sent	shockwaves	through	the	nation	and	stirred	the	radical	imaginations	of	Black	communities	that	were	growing	increasingly	indignant	over	the	daily	violence	of	American	racism.	In	the	following	months,	Williams	became	a	national	cause	célèbre,	attracting	loyal	supporters	and	fervent	detractors	alike.	Outside	of	Monroe,	Williams	found	
																																																								87	Tyson,	Radio	Free	Dixie,	149.		88	Negroes	with	Guns:	Rob	Williams	and	Black	Power,	2005,	accessed	May	19,	2017,	https://fod.infobase.com/PortalPlaylists.aspx?wID=102927&xtid=49787/.		 89	Ibid.	
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some	of	his	greatest	supporters	amongst	Harlem’s	radical	intellectuals,	writers,	and	organizers,	including	Julian	Mayfield,	John	Henrik	Clarke,	and	Malcolm	X.	Williams	had	first	met	Malcolm	a	year	earlier	during	a	trip	to	New	York,	and	found	an	ardent	supporter	in	the	minister	and	his	congregation	at	Temple	Number	7.	“Every	time	I	used	to	go	to	New	York	he	would	invite	me	to	speak,”	Williams	said	in	a	1968	interview,	also	noting	that	“they	were	giving	me	money	every	time	I	would	go	to	the	temple.”90	With	the	help	of	Malcolm	and	Mayfield,	Williams	was	able	to	build	a	veritable	arsenal	in	Monroe,	including	military	carbines,	dynamite,	and	machine	guns,	the	latter	of	which	Mayfield	was	said	to	have	delivered	early	that	spring.91		That	June	and	July,	Williams	made	several	trips	to	the	NAACP	headquarters	in	New	York	City	to	deal	with	the	fallout	from	his	advocacy	of	armed	self-defense,	which	included	his	suspension	from	the	organization.	Though	Williams	made	these	trips	for	the	purpose	of	appealing	his	suspension,	the	visits	also	allowed	the	militant	leader	to	strengthen	connections	with	his	comrades	and	supporters	in	the	North.	During	these	trips,	Williams	spoke	to	crowds	at	street	rallies,	in	barrooms,	and	at	various	institutions	to	spread	the	word	of	what	was	taking	place	in	Monroe	and	share	his	analysis	on	armed	resistance	in	domestic	and	international	struggles	for	Black	liberation.92		
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Though	Williams	had	the	fervent	support	of	radical	activists	and	intellectuals	in	Harlem	and	throughout	the	nation,	he	faced	reactionary	responses	from	within	and	without	the	NAACP.	In	addition	to	the	heightened	government	surveillance	that	his	declaration	drew	from	J.	Edgar	Hoover’s	FBI,	the	late	spring	and	early	summer	brought	a	dramatic	struggle	between	Williams	and	the	national	NAACP,	which	sought	to	distance	itself	from	the	Union	County	president’s	open	advocacy	of	armed	self-defense.	Though	national	executive	secretary	Roy	Wilkins	acknowledged	privately	that	“the	thought	of	using	violence	has	been	in	the	minds	of	Negroes,”	he	actively	maneuvered,	privately	and	publicly,	to	discredit	Williams	and	undermine	his	growing	influence	in	the	organization.93	Indeed,	armed	self-defense	was	a	common	practice	as	a	means	of	protection	and	survival	for	leaders	of	local	branches	of	the	organization	throughout	the	South.	The	national	organization,	however,	was	not	willing	to	affirm	a	general	policy	in	support	of	the	Constitutionally-protected	right	for	fear	of	political	retribution	and	alienating	its	white	supporters.	The	bitter	debate	in	the	organization	between	Williams	and	Wilkins	not	only	reflected	a	widening	rift	in	the	organization	over	non-violence	and	self-defense,	but	also	more	broadly,	it	demonstrated	a	growing	disillusionment	over	the	constraining	relationship	between	the	national	organization	and	its	local	branches.	These	debates	came	to	a	dramatic	head	in	July	during	the	NAACP’s	50th	anniversary	convention,	scheduled	for	the	week	of	July	13th	in	New	York	City.	As	
																																																								93	As	Tyson	notes,	Wilkins	went	so	far	as	to	solicit	the	cooperation	of	the	FBI	to	red-bait	and	discredit	Williams,	in	addition	to	bribing	Little	Rock	NAACP	leader	Daisy	Bates	to	publicly	denounce	Williams’	actions.	Tyson,	Radio	Free	Dixie,	149-165.	
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the	convention	was	nearing	its	commencement,	journalist	Louis	Lomax	reported,	there	were	“deep	rumblings	of	unrest	and	discontent,”	over	the	organization’s	reticence	to	embrace	the	tactics	of	non-violent	direct	action.	The	direct	mass	action	campaigns	waged	by	Rev.	Martin	Luther	King,	Jr.	and	his	Southern	Christian	Leadership	Conference	had	provided	tangible	benefits	to	Black	communities	in	Montgomery,	while	the	legal	approaches	of	the	NAACP,	though	highly	significant	in	their	own	regard,	had	done	little	since	the	Brown	decision	to	inspire	and	mobilize	the	masses.	As	the	convention	neared,	this	was	the	primary	issue	that	many	delegates	sought	to	raise	for	debate,	in	hopes	of	convincing	the	executive	board	to	“relinquish	its	absolute	power	and	institute	a	more	democratic	procedure,”	according	to	Lomax.	The	larger	goal	of	these	delegates	then,	beyond	the	embrace	of	non-violent	direct	action,	was	to	compel	the	highly	bureaucratic	organization	to	develop	a	more	expansive	tactical	approach	that	empowered	the	rank-and-file	in	its	movement	for	desegregation.	94	Given	the	struggles	that	Ella	Baker	had	undertaken	over	the	past	several	years	to	make	the	New	York	branch	of	the	NAACP	more	responsive	and	accountable	to	the	grassroots,	the	convention’s	location	was	quite	fitting	for	this	debate.	As	the	convention	opened,	however,	it	quickly	became	apparent	that	this	was	not	the	debate	that	would	be	troubling	the	floor	and	corridors	of	the	gathering.	With	the	firestorm	surrounding	the	suspension	of	Robert	Williams	and	his	position	on	armed	self-defense,	those	delegates	who	supported	direct	action	and	the	
																																																								94	Louis	E.	Lomax,	The	Negro	Revolt	(New	York:	Harper	&	Row,	Publishers,	1962),	101-102.	
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democratization	of	the	national	organization	hitched	their	wagons	to	Williams’	case	and	their	arguments	were	subsumed	within	a	defense	of	the	embattled	leader	from	Monroe.	By	conflating	the	two	issues,	these	delegates	played	into	the	hand	of	Roy	Wilkins,	who	had	cunningly	stacked	the	deck	against	Williams	through	his	maneuverings	with	many	of	the	most	notable	speakers	and	delegates	at	the	convention.	As	Timothy	Tyson	notes,	a	tone	of	moderate,	middle-class	respectability	was	set	from	the	convention’s	opening	session	when	Governor	Nelson	Rockefeller	took	to	the	stage	to	address	the	crowd	of	3,000	gathered	in	the	New	York	Coliseum	the	evening	of	July	13th.95	After	assuring	the	crowd	that	segregation	was	“on	its	way	out”	in	New	York	State	and	in	the	nation,	the	Republican	governor	proclaimed	that	America	had	been	“fortunate	in	the	kind	of	leadership	the	NAACP	has	given	in	this	great	struggle	for	civil	rights.”	Furthermore,	the	New	York	Times	reported,	Rockefeller	lauded	the	gathered	delegates	for	having	“made	no	appeal	to	violence,”	for	having	“rejected	retaliation	in	kind	to	threat	and	terrorism,”	and	for	having	“repulsed	the	threat	of	communism	to	invade	your	ranks.”96	This	focus	of	the	governor’s	address,	Tyson	argued,	was	“an	unmistakable	reference	to	the	Williams	case,”	and	was	designed	to	firmly	establish	the	narrative	set	by	Wilkins	as	the	defining	position	of	the	Convention.	The	link	was	made	even	more	explicit	after	the	governor’s	speech	concluded,	when	the	chair	of	the	convention	declared	that	
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deliberations	on	the	Williams	situation	would	be	brought	before	the	convention	later	in	the	week.97		
The	Nation	Meets	the	Nation:	“The	Hate	That	Hate	Produced”	and	the	Rising	
Black	Underclass		 While	those	gathered	at	the	New	York	Coliseum	for	the	convention	shuffled	in	to	hear	Governor	Rockefeller’s	speech	at	the	opening	session,	a	startling	documentary	news	series	aired	on	Mike	Wallace’s	television	program,	News	Beat.	Viewers	who	tuned	into	Channel	Thirteen	in	New	York	that	evening	were	greeted	by	the	characteristically	stern	white	reporter,	as	he	adjusted	his	footing	and	fidgeted	with	a	stack	of	papers.	“While	city	officials,	state	agencies,	white	liberals,	and	sober-minded	Negroes	stand	idly	by,”	Wallace	began	before	finding	his	footing	and	affixing	his	gaze	to	the	camera,	“a	group	of	Negro	dissenters	is	taking	to	street	corner	stepladders,	church	pulpits,	sports	arenas,	and	ballroom	platforms	across	the	United	States	to	preach	a	gospel	of	hate	that	would	set	off	a	federal	investigation	if	it	were	preached	by	southern	whites.”	To	illustrate	Wallace’s	narration,	the	program	then	showed	rare	video	footage	of	a	gathering	where	Black	men,	carefully	dressed	in	suits	and	ties,	and	Black	women,	adorning	flowing	white	robes	and	head	scarves,	sat	on	opposite	sides	of	a	hall	watching	a	performance	of	a	short	play,	in	which	a	symbolic	white	man	was	put	on	trial	in	a	Black	court	for	his	crimes	against	humanity.	When	the	spirited	prosecutor	exhorted	the	jury	to	bring	back	a	verdict	of	guilty,	the	audience	delivered	their	own	verdict	through	a	dignified,	yet	thunderous	applause.	Returning	to	the	News	Beat	studio,	Wallace	explained	that	this	indictment																																																									97	Tyson,	Radio	Free	Dixie,	162-163.	
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echoed	throughout	major	cities	across	the	country,	and	recited	the	predictable	guilty	verdict.	“The	sentence,”	Wallace	paused	for	dramatic	effect,	“is	death.”	New	Yorkers,	Wallace	later	said,	“were	stunned.”98	The	program,	provocatively	and	problematically	titled	“The	Hate	That	Hate	Produced,”	was	created	as	an	exposé	of	the	Nation	of	Islam,	who	Wallace	referred	to	as	“the	most	powerful	of	the	Black	supremacist	groups”	in	the	nation.	Though	Malcolm	X	and	the	NOI	had	gained	heightened	popularity	and	notoriety	in	New	York	City	two	years	earlier	following	their	intervention	in	the	beating	of	Johnson	X	by	the	NYPD,	white	New	Yorkers	and	Americans	in	general	knew	next	to	nothing	about	the	growing	organization.	The	news	series	provided	white	America—Wallace	included—with	a	frightening	first	glimpse	into	the	organization’s	existence.	“What	I	felt	about	Malcolm	X	when	I	first	saw	him	on	film,”	Wallace	recalled	in	an	interview,	“was	that	he	was	a	demagogue,	racist.”99	The	broadcast	was	the	idea	of	Louis	Lomax,	a	neophyte	to	Harlem	who,	like	Wallace,	was	shocked	the	previous	summer	when	he	first	encountered	the	militant	rhetoric	that	reverberated	from	nationalist	street	corner	rallies	in	the	neighborhood.	Unfamiliar	with	the	history	and	culture	of	street	corner	oration	in	Harlem,	Lomax	condemned	such	rhetoric	as	“inverse	racism,”	and	an	article	he	wrote	for	the	Baltimore	Afro-American	even	compared	Black	
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nationalists	to	the	Ku	Klux	Klan,	White	Citizens	Council,	and	Adolf	Hitler.100	Lomax,	devoid	of	a	nuanced	understanding	at	that	moment	of	the	emergence	of	the	NOI	within	the	historical	trajectory	of	Black	nationalist	political	organizing,	was	largely	responsible	for	the	problematic	narrative	spun	by	“The	Hate	That	Hate	Produced.”	Furthermore,	Lomax’s	analysis,	which	reduced	the	nuances	of	the	Nation’s	ideologies	and	programs	to	that	of	a	Black	counterpart	to	the	KKK,	took	on	different	meanings,	and	had	different	impacts,	when	reiterated	by	a	white	news	anchor.				 Though	little	known	to	Lomax,	Wallace,	and	most	white	New	Yorkers,	the	Nation	of	Islam’s	roots	ran	deep	in	Harlem	and	the	organization	was	only	just	beginning	to	really	bear	fruit.	In	the	two	years	since	the	beating	of	Johnson	X,	the	NOI	had	become	the	fastest	growing	organization	in	American	cities,	with	its	influence	reaching	across	the	nation	and	around	the	globe,	due	in	large	part	to	the	dogged	efforts	of	its	charismatic	minister	in	New	York.	Though	operating	within	the	doctrinaire	constraints	of	the	Honorable	Elijah	Muhammad’s	theology,	Malcolm	invoked	the	inherently	political	implications	of	the	Nation’s	ideologies	and	programs	to	locate	the	NOI	within	the	context	of	local,	national,	and	international	struggles	for	liberation	and	empowerment.	During	this	window	in	New	York	City,	Malcolm’s	organizing	efforts,	which	connected	local	and	global	struggles	for	Black	liberation,	demonstrated	his	development	as	a	Pan-African	and	nationalist	thinker	and	organizer.	While	leading	several	high-profile	challenges	against	police	brutality	in	the	city,	Malcolm	was	also	building	connections	with	Pan-Africanist	organizations	
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locally	and	globally.	In	his	address	at	an	African	Freedom	Day	rally	in	Harlem	earlier	that	spring,	part	of	which	aired	on	“The	Hate	That	Hate	Produced,”	Malcolm	spoke	poignantly	to	an	enthusiastic	crowd	of	the	interrelation	of	struggles	for	liberation	throughout	the	African	diaspora.	By	the	time	the	news	series	aired,	in	fact,	Malcolm	was	on	a	three-week	tour	of	the	Middle	East	and	Africa,	travelling	under	the	name	of	Malik	El-Shabazz	“so	that	my	brothers	in	the	East	would	recognize	me	as	one	of	them.”101	As	local	freedom	struggles	were	being	transformed	from	the	grassroots	by	poor	and	working-class	Black	communities,	Malcolm	was	appealing	to	this	base	and	helping	to	shape	this	transformation	led	by	those	most	deeply	and	personally	impacted	by	the	daily	transgressions	of	an	oppressive	white	society.	The	NOI’s	theology	was	particularly	relevant	for	many	within	the	ghettoized	Black	underclasses	in	American	cities,	who	saw	the	personification	of	the	NOI’s	“white	devil”	theology	in	their	daily	experiences	with	police	officers,	teachers,	employers,	and	welfare	caseworkers.	It	was	amongst	this	demographic	base	that	Malcolm	and	the	NOI	focused	their	organizing,	with	the	purpose	of	mobilizing	a	mass	movement.	By	focusing	their	efforts	on	poor	and	working-class	Black	communities,	as	William	Sales	has	argued,	the	NOI	challenged	the	notion	that	the	middle-class	was	the	primary	“agent	of	change”	in	Black	communities.	Furthermore,	this	challenge	was	directed	at	the	middle-class	specifically	because	“its	thinking	was	seen	as	totally	dominated	by	the	integrationist-assimilationist	paradigm.”	Like	Ella	Baker,	Jesse	
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Gray,	and	Mae	Mallory,	Malcolm	viewed	the	Black	underclasses	in	urban	American	society,	disaffected	with	gradualist	approaches	to	liberation,	as	a	grassroots	vanguard	possessing	the	potential	for	bringing	forth	fundamental	societal	change.	Though	their	programs	and	analyses	were	significantly	different,	these	influential	and	burgeoning	organizers	understood	that	these	communities	were	becoming	“the	most	explosive	and	dynamic”	force	in	urban	society.102	
“The	people	of	Harlem	are	in	an	angry	mood”:	A	“Near	Riot”	Shakes	New	York	
City	 The	same	evening	“The	Hate	That	Hate	Produced”	hit	the	airwaves,	the	frustrations	and	momentum	swelling	behind	the	“Negro	Revolt”	in	Harlem	nearly	reached	a	tipping	point.	The	afternoon	of	July	13th,	while	NAACP	members	convened	in	regional	organization	meetings	at	the	Coliseum	on	Columbus	Circle,	Carmela	Perez	walked	into	the	Regent	Restaurant	and	Bar	on	Seventh	Avenue	with	a	friend	to	have	a	drink.	It	was	a	warm	summer	day,	and	Perez,	a	21-year-old	Bronx	resident	of	Italian	and	Puerto	Rican	descent,	came	from	an	earlier	party,	where	she	had	been	drinking	for	some	time.	According	to	John	Panuthos,	the	owner	of	the	restaurant,	Perez	was	“apparently	highly	intoxicated”	when	she	walked	in,	and	within	a	few	minutes	excused	herself	to	the	ladies’	room.	After	about	45	minutes	had	passed	with	Mrs.	Perez	still	in	the	restroom,	her	companion	asked	the	owner	to	help	“get	her	out.”	The	two	men	pried	open	the	door,	and	asked	two	female	employees	to	assist	in	removing	Perez	from	the	bathroom,	who	was	“very	drunk”	and	“refused	to	leave.”	The	two	women	managed	to	evict	Perez	from	the	ladies’																																																									102	Sales,	From	Civil	Rights	To	Black	Liberation,	66-69.	
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room,	but	the	struggle	continued	in	the	dining	area,	where	the	young	woman	“lodged”	herself	in	a	booth	and	was	reportedly	“kicking,	screaming,	and	swinging”	at	the	employees	as	they	tried	to	eject	her	from	the	restaurant.103	“I	was	drinking	a	lot	but	I	know	what	I’m	doing	when	I’m	drinking,”	Perez	told	a	reporter	later	that	evening,	adding	that,	“I	didn’t	want	to	leave,	that’s	all.”104		 As	the	employees	struggled	with	Mrs.	Perez	inside	the	bar,	an	NYPD	patrol	car	carrying	two	officers	pulled	up	and	parked	outside.	Norman	Hammes,	a	white	patrolman,	entered	the	restaurant	to	get	a	cup	of	coffee,	while	Lieutenant	John	Angrist	stayed	in	the	car.	With	the	altercation	still	continuing	in	the	booth,	Panuthos	welcomed	the	timely	arrival	of	Hammes,	and	approached	the	patrolman	to	“get	[Perez]	out	of	the	place.”	According	to	Panuthos,	however,	the	struggled	only	intensified	with	the	intervention	of	Hammes.	“The	way	she	was	fighting,”	Panuthos	told	a	reporter,	“he	had	to	use	force	to	subdue	her.”	Hammes,	who	Panuthos	described	as	“a	little	fellow,”	struggled	with	the	unruly	patron	who	was	“doing	everything	in	her	power	to	try	to	maim	him.”	In	the	struggle,	Hammes	slapped	Perez	and	eventually	pulled	her	up	by	her	hair	as	he	tried	to	remove	her	from	the	booth.105	Angrist	was	now	inside,	having	been	called	in	for	assistance,	and	the	two	officers	reportedly	dragged	Perez	about	40	feet	from	the	restaurant	to	the	patrol	car	while																																																									103	For	details	of	the	incident	at	the	Regent	Restaurant	and	Bar,	see	“Crowd	Melted	Away	After	Clerk’s	Release,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	July	18,	1959;	“Harlem	Tensions	Cited	in	Flare-Up,”	New	York	Times,	July	15,	1959.		 104	George	Barner,	“Victim’s	Own	Story,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	July	18,	1959.	 	105	“Crowd	Melted	Away	After	Clerk’s	Release,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	July	18,	1959	
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punching	and	kicking	the	woman,	according	to	a	witness	statement.106	Unaware	of	the	confrontation	that	had	taken	place	inside,	many	witnesses	outside	watched	as	two	white	officers	manhandled	a	young,	olive-skinned	woman.			 While	bystanders	looked	on,	the	two	officers	struggled	to	get	Mrs.	Perez	into	the	car,	eventually	settling	for	confining	her	to	the	floor	of	the	front	seat	underneath	the	dashboard.	After	finally	securing	Perez	around	5:30	PM,	according	to	the	same	witness	who	lived	across	the	street	from	the	restaurant,	the	patrol	car	“drove	off	at	a	high	rate	of	speed”	up	Seventh	Avenue.	Within	moments,	however,	the	car	made	a	sudden	turn	at	117th	Street,	striking	the	concrete	median	dividing	Seventh	Ave.	According	to	the	officers,	Perez	had	grabbed	the	wheel	and	stepped	on	the	accelerator,	causing	the	vehicle	to	crash.	Charles	Samuel,	a	30-year-old	Black	postal	worker	had	been	fixing	a	tire	near	the	intersection	of	Seventh	Avenue	and	117th	Street	when	the	patrol	car	crashed,	and	as	a	crowd	began	to	form,	Samuel	approached	the	police	car	to	see	what	had	happened.	Upon	finding	two	white	officers	struggling	with	Perez	in	the	car,	Samuel	demanded	to	know	why	they	were	handling	the	young	woman	so	roughly.	Hammes	then	got	out	of	the	car	and	grabbed	Samuel,	while	simultaneously	drawing	his	gun	as	the	crowd	drew	closer.	As	Samuel	struggled	to	free	himself	from	the	officer’s	grasp,	the	.38	chrome-plated	Colt	was	
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discharged,	striking	Hammes	in	the	left	hand	before	hitting	Angrist	in	the	lower	back.107			 Moments	after	the	gunfire	rang	out,	twenty	patrol	cars	responding	to	a	call	for	backup	arrived	on	the	scene	and	Perez	and	Samuel	were	whisked	away	to	the	28th	Precinct	on	West	123rd	Street	as	the	crowds	followed	in	procession.	Rumors	of	police	brutality	traveled	quickly	in	Harlem,	and	in	a	scene	reminiscent	of	the	beating	of	Johnson	X	two	years	earlier,	a	crowd	of	nearly	1,000	angry	Harlem	residents	soon	surrounded	the	28th	Precinct	to	demand	Samuel’s	release.	That	some	in	the	crowd	were	unaware	of	what	had	actually	transpired	to	provoke	the	demonstration	speaks	to	the	perceived	prevalence	of	police	brutality	in	the	neighborhood.	“I	don’t	know	what	happened,”	a	protestor	told	a	reporter,	“but	I	know	these	Harlem	cops,	and	we	oughta	turn	the	station	out.”108	Just	weeks	earlier,	in	response	to	recent	allegations	of	police	brutality	against	Black	women,	Malcolm	X	had	in	fact	warned	Deputy	Police	Commissioner	Walter	Arm	that	“if	we	can’t	get	justice	from	the	law,	then	we’ll	have	to	seek	justice	elsewhere.”109	As	the	crowd	continued	to	swell	in	size	and	anger	outside	the	precinct,	that	very	sentiment	resounded,	and	a	“riot”	seemed	imminent.	Amongst	the	crowd,	however,	were	State	Senator	James	Watson,	Assemblyman	Lloyd	Dickens,	and	
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middleweight	boxing	champion	“Sugar”	Ray	Robinson,	who	managed	to	talk	their	way	inside	the	precinct	in	hopes	of	defusing	the	situation.	Robinson,	who	Watson	later	commended	for	preventing	“a	serious	situation	from	exploding	into	a	race	riot,”	coolly	explained	to	high-ranking	officers	in	the	precinct	that	in	order	to	prevent	the	looming	threat	of	violence,	the	crowd	needed	to	see	Samuel	walk	out	of	the	precinct.	The	three	men	were	then	able	to	negotiate	a	compromise,	by	which	the	slew	of	charges	facing	Samuel,	including	felonious	assault	and	inciting	to	riot,	were	reduced	to	a	summons	for	disorderly	conduct.	In	exchange,	Robinson	addressed	the	crowd	to	assure	them	that	the	police	had	not	abused	Mrs.	Perez,	though	he	later	told	reporters	“it	was	apparent	the	woman	had	been	beaten.”110	Accompanied	by	his	wife	and	ad	hoc	negotiating	team,	Samuel	walked	out	of	the	precinct	and	the	crowd	slowly	dissipated.		 Though	the	immediate	threat	of	a	potential	“riot”	was	narrowly	avoided,	the	confrontation	outside	the	28th	Precinct	put	the	city	on	notice,	and	made	a	political	lightning	rod	of	the	conditions	faced	by	Black	communities	in	Harlem	that	community	leaders	had	been	working	feverishly	to	address.	As	would	be	the	case	five	years	later,	politicians,	police,	newspapers,	and	community	leaders	sought	to	explain	the	causes	of	the	latest	unrest	and	jostled	to	devise	ways	to	curb	any	further	trouble.	In	speaking	to	reporters	about	police	abuse	of	Muslims	two	weeks	before	the	“near-riot,”	Malcolm	X	echoed	the	sentiments	of	many	Black	New	Yorkers	when	he	explained	that	Muslims	had	been	waiting	for	the	police	to	give	them	justice,	but	
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now,	“I’m	not	responsible	for	anything	that	happens.”111	While	the	city	narrowly	avoided	a	violent	confrontation	that	July,	it	had	become	clear	to	many	that	Harlem’s	Black	communities	were	no	longer	willing	to	wait	to	receive	justice—they	were	now	fighting	to	seize	it	for	themselves.	
v 		 The	confrontation	outside	the	28th	Precinct	that	July	represented	an	initial	climax	of	the	heightened	demands	for	rights	and	power	that	had	been	escalating	within	Harlem’s	Black	communities	in	the	previous	days,	weeks,	and	months.	The	collective	anger	that	drew	over	one	thousand	people	to	spontaneously	protest	at	the	precinct	that	night	was	illustrative	of	a	growing	impatience	with	moderate	approaches	to	civil	rights	advocacy,	along	with	a	swelling	embrace	of	militant	grassroots	political	action	in	Harlem	in	the	waning	days	of	the	1950s.	By	the	end	of	the	decade,	there	was	demonstrated—and	growing—support	in	Harlem	for	local,	national,	and	global	struggles	for	Black	liberation	based	upon	principles	of	self-determination,	indigenous	leadership,	self-defense,	and	Black	political	empowerment.	In	turn,	these	local	struggles	in	Harlem	were	intersecting	with	and	influencing	national	and	global	freedom	struggles.	Though	these	principles	would	become	most	closely	associated	with	the	Black	Power	Movement	in	the	latter-half	of	the	1960s,	the	organizational	analyses	and	efforts	of	leaders	such	as	Ella	Baker,	Jesse	Gray,	Mae	Mallory,	Malcolm	X,	and	others	signal	that	these	tenets	of	Black	
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Power	were	firmly	grounded	in	radical	grassroots	struggles	in	Harlem	in	the	late	1950s.			In	the	two	weeks	following	the	confrontation	at	the	28th	Precinct,	newspapers	up	and	down	the	east	coast,	and	as	far	away	as	Sudan,	carried	stories	of	the	altercation	and	rising	racial	tensions,	each	seeking	to	explain	the	underlying	causes	that	led	Harlem	residents	to	nearly	storm	the	building.112	Speaking	to	reporters	the	night	of	the	incident,	Hulan	Jack	attributed	the	conflict	to	rising	racial	tensions	in	the	neighborhood,	fueled	by	substandard	housing,	poor	schools,	and	low-paying	jobs.	“The	people	of	Harlem	are	in	an	angry	mood,”	Jack	said,	“and	the	city’s	got	to	do	something	about	it.”113	As	would	be	the	case	five	years	later	when	Harlem	was	rocked	by	an	actual	rebellion,	media	outlets	and	city	officials,	like	Jack,	employed	the	“powder	keg	thesis”	to	explain	the	causes	of	racial	unrest.	According	to	this	analysis,	forces	of	political,	societal,	and	economic	oppression	made	powder	kegs	of	Black	communities,	filling	them	with	potentially	explosive	resentment	that	could	be	spontaneously	sparked	by	an	act	of	alleged	police	abuse.		Though	inherently	flawed	for	its	denial	of	conscious	political	agency	to	those	within	the	hypothetical	keg,	the	thesis	nonetheless	dominated	mainstream	explanations	of	what	had	taken	place	in	Harlem	that	July.	Acting	upon	this	analysis,	which	also	made	invisible	governmental	complicity	in	building	and	filling	the	keg,																																																									112	On	August	22,	1959,	the	Amsterdam	News	carried	an	editorial	written	by	Malcolm	X	from	Khartoum,	stating	that	“Racial	trouble	in	New	York	occupied	prominent	space	on	the	front	pages	here	and	in	other	parts	of	Africa	yesterday.	Everyone	here	seems	aware	of	America’s	color	problems.”	Malcolm	X,	“Africa	Eyes	Us,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	August	22,	1959.		 113	“Harlem	Tensions	Cited	in	Flare-Up,”	New	York	Times,	July	15,	1959.	
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city	officials	launched	a	series	of	meetings,	studies,	and	committees	in	attempts	to	drain	some	of	the	powder	from	the	keg,	while	also	taking	measures	to	fasten	down	its	lid.	The	former,	however,	represented	mere	concessions	in	an	apparent	effort	to	appease	moderate-middle	class	Black	leadership	in	Harlem,	in	hopes	that	they	could	salve	the	hostility	of	the	masses.	However,	it	had	become	apparent	over	the	past	two	years	that	this	class	of	leadership	did	not	represent	the	interests	of	those	most	disenfranchised	by	racial	oppression	in	Harlem.	Notably	absent	from	a	meeting	called	by	Mayor	Wagner	on	July	21st	was	any	representation	from	grassroots	organizations	that	embodied	the	growing	spirit	of	militancy	and	self-determination	among	the	poor	and	working	classes	that	was	beginning	to	characterize	struggles	for	Black	liberation	in	Harlem	and	beyond.	Indeed,	it	was	this	growing	militancy	that	city	officials	sought	to	suppress	in	the	years	following	the	“near-riot”	through	increasingly	militarized	and	oppressive	policing.	In	a	letter	to	Mayor	Wagner	following	the	July	21st	meeting	at	City	Hall,	Hulan	Jack	acknowledged	the	importance	of	a	more	responsive	government	that	would	allow	“the	little	people	of	the	Harlem	community”	to	“speak	for	themselves,”	“offer	suggestions,”	and	“get	results	through	their	city	government.”114	Though	Jack’s	rhetoric	on	representation	and	accountability	may	have	been	fundamentally	similar	to	the	demands	of	civil	rights	leaders	for	equal	access	to	the	levers	of	political	power	in	the	city,	there	existed	a	grave	disconnect	between	this	hopeful	rhetoric	and	the	lived	realities	of	Harlem	residents	that	had	been	continuously	and	systematically	
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denied	effective	avenues	for	political	agency.	This	disconnect	was	illustrated	in	a	more	personal	way	when	Jack	was	booed	off	the	stage	of	an	NAACP	rally	by	members	of	the	Nation	of	Islam	in	late	July.115		By	the	start	of	the	new	decade,	growing	numbers	of	Harlem	residents	were	vociferously	demonstrating	their	disillusionment	with	moderate	approaches	to	Black	liberation,	and	advocating	for	more	independent	and	radical	analyses,	strategies,	and	tactics	for	achieving	fundamental	societal	change.	Building	upon	the	neighborhood’s	traditions	of	radical	political	organizing,	grassroots	organizers	in	the	final	years	of	the	1950s	had	begun	to	awaken	and	mobilize	the	masses	to	challenge	and	transform	the	political,	social,	and	economic	landscape	of	the	nation’s	largest	city.	As	James	Hicks	wrote	a	few	months	later,	there	was	a	“New	Negro	in	Harlem”	who	was	poised	to	mount	a	serious	challenge	to	old	ideas	and	institutions	of	power.		
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CHAPTER	4		
“AN	EXTREMELY	DANGEROUS	LUXURY”:	THE	HARLEM	AFFAIRS	COMMITTEE	
AND	THE	LIMITS	OF	LIBERALISM	IN	HARLEM,	1959-1962	
Northerners	indulge	in	an	extremely	dangerous	luxury.	They	seem	to	feel	that	
because	they	fought	on	the	right	side	during	the	Civil	War,	and	won,	they	have	
earned	 the	 right	 merely	 to	 deplore	 what	 is	 going	 on	 in	 the	 South,	 without	
taking	any	responsibility	for	it;	and	that	they	can	ignore	what	is	happening	in	
Northern	 cities	 because	 what	 is	 happening	 in	 Little	 Rock	 or	 Birmingham	 is	
worse.	–James	Baldwin	(1960)1		The	“near	riot”	outside	the	28th	Precinct	on	July	13,	1959	represented	a	dramatic	illustration	of	the	escalating	demands	for	rights	and	power	that	had	been	resonating	throughout	Harlem	that	spring	and	summer.	Inspired	by	local,	national,	and	global	struggles	for	Black	liberation	and	empowerment,	greater	numbers	of	Harlem	residents	were	becoming	active	in	grassroots	campaigns	to	build	the	collective	power	necessary	to	improve	conditions	in	housing,	education,	employment,	and	law	enforcement	in	their	neighborhoods.	Just	over	a	week	before	the	incident,	the	Amsterdam	News	had	characterized	this	surging	mobilization	as	the	“Negro	Revolt,”	marked	by	the	most	“hostile	and	serious”	collective	mood	in	Harlem	since	the	1930s,	“when	uptowners	took	measures	into	their	own	hands.”2	Though	the	editorial	staff	specified	the	reference	in	regards	to	economic	boycotts	aimed	at	opening	job	opportunities	in	the	1930s,	the	provocative	language	invoked	memories	from	1935,	when	an	allegation	of	police	brutality	triggered	an	uprising	in	Harlem.	
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That	rebellion,	which	many	Harlem	residents	still	remembered,	had	erupted	in	the	spring	of	1935	within	a	context	of	mounting	campaigns	against	discrimination	in	employment	and	law	enforcement.	Though	the	protests	outside	the	28th	Precinct	did	not	grow	into	a	large-scale	rebellion,	most	conscious	observers	in	Harlem	understood	the	“near	riot”	as	a	logical	consequence	of	decades	of	oppressive	resistance	from	the	city’s	white	power	structure	to	struggles	waged	by	Black	residents	for	civil	rights,	human	rights,	and	political	power.	“If	we	were	disposed	to	brag	and	boast,”	the	Amsterdam	News	editorial	staff	declared	a	few	days	later,	“we	could	scream	in	headlines:	‘We	knew	it	all	the	time!”3			 This	brief,	yet	powerful	demonstration	outside	the	precinct	was	a	significant	moment	in	the	development	of	the	modern	Civil	Rights	Movement	in	New	York	City	for	three	primary	reasons.	First,	the	fact	that	a	spontaneous	protest	mobilized	nearly	1,000	angry	residents	shows	that	there	existed	a	level	of	collective	political	consciousness	in	Harlem	that	could	quickly	translate	into	direct	action.	Beyond	merely	demonstrating	a	popular	frustration	with	continued	police	abuses,	which	alone	would	not	account	for	a	collective	direct	confrontation	of	such	scale,	this	action	reflected	the	influence	of	a	popular	political	culture	in	Harlem	that	was	being	shaped	by	the	rhetoric	and	praxis	of	a	more	radical	set	of	grassroots	leaders.	In	other	words,	the	action	illustrated	that	there	was	a	large,	and	growing,	population	of	Harlem	residents,	not	necessarily	affiliated	with	traditional	civil	rights	organizations,	who	were	nonetheless	enraged	by	racial	injustice	and	believed	that	they	should—and	could—do	something	about	it	beyond	the	usual	gradualist																																																									3	“Time	To	Act,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	July	18,	1959.	
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approaches.	Furthermore,	that	the	crowd	compelled	the	release	of	Charles	Samuel	from	the	precinct	on	reduced	charges	showed	that	this	type	of	collective	action	could	yield	tangible	victories.			 Second,	contestations	over	rights	and	power	in	Harlem	in	the	immediate	wake	of	the	unrest	represented	a	growing	popular	disillusionment	with	liberal	approaches	to	addressing	issues	of	institutional	racism.	The	escalation	of	protests	and	growing	numbers	of	local	people	engaged	in	struggles	for	civil	and	human	rights	in	Harlem	demonstrated	a	general	dissatisfaction	with	responses	from	City	Hall	that	failed	to	address	the	underlying	racial	causes	of	political,	social,	and	economic	inequality.	If	the	outbreak	of	unrest	was	predictable	to	the	Amsterdam	News,	then	the	ensuing	responses	from	City	Hall	should	have	come	as	no	surprise.	Sticking	close	to	the	script	that	Mayor	LaGuardia	had	drawn	up	in	in	response	to	the	1935	uprising	in	Harlem,	Mayor	Wagner	announced	the	formation	of	a	committee	tasked	with	studying	the	conditions	in	Harlem	that	led	to	unrest,	and	reporting	back	to	the	Mayor	with	recommendations	of	how	city	resources	could	be	more	effectively	utilized	to	prevent	future	disturbances.	However,	it	quickly	became	clear	to	many	Harlem	residents	that	the	objective	of	these	efforts	was	not	to	attack	the	foundations	of	systemic	racism	in	the	city,	but	rather	to	offer	a	modicum	of	reform	as	a	means	of	easing	racial	tensions.	At	the	same	time,	city	officials	were	also	taking	steps	to	prepare	for	the	possibility	of	future	disturbances	through	an	increased	militarization	of	the	New	York	Police	Department.	The	general	futility	of	liberal	investigation-commission	politics	to	meaningfully	address	racial	inequality	in	the	city,	coupled	with	an	expanding	police	apparatus	geared	toward	curbing	resistance	
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in	the	aftermath	of	the	“near-riot,”	would	shape	the	course	of	struggles	for	Black	liberation	and	empowerment	in	the	years	to	come.		 Third,	by	forcing	a	public	referendum	on	issues	of	inequality	in	Harlem,	local	people	effectively	helped	to	thrust	leaders	of	more	radical	grassroots	organizations	into	the	mainstream	of	political	discourse	in	the	city.	That	the	protests	outside	the	28th	Precinct	came	on	the	same	day	as	the	opening	of	the	NAACP’s	contentious	50th	Anniversary	conference,	and	the	airing	of	“The	Hate	That	Hate	Produced,”	which	introduced	Malcolm	X	to	the	masses	by	television,	is	historically	significant	not	because	of	any	causal	relationship	between	these	events,	but	because	the	correlation	of	events	during	a	heightened	period	of	protest	activities	in	Harlem	places	New	York	City	more	prominently	within	the	historical	trajectory	of	debates	over	non-violence,	self-defense,	Black	Nationalism,	community	control,	and	self-determination	within	the	evolution	of	the	national	Civil	Rights	Movement.	Furthermore,	Harlem	leaders	who	were	buoyed	to	greater	prominence	locally	and	nationally	by	the	events	of	July	1959,	including	Jesse	Gray,	Mae	Mallory,	Malcolm	X,	and	others,	owed	much	of	their	political	development	to	their	organizing	experiences	in	Harlem.	In	the	years	to	follow,	these	grassroots	leaders	built	upon	their	political	education	in	Harlem	and	ascended	to	formative	roles	in	national	struggles	for	Black	liberation.		
v 	“It	was	not	a	riot,”	a	ranking	officer	in	the	New	York	Police	Department	told	a	reporter	as	crowds	dispersed	from	outside	the	28th	Precinct	on	July	13,	1959,	“but	it	
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could	easily	have	become	one.”4	In	the	following	days,	it	became	evident	that	the	demonstration	had	given	City	Hall	cause	for	alarm.	Although	a	potentially	disastrous	confrontation	had	been	avoided	that	night,	the	conflict	signaled	to	city	officials	the	potential	that	existed	in	Harlem	for	another	rebellion.	The	highly-charged	mass	demonstration	that	night,	coming	amidst	a	period	of	surging	demands	for	Black	equality	and	empowerment	in	Harlem,	struck	a	nerve	in	City	Hall	and	set	in	motion	a	series	of	governmental	responses	aimed	at	easing	racial	tensions	in	the	city	in	hopes	of	preventing	a	repeat	of	1935	or	1943.	The	ensuing	government	actions	indicated	that	many	city	officials	perceived	of	this	“near-riot”	as	an	inherently	political	demonstration	rooted	in	the	social,	economic,	and	political	marginalization	of	Black	residents.		Although	the	mass	demonstration	forced	city	officials	to	acknowledge	this	reality,	their	approaches	to	addressing	these	issues	of	racial	inequality	proved	to	be	geared	toward	preventing	further	unrest,	rather	than	rectifying	the	underlying	issues	of	inequality	that	bred	such	protests.	Recognized	as	such	by	many	Harlem	residents,	the	city’s	responses	to	conditions	in	Harlem	demonstrated	the	limits	of	liberal	governance	for	achieving	meaningful	societal	change,	and	contributed	to	a	widening	political	gulf	between	grassroots	activists	and	city	officials.	Sensing	that	prescribed	avenues	for	political	redress	were	insufficient	for	improving	their	lived	conditions,	greater	numbers	of	Harlem	residents	became	mobilized	in	the	early	1960s	to	fight	for	rights	and	power	through	direct	action	campaigns	at	the	grassroots.	To	better	understand	this	declension	of	relations	between	Harlem																																																									4	“Sidelights	Of	The	‘Riot’,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	July	18,	1959.	
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residents	and	city	government,	the	actions	of	City	Hall	in	the	wake	of	the	“near-riot”	will	be	analyzed	in	detail	as	a	case	study	in	how	the	limits	of	liberal	governance	in	confronting	inequality	and	oppression	in	the	Jim	Crow	North	can	spawn	heightened	demands	and	increased	agitation	for	civil	and	human	rights	and	political	empowerment.		
	
The	Harlem	Affairs	Committee:	Responses	to	Racial	Unrest	in	a	Liberal	City	
		 As	news	of	a	Harlem	crowd	nearly	storming	a	police	precinct	travelled	far	and	wide,	city	officials	moved	quickly	to	neutralize	the	threat	of	greater	disorder.	The	following	day,	a	group	of	Harlem	politicians	and	officials	gathered	at	City	Hall	for	a	closed-session	meeting	with	Deputy	Mayor	Paul	O’Keefe.	The	meeting,	described	as	“peace	talks”	by	the	Amsterdam	News,	was	called	by	Manhattan	Borough	President	Hulan	Jack	and	attended	by	political	leaders	in	Harlem,	including	State	Senator	James	Watson	and	Assemblyman	Lloyd	Dickens,	who	had	both	been	present	outside	the	28th	Precinct.	The	purpose	of	the	meeting,	according	to	Dickens,	was	to	“determine	the	general	angle	which	brought	about	the	situation,”	and	to	provide	these	political	leaders	with	a	forum	to	issue	recommendations	to	resolve	the	unrest.5		Though	the	meeting	began	with	a	detailed	examination	of	the	charges	of	police	brutality	that	had	triggered	the	demonstrations	outside	the	precinct,	conversation	eventually	shifted	to	addressing	the	political	climate	and	“rising	race	tension”	in	Harlem.	During	the	two-hour	meeting,	Jack	charged	that	this	tension	was																																																									5	Al	Nall,	“Notarized	Riot	Statement:	‘The	Cop	Dragged	Her	Out	By	Her	Hair,”	
New	York	Amsterdam	News,	July	18,	1959.	
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rooted	in	an	increasing	resentment	by	Harlem	residents	over	“inadequate	housing,	poor	schools,	unsanitary	conditions,	and	low-paying	jobs.”	Jack	concluded	that	what	was	needed	from	the	Wagner	administration	was	a	greater	effort	to	establish	channels	of	communication	with	Harlem	residents	to	“make	them	feel	as	though	they’re	part	of	the	city.”6	To	the	Borough	President,	the	answer	to	relieving	tensions	was	simple:	make	the	government	more	accountable	to	the	people,	and	make	the	people	feel	as	though	they	have	a	voice	in	government.		Lloyd	Dickens	took	Jack’s	analysis	a	step	further	by	demanding	that	Black	citizens	“be	integrated	from	an	executive	standpoint”	in	all	city	departments,	citing	particularly	the	need	for	Black	police	captains	to	command	Harlem	precincts.7	Though	Dickens’	demands	for	Black	representation	in	city	policy-making	positions	in	Harlem	echoed	nationalistic	demands	for	community-control	and	self-determination,	the	Black	political	class	in	Harlem	seemed	to	be	in	general	consensus	that	Harlem’s	potentially-explosive	problems	could	be	solved	through	the	usual	channels	of	representative	government.	At	the	conclusion	of	the	meeting,	O’Keefe	smiled	broadly	as	he	posed	for	photos	with	the	group	of	officials—and	Sugar	Ray	Robinson—and	announced	that	he	would	personally	investigate	the	situation	and	set-up	an	appointment	for	the	group	to	meet	with	Mayor	Wagner	upon	his	return	from	the	U.S.	Conference	of	Mayors	in	Los	Angeles.	
																																																								6	“Harlem	Tensions	Cited	in	Flare-Up,”	New	York	Times,	July	15,	1959.		 7	Al	Nall,	“Notarized	Riot	Statement:	‘The	Cop	Dragged	Her	Out	By	Her	Hair,”	
New	York	Amsterdam	News,	July	18,	1959.	
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	 After	catching	a	red-eye	flight	back	into	the	city	two	days	later,	the	Mayor	met	with	Police	Commissioner	Stephen	Kennedy	for	an	hour-long	briefing	on	police	responses	to	the	unrest	earlier	in	the	week.	Kennedy	had	been	active	all	week	in	mobilizing	an	increased	police	presence	in	the	city	to	curb	any	threat	of	further	unrest,	and	had	much	to	say	about	the	matter	to	the	press.	In	an	immediate	response	to	the	demonstrations	Monday	night,	Kennedy	had	deployed	an	additional	88	officers	to	the	28th	Precinct	in	an	attempt	to	maintain	order.	Warning	against	the	continued	threat	of	“race	riots”	two	days	later,	Kennedy	also	sent	police	reinforcements	to	three	other	predominantly	Black	neighborhoods:	Bedford-Stuyvesant	in	Brooklyn,	South	Jamaica	in	Queens,	and	the	East	Bronx.	These	moves	to	expand	the	police	presence	in	Black	communities	drew	the	ire	of	many	Harlem	leaders,	who	charged	Kennedy	with	trying	to	create	“a	police	state.”	New	York	NAACP	officials	Jawn	A.	Sandifer	and	L.	Joseph	Overton,	for	instance,	stated	that	this	increased	police	deployment	would	only	aggravate	the	situation,	arguing	that	oppressive	policing	was	one	of	the	leading	factors	in	rising	racial	tensions	in	Harlem.8	Kennedy	harangued	these	allegations	as	“outrageous,”	and	complained	that	the	police	were	being	made	“scapegoats”	for	the	various	socio-economic	factors	contributing	to	racial	tension	in	Harlem.	The	commissioner	defended	his	actions	by	publicizing	crime	statistics	for	Central	Harlem,	which	he	described	as	“shocking,”	
																																																								8	Peter	Kihss,	“4	Negro	Areas	Get	Extra	Police	Units,”	New	York	Times,	July	16,	1959.	
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though	he	refused	to	provide	statistics	from	other	precincts	for	comparison.9	Furthermore,	Kennedy	couched	his	defense	in	fear-mongering	terms	typical	of	Cold-War	era	repression	of	political	dissent.	“A	race	riot,”	Kennedy	told	reporters,	“could	cause	more	destruction	of	community	relations	than	an	atom	bomb.”	With	such	rhetoric	of	hyper-criminality	and	widespread	destruction,	Kennedy	effectively	convinced	city	officials,	press	outlets,	and	even	some	civil	rights	leaders,	that	expanded	police	powers	were	necessary	to	maintain	law	and	order	and	prevent	disaster.10	In	the	following	days,	weeks,	and	months,	Kennedy	would	build	upon	this	platform	to	further	bolster	the	powers	of	the	NYPD	to	enforce	“law	and	order”	in	the	city.		 	Mayor	Wagner	left	his	meeting	with	Kennedy	feeling	confident	in	the	Police	Commissioner’s	handling	of	the	incident	outside	the	28th	Precinct.	Like	Kennedy,	the	Mayor	expressed	to	reporters	the	need	to	preserve	“law	and	order,”	but	also	downplayed	the	threat	of	any	possible	“race	riots”	in	the	city.	Also	like	Kennedy,	the	Mayor	pointed	to	underlying	problems	rooted	in	economic	inequality	as	the	causes	for	“tensions”	in	Harlem.	Speaking	to	reporters	after	the	meeting,	Wagner	argued	that	Harlem	needed	better	housing,	improved	building	conditions,	more	schools,	
																																																								9	Amsterdam	News	editor	James	Hicks	argued	in	his	editorial	column	on	July	25th	that	Commissioner	Kennedy	had	refused	the	request	of	Amsterdam	News	reporters	for	crime	statistics	for	the	24th	Precinct—a	predominantly	white	neighborhood	on	the	city’s	west	side	with	reported	high	crime	rates.	Hicks	also	argued	that	Kennedy’s	statistics	did	not	match	the	monthly	reports	given	at	meetings	of	the	28th	Precinct	Community	Council.	James	L.	Hicks,	“Another	Angle:	Somebody’s	Lying,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	July	25,	1959.		 10	Peter	Kihss,	“4	Negro	Areas	Get	Extra	Police	Units,”	New	York	Times,	July	16,	1959.	
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more	playgrounds,	and,	“perhaps	a	closer	relationship	with	the	department	heads	involved.”	This	last	point	proved	to	be	the	basis	for	the	Mayor’s	administrative	responses	to	the	problems	he	saw	as	contributing	to	the	unrest	in	Harlem.	Moments	later,	Wagner	called	for	a	meeting	with	community	and	political	leaders	in	Harlem	and	city	officials	the	following	week	to	“see	whether	we	can	work	out	better	liaison—to	have	people	give	complaints	more	rapidly,	and	their	hopes	and	aspirations.”11	It	was	clear	that	Harlem	residents	had	drawn	the	attention	of	City	Hall	to	questions	of	inequality	in	the	neighborhood.	The	next	step	for	City	Hall	was	to	figure	out	what	answers	they	could	come	up	with	to	make	these	questions	less	explosive.		 On	July	21st,	the	Mayor	invited	a	group	of	nearly	90	city	officials	and	representatives	from	Harlem	to	City	Hall	for	an	“initial	exploration”	of	ways	in	which	city	and	community	resources	could	be	“more	effectively	utilized”	to	address	the	problems	contributing	to	unrest.12	Wagner	had	requested	nearly	every	department	head	to	attend,	including	the	Police	Commissioner,	the	Commissioner	of	Housing	and	Buildings,	the	Superintendent	of	Schools,	and	many	others	whose	departments	were	implicated	in	the	poor	living	conditions	in	Harlem.13	Notable	
																																																								11	Peter	Kihss,	“Mayor	Calls	Parley	on	Harlem;	Seeks	Liaison	to	Ease	Tension,”	New	York	Times,	July	17,	1959.			 12	Executive	Memorandum	from	Mayor	Robert	Wagner	to	City	Commissioners,	Box	64,	Folder	743,	Papers	of	Mayor	Wagner:	Subject	Files,	New	York	City	Municipal	Archives	(henceforth	referred	to	as	Wagner	Papers).		 13	“City	Officials	at	the	Meeting	of	the	Mayor	with	Harlem	Community	Representatives	at	City	Hall	on	Tuesday,	2:30	P.M.,	July	21,	1959,”	Box	78,	Folder	966,	Wagner	Papers.	
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among	the	Harlem	leaders	in	attendance	were	Congressman	Adam	Clayton	Powell,	Jr.,	Councilman	Earl	Brown,	Assemblyman	Dickens,	Senator	Watson,	and	Assemblywoman	Bessie	Buchanan.	Also	in	attendance	were	several	members	of	the	clergy,	civic	leaders,	and	business	owners.14	In	his	account	of	the	meeting,	Brown	described	the	gathering	as	“the	most	imposing	group	of	city	officials	ever	in	one	room	with	Harlem	citizens	to	discuss	its	problems.”	Notably	absent	from	both	of	these	meetings,	however,	was	any	representation	from	community-based	organizations	or	grassroots	civil	rights	leadership,	who	were	in	a	better	position	to	provide	meaningful	commentary	and	analyses	of	the	situation	in	Harlem.	Furthermore,	only	twelve	of	the	sixty-eight	invited	representatives	from	Harlem	were	women.15	It	was	clear	that	though	grassroots	leadership	was	beginning	to	represent	and	mobilize	a	greater	number	of	poor	and	working-class	Harlem	residents	whose	interests	were	underrepresented	in	city	governance,	this	leadership	was	largely	excluded	from	any	dealings	with	the	formal	political	power	structure	in	the	city.		 Delegates	to	the	meeting	voiced	a	number	of	suggestions	for	the	alleviation	of	adverse	conditions	and	the	economic,	political,	and	social	empowerment	of	Harlem	residents,	but	the	topic	of	policing	dominated	the	meeting	and	its	press	coverage.	
																																																								14	Ibid.	Other	notable	figures	invited	were	Jackie	Robinson,	Sugar	Ray	Robinson,	Hubert	Delany,	Dorothy	Height,	Dr.	Kenneth	Clark,	Robert	Weaver,	and	Paul	Zuber.	Earl	Brown,	“The	City	Hall	Meeting,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	August	1,	1959.		 15	“City	Officials	at	the	Meeting	of	the	Mayor	with	Harlem	Community	Representatives	at	City	Hall	on	Tuesday,	2:30	P.M.,	July	21,	1959,”	Box	78,	Folder	966,	Wagner	Papers.	
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“Although	bad	housing	conditions	are	considered	to	be	Harlem’s	gravest	problem,”	Brown	argued	in	his	regular	column	in	the	Amsterdam	News,	“nobody	uttered	a	single	word	about	them.”16	Brown’s	claims	were	overstated;	delegates	repeatedly	suggested	improvements	in	education,	housing,	health,	and	sanitation	policies,	and	demanded	representation	in	policy-making	positions.17	Even	though	hyperbole,	Brown’s	claims	were	illustrative	of	a	heightened	popular	focus	on	policing.	This	attention	on	police	in	Harlem	was	logical,	since	police	actions	triggered	the	unrest	and	brought	years	of	police	brutality,	abuse,	and	misconduct	to	the	forefront	of	popular	consciousness	and	conversation.		One	of	the	most	controversial	discussions	around	policing	was	raised	when	Powell	and	Buchanan	requested	that	more	Black	policemen	be	assigned	to	Harlem.18	Though	this	request	echoed	the	calls	of	Harlem	residents	who	had	demanded	proportional	representation	in	the	police	force	for	years,	the	notion	sparked	adamant	opposition.	In	their	criticisms	of	this	suggestion	that	race	be	taken	into	account	in	public	policy,	white	and	Black	officials	alike	turned	the	argument	on	its	head	and	invoked	the	rhetoric	of	southern	segregation	to	discredit	Powell	and	Buchanan.	“Such	an	act	of	segregation	is	simply	not	right,”	Police	Commissioner	Kennedy	told	a	press	conference,	adding	that	“rather	than	segregate	the	police																																																									16	Earl	Brown,	“The	City	Hall	Meeting,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	August	1,	1959.		 17	Memorandum	from	Joyce	Phillips	Austin	to	Deputy	Mayor	Paul	T.	O’Keefe,	August	7,	1959,	Box	109072B,	Folder	249,	John	Carro	Files,	New	York	City	Municipal	Archives	(henceforth	referred	to	as	Carro	Files).		 18	“Commissioner	Balks	At	More	Colored	Harlem	Police,”	New	Journal	and	
Guide,	August	1,	1959.	
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department,	we	must	continue	to	fight	for	a	truly	integrated	city.”19	Meanwhile,	Brown	took	the	analogy	a	step	further	when	he	argued	that	Powell	and	Buchanan	“took	the	same	position	that	[Arkansas]	Gov.	Faubus	and	all	other	Southern	white	supremacists	have	taken	about	the	race	problem:	Jim	Crow	the	Negro	and	everything	will	be	fine	and	dandy.”20		The	transcript	of	the	meeting,	however,	showed	that	at	no	point	in	the	proceedings	did	anyone	suggest	that	Harlem	be	made	a	“Black	Precinct.”	Suggestions	were	made	for	greater	integration	of	police	in	Harlem,	interracial	patrols,	and	new	procedures	for	handling	allegations	of	brutality.21	Police	Commissioner	Kennedy	deliberately	mischaracterized	requests	for	reform	in	an	attempt	to	seize	a	moral	high	ground	on	race	relations	in	the	city,	in	spite	of	the	NYPD’s	inhumane	reputation	in	Harlem.	Furthermore,	the	Commissioner	found	support	for	his	defensive	posturing	across	the	aisle.	This	hostile	intransigence	from	the	NYPD,	masked	with	lofty	rhetoric	to	gain	popular	support,	was	a	tactic	that	the	department	would	employ	frequently	in	the	following	years	to	deceive	the	public	and	defend	against	demands	for	reform.		 If	the	meeting	produced	little	in	the	way	of	tangible	benefits	to	improve	societal	conditions,	it	did	provide	Harlem	representatives	with	a	rare	opportunity	to	voice	their	concerns,	complaints,	and	recommendations	to	such	a	collective	of	city																																																									19	Ibid.		 20	Earl	Brown,	“The	City	Hall	Meeting,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	August	1,	1959.		 21	Memorandum	from	Joyce	Phillips	Austin	to	Deputy	Mayor	Paul	T.	O’Keefe,	August	7,	1959,	Box	109072B,	Folder	249,	Carro	Files.	
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officials.	However,	it	was	also	recognized	that	this	access	to	government	needed	to	be	extended	to	the	people	as	well.	The	most	important	achievement	of	the	meeting,	as	Hulan	Jack	wrote	in	a	letter	to	the	Mayor,	was	the	recognition	that	channels	of	communication	must	be	established	whereby	“little	people	can	come	forward	to	intelligently	speak	for	themselves	to	make	complaints,	offer	suggestions	and	get	results	through	their	city	government	without	fear	or	reprisals.”	Judging	by	the	influx	of	letters,	telegrams,	and	phone	calls	to	the	Borough	President’s	office,	these	meetings	did	encourage	Harlem	residents	to	engage	with	their	political	representatives,	and	thereby,	with	electoral	politics.	Messages	poured	in	with	complaints	of	slum	housing	conditions,	inadequate	healthcare,	poor	education,	and	violations	of	civil	rights,	and	requests	for	governmental	intervention.		Perhaps	sensing	the	precariousness	of	his	own	political	standing	as	elections	neared,	Jack	pled	with	the	Mayor	to	act	upon	these	grievances	through	concerted,	institutional	actions.	“The	administration	cannot	afford	to	even	think	of	letting	these	people	down,”	he	concluded,	“they	are	with	us	and	they	expect	and	demand	that	we	be	with	them.”	Although	the	Borough	President’s	professed	faith	in	his	constituents’	loyalty	to	city	government	may	have	been	political	rhetoric,	he	nevertheless	understood	that	the	Mayor	needed	to	act	in	a	meaningful	way	to	address	the	deep-seated	problems	they	faced,	or	risk	the	alienation	of	his	constituents	from	electoral	politics.22			 Just	over	a	month	later,	Mayor	Wagner	did	act	when	he	announced	the	
																																																								22	Letter	from	Hulan	Jack	to	Mayor	Robert	Wagner,	August	3,	1959,	Box	3,	Folder	72,	Wagner	Papers.	
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formation	of	the	Committee	on	Harlem	Affairs	(CHA),	an	“action	committee”	that	would	assist	his	administration	in	“bringing	more	effective	services”	to	Harlem.	The	Committee	was	composed	of	five	city	officials	and	seventeen	representatives	from	Harlem.23	After	an	initial	meeting	to	review	a	series	of	reports	from	various	city	agencies,	the	CHA	decided	to	form	three	subcommittees	on	housing,	education,	and	law	enforcement,	based	on	what	they	saw	as	the	major	problems	in	Harlem.24	As	Hulan	Jack	had	suggested,	these	subcommittees	were	tasked	with	acting	as	liaison	between	Harlem	residents	and	city	officials,	and	set	out	to	conduct	research	on	conditions	in	Harlem	in	order	to	provide	the	Mayor’s	office	with	recommendations	of	possible	programs	for	implementation.	From	its	inception,	the	CHA	came	under	criticism	from	Harlem	residents	who	had	little	faith	that	a	city-sponsored	committee	would	have	any	real	impact	on	improving	conditions	in	Harlem	that	were	deeply	rooted	within	the	city’s	economic	and	political	structures.	In	a	sardonic	critique	of	the	Mayor’s	“compulsion”	for	“government	by	committee,”	New	York	Age	columnist	Chuck	Stone	argued	that	the	CHA	had	little	chance	for	success.	“Committees	don’t	solve	problems,”	Stone	wrote,	“votes,	tough	housing	laws,	court	enforcement	of	these	laws,	and	unbiased	police																																																									23	Office	of	the	Mayor	Press	Release,	September	10,	1959,	Box	5,	Folder	“Housing,	1958-9,”	Papers	of	Hulan	Jack,	New	York	City	Municipal	Archives	(henceforth	referred	to	as	Jack	Papers).		 24	The	structure	and	functions	of	the	CAH	closely	resembled	a	similar	committee	formed	by	Mayor	LaGuardia	following	the	1935	Harlem	rebellion.	Staffed	by	the	likes	of	Countee	Cullen,	A.	Philip	Randolph,	and	E.	Franklin	Frazier,	the	six	subcommittees	of	the	Mayor’s	Commission	reported	on	socio-economic	conditions	in	Harlem	that	led	to	a	“hostile	outburst	against	racial	discrimination	and	poverty.”	Janet	Abu-Lughod,	Race,	Space,	and	Riots	in	Chicago,	New	York,	and	Los	Angeles	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2007),	142-143.	
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protection	solve	problems.”25	Amsterdam	News	editor	James	Hicks	also	openly	doubted	that	the	committee	would	be	able	to	implement	any	suggestions	made	to	it.26		 A	lack	of	genuine	community	representation	was	also	cited	as	a	fundamental	objection	to	the	CHA.	Shortly	after	its	formation,	Hicks	described	the	Committee	as	consisting	of	“a	bunch	of	nice	guys	who	don’t	know	anything	about	the	man	in	the	street.”27	Though	leadership	from	the	New	York	NAACP,	Urban	League,	and	various	civic	associations	were	amongst	the	members	of	the	CHA,	Hicks’	analysis	demonstrated	the	perceived	disconnect	between	these	types	of	middle-class	oriented	organizations	and	the	bulk	of	Harlem’s	poor	and	working-class	communities.	Though	protesters	had	been	in	the	streets	all	month,	CHA	member	and	President	of	the	Peoples	Civic	and	Welfare	Association	Glester	Hinds,	told	reporters	in	late	July	that	there	was	no	tension	in	Harlem.	Furthermore,	Hinds	charged,	“all	people,	regardless	of	race,	should	let	the	law	take	its	course.”28		
																																																								25	Chuck	Stone,	“Okay,	Harlem,	You’re	a	Malted	Milkshake,”	New	York	Age,	undated	newsclipping,	Box	109072B,	Folder	249,	Carro	Files.		 26	Hicks	was	invited	to	appear	before	both	the	Subcommittee	on	Law	Enforcement	and	the	Subcommittee	on	Housing.	In	his	appearance	before	the	former,	Hicks	claimed	that	his	recommendations	to	integrate	Black	officers	into	policy-making	levels	of	the	NYPD	were	“twisted	out	of	shape”	by	Police	Commissioner	Stephen	Kennedy	to	“make	me	appear	as	an	advocate	of	racial	segregation.”	After	this	experience,	Hicks	declined	an	offer	to	appear	before	the	latter	subcommittee,	citing	the	malignant	rejection	and	misrepresentation	of	his	testimony.	Letter	from	James	Hicks	to	Robert	Lowe,	February	23,	1960,	Box	109072C,	Folder	251,	Carro	Files.		 27	“’Tensions’	in	Harlem,”	Baltimore	Afro-American,	September	26,	1959.			 28	“You	Said	It,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	July	25,	1959.	
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It	was	clear	to	many,	however,	that	Hinds	and	others	in	the	CHA	were	out	of	touch	with	those	in	Harlem	who	were	most	disenfranchised	by	political,	economic,	and	social	inequality	and	frustrated	by	the	ineffectiveness	of	the	“course”	of	the	law.	Echoing	the	analyses	of	grassroots	leaders	like	Ella	Baker,	Jesse	Gray,	Mae	Mallory,	and	Malcolm	X,	Stone	and	Hicks	suggested	to	their	readership	that	it	was	this	demographic	which	held	the	reigns	of	political	power	in	the	city.	“In	the	final	analysis,”	Stone	wrote,	“the	real	persons	who	are	going	to	reduce	Harlem’s	problems	to	their	lowest	common	denominator	are	not	Mayor	Wagner	or	his…committee,	but	the	Negroes	themselves.”29	Despite	its	inherent	flaws	and	lack	of	popular	support,	the	CHA	nonetheless	went	to	work	in	Harlem	at	the	dawn	of	the	1960s.	For	the	next	several	months,	the	three	subcommittees	of	the	CAH	met	periodically	to	discuss	their	findings,	write	reports,	and	issue	recommendations.	The	recommendations	issued	to	the	Mayor	are	significant	for	understanding	the	ways	in	which	city	and	civic	leaders	proposed	to	solve	what	they	viewed	as	the	most	pressing	social	problems	in	Harlem	at	that	time.30	Furthermore,	the	responses	that	these	recommendations	received	from	the	corresponding	City	Commissioners	offer	insights	into	how	city	officials	evaluated	their	own	effectiveness	in	addressing	issues	of	inequality	in	Harlem,	along	with	a	metric	by	which	to	gauge	the	willingness	of	city																																																									29	Chuck	Stone,	“Okay,	Harlem,	You’re	a	Malted	Milkshake,”	New	York	Age,	undated	newsclipping,	Box	109072B,	Folder	249,	Carro	Files.		 30	For	the	purposes	of	this	dissertation,	the	findings	and	recommendations	of	the	CHA	are	presented	and	analyzed	in	brief.	Further	scholarship	on	this	committee,	as	well	as	Wagner’s	“government	by	committee”	approach	to	addressing	issues	of	racial	inequality,	is	warranted	for	a	more	comprehensive	analysis	of	the	ways	in	which	liberal	governance	in	New	York	City	sought	to	make	sense	of,	engage	with,	and	de-escalate	demands	and	movements	for	racial	equality	in	the	city.	
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officials	to	engage	with	citizens	through	the	democratic	process	to	reform	government.			
The	Subcommittee	on	Education		At	the	July	21st	meeting,	four	main	suggestions	for	improving	education	were	raised	repeatedly	by	representatives	from	Harlem:	increased	curriculum	in	Harlem	schools,	reduced	split-sessions,	reduced	overcrowding	by	transferring	students	to	under-enrolled	schools,	and	the	assignment	of	experienced	teachers	to	Harlem.31	To	many	Harlem	parents	and	community	members,	each	of	these	recommendations	was	aimed	at	eradicating	symptoms	of	a	segregated	school	system,	which	continued	to	trap	Black	children	in	underdeveloped	schools.	None	of	these	suggestions	were	new,	as	they	had	largely	provided	the	basis	of	struggles	waged	for	educational	equality	in	Harlem	over	the	previous	five	years	in	the	wake	of	the	Brown	v.	Board	decision.	Despite	the	efforts	of	local	leaders	like	Ella	Baker	and	Drs.	Kenneth	and	Mamie	Clark,	however,	there	had	been	little	progress	made	toward	fulfilling	these	demands.	From	the	outset,	it	became	evident	that	the	Subcommittee	on	Education	was	particularly	troubled	by	the	“de	facto”	segregation	of	Harlem	schools,	which	Mae	Mallory	and	the	Harlem	Nine	had	garnered	national	attention	for	fighting	against	the	previous	year.32	Without	mentioning	these	struggles	for	desegregation	in	their	final	report,	the	Subcommittee	criticized	the	Board	of	Education	for	failing	to																																																									31	Memorandum	from	Joyce	Phillips	Austin	to	Deputy	Mayor	Paul	T.	O’Keefe,	August	7,	1959,	Box	109072B,	Folder	249,	Carro	Files.		 32	See	Chapter	Three.		
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implement	any	of	the	recommendations	of	the	Commission	on	Integration,	which	had	arisen	from	the	Brown	decision	under	the	leadership	of	the	Clarks	and	Ella	Baker.	The	implementation	of	these	earlier	recommendations,	the	Subcommittee	argued,	was	“essential	to	relieve	tensions	in	Harlem.”	Furthermore,	the	Subcommittee	found	that	as	a	result	of	the	Board’s	sluggish	and	ineffectual	enactment	of	these	recommendations,	there	had	actually	been	an	increase	in	segregated	schools	over	the	previous	five	years.33		To	resolve	the	problems	associated	with	Harlem’s	separate	and	unequal	schools,	the	Subcommittee	insisted	that	the	COI	recommendations	be	implemented,	requested	timely	reports	on	the	progress	of	school	integration,	and	suggested	that	an	additional	committee	be	established	to	evaluate	the	conditions	of	each	school	in	Harlem.	In	his	official	response	to	these	recommendations,	Superintendent	of	Schools	John	Theobald	offered	little	to	those	looking	for	action	plans	or	guarantees	to	improve	Harlem	schools.	Theobald	balked	at	providing	an	answer	as	to	why	the	COI’s	recommendations	had	not	been	implemented,	rejected	calls	for	an	advisory	committee	to	evaluate	the	conditions	of	schools,	and	promised	that	a	progress	report	on	desegregation	would	be	forthcoming	for	the	first	time	since	1957.	In	essence,	four	months	of	work	from	the	Subcommittee	produced	suggestions	for	further	studies	and	reports	of	conditions	in	Harlem	schools,	and	a	public	rejection	of	these	meager	requests	from	the	Superintendent	of	Schools.		
	
The	Subcommittee	on	Housing																																																									33	Initial	Recommendations	Submitted	by	the	Subcommittee	on	Education,	December	23,	1959,	Box	109072B,	Folder	250,	Carro	Files.	
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In	a	1935	report,	Mayor	LaGuardia’s	Commission	on	the	Harlem	Riot	laid	out	its	suggestions	for	improving	housing	conditions	in	Harlem.	The	Commission’s	primary	points	focused	on	the	need	for	a	planned	housing	program	for	Harlem	to	address	its	shortage	of	sound	units,	and	a	better	enforcement	of	housing	codes.	Additionally,	the	Commission	encouraged	Harlem	tenants	to	organize	and	protest	exorbitant	rents,	and	if	these	failed,	to	engage	in	rent	strikes.	Deemed	too	“radical,”	the	1935	report	was	never	publicly	released,	and	the	problems	it	addressed	remained	largely	unchanged.	Nearly	twenty-five	years	later,	Harlem	was	still	short	on	decent	housing;	building	codes	still	weren’t	being	enforced;	and	tenant	leaders	had	begun	to	revive	a	dormant	rent-strike	movement.	34	With	the	intractable	nature	of	Harlem’s	housing	problems	over	the	previous	two	decades,	the	Subcommittee	on	Housing	was	treading	on	familiar	ground	as	it	began	its	work.	Despite	Councilman	Brown’s	claims,	several	suggestions	were	put	forth	to	combat	Harlem’s	“grave”	housing	problems	at	the	July	21st	meeting.	These	recommendations	demonstrated	a	collective	concern	with	problems	that	remained	unresolved	since	1935,	with	a	few	modern	twists	to	reflect	current	developments.	The	major	points	of	contention	centered	on	urban	renewal	and	tenant	displacement,	enforcement	of	housing	codes	and	laws,	development	of	low	and	middle-income	housing,	and	Black	representation	in	Robert	Moses’	Committee	on	Slum	Clearance.35	
																																																								34	Abu-Lughod,	Race,	Space,	and	Riots	in	Chicago,	New	York,	and	Los	Angeles,	144.		 35	Memorandum	from	Joyce	Phillips	Austin	to	Deputy	Mayor	Paul	T.	O’Keefe,	August	7,	1959,	Box	109072B,	Folder	249,	Carro	Files.	
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These	initial	comments,	though	overshadowed	by	the	controversy	over	policing,	provided	the	foundation	for	the	Subcommittee’s	work	in	the	following	months.			 The	complexity	of	Harlem’s	housing	problems	was	made	clear	in	the	Subcommittee’s	report	to	Mayor	Wagner	that	December.	In	an	eight-page	document	that	implicated	eleven	different	city	agencies,	all	three	branches	of	city	government,	and	several	state	and	federal	departments,	the	Subcommittee	recommended	reforms	pertaining	to	urban	renewal	and	relocation,	sanitation,	building	inspections	and	code	enforcement,	rodent	control,	housing	development,	and	healthcare.36	Of	greatest	concern	to	the	Subcommittee	was	the	need	for	more	housing	units	for	low,	and	particularly,	middle-income	residents,	and	the	careful	relocation	of	residents	displaced	by	urban	renewal	sites.37	Of	more	immediate	concern	to	many	Harlem	residents,	however,	were	the	dangerous	conditions	of	apartments	that	low-income	families	were	largely	confined	to,	as	residential	segregation	made	it	extremely	difficult	to	find	housing	outside	of	the	ghetto.	These	were	the	conditions	that	were	bringing	tenants	out	into	the	streets,	and	filling	the	mailboxes	of	city	officials	with	complaints.	The	Subcommittee	did	offer	recommendations	for	strengthened	building	code	enforcement	and	harsher	penalties	for	neglectful	landlords,	though	
																																																								36	“Initial	Verbatim	Recommendations	Submitted	by	the	Subcommittee	on	Housing,”	December	11,	1959,	Box	109072C,	Folder	251,	Carro	Files.	At	no	point	was	any	mention	of	expanding	Black	homeownership	mentioned,	despite	only	17%	of	non-white	households	in	New	York	City	being	owner-occupied	as	compared	to	40%	of	white	households.	Roberta	Gold,	When	Tenants	Claimed	the	City:	The	
Struggle	for	Citizenship	in	New	York	City	Housing	(Urbana:	University	of	Illinois	Press,	2014),	112.		 37	Memorandum	from	Hope	R.	Stevens	to	Mayor	Robert	Wagner,	February	9,	1960,	Box	109072C,	Folder	251,	Carro	Files.	
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the	Department	of	Buildings	deferred	any	response	pending	the	passage	of	three	bills	in	to	the	City	Council	to	provide	greater	enforcement	powers	to	the	City.	In	the	interim,	the	Department	of	Buildings	conducted	a	wave	of	inspections	in	the	following	months,	turning	up	thousands	of	violations.		 Though	the	Subcommittee	showed	signs	of	class	bias	favoring	moderate	and	middle-income	Harlem	residents	in	some	aspects	of	their	report,	Chairman	Hope	Stevens	touched	upon	a	vital	point	in	a	post-report	memo	to	Mayor	Wagner.	“We	believe	it	to	be	the	greatest	importance,”	Stevens	wrote,	“that	residents	of	the	Harlem	community	be	given	proof	that	they	are	sharing	in	the	development	of	the	city	through	participation	in	its	governmental	functions	at	levels	where	their	influence	can	be	felt.”38	To	Stevens,	a	degree	of	self-determination	for	Harlem’s	Black	residents	was	imperative	if	hostilities	toward	the	city’s	oppressive	white	power	structure	were	to	be	eased.	More	than	any	other	area	of	racial	discrimination,	Stevens	argued,	housing	inequality	most	directly	contributed	to	a	“psychological	situation	around	which	feelings	of	hostility	with	resulting	tensions	will	continue	to	center.”	The	nature	of	this	“psychological	situation,”	Stevens	warned	Wagner	in	conclusion,	could	be	greatly	influenced	by	the	Mayor’s	efforts	to	empower	Harlem	residents	by	providing	political	representation	at	policy-making	levels	to	promote	a	sense	of	collective	agency.	Like	Jesse	Gray,	Stevens	understood	the	political	gravity	of	the	housing	question	in	Harlem,	and	his	warning	to	the	Mayor	proved	prescient.	The	Mayor’s	responses	to	the	housing	question	had	profound	impacts	on	the	
																																																								38	Memorandum	from	Hope	R.	Stevens	to	Mayor	Robert	Wagner,	February	9,	1960,	Box	109072C,	Folder	251,	Carro	Files.	
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direction	of	struggles	for	rights	and	power	in	the	city	and	will	be	explored	in	greater	detail	in	the	following	section.	
	
The	Subcommittee	on	Law	Enforcement	
			 The	heated	public	debate	around	the	actions	and	policies	of	the	NYPD	in	the	immediate	wake	of	the	“near-riot”	swelled	as	the	Subcommittee	on	Law	Enforcement	got	to	work.	Speaking	to	a	crowd	of	nearly	5,000	gathered	at	125th	Street	and	7th	Avenue	for	the	annual	Marcus	Garvey	Day	celebration	in	early	August,	United	African	Nationalist	Movement	president	James	Lawson	blasted	the	NYPD	for	its	rampant	brutality	against	African	Americans,	called	for	Black	police	captains	in	Black	neighborhoods,	and	demanded	Stephen	Kennedy’s	resignation	as	police	commissioner.39			 Though	the	nationalist	leader	had	been	painted	as	a	dangerous	militant	in	“The	Hate	That	Hate	Produced”	just	weeks	earlier,	Lawson’s	comments	at	the	rally	were	hardly	radical,	and	certainly	not	unique.	Indeed,	his	charges	of	police	misconduct	and	demands	for	Black	representation	within	the	upper	ranks	of	the	NYPD	had	been	brought	up	by	others	at	the	July	21st	meeting	and	consequently	became	major	focal	points	of	the	Subcommittee	on	Law	Enforcement’s	deliberations.	For	two	months,	the	Subcommittee	held	weekly	meetings	and	conferred	with	individuals	and	representatives	of	various	organizations	and	city	departments,	including	Amsterdam	News	editor	James	Hicks,	and	the	Black	police	union	of	the	NYPD,	the	Guardians	Association.																																																										39	“Nationalists	Demand	Kennedy’s	Dismissal,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	August	8,	1959.	
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	 The	political	tug-of-war	that	ensued	over	the	Subcommittee	on	Law	Enforcement	elevated	a	host	of	deep-seated	racial	problems	within	the	NYPD’s	policies	and	practices	of	policing	Black	communities	in	New	York	City	to	a	higher	level	in	public	discourse	and	warrants	a	more	extensive	analysis.	In	their	November	report,	the	Subcommittee	put	forth	nine	recommendations	for	improving	relations	between	the	police	and	Harlem	community.	These	included:	the	appointment	of	a	Black	Deputy	Commissioner,	ending	the	common	police	practice	of	using	Harlem	as	a	training	ground,	improved	race	and	human	relations	training	for	police,	expanded	public	relations	efforts,	ending	illegal	searches	and	seizures,	and	increasing	the	number	of	Black	officers	on	the	force.	In	essence,	the	Subcommittee’s	recommendations	demonstrated	a	primary	concern	with	improving	the	image	of	the	police	in	Harlem	through	greater	Black	representation	within	the	NYPD,	improved	interpersonal	police	training,	and	through	curbing	some	of	the	most	flagrant	abuses	commonly	reported	by	Harlem	residents.	Notably	absent	from	the	report,	however,	was	any	mention	or	suggestion	of	disciplinary	procedures	for	police	officers	that	violated	departmental	policies	or	infringed	upon	the	civil	rights	of	Black	citizens.40				 Although	the	liberal	nature	of	these	recommendations	posed	hardly	any	threat	to	the	fundamental	structures	or	powers	of	the	NYPD,	they	were	nonetheless	met	with	a	characteristically	defensive	response	from	Commissioner	Kennedy.	Doubling	down	on	his	previous	refusal	to	hire	more	Black	officers,	Kennedy	misrepresented	the	Subcommittee’s	recommendation	as	an	illegal	quota	system,	
																																																								40	Recommendations	of	the	Subcommittee	on	Law	Enforcement,	November	12,	1959,	Box	109072C,	Folder	251,	Carro	Files.	
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and	declared	that	appointments	in	the	NYPD	would	not	be	made	“on	the	basis	of	politics,	color,	race	or	religion.”	Kennedy	went	on	to	describe	his	efforts	to	professionalize	the	police	force,	expand	human	relations	training,	and	profess	his	opposition	to	police	misconduct	as	a	means	of	dismissing	each	concern	laid	out	in	the	Subcommittee’s	recommendations.	As	a	means	of	deflecting	responsibility	for	racial	tensions	in	Harlem	away	from	the	NYPD,	the	Commissioner	put	forth	a	narrative	suggesting	that	police	were	being	unjustly	treated	as	scapegoats	for	“the	long	accumulated	ills	of	the	Harlem	community.”	Kennedy	explained	that	strained	police-community	relations	in	Harlem	were	a	result	not	of	police	malfeasance,	but	of	citizens	taking	out	their	frustrations	over	racial	oppression	on	officers	merely	trying	to	fulfill	their	duty	to	“protect	the	community	as	a	whole.”41			 Kennedy’s	response	was	met	with	a	predictably	damning	public	rebuke	from	the	members	of	the	Subcommittee	and	other	public	figures	in	Harlem.	Subcommittee	Chairman	Thomas	Dyett	called	Kennedy’s	comments	a	“vituperative	outburst	of	fury,”	and	suggested	that	the	Commissioner’s	hostility	was	based	on	his	realization	that	tensions	in	Harlem	had	grown	“steadily	and	even	alarmingly”	under	his	leadership.	In	this	scathing	critique,	Dyett	addressed	several	of	Kennedy’s	claims,	giving	particular	attention	to	the	lack	of	Black	officers	and	illegal	searches	and	seizures.	Expanding	on	the	Subcommittee’s	insistence	on	the	“psychological	importance”	of	having	more	Black	officers	in	the	NYPD,	Dyett	argued	that	Kennedy’s	
																																																								41	Letter	from	Stephen	P.	Kennedy	to	Mayor	Robert	F.	Wagner,	January	14,	1960,	Box	109072B,	Folder	249,	Carro	Files.	
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failure	to	appoint	a	Black	deputy	commissioner	could	give	the	impression	that	the	Police	Commissioner	“intends	to	maintain	a	lily-white	staff.”42		Furthermore,	Dyett	contended	that	the	appointment	of	only	white	men	as	Deputy	Commissioners	“may	in	itself	be	telling	evidence	of	discrimination.”	Black	residents	of	New	York	City	hardly	needed	Dyett	to	tell	them	what	they	already	believed	to	be	true.	It	certainly	did	not	appear	coincidental	to	many	that	in	a	police	force	of	23,000	there	were	only	1,200	Black	officers	(5.2%);	that	of	60	inspectors	only	one	was	Black	(1.6%);	that	of	212	captains	there	was	not	a	single	Black	officer;	or	that	only	10	of	750	lieutenants	were	Black	(1.3%).43	The	significance	of	Dyett’s	claim	lay	not	in	the	observation	of	racial	disparity,	but	in	the	premise	of	his	argument,	which	held	that	a	disparate	adverse	impact	of	otherwise	race-neutral	policies	on	a	particular	racial	group	constituted	evidence	of	racial	discrimination.	It	would	be	another	five	years	before	this	argument	became	codified	in	federal	law	through	the	passage	of	the	1964	Civil	Rights	Act.	Like	the	Black	mothers	of	the	Harlem	Nine,	Dyett	had	issued	a	challenge	to	the	system	of	de	facto,	yet	government	supported,	segregation	in	the	city,	which	officials	like	Kennedy	had	tried	to	mask	with	rhetoric	that	professed	allegiance	to	racial	equality.		In	addition	to	his	criticism	of	racial	discrimination	in	employment	and	promotion,	Dyett	also	took	Kennedy	to	task	for	his	apparent	justification	of	illegal	searches	and	seizures.	Though	Kennedy	noted	in	his	comments	that	he	did	not																																																									42	“Comments	on	Recommendations	of	Sub-Committee	on	Law	Enforcement,”	February	19,	1960,	Box	109072C,	Folder	252,	Carro	Files.		 43	“Commissioner	Ought	to	Resign’:	Powell	Blasts	N.Y.	Police	Dep’t,”	New	
Pittsburgh	Courier,	March	5,	1960.	
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condone	such	conduct,	he	nonetheless	went	on	to	justify	its	occurrence	based	on	the	difficulties	officers	faced	in	making	“split-second”	decisions	about	the	civil	and	human	rights	of	those	involved	in	an	alleged	crime.44	“These	split-second	decisions,”	Dyett	charged,	have	at	times	included	the	shooting	of	teenagers	running	away	from	the	scene	of	a	crime,	resulting	in	the	handing	out	of	a	death	sentence	by	an	over-zealous	or	perhaps	vicious	policeman	for	an	offense	for	which	the	Court	of	Appeals	might	hesitate	to	approve	capital	punishment.45		While	Kennedy	tried	to	spin	the	lived	experiences	of	Harlem	residents	into	a	narrative	of	police	benevolence	in	the	face	of	community	hostility,	Dyett	attempted	to	provide	a	check	on	the	Commissioner’s	propagandistic	interpretation.	This	advocacy	from	the	Subcommittee	on	Law	Enforcement	far	outpaced	that	of	the	other	two	Subcommittees	of	the	HAC,	yet	still	proved	largely	ineffectual	in	producing	meaningful	police	reform.		 Kennedy’s	continued	intransigence	also	prompted	Adam	Clayton	Powell	to	escalate	his	critiques	of	the	embattled	Police	Commissioner	in	early	1960.	As	he	had	during	the	July	21st	meeting	at	City	Hall,	Powell	continued	to	demand	greater	Black	representation	amongst	the	ranks	of	the	NYPD.	During	a	February	sermon	at	the	Abyssinian	Baptist	Church,	Powell	berated	Kennedy	for	his	repeated	refusals	to	comply	with	the	recommendations	of	the	CHA.	Powell	echoed	Judge	Dyett’s	charge	
																																																								44	Letter	from	Stephen	P.	Kennedy	to	Mayor	Robert	F.	Wagner,	January	14,	1960,	Box	109072B,	Folder	249,	Carro	Files.		45	“Comments	on	Recommendations	of	Sub-Committee	on	Law	Enforcement,”	February	19,	1960,	Box	109072C,	Folder	252,	Carro	Files.	
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that	the	Commissioner	had	created	a	“lily-white”	department,	and	went	on	to	demand	Kennedy’s	resignation.46		 About	a	month	later,	Powell	expanded	upon	his	sermon	in	a	statement	published	in	the	Pittsburgh	Courier.	After	explaining	in	detail	his	demands	for	Black	representation	in	policy-making	positions	within	the	NYPD,	Powell	expressed	concern	over	the	patterns	of	police	repression	that	frequently	followed	any	public	protests	over	police	actions.	“The	immediate	answer	they	get,”	Powell	charged,	“is	an	arrogant	statement	in	the	press	from	the	Commissioner	immediately	followed	by	the	dispatching	of	‘shock	troops’	to	the	area	in	an	open	attempt	to	intimidate	the	people.”	Powell’s	analysis	certainly	rang	true	for	the	“near-riot”	months	earlier,	and	countless	other	protests	of	police	misconduct	in	the	years	and	decades	prior.	Repeating	his	demand	for	the	Commissioner	to	resign,	Powell	suggested	that	the	Mayor	appoint	“an	interim	board	of	responsible	citizens	to	clean	up	the	mess”	in	the	police	department.	Powell	insisted	that	as	a	basic	tenet	of	a	democratic	society,	police	power	must	be	subjected	to	civilian	control	“under	the	will	of	the	people.”	Kennedy’s	dogged	refusal	to	submit	to	the	will	of	the	people	in	Harlem	and	beyond	reaffirmed	for	the	Congressman	and	his	constituents	the	need	to	seek	out	and	fight	for	the	realization	of	this	democratic	ideal.	With	Kennedy’s	hostility	to	sensible	police	reform	supported	by	the	Mayor	on	one	side,	and	surging	demands	for	police	accountability	and	community	control	on	the	other,	the	Subcommittee’s	efforts	proved	to	merely	stoke	the	tinder	of	a	looming	wildfire.	
																																																								46	Emanuel	Perlmutter,	“Powell	Demands	Kennedy	Resign,”	New	York	Times,	February	8,	1960.		
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	 In	a	meeting	of	the	Subcommittee	on	Law	Enforcement	with	Mayor	Wagner	in	April	1960,	Jack	Blumstein	expressed	several	points	that	were	indicative	of	the	general	ineffectiveness	of	the	Committee	on	Harlem	Affairs	in	resolving	issues	of	inequality	in	Harlem.	Despite	the	eight	months	of	work	put	in	by	the	three	subcommittees	of	the	CHA,	Blumstein	pointed	out	that	racial	tensions	in	Harlem	were	still	high,	and	that	“a	spark	could	set	off	real	trouble.”	Blumstein’s	comments	were	nearly	identical	to	those	of	Mayor	Wagner	the	previous	July	when	he	announced	the	formation	of	the	Committee.	“Positive	action	and	quick	help	is	needed,”	Blumstein	argued,	insisting	that	Black	communities	needed	to	be	“made	aware	and	aroused	sufficiently”	to	feel	as	though	they	had	a	voice	in	government	and	were	“a	part	of	the	team	to	maintain	law	and	order.”47		 The	reason	for	the	CHA’s	ineffectiveness	lay	inherently	in	the	premise	upon	which	the	committee	was	founded.	As	conceived	by	Mayor	Wagner,	the	purpose	of	the	CHA	was	not	to	solve	the	problems	of	inequality	caused	by	institutional	racism	in	the	city,	but	rather	to	ease	racial	tensions	in	Harlem	through	making	the	government	appear	more	amenable	to	calls	for	Black	equality	and	empowerment.	“The	best	way	to	refuse	to	grapple	with	a	problem,”	Chuck	Stone	opined,	“is	to	appoint	a	committee.”48	This	government-by-committee	approach	to	investigating	and	reporting	on	racial	tensions	in	Harlem	was	exemplary	of	liberal	approaches	to	issues	of	racial	inequality	in	New	York	City.	Rather	than	attempting	to	meaningfully																																																									47	“Remarks	of	Mr.	Jack	Blumstein	Meeting	of	Mayor	with	Subcommittee	on	Law	Enforcement,	April	7,	1960,”	Box	109072B,	Folder	249,	Carro	Files.		 48	Chuck	Stone,	“Okay,	Harlem,	You’re	a	Malted	Milkshake,”	New	York	Age,	undated	newsclipping,	Box	109072B,	Folder	249,	Carro	Files.	
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address	the	root	causes	of	racial	and	economic	inequality,	this	approach	dealt	with	their	symptoms	in	an	attempt	to	ensure	tranquility	rather	than	to	promote	justice.			 	Because	of	its	fundamentally	flawed	and	limited	premise,	the	CHA	proved	more	effective	in	further	straining	relations	between	Black	communities	in	Harlem	and	City	Hall	than	in	cooling	the	volatile	racial	and	political	climate	that	had	provoked	unrest	in	the	first	place.	Though	there	was	little	public	faith	from	the	start	that	the	CHA	would	be	able	to	enact	any	meaningful	reform	in	Harlem,	the	Committee’s	futility	in	implementing	even	the	most	conservative	measures	of	reform	affirmed	an	increasingly	popular	cynicism	of	city	government’s	ability	to	act	upon	the	interests	of	Black	communities	in	New	York	City.		Furthermore,	although	one	of	the	guiding	principles	of	the	Committee	was	to	promote	greater	dialogue	between	local	people	and	city	government,	few	efforts	were	actually	made	to	include	any	representation	from	the	ranks	of	those	in	the	city	most	adversely	affected	by	the	daily	assaults	of	institutional	racism.	In	a	report	to	the	Subcommittee	on	Law	Enforcement,	the	Guardians	Association	suggested	that	this	demographic,	“the	unfortunate,	underprivileged,	and	unstable	elements,”	must	be	represented	within	city	government,	for	they	were	the	“most	likely	group	to	cause	a	major	community	disorder.”49	Seeking	redress	for	the	violence	of	institutional	racism	and	finding	little	representation	in	city	government,	greater	numbers	of	disenfranchised	Harlem	residents	became	mobilized	at	the	dawn	of	the	1960s	to	engage	in	organized	grassroots	struggles	for	civil	rights,	human	rights,	and	
																																																								49	Memo	from	the	Guardians	Association	to	the	Harlem	Affairs	Committee,	September	30,	1959,	Box	109072B,	Folder	249,	Carro	Files.	
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political	power.	With	demands	for	Black	equality	and	empowerment	surging	locally	and	nationally,	the	ideological	rift	between	City	Hall	and	Harlem	appeared	to	be	only	widening,	despite	the	nominal	efforts	of	the	CHA	to	narrow	the	gap	as	the	new	decade	began.		
Tenants	Rights,	Human	Rights,	and	Political	Power	in	Harlem		
	 Though	grassroots	community	leadership	was	mostly	excluded	from	the	formation	and	proceedings	of	the	CHA,	many	leaders	and	residents	saw	the	Committee	as	a	political	tool	and	seized	on	the	opportunity	to	raise	their	concerns	and	demands	to	city	officials.	While	struggles	for	equality	in	education,	housing,	employment,	and	policing	had	been	in	motion	well	before	the	summer	of	1959,	the	dramatic	events	that	unfolded	that	summer	in	New	York	and	the	nation	forced	these	fights	for	civil	and	human	rights	to	the	fore	of	popular	consciousness	in	Harlem.	One	of	the	key	movers	in	this	groundswell	of	activism	in	Harlem,	Jesse	Gray’s	burgeoning	tenant	movement	was	also	a	primary	beneficiary	of	the	heightened	visibility	the	summer	of	1959	provided.	Gray’s	organizing	efforts	to	capitalize	on	this	political	momentum	were	aided	by	a	flood	of	coverage	of	Harlem	housing	conditions	in	local	newspapers,	particularly	the	Amsterdam	News.	On	the	heels	of	Gray’s	recently	launched	rent	strikes	and	the	subsequent	“near	riot,”	the	Amsterdam	News	devoted	nearly	an	entire	edition	to	covering	housing	problems	in	Harlem	and	exhorting	readers	to	take	action.	In	what	the	editorial	board	described	as	an	effort	to	“shock	the	moral	conscience	of	the	city,”	the	front	fold	of	the	paper	was	covered	with	photographs	of	
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Black	men,	women,	and	children	holding	large	rats	they	had	killed	in	their	Harlem	apartments.	More	photographs	of	Black	women	and	their	children	who	had	been	bitten	by	rats	appeared	in	the	following	pages,	alongside	a	column	describing	some	of	the	recent	infant	victims	of	these	“vicious,	flesh-loving”	rodents.50	Like	Gray,	the	Amsterdam	News	emphasized	the	horrific	impacts	that	rat-infested	apartments	had	on	Black	women	and	children	to	elicit	sympathy	and	outrage	amongst	their	readership.	Furthermore,	to	broaden	their	audience	and	gain	the	support	of	“the	entire	city,”	the	editorial	board	explicitly	encouraged	clubs,	civic	organizations,	and	individuals	to	clip	out	the	page	of	photographs	and	share	them	with	people	who	may	not	have	been	aware	of	the	housing	conditions	in	Harlem.	“We	know	of	no	better	way	to	convince	city	officials	that	the	problem	does	exist,”	an	explanatory	editorial	argued,	“than	by	showing	them	the	actual	truth	in	pictures.”	This	media	tact	was	not	merely	an	attempt	to	cast	sunlight	on	a	festering	illness	as	a	means	of	disinfecting—it	was	a	call	to	political	action.	To	familiarize	their	readership	with	the	city	officials	“responsible	for	it	all,”	the	editorial	board	plastered	their	headshots,	names,	and	titles	directly	below	the	photographs	of	rat-bitten	babies	and	their	mothers.51		
																																																								50	“Rats	Who	Run	Harlem,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	July	25,	1959;	“Wonder	Why	Harlem	is	Mad?—Here’s	Your	Answer,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	July	25,	1959;	“Courts	Fine	Landlords	$5	in	Rat	Bite	Cases,”	New	York	Amsterdam	
News,	July	25,	1959.		 51	“We	Apologize	(An	Editorial),”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	July	25,	1959;	“Wonder	Why	Harlem	is	Mad?—Here’s	Your	Answer,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	July	25,	1959.	
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	 The	tactic	proved	effective,	as	letters	poured	into	the	offices	of	the	Mayor	and	Borough	President	in	the	following	weeks	and	months.	Desperate	Harlem	residents	complained	of	unsanitary	conditions,	infestations	of	rats,	roaches,	and	mice,	and	having	gone	days	or	longer	without	hot	water.	The	influx	of	correspondence	and	media	attention	fueled	by	protests	in	the	streets	resonated	throughout	City	Hall	and	prompted	Hulan	Jack	and	Deputy	Commissioner	of	Buildings	Harold	Birns	to	expand	the	number	of	buildings	they	inspected	in	the	early	fall.52	Few	residents,	however,	had	reason	to	believe	that	inspections	and	the	nominal	fines	for	violations	that	typically	followed	were	capable	of	forcing	landlords	to	make	repairs	of	their	buildings.	This	lack	of	faith	in	city	agencies	to	expediently	resolve	pressing	housing	problems	made	joining	Gray	and	the	Lower	Harlem	Tenants	Council’s	rent	strike	a	more	appealing	option	for	many.	In	one	striking	building	on	West	118th	Street,	tenants	had	been	without	hot	water	for	over	five	months	when	they	joined	the	strike.53	In	early	August,	Gray	announced	that	two	more	buildings	had	joined,	bringing	the	total	number	of	striking	buildings	to	twenty-one.54	By	the	end	of	the	month,	the	New	York	Herald	Tribune	reported	that	125	buildings	in	the	area	
																																																								52	For	letters	from	constituents	received	by	Hulan	Jack,	see	Box	5,	Folder	“Harlem	and	East	Harlem,”	Jack	Papers.		 53	“118th	Street	Tenants	Join	Rent	Strike,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	September	5,	1959.		 54	“Rent	Strike	Spreads	to	More	Houses,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	August	8,	1959.		
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bounded	by	Fifth	and	Eighth	Avenues	and	110th	and	118th	Streets	were	engaged	in	the	rent	strike.55			 Though	the	LHTC’s	rent	strike	brought	people	into	the	streets	by	the	dozens	and	hundreds	to	take	part	in	protests	and	rallies,	direct	action	campaigns	were	but	one	facet	of	Gray’s	organizing	arsenal.	During	his	many	years	of	organizing	in	Harlem,	Gray	had	demonstrated	his	skillful	abilities	to	deal	with	political	movements	both	in	the	streets	and	in	the	suites.	Although	much	of	the	scholarly	attention	that	Gray	has	received	focuses	on	his	showmanship	in	the	streets,	including	dramatic	anti-eviction	demonstrations	and	militant	street	corner	rhetoric,	his	skillful	maneuverings	within	the	political	system	have	been	under-recognized.56	In	1953,	Gray	and	the	Harlem	Tenants	Council	successfully	waged	“a	great	struggle”	to	save	rent	control	in	New	York	City	when	Governor	Thomas	Dewey	proposed	a	15%	rent	increase	across	the	board	in	the	state.		Three	years	later,	Gray	and	the	HTC	achieved	“a	major	break”	in	the	community	when	they	forced	the	passage	of	the	Rooming	House	Bill	in	1956.57	By	the	early	1950s,	single	room	occupancy	(SRO)	dwellings,	or	rooming	houses,	had	become	the	targets	of	urban	developers,	such	as	Robert	Moses,	for	demolition	and																																																									55	It	is	likely	that	this	number	was	inflated,	given	the	stark	jump	in	buildings	reported	to	be	on	strike	from	21	to	125	in	the	course	of	one	month.	“Tenants	Picket	W.	Side	Tenement,”	New	York	Herald	Tribune,	September	2,	1959.		 56	See	Joel	Schwartz,	“Tenant	Power	in	the	Liberal	City,	1943-1971,”	in	The	
Tenant	Movement	in	New	York	City,	1904-1984,	ed.	Ronald	Lawson	and	Mark	Naison	(New	Brunswick:	Rutgers	University	Press,	1986).		 57	Jesse	Gray	interview	with	Katherine	M.	Shannon,	July	26,	1967,	Ralph	Bunche	Oral	History	Collection,	Moorland-Spingarn	Research	Center,	Howard	University	Libraries.	
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redevelopment	due	to	a	popular	narrative	that	painted	rooming	house	residents	as	predominantly	Black	men	who	were	criminal	elements	in	society	and	a	leading	source	of	urban	blight.	In	reality,	however,	SRO	units	were	often	the	only	lodgings	that	tens	of	thousands	of	poor	and	working-class	Black	families	could	afford,	or	find,	given	the	severe	housing	shortage	in	Harlem.	The	bill	that	Gray	and	the	HTC	succeeded	in	pushing	through	was	designed	to	stop	the	summary	eviction	of	tenants	from	SRO	units	and	to	provide	a	legal	guarantee	of	due	process	for	thousands	of	SRO	tenants.		While	coordinating	the	rent	strikes	in	the	summer	of	1959	on	a	building-by-building,	and	block-by-block	basis	to	demand	building	repairs	in	the	short-run,	Gray	was	also	using	this	political	mobilization	to	advocate	for	long-term	legislative	reform.	In	a	letter	to	Hulan	Jack	in	August	1959,	Gray	charged	that	the	squalid	housing	conditions	that	were	allowed	by	City	Hall	to	proliferate	in	Harlem	were	caused	in	part	by	“unscrupulous	landlords	who	hire	wine-bibbers	and	dope	addicts	as	Superintendents.”	In	addition	to	the	abdication	of	their	duties	which	created	unsafe	living	conditions,	Gray	argued	that	having	addicts	or	drunks	as	building	superintendents	also	attracted	more	addicts	to	congregate	in	the	building’s	vicinity,	making	the	housing	problem	“more	trying.”	To	rectify	this	problem,	Gray	and	the	Lower	Harlem	Tenant	Council	demanded	that	new	standards	and	requirements	be	set	for	superintendents,	including	criminal	background	checks	and	quarterly	inspections	from	city	agencies.	Gray	suggested	that	this	legislative	reform	would	
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“immediately	improve	the	overall	housing	situation	in	Harlem,”	adding	that	the	demand	was	backed	by	the	residents	of	the	21	buildings	on	rent	strike	at	that	time.58				Less	than	a	month	later,	the	Borough	President	sent	an	impassioned	letter	to	Mayor	Wagner	describing	at	length	his	position	on	the	housing	question	in	New	York	and	offering	legislative	solutions	to	address	what	he	called	“the	most	explosive	issue	since	Civil	Rights.”	Though	Jack’s	concerns	with	housing	had	developed	over	a	number	of	years,	the	influence	of	Gray’s	demands	on	Jack’s	analysis	were	evident	in	his	correspondence	with	the	Mayor.	Citing	the	rampant	problem	of	landlords	hiring	inexperienced	or	irresponsible	superintendents	as	one	of	the	“greatest	evils”	leading	to	housing	deterioration,	Jack	urged	the	Mayor	to	appoint	a	city	administrator	to	prepare	and	introduce	legislation	to	regulate	the	employment	of	superintendents.	Jack	also	suggested	that	the	Mayor	support	legislation	to	permit	the	Department	of	Buildings	and	Department	of	Health	to	seize	rents	from	intransigent	landlords	and	make	necessary	repairs	to	housing	units.	59		The	latter	suggestion	echoed	a	demand	that	Gray	had	been	raising	for	nearly	a	decade—that	government	be	given	the	power	to	take	control	of	private	property	to	make	emergency	repairs	for	tenants	when	landlords	were	either	unwilling	or	unable	to	do	so.	Though	criticized	by	a	city	planning	official	for	being	“impatient”	and	“pressing	for	faster	action	than	we	can	achieve,”	Jack	was	not	alone	in	his	
																																																								58	Letter	from	Jesse	Gray	to	Hulan	Jack,	August	4,	1959,	Box	5,	Folder	“Harlem	and	East	Harlem,”	Jack	Papers.		 59	Letter	from	Hulan	Jack	to	Hon.	Robert	F.	Wagner,	September	2,	1959,	Box	5,	Folder	“Harlem	and	East	Harlem,”	Jack	Papers.	
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support	for	a	receivership	law.60	In	early	1960,	the	New	York	City	Council	called	upon	the	State	Legislature	to	pass	a	receivership	bill	introduced	by	Senator	James	Watson.	The	bill	naturally	had	the	active	support	of	Gray,	who	brought	a	“mass	delegation”	of	tenants	from	the	LHTC	to	Albany	that	February	to	demand	the	bill’s	passage,	along	with	other	legislative	acts	to	improve	housing	conditions	in	Harlem.61	Despite	this	support	from	community	activists	and	city	officials,	the	receivership	bill	failed	to	make	it	through	the	Republican-controlled	state	legislature.	It	would	be	another	two	years	until	such	a	bill	was	enacted	in	New	York	City.		In	addition	to	making	legislative	headway,	it	was	clear	that	by	1960	Gray’s	tenant	movement	was	gaining	popular	momentum	in	the	city,	and	was	capable	of	scoring	some	tangible	benefits	for	low-income	renters	in	Harlem.	Coupled	with	the	radical	zeitgeist	of	the	summer	of	1959,	Gray’s	rent	strike	and	organizing	efforts	had	made	Harlem’s	housing	problems	a	top	priority	for	city	officials.	The	ensuing	“cellar-to-roof”	inspections	conducted	by	the	Department	of	Buildings	and	Department	of	Health	revealed	thousands	of	violations	in	Harlem	tenements,	led	to	stiffer	fines	and	summons	for	slumlords,	and	prompted	long-overdue	repairs.	The	resulting	court	proceedings	against	landlords	were	indicative	of	a	changing	popular	tune	when	it	came	to	building	code	enforcement	in	the	city.	When	the	attorney	for	a	Harlem	landlord	brought	to	trial	likened	the	high	bail	set	for	his	client	to	that	set	for	“murderers,”	a	city	magistrate	sharply	retorted,	“is	it	less	than	murder	to	allow																																																									60	“Felt	Gives	Harlem	‘Priority’	in	Housing,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	January	16,	1960.		 61	“Council	Asks	State	Back	Watson	Bill,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	February	20,	1960.	
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buildings	to	deteriorate	and	jeopardize	the	health	and	welfare	of	the	tenants?”	The	landlord	was	eventually	fined	over	$3,000	and	given	60	days	to	rectify	the	violations.62		These	victories,	though	perhaps	minor	in	the	grand	scheme,	were	significant	for	movement	building	and	endeared	Gray	to	those	residents	of	Harlem	most	adversely	impacted	by	race-based	housing	and	economic	injustice.	As	Gray’s	stature	grew	in	the	hallways	of	Harlem	tenements	and	in	the	corridors	of	City	Hall,	accolades	began	to	pour	in	for	the	dynamic	leader.	Readers	of	the	Amsterdam	News	sent	in	hundreds	of	ballots	nominating	Gray	for	the	honorary	title	of	“Mayor	of	Harlem”	in	1959.63	After	delivering	an	impassioned	plea	for	better	housing	during	a	hearing	on	welfare	at	the	Upper	Manhattan	Court	in	1960,	Gray	was	reportedly	“showered	with	kisses	from	housewives.”64	A	letter	to	the	editor	of	the	Amsterdam	
News	in	1961	lauded	Gray	as	a	“patron	saint”	to	tenants	in	Harlem.65		Through	winning	tangible	benefits	for	his	constituents	through	direct	action	campaigns	and	legislative	lobbying,	Gray	and	the	LHTC	were	taking	pivotal	steps	towards	building	a	grassroots	movement	of	poor	Black	Harlem	residents	for	economic	and	political	empowerment.	Although	he	did	not	“see	the	revolution																																																									62	“Harlem	Landlady	Pleads	Guilty	to	18	Violations,”	New	York	Herald	
Tribune,	April	12,	1960;	“Woman	Landlord	Fined	$3,380,	Put	on	Probation,”	New	
York	Herald	Tribune,	April	23,	1960.		 63	“Ten	Nominated	For	Mayor	of	Harlem,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	September	19,	1959.		 64	Les	Matthews,	“Mr.	1-2-5	Street,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	November	19,	1960.		 65	John	Hill,	“Manifesto,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	March	18,	1961.	
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around	the	corner,”	as	Northern	Student	Movement	organizer	Danny	Schechter	would	later	note,	Gray’s	understanding	of	the	processes	of	societal	transformation	emphasized	the	“need	to	organize	people	around	struggle.”66	The	education	that	Gray	received	during	his	time	in	the	NMU	and	Community	Party,	along	with	his	subsequent	organizing	experience	in	New	York,	informed	his	analysis	that	“struggle	unifies	the	community.”67	By	organizing	tenants	to	demand	improved	housing	conditions,	Gray	sought	to	not	only	empower	renters	to	improve	their	daily	lives,	but	to	unify	the	community	through	struggle	to	demand	and	eventually	seize	economic	and	political	power	in	the	city.	Gray’s	efforts	to	mobilize	Harlem	tenants	and	improve	housing	conditions	in	the	early	1960s	were	characterized	by	this	duality	between	long-range	movement	building	and	pragmatic	housing	reform	for	tangible	gains	in	the	short-run.	The	pressing	realities	of	housing	conditions	in	Harlem	made	it	necessary	for	the	LHTC	to	use	whatever	tools	were	available	to	protect	tenants	and	demand	housing	justice,	which	at	times	meant	working	through	the	channels	of	liberal	housing	reform.	This	duality	largely	characterized	the	surging	organizing	efforts	of	Gray	and	the	LHTC	from	1960-1962.		Throughout	1960,	the	LHTC	waged	direct	action	campaigns	to	force	city	agencies	to	conduct	inspections	of	Harlem	housing	units	and	hold	landlords	accountable	for	rampant	violations.	Though	Gray	was	the	figurehead	of	these	
																																																								66	Danny	Schechter,	News	Dissector:	Passions,	Pieces,	and	Polemics,	1960-2000	(New	York:	Akashic	Books,	2001),	39-40.		 67	Jesse	Gray	interview	with	Katherine	M.	Shannon,	July	26,	1967.		
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demonstrations,	the	majority	of	the	feet	on	the	streets	belonged	to	Black	women	who	carried	signs	and	picketed	in	front	of	various	tenements	and	city	administration	buildings	to	demand	inspections	and	repairs.	While	coordinating	these	protests	in	favor	of	liberal	housing	reform,	Gray	was	also	orchestrating	political	campaigns	in	an	attempt	to	translate	this	groundswell	of	grassroots	mobilization	into	a	movement	for	community	control	of	the	levers	of	governmental	power	in	Harlem.		That	June,	Gray	and	the	LHTC	challenged	the	political	mainstream	in	Harlem	by	backing	a	slate	of	candidates	for	judicial	posts	on	the	Tenth	Municipal	Court.	The	posts	were	of	particular	interest	to	Harlem	tenants,	as	these	justices	were	responsible	for	ruling	on	the	grievances	levied	by	tenants	against	neglectful	and	exploitative	landlords.	The	week	before	the	primary,	100	delegates	to	the	LHTC’s	annual	convention	voted	to	endorse	the	candidacy	of	incumbent	Justice	Herman	Stoute	and	challenger	Connie	Jones	for	the	two	seats	on	the	bench—thereby	opposing	candidates	supported	by	Adam	Clayton	Powell,	Jr.’s	United	Democratic	Leadership	Team.	The	LHTC’s	decision	to	formally	endorse	these	candidates	came	after	the	president-justice	of	the	Municipal	Court	rejected	the	organization’s	demands	that	he	dismiss	“pro-landlord”	Justice	Maxwell	P.	Shapiro.	In	responding	to	the	court’s	rebuke,	however,	Gray	and	the	LHTC	did	not	limit	their	involvement	to	an	endorsement	of	alternative	candidates	for	the	bench.	At	the	convention,	Gray	also	sent	a	more	dramatic	message	to	the	white	power	structure	in	Harlem,	when	he	
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announced	that	Justice	Shapiro	would	be	“hanged	in	effigy”	at	a	mass	rally	at	125th	Street	and	Seventh	Avenue	that	weekend.68	In	1961,	when	state	rent	control	laws	were	up	for	renewal,	the	LHTC	again	directed	their	energies	toward	ensuring	that	a	proposed	statewide	rent	increase	would	not	make	it	through	the	Legislature.	The	LHTC	and	other	housing	organizations	called	upon	political,	religious,	and	civic	leaders	to	oppose	the	increase	and	held	several	rallies	along	with	other	organizations	to	drum	up	popular	opposition	and	resistance	to	the	planned	changes	in	rent	control.69	As	1961	was	also	an	election	year	in	the	city,	the	debate	became	a	pressure	point	upon	Mayor	Wagner’s	re-election	campaign,	and	Wagner’s	support	for	the	extension	of	rent	control	eased	his	path	to	victory.70	Despite	a	“smug”	Mayoral	administration	that	prided	itself	on	its	support	for	housing	reform,	the	basic	demands	of	housing	inspections	raised	over	the	past	two	years	had	yet	to	be	meaningfully	addressed.71		While	the	rent	control	debate	and	city	elections	were	swirling	that	year,	Gray	and	his	band	of	tenants	escalated	their	fight	for	more	expedient	housing	inspections	
																																																								68	“Tenants	Council	Holds	Convention,	Plans	Rally,”	New	York	Amsterdam	
News,	June	4,	1960.		 69	“Urge	Fight	On	Rises	On	Rents,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	February	4,	1961;	“Big	Rally	On	Rent	Controls,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	February	18,	1961;	Gold,	When	Tenants	Claimed	the	City,	119.		 70	Joel	Schwartz,	“Tenant	Power	in	the	Liberal	City,	1943-1971,”	169.		 71	Schwartz	described	the	Wagner	administration	as	“quite	smug	about	the	1961	extension	package.”	Schwartz,	“Tenant	Power	in	the	Liberal	City,	1943-1971,”	169;	Mayor	Wagner	also	painted	himself	as	a	champion	of	housing	reform	in	an	oral	history	interview	conducted	in	1979.	Robert	F.	Wagner	interview	with	Ed	Edwin,	1979,	Columbia	Center	for	Oral	History,	Columbia	University	Libraries.	
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and	code	enforcement.	For	five	months	that	spring	and	summer,	a	group	of	LHTC	members	“tired	of	waiting	month	in	and	month	out”	for	building	inspectors	to	act	against	slumlords	conducted	their	own	weekly	building	inspections	in	an	attempt	to	rouse	the	city	to	action	on	the	tenants’	behalf.72	Though	a	relatively	conservative	action	at	face	value,	this	initiative	demonstrated	a	willingness	of	LHTC	members	to	assume	the	roles	of	city	officials	to	govern	their	own	community,	while	also	providing	a	useful	organizing	tool.	The	volunteer	inspections	gave	the	rank-and-file	of	the	LHTC	an	entrée	into	the	halls	and	apartments	of	buildings	and	provided	an	opportunity	to	build	relationships	with	unaffiliated	tenants.	Largely	conducted	by	poor	and	working-class	Black	women,	this	type	of	unglamorous,	building-by-building	organizing,	garnered	little	media	attention,	but	helped	to	build	and	grow	the	LHTC	into	a	viable	organization	in	the	early	1960s.		As	patience	with	the	slow	pace	of	housing	improvements	waned	over	the	following	year,	LHTC	protests	continued,	and	in	1962,	city	and	state	legislators	responded	with	policy	measures	designed	to	create	a	“slumless	city.”73	That	February,	after	the	administration	of	rent	control	policy	was	transferred	from	the	state	to	the	city,	Mayor	Wagner	announced	the	formation	of	the	Rent	and	Rehabilitation	Administration	(RRA)	to	carry	out	a	“new	look”	municipal	housing	program.	As	one	of	its	fundamental	initiatives,	the	RRA	attempted	to	prod	landlords	
																																																								72	“Rats	Infesting	Beds,	Housing	Probers	Told,”	New	York	Herald	Tribune,	April	9,	1961;	“Volunteers	Check	Harlem	Tenements,”	New	York	Times,	August	20,	1961.		 73	Charles	G.	Bennett,	“Wagner	Sets	Up	Housing	Agency	With	Wide	Goals,”	
New	York	Times,	February	27,	1962.	
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into	making	repairs	to	buildings	through	incentives	such	as	government	loans	and	tax	abatements.	While	Gray	and	the	LHTC	had	been	pushing	for	the	proverbial	stick	to	discipline	recalcitrant	landlords,	the	Wagner	administration	was	offering	them	a	carrot.	To	many	Harlem	residents,	the	RRA	was	merely	the	same	old	routine	of	lax	building	code	enforcement	dressed	up	in	new	clothes.		A	more	promising	legislative	action	came	a	few	months	later,	when	the	state	legislature	finally	passed	a	receivership	bill	that	Gray,	Senator	Watson,	and	other	tenant	rights	activists	had	been	advocating	for	years.74	To	Gray,	a	receivership	law	represented	“one	of	the	most	important	concepts”	for	systemically	improving	housing	conditions	for	low-income	renters.75	In	theory,	the	receivership	bill	would	allow	the	city	to	expedite	the	process	of	repairing	housing	violations	by	subverting	the	delays	caused	by	the	habitual	stalling	of	negligent	landlords.	In	practice,	however,	Harlem	tenants	found	that	the	sluggish	routine	of	inspections,	delays,	and	inaction	continued	largely	uninterrupted	that	year.	That	September,	a	wave	of	inspections	on	W.	117th	Street	turned	up	over	1,400	violations	in	23	buildings,	yet	by	December,	tenants	were	still	waiting	for	repairs	to	begin.76	With	the	receivership	process	dragging,	Gray	and	the	newly	re-named	Community	Council	on	Housing	(CCH)	resorted	to	pickets	and	marches	on	City	Hall	to	demand	that	the	RRA	slash	
																																																								74	Gold,	When	Tenants	Claimed	The	City,	119.			 75	Jesse	Gray,	interview	by	Katherine	M.	Shannon,	July	26,	1967.		 76	“1,447	Violations	in	23	Tenements,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	September	29,	1962;	“What	Happened	To	Those	Promised	Cuts	in	Rent?”,	New	York	
Amsterdam	News,	November	24,	1962;	“Rent	Reductions	Due	25	Buildings,”	New	
York	Amsterdam	News,	December	8,	1962.	
		159	
rents	until	the	city	took	control	of	the	buildings	and	made	repairs.	By	the	end	of	January,	city	officials	were	still	inspecting	the	buildings	and	considering	seizing	some	of	them	through	receivership—and	many	tenants	were	still	without	heat	or	hot	water.77			While	Gray	was	struggling	to	force	city	agencies	to	utilize	legislative	tools	to	improve	conditions	for	Harlem	tenants,	he	was	also	expanding	his	analysis	and	advocacy	of	Black	empowerment	outside	of	these	liberal	political	channels.	By	the	year’s	end,	Gray	was	beginning	to	explicitly	embrace	tenets	of	Black	economic	and	political	nationalism.	In	June	of	1962,	rumors	began	to	spread	around	Central	Harlem	of	a	“gentleman’s	agreement”	between	white	merchants	and	the	Uptown	Chamber	of	Commerce	designed	to	bar	black	businesses	from	opening	up	shop	on	125th	Street	between	Eighth	and	Lenox	Avenues.	Nationalist	organizations,	including	James	Lawson’s	United	African	Nationalist	Movement,	formed	a	coalition	to	coordinate	boycotts	and	demonstrations	of	several	white-owned	businesses	on	125th	Street	to	protest	the	alleged	restrictive	covenant.	Leading	the	coalition	was	Lewis	Michaux	of	African	Nationals	in	America	and	owner	of	the	landmark	National	Memorial	Bookstore,	as	well	as	Jesse	Gray,	who	called	for	a	week-long	boycott	and	picket	of	stores	on	125th	Street	unless	a	white	restaurateur	pulled	his	plans	to	open	a	restaurant	that	would	compete	with	the	only	Black-owned	restaurant	in	the	
																																																								77	“City	May	Seize	11	Buildings,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	January	26,	1963.	
		160	
commercial	hub.78	According	to	the	Amsterdam	News,	the	City’s	Commission	on	Human	Rights	quickly	intervened	to	“prevent	any	flareup	which	would	lead	to	rioting.”	Though	the	protests	drew	the	ire	of	Jackie	Robinson	and	A.	Philip	Randolph	over	allegations	of	anti-Semitic	chants	at	demonstrations,	the	restaurateur	eventually	agreed	to	either	take	on	Black	partners	or	sell	the	business	to	Black	investors.79	The	victory	was	minor,	particularly	since	few	Black	residents	could	afford	to	take	over	the	business,	but	it	nonetheless	demonstrated	a	collective	push	for	Black	economic	empowerment	and	community	control	in	a	neighborhood	long	exploited	by	white	outsiders.	Gray’s	embrace	of	Black	economic	nationalism	was	not	isolated,	but	rather	indicative	of	an	evolution	in	his	public	political	thought.	Though	he	had	long	been	active	in	radical	electoral	politics,	it	was	not	until	the	early	days	of	1963	that	Gray	began	to	publicly	advocate	an	explicitly	racial	political	nationalism—a	full	three	years	before	Stokely	Carmichael	would	seize	the	national	spotlight	with	his	clarion	call	for	“Black	Power”	in	Mississippi.	That	February,	Gray	announced	his	candidacy	for	Democratic	District	leader	of	the	16th	Assembly	District,	declaring,	"regardless	to	how	good	a	white	man	is,	he	cannot	speak	for	us."	Following	his	announcement,	the	
New	Pittsburgh	Courier	reported	that	“Mr.	Gray	is	of	the	opinion	that	in	any	area	predominantly	populated	by	Negroes	or	Puerto	Ricans,	a	Negro	or	Puerto	Rican																																																									78	“Harlem	Threatens	Boycott	of	125th	Street,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	June	9,	1962;	“Pickets	March,	Tension	Mounts	On	West	125th	St.,”	New	York	
Amsterdam	News,	June	30,	1962.		 79	“Harlem	Business	Yields	in	Dispute,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	July	13,	1962;	“Harlem	Pickets	Switch	Tactics,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	July	14,	1962;	“Seek	125th	St.	Harmony,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	July	14,	1962.	
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should	be	at	the	helm	of	that	district.”	80	Though	still	on	the	margins	of	electoral	politics	in	Harlem	in	early	1963,	Gray	had	firmly	established	himself	as	a	key	mobilizer	of	a	surging	Black	political	consciousness	at	the	grassroots,	which	was	shaping,	and	being	shaped	by,	a	Black	radical	political	milieu	in	Harlem	in	the	early	1960s.81		This	embrace	of	self-determination	and	community	control	was	not	inconsistent	with	the	ideological	underpinnings	of	Gray’s	housing	advocacy,	and	indeed	was	a	logical	extension	of	it.	Dating	back	to	their	days	in	the	NMU	and	Community	Party,	Gray,	Jack	O’Dell,	and	Harry	Haywood	had	continuously	debated	“the	national	question”	as	it	related	to	Black	liberation	and	Black	popular	consciousness.	The	national	question,	Gray	later	argued,	“must	be	one	of	the	fundamental	questions	in	building	a	popular	peoples	coalition	in	this	country.”82	Furthermore,	Haywood,	Gray’s	mentor	in	the	NMU,	argued	in	1964	that	a	“grassroots	nationalist”	movement	for	Black	political	power	must	fight	for	political	control	in	centers	of	population	concentration	to	enable	Black	communities	to	“control	decisions	affecting	his	life	and	destiny.”83	Gray	had	continuously	advocated	for	the	representation	of	Black	tenants	within	the	political	system	as	a	means	of																																																									80	“New	York	Political	Roundup,”	New	Pittsburgh	Courier,	February	23,	1963.		81	This	Black	radical	political	milieu	will	be	analyzed	in	depth	in	Chapter	Four.		 82	Jesse	Gray	interview	with	Harry	Haywood,	April	6,	1975,	Box	6,	Folder	3,	Harry	Haywood	Papers,	Schomburg	Center	for	Research	in	Black	Culture	(henceforth	referred	to	as	Haywood	Papers).		 83	Harry	Haywood,	“Black	Political	Power:	The	Next	Stage	in	the	Afro-American	Liberation	Struggle,”	Box	5,	Folder	1,	Haywood	Papers.		
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gaining	direct	access	to,	and	control	over,	the	levers	of	power	that	could	improve	their	housing	conditions.	The	housing	question,	to	Gray,	O’Dell,	and	Haywood,	was	a	means	by	which	raise	Black	political	consciousness	at	the	grassroots	and	mobilize	poor	Black	communities	to	build	a	mass	national	movement	for	Black	political	power	and	liberation.84		Though	Gray’s	organizing	efforts	from	1959-1962	have	been	interpreted	by	scholars	as	little	more	than	an	advocacy	of	liberal	housing	reform	masquerading	as	a	radical	tenant	movement,	these	narratives	tend	to	gloss	over	Gray’s	analyses	on	social	transformation	that	informed	his	tenant	organizing.85	Although	Gray	did	utilize	the	tools	of	liberal	housing	reform,	this	tactic	was	a	part	of	a	duality	that	characterized	his	organizing	and	was	more	complementary	to	his	visions	of	a	radical	housing	movement	than	it	was	contradictory.	In	Gray’s	analysis,	organizing	tenants	to	demand	reforms	in	government	housing	policies	was	a	means	by	which	poor	and	working-class	Black	tenants	could	be	mobilized	to	not	only	build	political	power,	but	also	to	alter	the	ideological	basis	that	undergirded	housing	inequality.	When	the	
																																																								84	Despite	Jesse	Gray’s	burgeoning	embrace	of	Black	economic	and	political	nationalism	during	this	period,	no	evidence	has	been	found	to	suggest	that	he	applied	this	model	to	housing.	While	he	was	actively	supporting	Black	ownership	of	businesses	and	Black	political	representation	in	Harlem,	it	does	not	appear	that	Gray	had	developed	a	program	for	community	takeover,	control,	or	ownership	of	apartment	buildings	in	Harlem.			 85	Most	scholars	have	glossed	over	Gray’s	organizing	activities	from	1959-1963,	and	instead	focus	on	the	genesis	and	execution	of	the	1963-1964	rent	strike	movement.	See	Schwartz,	“Tenant	Power	in	the	Liberal	City,	1943-1971”;	Gold,	
When	Tenants	Claimed	The	City;	Michael	Lipsky,	Protest	In	City	Politics;	Naison,	“The	Rent	Strikes	in	Harlem”;	Mandi	Isaacs	Jackson,	“Harlem’s	Rent	Strike	and	Rat	War:	Representation,	Housing	Access	and	Tenant	Resistance	in	New	York,	1958-1964,”	
American	Studies	47,	no.	1	(Spring	2016):	53-79.	
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LHTC	demanded	that	city	agencies	prioritize	housing	inspections	in	the	early	1960s,	the	purpose	was	to	force	the	city	government	to	adopt	a	more	proactive	housing	policy	than	the	reactive	policy	of	only	intervening	upon	the	receipt	of	complaints.86		To	Gray,	safe	and	quality	housing	was	a	basic	human	right,	a	positive	right,	which	a	government	had	an	obligation	to	ensure	and	regulate.	“My	principle	objective,”	Gray	later	said,	“has	been	to	change	the	350-year	old	concept	of	property	first	and	people	second.”87	Gray	defined	this	struggle	as	a	“human	rights	movement,”	with	a	goal	of	dismantling	the	systemic	race	and	class	based	oppression	that	informed	housing	policies	and	maintained	a	racial	and	economic	hierarchy	in	the	city.	In	order	to	supplant	the	values	that	informed	government	policies	privileging	the	right	of	wealthy	white	landlords	to	accumulate	property	and	capital,	poor	Black	tenants	needed	to	organize	themselves	to	seize	political	power	in	their	communities.	Seen	in	this	light,	Gray’s	demands	and	mobilization	for	housing	inspections	in	the	early	1960s	takes	on	a	less	accommodating,	and	far	more	radical	shape.				By	the	end	of	1962,	it	was	clear	that	Gray	and	the	CCH	were	gaining	momentum	and	that	Hulan	Jack’s	earlier	assessment	of	housing	inequality	as	the	“most	explosive	issue	since	civil	rights”	had	been	quite	prescient.	The	organizing	efforts	of	the	CCH	from	1959-1962,	coordinated	by	Gray	and	organized	by	a	cadre	of	Black	women	tenants,	had	pushed	tenant	organizing	to	the	forefront	of	Black	liberation	struggles	in	the	city.	Fueled	by	the	momentum	the	CCH	helped	to																																																									86	Jesse	Gray	interview	with	Katherine	M.	Shannon,	July	26,	1967.		 87	Ibid.	
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generate,	a	host	of	influential	individuals	and	organizations	became	active	in	tenant	organizing	during	these	years.	In	the	spring	of	1960,	attorney	Paul	Zuber,	who	had	previously	represented	Mae	Mallory	in	her	suit	against	the	NYC	Board	of	Education,	provided	counsel	for	15	families	on	137th	Street	who	had	been	without	running	water	for	over	a	month.	Zuber	filed	legal	complaints	in	municipal	court,	and	also	withheld	rent	on	behalf	of	the	tenants	until	all	repairs	were	completed	in	the	building.88		The	direct	action	tactics	characteristic	of	the	Civil	Rights	Movement	and	the	CCH	were	also	influencing	the	organizing	of	more	liberal	housing	advocates.	At	the	third	annual	conference	of	the	more	moderate	Metropolitan	Council	on	Housing	in	1961,	members	advocated	for	“mass	demonstrations”	to	demand	a	moratorium	against	demolitions.	Yorkville	Assemblyman	Mark	Lane,	who	had	been	actively	involved	with	the	Political	Committee	of	the	LHTC	the	previous	year,	called	for	“mass	action”	to	force	a	stalled	tenement	repair	bill	out	of	legislative	committee.	Citing	the	nonviolent	direct	action	campaigns	of	the	sit-ins	and	Freedom	Rides	in	his	keynote	address,	housing	attorney	Harris	Present	encouraged	the	MCH	to	“court	mass	evictions”	to	win	a	moratorium	on	demolitions.	Though	the	MCH’s	advocacy	of	direct	action	ebbed	and	flowed	in	the	following	years	based	on	the	currents	of	housing	legislation	and	civil	rights	organizing	in	the	city	and	state,	it	was	clear	that	
																																																								88	“Hydrant	Sole	Water	Supply	For	15	Tenement	Families,”	New	York	Herald	
Tribune,	April	6,	1960;	“Jack	Arranges	To	Get	Water	For	Tenement,”	New	York	
Herald	Tribune,	April	7,	1960.	
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this	large,	middle-class	housing	organization	was	being	directly	influenced	by	actions	from	the	grassroots.89	With	the	formation	of	the	East	Harlem	Tenants	Council	and	a	CORE	housing	clinic	on	West	125th	Street	in	1962,	the	tenant	movement	that	Gray	and	the	CCH	had	spearheaded	in	Harlem	showed	signs	of	expanding	across	ethnic	lines	and	into	the	mainstream	of	the	Civil	Rights	Movement.	For	several	years,	Gray	had	been	attempting	to	make	inroads	with	New	York’s	rapidly	growing	Puerto	Rican	communities	and	had	found	a	capable	comrade	in	Ted	Vélez,	a	young	social	worker	and	City	College	graduate.	Vélez	began	volunteering	with	Gray	and	the	LHTC	around	1960,	and	two	years	later	used	his	experience	and	connections	to	establish	the	EHTC	in	the	barrio	of	East	Harlem.	Under	the	leadership	of	Vélez	and	Tony	Williams,	the	EHTC	followed	the	organizational	and	tactical	models	of	the	CCH,	and	developed	a	“network	of	building	captains”	to	promote	indigenous	leadership	and	a	self-sustaining	movement	among	Puerto	Rican	renters.90		While	Vélez	and	Williams	were	building	their	organization	in	East	Harlem,	the	New	York	(Harlem)	Congress	of	Racial	Equality	(NY	CORE)	was	changing	their	tact	on	housing	activism.	Though	NY	CORE	had	previously	focused	their	organizing	efforts	around	open-housing	campaigns,	as	demonstrated	during	a	February	1962	protest	at	Gracie	Mansion	to	demand	that	City	Hall	“give	us	a	strong	law	for																																																									89	Schwartz,	“Tenant	Power	in	the	Liberal	City,	1943-1971,”	169-171;	“Tenants	Rally	Set	Sept.	19,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	September	10,	1960;	“Tenants	Council	Holds	Convention,	Plans	Rally,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	June	4,	1960.		 90	Schwartz,	“Tenant	Power	in	the	Liberal	City,	1943-1971,”	177;	Gold,	When	
Tenants	Claimed	The	City,	134-135.	
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integrated	housing,”	by	the	year’s	end	the	chapter	had	begun	to	expand	their	focus	to	address	the	conditions	of	slum	housing.91	According	to	Schwartz,	NY	CORE	had	found	itself	“caught	in	the	crosscurrents	of	civil	rights	and	Muslim	nationalism”	and	opened	the	housing	clinic	to	keep	up	with	the	rising	tide	of	grassroots	organizing	for	community	empowerment.	Though	Schwartz	attributes	NY	CORE’s	shift	in	housing	advocacy	to	the	“accelerating	civil	rights	movement,”	Gray	and	the	CCH	were	actively	shaping	the	struggle	for	Black	liberation	in	New	York	and	played	a	central	role	in	making	tenants	rights	a	fundamental	component	of	these	same	struggles.	At	its	inception,	CORE	announced	that	the	housing	clinic	would	send	investigation	teams	into	buildings	and	“call	on	residents”	to	inform	them	of	their	housing	rights.92	By	the	following	year,	NY	CORE	would	evolve	from	this	limited	premise	to	fall	more	closely	in	line	with	the	direct	action	organizing	efforts	of	the	CCH.			 The	period	from	1959-1962	proved	to	be	a	formative	one	for	struggles	for	tenants	rights	and	human	rights	in	Harlem.	At	the	dawn	of	the	1960s,	Jesse	Gray	and	the	LHTC/CCH	had	brought	tenant	organizing	and	rent	strikes	back	into	the	popular	lexicon	of	Black	freedom	struggles	in	New	York	City.	Over	the	following	three	years,	Gray	and	his	cadre	of	tenant	organizers	used	the	momentum	of	the	1959	rent	strikes	and	heightened	demands	for	rights	and	power	to	build	a	grassroots	movement	that	
																																																								91	Memo	from	Detective	William	A.	Navero,	Shield	#306,	BSS	to	Commanding	Officer,	Bureau	of	Special	Services,	February	12,	1962,	NYPD	Inspectional	Services	Bureau	Files,	New	York	City	Municipal	Archives;	Schwartz,	“Tenant	Power	in	the	Liberal	City,	1943-1971,”	174.		 92	Schwartz,	“Tenant	Power	in	the	Liberal	City,	1943-1971,”	174.	
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pushed	tenants	rights	and	housing	rights	to	the	center	of	popular	discourse	around	civil	rights,	human	rights,	and	political	power	in	Harlem.	With	this	groundswell	of	activism	from	the	grassroots	came	important	legislative	victories,	as	well	as	the	growth	of	an	organizational	framework	that	politically	mobilized	poor	and	working-class	Black	renters	in	consciousness	and	in	action.	Despite	these	tangible	and	intangible	strides	made	by	Gray	and	the	CCH,	however,	the	rampant	abuses	of	Black	and	Puerto	Rican	tenants	continued	to	plague	Harlem	communities.	The	liberal	responses	from	City	and	State	governments	proved	capable	of	rectifying	violations	in	some	buildings,	but	wholly	incapable	of	addressing	housing	inequality	in	any	systematic	ways.	For	some	renters	and	organizers,	this	piecemeal	approach	to	housing	reform	had	a	pacifying	effect—tempers	cooled	as	inspectors	converged	upon	buildings	and	occasionally	succeeded	in	forcing	repairs.	Many	others,	however,	were	growing	increasingly	impatient	with	the	limited	reach	of	these	largely	ineffective	liberal	responses	to	the	most	pressing	needs	of	Harlem’s	Black	community.		
v 	In	July	of	1960,	James	Baldwin	lifted	American	audiences	out	of	their	Davenports	and	dropped	them	into	the	streets	of	Central	Harlem	in	a	gripping	essay	in	Esquire	magazine.	In	blunt,	yet	moving	terms	in	“Fifth	Avenue	Uptown:	A	Letter	from	Harlem,”	Baldwin	laid	bare	the	material	and	psychological	realities	of	life	on	the	“fetid	block”	of	the	Harlem	ghetto	built	and	enforced	by	whites,	and	occupied	by	African	Americans.	Using	the	housing	situation	faced	by	so	many	Black	residents	of	Harlem	as	an	entrée	and	central	theme	of	the	piece,	Baldwin	explained	to	readers	as	
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few	other	writers	could,	the	human	toll	that	slum	housing	conditions	took	on	its	residents.	“They	patiently	browbeat	the	landlord	into	fixing	the	heat,	the	plaster,	the	plumbing;	this	demands	prodigious	patience;	nor	is	patience	usually	enough,”	Baldwin	wrote.	“Such	frustration,	so	long	endured,”	he	continued,	“is	driving	many	strong,	admirable	men	and	women	whose	only	crime	is	color	to	the	very	gates	of	paranoia.”93		This	frustration,	Baldwin	argued,	was	caused	not	merely	by	the	seemingly	intractable	problems	of	inhumane	housing	conditions	in	Harlem,	but	also	by	the	popular	understanding	that	such	conditions	were	symptomatic	of	a	larger	system	of	racial	oppression.	Housing	projects	and	policemen,	Baldwin	explained,	were	hated	for	the	same	reason	in	Harlem:	“both	reveal,	unbearably,	the	real	attitude	of	the	white	world,	no	matter	how	many	liberal	speeches	are	made,	no	matter	how	many	
lofty	editorials	are	written,	no	matter	how	many	civil-rights	commissions	are	set	up	[emphasis	added].”	Having	grown	up	in	Harlem	and	born	witness	to	the	daily	realities	of	racial	oppression	there,	Baldwin	understood	and	expressed	what	few	whites	were	able	or	willing	to	comprehend:	liberal	governance	would	not,	and	could	not,	improve	or	solve	the	conditions	of	a	ghetto.	The	only	way	a	ghetto	could	be	improved,	Baldwin	argued,	was	“out	of	existence.”94		Baldwin’s	essay	read	like	a	direct	critique	of	the	anemic	liberal	responses	to	racial	inequality	and	unrest	from	City	Hall	in	the	wake	of	the	“near	riot”	in	Harlem	in	
																																																								93	James	Baldwin,	Nobody	Knows	My	Name	(New	York:	Dell	Publishing	Co.,	1962),	60.		 94	Ibid,	63-65.	
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1959.	Lofty	speeches	and	editorials	abounded	while	the	Mayor’s	Committee	on	Harlem	Affairs	investigated	well-known	problems	and	submitted	reports	offering	piecemeal	solutions	for	curbing	racial	tensions.	To	be	certain,	there	were	genuinely	progressive	proposals	scattered	amongst	the	CAH’s	proceedings,	but	the	premise	upon	which	the	Committee	operated	was	not	designed	to	dismantle	the	institutional	walls	of	the	ghetto,	but	rather	to	whitewash	them	to	provide	a	semblance	of	reform	and	to	cool	a	heated	political	climate.	Furthermore,	while	city	officials	were	touting	liberal	reforms	to	psychologically	disarm	rising	protests	at	the	grassroots,	they	were	also	taking	measures	to	militarize	the	city’s	police	force	to	physically	suppress	surging	demands	for	rights	and	power.	Despite	the	best	efforts	of	City	Hall	to	undercut	Black	demands	for	human	rights	and	political	empowerment	in	this	period,	organizers	at	the	grassroots	were	succeeding	in	mobilizing	and	organizing	Harlem	residents	in	consciousness	and	in	action.	While	Jesse	Gray	and	the	CCH	were	expanding	their	organizing	efforts	in	Harlem	to	include	more	buildings	and	more	fundamental	demands,	Malcolm	X	along	with	a	growing	cadre	of	radical	Black	artists,	activists,	and	organizers	were	re-shaping	the	political	landscape	of	Harlem,	the	city,	and	the	nation.95	As	more	Harlem	residents	became	increasingly	aware	and	impatient	with	the	designed	limitations	of	a	liberal	government	for	rectifying	institutional	inequality	in	any	meaningful	way,	support	for	more	radical	alternatives	rose,	and	an	already	limited	trust	in	City	Hall	fell	further.	By	1963,	Harlem	was	on	the	cusp	of	becoming	a	movement	center,																																																									95	The	organizing	efforts	of	Malcolm	X,	Mae	Mallory,	the	Fair	Play	For	Cuba	Committee,	and	other	Black	radical	activists	and	organizations	will	be	examined	in	detail	in	Chapter	Four.	
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empowered	with	a	radical	political	consciousness	and	united	through	struggle.	In	a	post-script	to	“Fifth	Avenue,	Uptown”	published	in	1961,	Baldwin	warned	readers	that	“any	effort,	from	here	on	out,	to	keep	the	Negro	in	his	‘place’	can	only	have	the	most	extreme	and	unlucky	repercussions.”96								
																																																								96	James	Baldwin,	Nobody	Knows	My	Name	(New	York:	Dell	Publishing	Co.,	1962),	81.	
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CHAPTER	5		
“MAJESTIC	LIONS	OF	THE	VALLEYS	AND	PLAINS”:	MAE	MALLORY,	MALCOLM	X,	
AND	THE	“NEW	AFRO-AMERICAN	NATIONALISM”	IN	HARLEM,	1959-1963	
Passive	resistance	may	work	for	peripheral	things	such	as	the	right	to	eat	at	a	
lunch	counter,	the	right	to	use	comfort	stations	and	waiting	rooms	on	a	non-
segregated	basis.	Passive	resistance	has	helped	to	show	the	need	for	more	
militant	action.	No	people	under	the	sun	ever	won	complete	liberation	by	
completely	passive	means.	–Mae	Mallory	to	Lorraine	Hansberry	(1963)1	
	 	
They	call	us	racial	extremists.	They	call	Jomo	Kenyatta	also	a	racial	extremist	
and	Tom	Mboya	a	moderate.	It	is	only	the	white	man’s	fear	of	men	like	
Kenyatta	that	makes	him	listen	to	men	like	Mboya.	If	it	were	not	for	the	
extremists,	the	white	man	would	ignore	the	moderates.	To	be	called	a	
‘moderate’	in	this	awakening	dark	world	today,	that	is	crying	for	freedom,	is	to	
receive	the	‘kiss	of	death’	as	spokesmen	or	leaders	of	the	masses…for	the	masses	
are	ready	to	burst	the	shackles	of	slavery	whether	the	‘moderates’	will	stand	up	
or	not.	–Malcolm	X	(1960)2	 	As	dawn	rose	on	the	new	decade	of	the	1960s,	America	was	startled	awake	by	a	new	militancy	demonstrated	by	young	civil	rights	activists	who	were	taking	bold	new	steps	in	the	long	march	toward	freedom.	In	February	1960,	college	students	in	Greensboro,	North	Carolina	and	Nashville,	Tennessee	began	sitting-in	at	segregated	lunch	counters	to	expedite	the	process	of	desegregation	through	nonviolent	direct	action.	Impatient	with	the	gradual	pace	of	desegregation	since	the	
Brown	decision	that	had	been	continually	hamstrung	by	the	dogged	resistance	of	local	white	communities	and	a	complicit	federal	government,	students	throughout	the	South	directly	confronted	segregation	in	their	communities	and	consequently																																																									1	Letter	from	Mae	Mallory	to	Lorraine	Hansberry,	June	1,	1963,	Box	1,	Folder	2,	Mae	Mallory	Papers,	Walter	P.	Reuther	Library,	Wayne	State	University	(henceforth	referred	to	as	Mallory	Papers).		 2	Louis	E.	Lomax,	When	The	Word	Is	Given	(New	York:	Signet	Books,	1963),	132.	
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pushed	older	leaders	to	embrace	new	tactics.	Images	of	young,	sharply	dressed	Black	men	and	women	being	brutalized	by	white	posses	at	department	store	lunch	counters	spread	throughout	the	nation	in	newspaper	and	television	news	reports.	In	the	North,	civil	rights	organizations	waged	sympathy	protests	and	boycotts	of	Woolworth’s	department	store	in	several	major	cities.		In	a	matter	of	months,	this	new	militancy	and	groundswell	of	student	activists	were	organized	into	the	Student	Nonviolent	Coordinating	Committee	(SNCC)	under	the	guidance	of	veteran	grassroots	organizer	Ella	Baker.	Resisting	overtures	from	the	Southern	Christian	Leadership	Conference	(SCLC)	to	form	a	youth	branch	of	Dr.	King’s	organization,	SNCC’s	formation	as	an	independent,	grassroots	student	organization	marked	a	clear	departure	from	the	bourgeois	leadership	that	had	long	dominated	mainstream	civil	rights	organizations.	With	the	new	decade	still	in	its	infancy,	this	generation	of	students—the	age	peers	of	Emmett	Till—had	sparked	what	James	Baldwin	described	as	“a	revolution	in	the	consciousness	of	this	country	which	will	inexorably	destroy	nearly	all	that	we	now	think	of	as	concrete	and	indisputable.”3	While	southern	college	students	waged	campaigns	against	segregation	and	shifted	the	Movement	into	a	higher	gear,	struggles	for	independence	and	liberation	in	Africa	and	across	the	Diaspora	were	reinvigorating	a	revolutionary	international	consciousness	in	African	American	communities—particularly	in	New	York	City.	As	Rhonda	Y.	Williams	notes,	SNCC	emerged	in	an	era	of	resurgent	Pan-Africanism	
																																																								3	James	Baldwin,	The	Price	of	the	Ticket:	Collected	Nonfiction	1948-1985	(New	York:	St.	Martin’s-Marek,	1985),	262.	
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amidst	the	establishment	of	17	new	African	nations.4	This	revolutionary	consciousness	had	deep	roots	in	Harlem,	where	Marcus	Garvey’s	UNIA	had	inspired,	awoken,	and	mobilized	generations	of	African	Americans.	By	the	early	1960s,	Harlem	was	experiencing	a	rebirth	of	Pan-African,	nationalist,	and	revolutionary	popular	thought,	as	cadres	of	nationalist	leaders	and	radical	intellectuals	brought	revolutionary	analyses	to	street	corners,	salons,	newspapers,	and	rallies.	“A	militant	new	generation	has	arisen,”	poet	Rolland	Snellings	(Askia	Touré)	wrote	in	1963,	“truly	Garvey’s	‘cubs	in	the	woods’	have	become	majestic	lions	of	the	valleys	and	plains.”5	Though	inspired	by	anti-colonial	independence	movements	in	Africa	and	the	Caribbean,	this	heightened	radical	consciousness	was	also	fundamentally	influenced	by	the	experiences	of	Harlem’s	poor	and	working	class	communities	that	had	been	shaping	the	direction	of	local	grassroots	struggles	for	equality	and	empowerment	over	the	past	several	years.	Indeed,	the	proletarian	leadership	of	this	“New	Afro-American	Nationalism,”	as	Dr.	John	Henrik	Clarke	termed	the	emergent	political	phenomena,	had	“turned	away	from	a	leadership	that	was	begging	and	pleading	to	a	more	dynamic	leadership	that	is	insisting	and	demanding.”6		The	Civil	Rights	Movement	in	Harlem	in	the	early	1960s	was	marked	by	a	distinct	popular	break	with	what	singer	Abbey	Lincoln	called	the	“crumb-crunching,	
																																																								4	Rhonda	Y.	Williams,	Concrete	Demands:	The	Search	for	Black	Power	in	the	
20th	Century	(New	York:	Routledge,	2015),	72.		5	Rolland	Snellings,	“The	New	Afro-American	Writer,”	Liberator	3,	no.	10	(October	1963),	10.		 6	John	Henrik	Clarke,	“The	New	Afro-American	Nationalism,”	Freedomways	1,	no.	3	(Fall	1961):	285-295.	
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cocktail-sipping	Uncle	Tom	leadership”	class	and	an	assertion	of	liberation	and	self-determination	by	any	means	necessary.7	The	masses	in	Harlem	and	throughout	the	nation	had	grown	demonstrably	impatient	with	the	limits	of	liberal	governance,	as	well	as	the	lack	of	vision	and	sense	of	urgency	that	many	felt	characterized	the	moderate,	middle-class	civil	rights	organizations,	to	meaningfully	address	the	unceasing	inequality	and	oppression	faced	by	poor	and	working-class	Black	communities.	This	evolution	of	the	Movement	in	Harlem	was	not	merely	rhetorical.	Building	upon	the	successes	of	organizations	like	the	Community	Council	on	Housing	(CCH),	the	Nation	of	Islam	(NOI),	and	the	Harlem	Nine	in	mobilizing	communities	and	achieving	tangible	victories,	existing	and	emerging	civil	rights	groups	began	to	shift	their	focus	to	community	organizing	and	building	radical	grassroots	organizations	of	the	most	marginalized	communities	in	Harlem.			The	period	from	1959-1963	represented	a	dynamic	and	formative	stage	in	struggles	for	rights	and	power	in	Harlem	that	had	significant	reverberations	throughout	the	nation.	Though	many	years	in	the	making,	this	evolution	was	expedited	at	the	dawn	of	the	new	decade	by	the	convergence	of	local,	national,	and	global	freedom	struggles	in	Harlem.	This	chapter	analyzes	these	political	trends	and	catalytic	events	from	Harlem	to	Havana,	and	Greensboro	to	the	Congo,	which	influenced	this	shift	in	militancy	and	organizational	analyses	in	the	Black	Mecca	and	beyond.	Debates	about	community	organizing,	nonviolent	resistance,	armed	self-defense,	civil	disobedience,	liberal	reform,	self-determination,	and	revolutionary	nationalism	were	commonplace	from	street	corners	to	theatre	stages	and	indeed																																																									7	Ibid,	287.	
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characterized	the	growth	of	the	Movement	during	this	period.	By	analyzing	the	evolving	actions	and	ideologies	of	Mae	Mallory	and	Malcolm	X,	along	with	their	expansive	networks,	this	chapter	considers	not	only	the	impacts	of	broader	struggles	upon	the	Movement	in	Harlem,	but	more	significantly,	the	formative	roles	played	by	local	people	in	challenging	racial	oppression	in	the	urban	north	and	pushing	the	national	Civil	Rights	Movement	in	more	radical	directions	in	the	early	1960s.	
v 		 As	thousands	gathered	in	New	York	City	in	July	of	1959	for	the	50th	Anniversary	Convention	of	the	NAACP,	copies	of	a	small,	unfamiliar	newspaper	called	The	Crusader	made	their	way	through	the	corridors	of	the	New	York	Coliseum	at	the	southern	end	of	Central	Park.	Though	members	came	from	across	the	country	to	commemorate	the	organization’s	“Golden	Anniversary,”	the	celebratory	impetus	for	the	occasion	was	overshadowed	by	the	mounting	internal	debate	over	the	NAACP’s	positions	on	nonviolent	direct	action	and	armed	self-defense.	That	spring,	president	of	the	Monroe	NAACP	branch,	Robert	F.	Williams,	had	infamously	declared	his	intention	to	“meet	violence	with	violence”	in	the	face	of	unrelenting	attacks	upon	Black	women	by	white	men,	and	now	he	stood	ready	to	defend	himself	from	being	suspended	by	the	organization	amidst	rising	national	support	for	armed	self-defense	and	self-determination.	On	the	other	end	of	the	park	from	where	the	Convention	was	being	held,	copies	of	Williams’	newly	launched	newspaper,	The	
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Crusader,	flooded	the	streets	of	Harlem,	where	many	Black	residents	were	following	the	proceedings	of	the	Convention	with	great	interest.8		Mae	Mallory,	herself	a	vocal	advocate	of	armed	self-defense	and	self-determination,	had	recently	celebrated	a	major	legal	victory	against	de	facto	segregation	in	Harlem’s	public	schools	when	she	first	caught	wind	of	Williams’	fights	against	Klan	violence	and	NAACP	suppression.	As	the	Convention	was	proceeding,	a	neighbor	approached	Mallory	at	her	apartment	on	West	129th	Street	and	told	her	to	tune	into	the	local	radio	station	WLIB.	“She	says	there	is	something	on	there	that	you	would	be	interested	in,”	Mallory	later	recalled,	“and	this	was	during	the	NAACP	Conference…when	Robert	Williams	was	there…brought	up	on	charges	by	the	national	body	[for]	advocating	armed	self-defense.”	The	radio	coverage	of	the	Conference	proved	a	formative	moment	in	Mallory’s	political	development	and	finally	brought	her	personal	analyses	on	self-determination,	human	rights,	and	self-defense	within	intersectional	struggles	for	Black	liberation	into	organizational	practice.	“I	heard	it	and	I	said	‘My	God,	you	know,	this	is	only	right.’	So	instead	of	going	to	work	that	day	I	got	up	and	went	in	the	streets	and	organized	some	support	for	Robert	Williams,”	a	man	she	had	never	met.9	Mallory	quickly	drew	upon	her	connections	with	the	Harlem	Nine	and	other	women	in	her	neighborhood	with	the	intention	of	picketing	the	NAACP	convention	if	Roy	Wilkins	did	not	“drop	the	
																																																								8	Timothy	B.	Tyson,	Radio	Free	Dixie:	Robert	F.	Williams	&	the	Roots	of	Black	
Power	(Chapel	Hill:	The	University	of	North	Carolina	Press,	1999),	193.		 9	Mae	Mallory	interview	with	Malaika	Lumumba,	February	27,	1970,	Ralph	Bunche	Oral	History	Collection,	Moorland-Spingarn	Research	Center,	Howard	University.	
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charges	against	Rob.”10	Though	the	protest	failed	to	materialize,	Mallory	nonetheless	threw	herself	into	the	struggle	to	support	the	Black	community	in	Monroe.	In	Robert	and	Mabel	Williams,	Mallory	found	kindred	spirits	in	a	grassroots	fight	against	state-sponsored	racial	violence	shaped	by	class	and	gender.	In	Monroe,	the	Williams’	had	effectively	organized	one	of	the	few	working-class	branches	of	the	NAACP,	a	distinction	that	fundamentally	shaped	the	analyses	and	actions	of	the	branch,	and	brought	the	Monroe	branch	into	conflict	with	the	national	organization.	Though	the	right	to	armed	self-defense	was	guaranteed	by	the	US	Constitution	and	widely	practiced	within	Black	communities	throughout	the	South,	the	national	organization,	characterized	by	middle-class,	moderate	leadership,	refused	to	publically	endorse	self-defense	as	an	acceptable	tactic	in	struggles	against	state	and	vigilante	violence.	Like	the	Williams’,	Mae	Mallory	was	quite	familiar	with	how	class	dynamics	impacted	civil	rights	organizing.	As	a	contemporary	of	Ella	Baker	in	struggles	for	school	desegregation	in	Harlem,	Mallory	recognized	the	same	limits	that	the	bureaucratic	approach	of	the	NAACP	placed	upon	such	efforts	and	thus	organized	a	more	militant	grassroots	base	to	carry	out	popular,	direct-action	campaigns	for	equality	and	self-determination	in	public	education.11		
																																																								10	Letter	from	Mae	Mallory	to	Mabel	and	Robert	F.	Williams,	June	3,	1963,	Box	1,	Folder	2,	Mallory	Papers.	According	to	Mallory,	her	plans	to	picket	the	convention	were	shot	down	by	her	fellow	activists.	“I	met	with	negative	response	from	Penny	(Parnella)	[Pernella	Wattley],	Jeanie	(not	Jeanne	Walton)	and	some	others.	They	have	me	some	stupid	excuse	about	we	could	not	let	the	whites	downtown	see	us	picket	the	NAACP.”		11	See	Chapter	Three.	
		178	
Additionally,	like	the	Williams,	Mallory’s	experiences	with	gendered	and	class-based	racial	violence	shaped	her	political	analyses	of	institutional	racism	and	embrace	of	armed	self-defense.	Raised	by	a	community	of	Black	women	in	the	South	who	advocated	self-defense	and	demanded	equality,	Mallory	was	taught	at	a	young	age	to	“hold	your	head	up,	stick	your	chest	out,	and	march	to	the	tune	of	‘The	World	Is	Mine.”12	Mallory	brought	this	resolve	to	the	school	boycott,	when	she	was	subjected	to	accusations,	death	threats,13	and	criminal	reprisals	in	response	to	her	relentless	demands	for	educational	equality	for	her	two	children.	After	early	attempts	by	her	children’s	school	principal	to	paint	Mallory	as	a	“Communist”	and	troublemaker	failed	to	deter	her	demands	for	a	new	school,	Mallory	was	arrested	on	charges	of	fraud	and	grand	larceny	in	1957	for	briefly	receiving	welfare	benefits	while	she	was	employed.	“I	had	never	been	to	jail	in	my	life,”	Mallory	recalled,	“but	this	whole	furor	around	the	schools	stirred	up	such	a	thing	until	the	power	structure	decided	that	they	would	try	to	find	something	that	they	could	discredit	me	with.”14	To	Mallory,	the	arrest	was	not	simply	a	matter	of	political	retaliation	to	curb	the	school	protests,	but	a	systemic	response	designed	to	cripple	her	ability	to	find	employment	and	housing,	care	for	her	children,	and	stifle	any	further	protests.	“They	try	to	pile	as	much	on	you	as	they	can	pile	on	you	to	see	if	you	will	snap,	to	see	if	you	will	break,”	she	said	of	her	persecution,	“and	I	am	just	determined	that	I’m	not																																																									12	Mae	Mallory	interview	with	Malaika	Lumumba,	February	27,	1970.		 13	See	Chapter	Three.		14	Mae	Mallory	interview	with	Malaika	Lumumba,	February	27,	1970;	“Protests	School,	Arrested	on	Welfare	Charge,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	June	29,	1957.	
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going	to.”	With	the	help	of	Ramona	Garrett,	a	former	CPUSA	member	and	Pan-Africanist	organizer	in	Harlem,	Mallory	had	a	three-year	sentence	reduced	to	thirty	days,	but	the	experience	left	her	embittered	by	the	political	system	and	determined	to	dismantle	it.15	The	systemic	critique	of	American	society	that	Mallory	had	developed	by	1960	was	reflective	of	an	analysis	that	was	becoming	increasingly	popular	among	Black	communities	in	Harlem	and	throughout	the	nation.	As	the	protests	outside	the	28th	Precinct	had	demonstrated	that	summer,	many	Harlem	residents	recognized	the	inherently	oppressive	nature	of	American	society	and	were	no	longer	willing	to	accept	the	limitations	of	liberal	governance	for	redressing	grievances.	This	popular	analysis	was	not	only	informed	by	the	systemic,	intersecting	forces	of	racial	oppression	faced	by	poor	and	working-class	communities	in	Harlem.	Coming	amidst	an	influx	of	liberation	movements	throughout	the	African	Diaspora,	the	courageous	armed	resistance	of	the	Williams’	and	the	Monroe	NAACP	inspired	a	revolutionary	fervor	amongst	Harlem	residents,	organizers,	and	intellectuals	in	their	local	struggles	for	human	rights	and	self-determination.	Having	already	established	herself	within	Harlem’s	grassroots	civil	rights	milieu	through	the	school	boycotts,	Mallory	played	an	active	role	in	inspiring	and	shaping	the	flowering	of	this	revolutionary	consciousness	at	the	grassroots	in	Harlem	at	the	advent	of	the	1960s.	Though	Robert	Williams’	suspension	was	ultimately	upheld	by	the	national	NAACP,	his	unwavering	claim	to	the	right	of	armed	self-defense	in	the	face	of	racial	terrorism	inspired	Black	communities	across	the	nation	and	earned	him	the																																																									15	Mae	Mallory	interview	with	Malaika	Lumumba,	February	27,	1970.	
		180	
allegiance	of	a	powerful	cadre	of	radical	organizers	and	intellectuals	in	Harlem.	As	Timothy	Tyson	notes,	Williams’	advocacy	of	Black	economic	empowerment,	self-determination,	Black	culture,	and	armed	self-reliance	“reinvigorated	many	elements	of	the	black	nationalist	tradition	whose	forceful	emergence	in	the	mid-1960s	would	become	known	as	Black	Power.”16	These	aspects	of	Williams’	political	ideology	had	deep	roots	in	Harlem’s	Black	radical	tradition,	and	his	occasional	trips	to	New	York	City	in	1958	and	1959	brought	Williams	into	close	contact	with	the	likes	of	writer	Julian	Mayfield,	historian	John	Henrik	Clarke,	and	the	Nation	of	Islam’s	Harlem	minister	Malcolm	X.	Williams	received	warm	reception	in	Harlem,	often	leaving	with	donations	from	Malcolm	X	for	arms	and	ammunition,	and	was	regularly	invited	to	speak	at	street	corner	rallies	and	in	the	NOI’s	Temple	Number	Seven.	“I	was	the	only	one	from	the	NAACP	who	could	go	down	in	Harlem	and	stand	on	a	ladder	on	a	corner	and	speak	there,”	Williams	later	said	of	these	visits.17	These	early	visits	to	Harlem	provided	Williams	with	valuable	inroads	into	a	national	network	of	influential	Black	radicals,	but	the	heightened	publicity	he	received	during	the	summer	of	1959	inspired	a	more	coordinated	effort	to	support	the	Black	community	of	Monroe.		When	Mae	Mallory	finally	heard	of	the	Williams’	crusade	for	human	rights,	economic	empowerment,	and	self-determination	in	Monroe	on	the	radio	that	summer,	she	launched	herself	into	organizing	work	to	support	their	fight.	“Our	group	decided	that	well,	we’ll	all	join	his	chapter,”	Mallory	recalled,	“let	him	set	up																																																									16	Tyson,	Radio	Free	Dixie,	191.		 17	Ibid,	205.	
		181	
his	own	organization	and	we’ll	all	join	him.”18	The	group	that	Mallory	assembled,	whose	ranks	included	Robert	Williams’s	first	cousin	Ora	Mae	Mobley,	was	a	small	but	determined	organization	called	The	New	York	Crusader	Family.	Named	after	the	Williams’	newspaper,	The	Crusader,	which	he	and	Mabel	would	send	north	to	Harlem	in	bundles,	The	NY	Crusader	Family	(also	known	as	Crusaders	For	Freedom)	initially	began	their	work	by	distributing	the	circular	throughout	New	York	City.	“It	was	a	very	interesting	little	pamphlet,”	Mallory	continued,	“so	then	we	decided	let’s	send	people	The	Crusader	for	Christmas	instead	of	Christmas	cards	because	this	is	a	greater	message,	you	know,	than	Hallmark.”19	Flying	under	the	banner	of	“Advancing	The	Cause	of	Race	Pride	and	Freedom,”	the	messages	carried	in	The	
Crusader	were	well	received	in	Harlem.	In	the	place	where	Cyril	Briggs	had	called	for	an	armed	war	against	the	KKK	in	the	1920s	on	the	pages	of	his	own	newspaper,	
The	Crusader,	Williams	found	the	inspiration	for	the	title	of	his	paper	and	the	vociferous	support	of	nationalist	organizers	like	Mallory	and	Queen	Mother	Moore,	who	“rallied	the	support	teams”	for	the	Black	community	of	Monroe.20	
From	Havana	to	Harlem:	The	Cuban	Revolution	and	Black	Radicalism	in	New	
York	City	From	1959-1961,	The	NY	Crusader	Family	escalated	their	organizing	efforts	to	aid	the	struggle	in	Monroe,	while	also	supporting	national	and	global	freedom	struggles	from	the	streets	of	Harlem.	The	political	climate	in	Harlem	at	the	advent	of																																																									18	Mae	Mallory	interview	with	Malaika	Lumumba,	February	27,	1970.		19	Ibid.		 20	Tyson,	Radio	Free	Dixie,	194-202.	
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the	1960s	was	charged	by	the	wave	of	revolutions	beginning	to	sweep	through	the	African	continent,	as	well	as	its	diaspora.	In	1958,	Guinean	independence	leader	Sekou	Toure	became	the	first	president	of	the	newly	formed	Republic	of	Guinea,	and	by	the	end	of	1960,	17	more	nations	in	Africa	would	emerge	independent	through	their	own	revolutionary	struggles.	On	New	Year’s	Day	in	1959,	the	era	of	anticolonial	revolution	appeared	at	the	doorstep	of	the	United	States	when	Cuban	dictator	Fulgencio	Batista	fled	the	island	nation,	signaling	the	victory	of	the	guerilla	army	led	by	Fidel	Castro.	Happening	just	250	miles	off	the	coast	of	Miami	and	orchestrated	by	charismatic	leaders	of	African	descent,	the	Cuban	Revolution	captured	the	attention	and	imagination	of	African	American	communities	already	impatient	with	the	slow	pace	of	racial	progress	and	stoked	a	revolutionary	fervor	amongst	Black	radicals.		African	American	newspapers	and	writers	throughout	the	United	States	extolled	the	victory	of	an	integrated	army,	led	in	large	part	by	Afro-Cubans,	over	an	oppressive	dictatorship	and	carried	the	words	of	Castro	who	vowed	to	“eliminate	all	forms	of	discrimination.”21	Black	journalists	like	William	Worthy,	and	reporters	from	the	Amsterdam	News	and	other	syndicates,	reported	back	to	African	American	communities	with	their	experiences	on	the	island	and	the	promises	of	the	revolution.	“The	important	lesson	in	the	Cuban	experience,”	Julian	Mayfield	wrote,	“is	that	social	change	need	not	wait	on	the	patient	education	of	white	
																																																								21	C.W.	Mackay,	“Fantastic!	Inside	Cuba,”	The	Baltimore	Afro-American,	January	31,	1959.	
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supremacists.”22	Rep.	Adam	Clayton	Powell,	Jr.,	who	had	persuaded	Congress	in	the	previous	year	to	cease	the	US	shipment	of	arms	to	Batista	forces,	visited	the	island	at	Castro’s	invitation	that	January	and	urged	Congress	to	support	the	new	Cuban	government,	while	also	publicly	hoping	that	the	Cuban	victory	would	inspire	similar	revolutions	throughout	the	Caribbean	and	Latin	America.23		The	shockwaves	that	the	Cuban	Revolution	sent	across	the	globe	reverberated	particularly	loudly	in	New	York	City,	with	Harlem	playing	host	to	Castro	and	other	foreign	dignitaries	in	1960.	During	a	visit	to	the	city	in	the	spring	of	that	year,	Fidel	Castro	was	greeted	by	the	roar	of	20,000	revelers	at	Pennsylvania	Station	in	Midtown	Manhattan,	with	40,000	more	gathered	in	Central	Park	to	celebrate	the	revolutionary’s	arrival	in	the	United	States.24	“Every	Afro-American	in	his	right	mind	supports	Fidel	Castro,”	Mae	Mallory	wrote	of	the	Cuban	leader’s	popularity	in	Harlem,	“even	if	he	is	afraid	to	do	so	publicly.”25		Despite	the	popular	reception	he	received	from	African	American	communities	across	the	nation,	Castro	and	his	revolutionary	government	in	Cuba	quickly	became	a	target	of	Cold	War	era	suspicion	and	persecution	from	the	United	States	government.	Perceived	as	a	threat	to	the	economic	interests	of	powerful	US	investors	and	the	imperial	aspirations	of	US	global	capitalism	under	the	guise	of																																																									22	Tyson,	Radio	Free	Dixie,	222.		 23	John	Young	III,	“Harlem	Has	Big	Stake	in	Cuba,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	February	7,	1959.		 24	Tyson,	Radio	Free	Dixie,	222.		 25	Mae	Mallory,	“Fidel	Castro	in	New	York,”	September	1961,	Box	2,	Folder	10,	Mallory	Papers.	
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“democracy,”	Castro	was	subjected	to	Communist	smear	campaigns	and	countless	assassination	attempts	from	the	CIA.	For	Black	organizers	and	intellectuals	who	had	been	active	in	left-labor	led	struggles	during	the	post-World	War	II	era,	these	repressive	tactics	that	characterized	the	McCarthy	Era	were	all	too	familiar,	and	many	organized	to	actively	support	Castro’s	government	in	spite	of	US	opposition.		In	the	spring	of	1960,	a	group	of	30	intellectuals	and	activists	formed	the	Fair	Play	For	Cuba	Committee	to	challenge	mainstream	media	narratives	about	the	Cuban	government	and	to	coordinate	active	support	for	the	revolutionary	government.	Of	the	thirty	founding	members	of	the	FPCC,	which	included	the	likes	of	French	philosopher	Jean-Paul	Sartre	and	American	writer	Norman	Mailer,	nearly	one	third	were	African	American,	most	of	whom	were	“drawn	from	among	[Robert	F.]	Williams’s	nationalist	supporters	in	Harlem.”	These	members	included	writers	James	Baldwin,	John	O.	Killens,	and	Julian	Mayfield,	journalists	William	Worthy	and	Richard	Gibson,	historian	John	Henrik	Clarke,	and	Robert	Williams	himself.26	In	June	of	that	year,	FPCC	provided	Williams	with	the	opportunity	to	visit	the	island	as	an	official	guest	of	Fidel	Castro	and	the	Cuban	government.27	On	his	way	to	Havana,	Williams	was	given	a	warm	farewell	reception	from	The	Crusader	Family	before	flying	out	of	New	York	City.	Though	not	involved	in	an	official	capacity	with	FPCC,	the	organizing	work	that	Mae	Mallory	undertook	in	Harlem	with	The	Crusader	Family	brought	her	into	close	collaboration	with	many	of	
																																																								26	Tyson,	Radio	Free	Dixie,	224.		 27	Ibid;	Peniel	E.	Joseph,	Waiting	‘Til	the	Midnight	Hour:	A	Narrative	History	of	
Black	Power	in	America	(New	York:	Henry	Holt	and	Company,	2006),	29.	
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the	group’s	members	and	their	broader	networks.	In	many	ways,	this	expansive	network	of	organizations	and	affiliations	that	Black	FPCC	members	represented	was	illustrative	of	the	deeply	rooted	Black	radical	tradition	that	was	flowering	in	Harlem	by	the	early	1960s.	Inspired	by	the	impatience	of	the	student	sit-in	movement	erupting	in	the	South,	as	well	as	the	anti-colonial	climate	of	revolution	throughout	the	African	Diaspora,	Black	activists	in	New	York	City	escalated	their	local	protest	activities	within	a	national	and	global	context	in	the	early	1960s.		This	network	of	affiliations	that	both	preceded	and	emerged	in	the	wake	of	the	FPCC	included	organizations	such	as	the	Harlem	Writers	Guild	(HWG),	the	Organization	of	Young	Men	(OYM),	and	On	Guard	Committee	For	Freedom	(OGFF),	publications	such	as	Freedom,	Freedomways,	and	Liberator	magazines,	and	countless	ties	to	the	diverse	array	of	notable	Black	leaders,	nationalist	groups,	and	community	organizations.	Though	many	of	the	individuals	involved	in	this	radical	political	milieu	lived	outside	of	Harlem,	as	James	Smethurst	notes,	“when	black	artists	and	intellectuals	engaged	in	radical	cultural	and	political	African-American	identified	activities,	organizations,	and	institutions,	their	symbolic	(and	often	practical)	locus	was	often	still	Harlem.”	The	continued	work	of	radical	grassroots	organizers	in	Harlem,	including	Mae	Mallory	and	Jesse	Gray,	and	artist-activists	like	actors	Ossie	Davis	and	Ruby	Dee,	Smethurst	argues,	carried	the	torch	of	“the	long	history	of	Left	and	nationalist	political	and	artistic	activity”	which	made	Harlem	a	logical	and	fertile	location	for	radical	organizing	in	the	early	1960s.28		
																																																								28	James	Smethurst,	The	Black	Arts	Movement:	Literary	Nationalism	in	the	
1960s	and	1970s	(Chapel	Hill:	The	University	of	North	Carolina	Press,	2005),	114.	
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Though	less	known	in	the	artistic	and	intellectual	spheres	that	many	of	these	activists	occupied,	Mae	Mallory	was	known	in	the	streets	of	Harlem	and	emerged	as	a	driving	force	behind	many	of	the	most	explosive	organizing	activities	in	the	city	from	1960-1961.	Furthermore,	Mallory’s	evolving	political	analysis	and	actions	during	this	period	marked	a	rejection	of	moderate	civil	rights	organizations	and	a	budding	embrace	of	self-determination,	armed	self-defense,	Pan-African	solidarity,	and	revolutionary	nationalism—an	evolution	that	signified	a	trending	radicalization	amongst	poor	and	working-class	Black	communities	in	Harlem	from	1960-1964.		Like	Williams,	Mayfield,	Worthy,	and	countless	other	activists,	Mallory	drew	inspiration	from	the	Cuban	Revolution	that	fueled	her	organizing	and	political	analysis.	When	Castro	visited	New	York	City	in	September	1960,	Mallory	and	the	Crusaders	For	Freedom	coordinated	a	motorcade	to	welcome	the	iconic	revolutionary	at	Idlewild	(now	John	F.	Kennedy)	Airport,	and	organized	rallies	outside	of	the	Hotel	Theresa	after	discourteous	treatment	at	a	midtown	hotel	prompted	his	move	uptown	to	Harlem.	The	Crusaders	gave	Castro	a	rousing	welcome	at	the	Hotel	Theresa,	chanting	“Vive	Castro!”	and	“Venceremos”	along	W.	125th	Street	while	carrying	signs	that	read	“Give	em	hell	Fidel”	and	“Harlem	loves	Castro.”29	Mallory	herself	denounced	the	brusque	treatment	Castro	had	received	at	the	Shelbourne	Hotel,	charging	that	the	“biased”	management	was	“carrying	out	the	policy	of	the	State	Dept.,	to	lie,	to	be	impolite	and	create	as	much	confusion	and	chaos	as	possible.”		
																																																								29	Mae	Mallory,	“Fidel	Castro	in	New	York,”	September	1961,	Box	2,	Folder	10,	Mallory	Papers.	
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Mallory	also	pointedly	questioned	the	motives	of	the	federal	government	in	attempting	to	salve	the	situation	by	offering	Castro’s	delegation	a	free	stay	at	the	Shelbourne	rather	than	move	to	Harlem.	“In	this	country	of	Free	ENTERPRISE	does	it	mean	that	people	that	the	United	States	Gov’t	call	UNFRIENDLY	should	live	rent	free	rather	than	let	a	native	born	black	man	make	one	cent	on	his	enterprise,”	Mallory	charged,	“or	is	there	something	that	it	would	behove	[sic]	the	black	man	in	these	United	States	to	learn	from	Fidel	Castro?”30	In	Mallory’s	analysis,	these	intentional	and	conspiratorial	political	maneuverings	of	the	State	evinced	a	fundamental	contradiction	in	American	society.	That	a	capitalist,	“free	enterprise”	society	was	willing	to	sacrifice	the	principles	of	free	market	trade	to	either	prevent	Black	businesses	from	earning	capital,	or	to	suppress	radical	internationalist	communications,	further	demonstrated	to	Mallory	the	systematic	depths	of	American	racism	and	marked	an	evolution	of	her	critique	of	the	racist	foundations	of	capitalist	society.		If	Mallory	was	correct	in	her	assessment	of	governmental	anxieties	over	the	subversive	possibilities	of	Castro’s	visit	to	Harlem,	the	influence	that	the	visit	had	on	many	radical	intellectuals	and	activists	proved	that	Big	Brother	had	reason	to	be	concerned.	Like	Mallory,	Castro’s	arrival	had	a	profound	impact	on	the	political	development	of	Sarah	E.	Wright,	an	African	American	aspiring	novelist	and	member	of	the	Harlem	Writers	Guild	(HWG).	“Fidel	was	part	of	a	flood	of	new	Third	World	leaders,”	Wright	later	wrote,	“who	were	now	coming	to	serve	notice	that	the	days	of	the	Black	Man’s	Burden…were	drawing	to	a	close.”	Formed	in	1950	as	a	writing																																																									30	Ibid.	
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salon	for	radical	Black	artists	and	intellectuals,	including	Wright,	Killens,	Clarke,	Mayfield,	and	singer	Abbey	Lincoln,	the	HWG	by	1960	represented	what	Smethurst	describes	as	“the	unrepentant	left”—those	intellectual-activists	who	remained	unwavering	in	their	support	of	the	ideological	bases	of	the	Leftist	and	nationalist	movements	of	the	post-World	War	II	era	in	spite	of	the	systemic	suppression	that	dismantled	such	movements	during	the	McCarthy	Era.31	With	the	radical	fervor	of	the	post-war	era	showing	promising	signs	of	life	by	1960,	intellectual-activists	like	those	in	the	HWG	brought	the	radical	politics	of	that	era	into	organized	action	at	the	turn	of	the	decade.		The	political	analysis	and	activism	of	many	HWG	members	was	also	informed	by	close	personal	relationships	with	local,	national,	and	global	liberation	struggles,	which	were	converging	in	Harlem	during	this	period	with	their	active	assistance.	In	her	reflections	on	the	HWG,	Wright	explained	that	firsthand	reports	of	racial	violence	in	the	South,	where	many	HWG	members	had	come	from,	conveyed	“a	greater	immediacy	to	us	than	the	nightly	TV	footage.”	At	the	same	time,	Wright	noted,	“we	were	also	at	one	with	the	seething	ghettos	of	the	North,	our	ears	attuned	to	Malcolm’s	message.”	And	with	1960	dubbed	the	“Year	of	Africa”	by	the	United	Nations	for	the	anti-colonial	revolutions	sweeping	the	continent,	HWG	members	immersed	themselves	in	solidarity	work	for	various	armed	liberation	struggles,	and	were	instrumental	in	spreading	a	consciousness	of	Africa	to	African	American	communities.	To	Wright	and	other	members	of	the	HWG,	then,	Castro’s	nearby	
																																																								31	Smethurst,	The	Black	Arts	Movement,	118.	
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victory	and	triumphant	arrival	in	Harlem	signified	that	“there	was	a	new	day	coming!”32		Wright	learned	of	Castro’s	arrival	in	Harlem	during	a	weekly	meeting	of	the	HWG	that	she	was	hosting	in	her	Lower	East	Side	apartment	with	her	husband,	Joseph	Kaye,	and	attended	by	John	O.	and	Grace	Killens,	John	Henrik	Clarke,	and	Bill	Forde.	When	a	phone	call	for	Clarke	announced	that	the	Cuban	premier	was	moving	to	the	Hotel	Theresa,	the	group	hastily	sped	uptown	to	join	the	throngs	of	revelers	on	W.	125th	St.	and	Seventh	Ave.,	braving	the	rain	and	rough	police	presence	to	celebrate	Castro’s	arrival	and	“protect	Fidel	against	unseen	menaces.”33		Though	the	majority	of	those	who	flocked	to	lay	eyes	on	Castro	may	not	have	been	Fidelistas,	as	Julian	Mayfield	noted,	the	feeling	along	125th	Street	“was	that	anybody	so	completely	rejected	by	white	America	must	have	some	good	points.”34	“While	most	of	white	New	York	was	gnashing	its	teeth,	Harlem	was	erupting!,”	Wright	recalled,	echoing	Mallory’s	assessment	of	the	fearful	responses	of	government	agencies	to	Castro’s	arrival,	which	included	FBI	surveillance	and	police	suppression	of	demonstrations.	Despite	the	hostilities	displayed	by	city	and	federal	agencies,	and	the	ambivalence	of	local	“mainstream	leaders”	(including	Jackie	Robinson	and	the	previously-supportive	Adam	Clayton	Powell,	Jr.),	the	thousands	that	greeted	Castro	on	a	near-daily	basis	in	Harlem	effectively	served	notice	that	the																																																									32	Sarah	E.	Wright,	“The	Lower	East	Side:	A	Rebirth	of	World	Vision,”	African	
American	Review	27	(Winter	1993):	594.		 33	Ibid,	595.		 34	Julian	Mayfield,	“The	Cuban	Challenge,”	Freedomways	1,	no.	2	(Summer	1961):	185.	
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collective	mood	of	the	people	was	aligned	more	closely	with	that	of	Mallory	and	Wright,	rather	than	the	established	leadership	class.	As	Smethurst	notes,	Castro’s	meetings	in	Harlem	with	Malcolm	X,	Robert	F.	Williams,	and	other	community	leaders	“energized	nationalists	and	leftists	(and	Left	nationalists),	facilitated	the	circulation	of	radical	ideas	in	the	community,	and	reinforced	the	image	of	Harlem	as	a	center	for	such	ideas.”35		Though	the	immediate	exhilaration	that	Mallory,	Wright,	and	thousands	of	others	in	Harlem	felt	during	Castro’s	ten-day	visit	would	fade,	it	nonetheless	left	a	lasting	mark	on	the	collective	consciousness	of	a	generation	of	activists	and	local	people.	“What	has	always	remained…of	Fidel’s	visit,”	Wright	recalled	over	30	years	later,	“is	a	social	vision	immersed	so	deep	in	my	heart	it	can	never	be	dislodged.”36	Like	Wright	and	other	members	of	the	HWG,	the	revolutionary	fervor	of	1960	stoked	the	radical	imaginations	of	the	African	American	leftist	and	nationalist	literary	communities	in	New	York	City	and	prompted	a	shift	to	more	active	organizational	involvement	in	radical	struggles	for	rights	and	power	in	Harlem.		One	of	the	first	organizations	to	emerge	from	the	downtown	literary	scene	amidst	this	political	zeitgeist	was	the	Organization	of	Young	Men	(OYM),	formed	in	1960	by	writer	LeRoi	Jones	(Amiri	Baraka).	A	native	of	Newark,	NJ,	Baraka	had	traveled	to	Cuba	with	FPCC	that	July	at	the	invitation	of	Richard	Gibson,	along	with	Sarah	Wright,	Harold	Cruse,	Julian	Mayfield	and	his	wife	Ana	Cordero,	where	he	met	Castro	and	Robert	F.	Williams	for	the	first	time.	Seeing	the	fruits	of	an	anti-colonial																																																									35	Smethurst,	The	Black	Arts	Movement,	113.		 36	Wright,	“The	Lower	East	Side,”	596.	
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revolution	firsthand	in	the	streets	of	Havana,	Baraka’s	tour	of	the	island	pulled	back	the	curtains	on	a	concept	that	had	previously	seemed	“foreign,”	“romantic,”	and	even	“hopeless”	to	him	and	other	self-fancied	rebels	in	the	United	States.37	Coupled	with	the	southern	student	movement,	the	trip	spurred	Baraka	to	reconsider	the	efficacy	of	the	“bland	revolt”	that	the	culture	of	the	downtown	beat	scene	represented	and	provided	the	inspiration	and	push	needed	to	begin	putting	his	evolving	radical	political	consciousness	into	organizational	practice.		Once	back	in	New	York,	Baraka	began	working	his	connections	in	the	literary	scene	to	put	together	a	group	to	raise	political	consciousness	downtown.	The	Organization	of	Young	Men	emerged	from	these	efforts	as	an	all-Black	group	of	writers,	musicians,	and	intellectuals,	including	Archie	Shepp,	Harold	Cruse,	Calvin	Hicks,	and	A.B.	Spellman,	who	recognized	that	“it	was	time	to	go	on	the	offensive	in	the	civil	rights	movement.”38	According	to	Smethurst,	the	OYM	was		intended	as	a	vehicle	for	downtown	black	artists	and	activists	to	engage	and	enter	into	the	more	militant	side	of	the	domestic	civil	rights	movement	and	to	link	civil	rights	in	the	United	States	with	struggles	against	colonialism	and	neocolonialism	around	the	world,	while	maintaining	a	distance	from	‘mainstream’	civil	rights	organizations.”39			
																																																								37	LeRoi	Jones,	“Cuba	Libre,”	Evergreen	Review	4,	no.	15	(Nov.-Dec.	1960),	139.		 38	Though	the	group	was	composed	exclusively	of	Black	intellectuals	and	artists,	Baraka	noted	in	his	autobiography	that	this	was	not	by	design.	Furthermore,	Baraka	notes	several	times	that	most	of	these	men	were	married	to	white	women.	It	is	also	worth	noting	that	the	group’s	membership,	which	its	name	alludes	to,	was	comprised	entirely	of	men.	Amiri	Baraka,	The	Autobiography	of	LeRoi	Jones	(Chicago:	Lawrence	Hill	Books,	1997),	248.		39	Smethurst,	The	Black	Arts	Movement,	395-96n35.	
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Smethurst’s	assessment	is	evident	in	a	recruitment	letter	sent	in	the	spring	of	1961,	in	which	Baraka	sent	out	a	call	to	“young	Negro	men…to	form	some	highly	militant	organization…to	combat	the	rise	of	Uncle	Tomism,	shallow	minded	white	liberalism,	racism,	and	ignorance.”	“The	new	nations	of	Africa,	and	the	newly	independent	peoples	of	Asia	and	Latin	America,”	Baraka	continued,	“form,	now,	a	majority	of	the	peoples	of	the	world.	They	are,	indeed,	our	brothers…but	we	must	earn	this	brotherhood	by	acting.”40	Though	by	Baraka’s	own	admission	the	group	lacked	a	collective	analysis	and	sense	of	direction,	it	nonetheless	represented	“a	confirmation	of	rising	consciousness”	that	resonated	throughout	the	city	and	would	quickly	converge	with	the	radical	political	milieu	that	was	surging	in	Harlem.41	Furthermore,	as	Smethurst	notes,	the	formation	of	the	OYM	marked	a	“crucial	step	in	Baraka’s	move	toward	Black	Power”	and	the	opening	of	the	Black	Arts	Repertory	Theatre	School	five	years	later.42	
“A	nation	within	a	nation”:	Malcolm	X	and	the	Nation	of	Islam	in	Harlem,	1959-
1961	 If	Baraka’s	pilgrimage	to	Cuba	provided	the	push	factor	for	his	involvement	in	organized	political	action,	this	process	was	expedited	by	his	introduction	to	Malcolm	X	through	“The	Hate	That	Hate	Produced”	the	previous	year.	While	Mike	Wallace’s	weeklong	television	special	had	evoked	shock	and	outrage	in	white	
																																																								40	LeRoi	Jones,	“An	Organization	of	Young	Men,”	April	18,	1961,	Box	2,	Folder	21,	Mallory	Papers.		 41	Baraka,	The	Autobiography	of	LeRoi	Jones,	248.		 42	Smethurst,	The	Black	Arts	Movement,	345.	
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audiences,	the	stirring	visuals	of	the	NOI	and	its	loquacious	young	minister	electrified	a	generation	of	Black	audiences.	“He	charged	me	in	a	way	no	one	else	had	ever	done.	He	reached	me,”	Baraka	later	recalled.	To	Baraka	and	many	other	young	militants,	the	emergence	of	Malcolm	X	represented	the	rise	of	a	dynamic	new	leadership	that	rejected	gradual	approaches	to	liberation	and	more	accurately	reflected	the	increasingly	militant	mood	and	analyses	of	the	Black	masses.	“What	Malcolm	said	were	things	that	had	gone	through	my	mind	but	he	was	giving	voice	to,”	Baraka	remembered,	“his	media	appearances	made	my	head	tingle	with	anticipation	and	new	ideas.	He	made	me	feel	even	more	articulate	and	forceful,	myself,	just	having	seen	him.”43	Though	“The	Hate	That	Hate	Produced”	had	exposed	the	Nation	to	the	racist	vitriol	of	white	American	society,	the	national	visibility	the	program	offered	also	provided	a	springboard	for	their	recruitment	and	expansion.	One	of	the	major	facets	of	the	NOI’s	recruiting	strategies	at	the	turn	of	the	decade	was	the	dissemination	of	pamphlets,	handbills,	and	newspapers	throughout	the	streets	of	Harlem,	where	members	ardently	“fished”	for	converts.	The	NOI’s	increased	emphasis	on	producing	and	circulating	literature	also	had	another	motivation,	though.	As	Manning	Marable	notes,	the	media	firestorm	that	followed	in	the	wake	of	Mike	Wallace’s	television	special	motivated	the	NOI	to	establish	its	own	media	outlets	in	an	attempt	to	gain	control	over	its	image.		Though	for	years	Elijah	Muhammad	had	written	columns	in	the	Pittsburgh	Courier	and	the	Los	Angeles	
Herald-Dispatch,	the	spotlight	that	the	NOI	had	attracted	by	1959	presented	a	prime	opportunity	for	the	Nation	to	launch	their	own	publications	to	both	write	their	own																																																									43	Amiri	Baraka,	The	Autobiography	of	LeRoi	Jones,	273-74.	
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narratives	and	to	reach	their	goal	of	adding	one	million	converts	by	1961.44	Despite	the	increasing	demands	of	leading	Mosque	No.	7,	organizing	new	mosques	across	the	nation,	and	managing	his	heightened	public	profile,	Malcolm	X	took	the	lead	in	launching	what	would	become	one	of	the	NOI’s	“most	potent	vehicles,”	Muhammad	
Speaks.		After	a	short-lived	attempt	at	publishing	a	magazine	titled	The	Messenger	in	the	fall	of	1959,	Malcolm	X	scored	immediate,	widespread	success	in	launching	
Muhammad	Speaks	in	May	of	1960.45	To	get	the	paper	off	the	ground	required	tireless	dedication	from	Malcolm,	who	set	aside	a	room	in	his	house	in	East	Elmhurst,	Queens,	for	the	paper’s	production.	“He	would	have	pages	plastered	all	over	the	wall,”	Elijah	Muhammad’s	son	Wallace	Muhammad	recalled.	“The	whole	room	was	just	turned	into	a	workplace	for	the	production	of	the	paper.”46	Printed	out	of	an	office	at	113	Lenox	Avenue	in	Harlem,	the	tabloid-sized	paper	sold	for	fifteen	cents	and	was	billed	as	“a	militant	monthly	dedicated	to	Justice	for	the	Black	Man.”47	Bundles	of	the	newspaper	were	swiftly	delivered	to	Mosques	across	the	nation	and	members	of	the	NOI	were	ordered	to	fill	strict	quotas	of	sales	and	subscriptions.	Neatly-dressed	members	of	the	Nation	became	regular	fixtures	on	the	
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streets	of	Harlem	where	they	hawked	copies	of	the	paper,	while	also	setting	up	shop	outside	of	churches,	NAACP	meetings,	street	rallies,	and	any	other	places	where	African	Americans	congregated.48	The	relentless	salesmanship	of	NOI	members	(performed	under	threat	of	economic	or	physical	punishment)	had	remarkable	impacts	in	short	time.	As	Marable	notes,	Muhammad	Speaks	“quickly	attracted	tens	of	thousands	of	regular	readers,	the	vast	majority	of	them	non-Muslims.”49	Within	its	first	two	years	in	publication,	the	newspaper	had	a	circulation	of	over	50,000	and	by	1963	Muhammad	Speaks	would	have	the	largest	distribution	of	any	African	American	newspaper	in	publication.50		In	addition	to	the	tireless	efforts	of	the	NOI’s	ever-present	sales	force,	the	paper	also	drew	widespread	readership	by	featuring	columns	from	well-known	writers	who	wrote	effectively	to	the	mood	of	the	Black	masses	in	Harlem	and	the	nation.	The	pages	of	Muhammad	Speaks	regularly	contained	columns	in	the	early	1960s	from	notable	Harlem	writers	Langston	Hughes,	John	Henrik	Clarke,	and	Sylvester	Leaks,	who	helped	to	shape	the	political	analysis	of	the	widely	circulated	paper.	An	activist	and	associate	of	Clarke,	Leaks	was	a	particularly	ideal	fit	for	covering	issues	of	self-defense	and	self-determination,	which	were	central	pillars	of	NOI	ideology.	Described	by	Julian	Mayfield	as	a	“militant	writer”	who	knew	when	it	
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was	time	to	“lay	down	his	pen,	stop	talking	and	wade	in	with	his	fists,”51	Leaks	in	the	following	years	would	become	head	of	Crusaders	For	Freedom	and	a	fixture	at	street	rallies	and	radical	organizing	campaigns.		After	its	early	successes	in	Harlem,	production	of	Muhammad	Speaks	eventually	shifted	to	the	NOI’s	national	headquarters	in	Chicago,	where	Elijah	Muhammad	and	his	inner	circle	could	exercise	closer	control	of	the	paper.	Though	Muhammad’s	conservative	doctrine	of	political	abstinence,	Victorian	social	mores,	and	Black	capitalism	was	reflected	in	his	columns,	Smethurst	points	out	that	“the	general	editorial	direction	of	the	paper	was	militantly	antiracist	and	anti-imperialist	(and	often	anticapitalist)	as	well	as	nationalist.”	This	juxtaposition	of	Muhammad’s	conservatism	with	the	radical	leftist	and	nationalist	leanings	of	a	national	editorial	staff	drawn	from	veterans	of	the	African	American	press	and	Popular	Front	in	Chicago	foreshadowed	looming	contestations	over	political	ideology	and	activism	between	Muhammad	and	Malcolm.52			 As	Malcolm	and	the	NOI	shot	into	surging	national	conversations	around	civil	rights,	integration,	Black	nationalism,	self-determination,	and	self	defense	by	1960,	the	Harlem	minister	was	increasingly	sought	after	for	public	debates	and	lectures	on	these	issues	that	were	shaping	the	direction	of	the	Black	Freedom	Struggle.	Malcolm	X	used	these	opportunities	to	not	only	confront	misrepresentations	of	the	NOI’s	theology	as	racist	or	hate-mongering,	but	also	to	expound	his	positions	on	the	
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direction	of	the	Black	Freedom	Struggle	and	challenge	the	legitimacy	of	its	mainstream	leadership.	In	March,	Malcolm	X	was	invited	to	debate	Rev.	William	M.	James	of	the	Metropolitan	Community	United	Church	in	Harlem	on	a	local	radio	broadcast	moderated	by	radical	white	attorney	William	Kunstler.	Citing	claims	by	Roy	Wilkins	that	the	NOI	was	“no	better	than	the	Ku	Klux	Klan,”	Kunstler	quickly	pressed	Malcolm	to	defend	the	racial	separatism	preached	by	Elijah	Muhammad.	In	defending	the	nation’s	theology,	Malcolm	rejected	Wilkins’s	comments	as	uninformed	and	called	attention	to	the	hypocrisy	of	western	religions	that	historically	practiced	racial	discrimination	but	now	condemned	the	Nation	of	Islam	for	religious	exclusivity.53		While	affirming	the	Nation’s	theology	in	public	appearances	that	spring,	Malcolm	also	explained	its	nationalistic	ideologies	that	drew	from	traditions	of	secular	Black	nationalism	while	also	contributing	to	its	resurgence	in	the	early	1960s.	At	a	lecture	at	Boston	University	the	same	month,	Malcolm	X	devoted	much	of	a	two-hour	question	and	answer	session	to	explaining	the	NOI’s	position	on	the	“nation	question”	and	reparations.	As	“back	salary”	for	generations	of	enslavement,	Malcolm	told	the	interracial	crowd,	Elijah	Muhammad	called	for	the	United	States	to	compensate	Black	Americans	with	“either	a	tract	of	land,	or	several	states,	wherein	they	could	form	their	own	government.”54	Although	these	aspects	of	the	Nation’s	theology	built	upon	past	generations	of	Black	nationalist	political	organizing,	in																																																									53	Marable,	Malcolm	X,	169-70.		54	“Malcolm	X	Defends	Muhammad	At	Boston	U.,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	March	5,	1960;	“Defends	Muslim	Leader	At	Meet,”	Chicago	Defender,	March	15,	1960.	
		198	
these	early	appearances	Malcolm	exercised	caution	in	explicitly	commenting	on	the	Black	Freedom	Struggle	as	mandated	by	Muhammad’s	position	on	political	noninvolvement.			 While	most	of	Malcolm’s	public	appearances	at	the	dawn	of	the	1960s	were	dedicated	to	explicating	the	theology	and	programs	of	the	Nation	of	Islam,	he	did	make	overtures	to	local	civil	rights	and	nationalist	groups	in	Harlem.	Though	he	had	actively	supported	Robert	F.	Williams	with	funds	and	a	public	platform	when	he	visited	Harlem	over	the	previous	few	years,	Malcolm	X’s	primary	engagement	with	Harlem’s	freedom	struggles	had	been	in	the	realm	of	psychological	decolonization	and	empowerment	through	his	revelatory	public	speeches	and	dramatic	stands	against	police	brutality.	“People	use	that	cliché,	‘the	university	of	the	streets,”	Peter	Bailey	recalled,	“but	that	really	was	the	university	of	the	street	because	it	was	a	tremendous	learning	experience.”55		Malcolm	X,	who	Bailey	described	as	a	“master	teacher,”	also	recognized	that	if	the	Nation	were	to	bring	about	fundamental	societal	change,	they	would	need	allies	to	put	their	liberatory	education	into	praxis.	Having	cut	his	teeth	on	the	street	corners	of	Harlem’s	grassroots	nationalist	scene,	Malcolm	knew	fully	well	that	the	sectarian	nationalist	groups	competing	for	followers	were	stifling	collective	action.	As	John	Henrik	Clarke	would	describe	the	following	year,	“this	nationalism	is	being	hampered	by	too	many	organizations	and	too	many	leaders	with	conflicting	
																																																								55	William	Strickland,	Malcolm	X:	Make	It	Plain,	115.	
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programs.”56	With	the	likes	of	James	Lawson,	Carlos	Cooks,	Eddie	“Pork	Chop”	Davis,	Bessie	Philips,	and	many	other	veteran	speakers	and	organizers	staking	claims	to	various	corners	and	constituencies,	Malcolm	made	a	move	in	the	spring	of	1960	to	bring	these	nationalist	factions,	civil	rights	groups,	and	community	leaders	together	under	a	common	banner	of	Black	liberation	and	empowerment	in	Harlem.			 In	May	1960,	an	advertisement	in	the	New	York	Amsterdam	News	announced	a	“huge	6-hour	outdoor”	rally	to	be	held	at	the	corner	of	125th	St.	and	7th	Ave.	Under	a	bold	headline	announcing	the	Harlem	Freedom	Rally,	a	stone-faced	photograph	of	Malcolm	X	issued	a	call	to	religious,	political,	business,	and	civic	leaders	in	Harlem.	“Let	us	forget	our	religious	and	political	differences.	We	must	come	together	on	the	same	platform	in	a	great	display	of	UNITY	against	our	common	enemy,	and	fight	for	one	common	cause…complete	and	immediate	FREEDOM	for	the	Black	Man	in	America.”	The	list	of	speakers	invited	to	the	rally	represented	a	veritable	cross-section	of	African	American	political	thought	in	Harlem,	many	of	whom	had	been	involved	in	the	Mayor’s	Commission	on	Harlem	Affairs	the	previous	year.	The	expansive	guest	list	included	Roy	Wilkins,	Lester	Granger,	Martin	Luther	King,	Jr.,	A.	Philip	Randolph,	Jackie	Robinson,	Hope	Stevens,	James	Watson,	Adam	Clayton	Powell,	Jr.,	James	Lawson,	and	Sugar	Ray	Robinson,	among	many	others	known	in	Harlem’s	political,	religious,	and	social	circles.57		
																																																								56	John	Henrik	Clarke,	“The	New	Afro-American	Nationalism,”	Freedomways	1,	no.	3	(Fall	1961):	286.		57	“Harlem	Freedom	Rally,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	May	21,	1960.	
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Shortly	after	noon	on	May	28th,	an	estimated	four	thousand	people	flocked	to	Harlem	Square	where	speakers	blasted	Louis	X’s	“A	White	Man’s	Heaven	is	a	Black	Man’s	Hell”	from	a	stage	set	up	in	front	of	Louis	Michaux’s	bookstore.58	On	the	grandstand,	Bessie	Philips,	Percy	Sutton,	Wallace	Muhammad,	Max	Roach,	Louis	X,	Hope	Stevens,	and	Louis	Michaux	looked	out	onto	a	bustling	crowd	on	the	streets	and	sidewalks	where	dozens	raised	signs	reading	“We	Must	Have	Some	Land.”59	Rising	to	the	podium,	Malcolm	began	his	address	with	calls	for	unity	amongst	Black	leaders	for	the	purpose	of	achieving	freedom,	equality,	justice,	and	human	rights	so	long	denied	by	the	American	government.		Far	from	a	sentimental	call	for	symbolic	brotherhood,	Malcolm	explained	that	this	unity	in	leadership	must	be	built	and	directed	by	the	grassroots.	The	purpose	of	the	rally,	he	explained,	was	for	the	masses	to	become	familiarized	with	“our	leaders	who	have	been	acting	as	our	spokesmen.”	Reflecting	a	growing	local	and	national	disillusionment	with	gradualist	leadership	in	the	wake	of	the	“near-riot”	in	Harlem	and	the	sit-ins	throughout	the	South,	Malcolm	pointed	to	the	need	for	local	people	to	control	their	own	movements.	“We	want	to	get	behind	leaders	who	will	fight	for	us…leaders	who	are	not	afraid	to	demand	freedom,	justice,	and	equality,”	he	declared,	“we	do	not	want	leaders	who	are	hand	picked	for	us	by	the	
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white	man.	We	don’t	want	any	more	Uncle	Toms.”60	Keeping	with	NOI	doctrines,	Malcolm	challenged	the	crowd	to	begin	this	process	by	building	unity	in	their	neighborhoods	by	abstaining	from	“immoral	habits”	that	divided	the	community.	From	there,	Malcolm	argued,	the	people	needed	to	“form	a	platform	that	will	be	good	for	all	our	own	people,	as	well	as	for	others,”	and	give	“intelligent	active	support	to	our	political	leaders”	who	would	fight	fearlessly	and	unselfishly	for	this	platform	of	Black	liberation.		In	this	speech,	Malcolm	blended	elements	of	the	Nation’s	theology	of	moral	conservatism,	racial	separatism,	and	economic	nationalism	with	calls	for	self-determination,	secular	Black	nationalism,	and	Pan-Africanism	that	were	characterizing	grassroots	freedom	struggles	in	Harlem	at	the	time.	Describing	the	20	million	Black	Americans	as	constituting	a	“nation	within	a	nation,”	Malcolm	invoked	the	“Spirit	of	Bandung”	and	cited	his	recent	trip	to	Africa	to	call	for	“freedom	from	colonialism,	foreign	domination,	oppression	and	exploitation.”	It	was	clear	in	his	speech	that	Malcolm	saw	the	Bandung	Conference	and	ongoing	anti-colonial	liberation	struggles	as	models	for	building	a	revolutionary	united	Black	freedom	movement	in	the	United	States	led	by	the	militancy	of	the	masses.		Using	Jomo	Kenyatta	and	Tom	Mboya	as	examples	of	“extremists”	and	“moderates,”	respectively,	Malcolm	explained	the	centrality	of	“extremists”	in	advancing	liberation	struggles,	despite	the	disparaging	connotation	of	the	term	in	mainstream	media	outlets.	“To	be	called	a	‘moderate’	in	this	awakening	dark	world	today…is	to	receive	the	‘kiss	of	death’	as…leader	of	the	masses,”	Malcolm	declared,																																																									60	Lomax,	When	The	Word	Is	Given,	128-29.	
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“for	the	masses	are	ready	to	burst	the	shackles	of	slavery	whether	the	‘moderates’	will	stand	up	or	not.”61	With	Hope	Stevens	as	the	only	invited	speaker	to	actually	show	up,	it	was	evident	that	“moderate”	leaders	were	generally	unwilling	to	engage	in	talks	with	the	“extremist”	spokesman	for	the	Nation	of	Islam	at	this	point.	Though	Marable	may	have	overstated	his	claims	that	the	rally	was	responsible	for	“transforming	Malcolm	into	a	respectable	political	leader	in	Harlem’s	civic	life,”	the	Harlem	Freedom	Rally	nonetheless	marked	a	significant	entrée	for	Malcolm	into	coalition	building	in	Harlem	and	showed	an	early	step	toward	active	engagement	in	political	organizing.62			 	While	it	is	unclear	if	Elijah	Muhammad	objected	to	Malcolm’s	focus	on	politics	and	Pan-Africanism	in	his	Harlem	Freedom	Rally	speech,	he	was	explicit	in	his	displeasure	when	Malcolm	held	a	summit	with	Fidel	Castro	in	the	Hotel	Theresa	that	fall.	To	be	certain,	Malcolm	had	been	a	regular	fixture	at	Harlem	rallies	for	visiting	African	leaders,	including	Guinean	President	Sekou	Touré	the	previous	fall	and	a	Nigerian	attaché	months	later.	Throughout	the	summer	of	1960,	Malcolm	spoke	at	Harlem	street	rallies	about	the	“march	toward	freedom	of	the	dark	masses	throughout	the	rest	of	Africa,	Asia	and	even	Latin	America,”	warning	of	the	“explosive	Congolese	situation”	where	global	neo-colonial	forces	threatened	the	leadership	of	Prime	Minister	Patrice	Lumumba.63	So	when	Malcolm	made	his	way	to	the	Hotel	Theresa	to	greet	Fidel	Castro	that	fall	as	part	of	a	previously	formed																																																									61	Ibid,	132.		62	Marable,	Malcolm	X,	170.		63	“Malcolm	X	Speaks	Sat.,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	August	13,	1960.	
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welcoming	committee,	it	was	a	culmination	of	sorts	for	this	early	period	of	his	Pan-African	thought.		Joined	by	Amsterdam	News	columnist	James	Booker,	NOI	member	Luqman	Abdul-Hakeem,	and	a	few	others,	Malcolm	and	Fidel	met	in	the	revolutionary	leader’s	ninth	floor	room	around	midnight	as	throngs	of	revelers	milled	about	on	the	sidewalks	outside.	After	Malcolm	expressed	his	support	for	the	revolutionary	government	and	assured	Castro	that	the	masses	in	Harlem	were	not	deluded	by	the	anti-Cuban	“propaganda”	in	the	US	media,	Castro	expressed	his	solidarity	with	Pan-African	liberation	struggles.	“We	are	all	brothers.	It	is	wonderful	that	14	new	African	nations	are	in	the	United	Nations,”	Castro	warmly	expressed	to	Malcolm.	“They	are	oppressed	and	exploited	just	as	we	are,”	he	continued,	“the	new	nations	and	we	in	Latin	America	are	all	African	Americans.”64	Though	their	conversation	was	brief,	Malcolm	left	the	Hotel	Theresa	inspired	by	Castro	and	his	successful	overthrow	of	an	oppressive	government.	Castro	also	threw	down	an	indirect	challenge	during	their	meeting,	which	was	surely	not	missed	by	Malcolm.	“We	in	Cuba	have	done	in	18	months,”	Castro	stated	plainly,	“what	you	are	still	trying	to	do	for	400	years.”65		 While	Muhammad	fumed	from	Chicago,	telling	reporters	that	he	would	have	prevented	Malcolm	from	visiting	Castro	had	he	known,	the	masses	in	Harlem	were	galvanized	and	empowered	by	the	international	stage	and	proximity	to	
																																																								64	James	Booker,	“Castro	Talks,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	September	24,	1960.		 65	Ibid.	
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revolutionary	power	that	one	of	their	own	now	occupied.66	“Malcolm	was	considered	a	grassroots	leader,”	Abdul-Hakeem	later	noted,	“he	was	very	popular	in	Harlem.”67	Though	still	largely	ostracized	by	mainstream	civil	rights	leaders,	it	was	evident	that	Malcolm’s	credibility	among	the	masses	in	Harlem	and	other	major	cities	was	rapidly	growing.	Within	just	a	few	years	time,	the	militant	minister	had	successfully	taken	on	the	NYPD,	been	featured	in	a	weeklong	television	broadcast,	challenged	moderate	leaders	to	embrace	the	militancy	of	the	masses,	and	summited	with	revolutionary	leaders—all	while	maintaining	his	active	presence	in	the	streets	of	Harlem.		While	his	meteoric	ascension	was	met	with	scorn	from	moderate	civil	rights	leaders	and	white	liberals,	apprehension	from	Muhammad,	and	repression	from	law	enforcement,	it	was	enthusiastically	embraced	by	thousands	of	African	Americans.	From	1959-1961,	the	membership	of	Mosque	No.	7	in	Harlem	rose	from	1,125	members	(569	of	whom	were	considered	“active”)	to	2,369	members	(767	active).68	By	1960,	the	Nation	of	Islam	had	grown	to	200	Mosques	nationwide	with	50,000	members,	with	tens	of	thousands	more	who	never	joined	but	were	in	sympathy	with	
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		205	
or	actively	supported	the	NOI’s	positions.	69	Much	of	this	growth	must	be	directly	attributed	to	Malcolm’s	organizational	skills	in	building	many	of	these	Mosques,	as	well	as	his	liberatory	rhetoric,	which	was	mobilizing	ideological	resources	by	empowering	thousands	to	break	free	from	the	chains	of	psychological	colonialism	and	embrace	more	radical	analyses	and	actions.	
The	UN	“Riots”	and	the	Emergence	of	the	“New	Afro-American	Nationalism”	in	
Harlem	While	participating	in	solidarity	campaigns	in	support	of	international	liberation	struggles,	intellectuals	and	activists	in	New	York	City	were	also	organizing	on	behalf	of	struggles	in	the	southern	United	States—all	while	continuing	their	local	fights	for	African	American	rights	and	power.	Like	Wright,	Baraka,	Malcolm	X	and	countless	other	radical	New	Yorkers,	Mae	Mallory	understood	these	seemingly	diverse	struggles	as	intrinsically	linked	aspects	of	a	global	struggle	for	the	human	rights	and	self-determination	of	racially-oppressed	peoples.	As	sit-in	demonstrations	swept	through	the	South,	heralding	the	emergence	of	southern	student	involvement	in	the	Civil	Rights	Movement,	the	New	York	Crusader	Family	was	routinely	on	the	front	lines	of	solidarity	protests	and	demonstrations	in	Harlem.		In	March	1960,	the	Crusader	Family,	CORE,	and	the	NAACP	co-sponsored	a	protest	at	a	Harlem	Woolworth’s,	drawing	300	people	to	the	corner	of	125th	Street	and	7th	Avenue.	At	the	rally,	the	Crusader	Family	distributed	flyers	calling	for	a	national	boycott	of	Woolworth’s,	couching	their	demands	in	language	familiar	to	
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those	involved	in	New	York	City’s	vibrant	post-war	organizing	network.	“We	fought	for	democracy	everywhere	and	we	demand	the	right	to	eat	anywhere,”	the	flyer	read,	“We	will	no	longer	fill	the	front	lines	overseas—and	go	in	the	back	doors	at	home!...Join	the	picket	line	in	the	fight	for	freedom	in	the	free?	world.”70	Through	this	type	of	rhetoric,	The	Crusaders,	like	OYM	downtown,	challenged	Harlem	residents	to	locate	the	fight	against	segregation	in	public	accommodations	in	the	South	within	the	context	of	national	and	global	armed	struggles	to	advance	the	causes	of	democracy	and	freedom,	all	while	becoming	actively	involved	in	these	struggles	in	their	neighborhoods.				Mallory’s	impressive	track	record	of	local	organizing,	coupled	with	her	relationship	with	Rob	and	Mabel	Williams	through	The	Crusader	Family,	brought	her	directly	into	the	fold	of	an	emergent	network	of	radical	organizations	operating	out	of	Harlem.	By	the	spring	of	1961,	it	was	clear	that	the	Pan-Africanist,	leftist,	nationalist,	and	revolutionary	ideologies	promoted	by	generations	of	radical	organizers	and	street	corner	speakers	in	Harlem	had	gained	traction	in	a	way	unseen	since	the	Garvey	Movement.	Just	months	after	Castro’s	visit	to	Harlem,	local	and	global	Black	freedom	struggles	converged	in	New	York	City	in	an	explosive	way	that	February	following	the	assassination	of	Congolese	Prime	Minister	Patrice	Lumumba.		The	first	leader	of	the	newly	liberated	African	nation,	Lumumba	had	risen	to	power	in	June	of	1960	after	being	released	from	jail	for	his	part	in	political	uprisings	
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against	the	Belgian	colonial	government	the	previous	year.71	With	his	rise	to	power	and	the	liberation	of	the	Congo	from	Belgium’s	notoriously	horrific	control	coming	amidst	a	wave	of	African	liberation	movements,	Lumumba’s	charisma	and	bold	defiance	in	the	face	of	colonial	oppression	endeared	him	to	African	American	radicals	and	aspiring	revolutionaries.	“Patrice	Lumumba,	Kwame	Nkrumah,	and	Sékou	Touré	were	the	Holy	African	Triumverate	which	radical	black	Americans	held	dear,”	Maya	Angelou	lamented	years	later,	“and	we	needed	our	leaders	desperately.”72	So	when	Lumumba’s	death	was	made	public	on	February	13th,	1961	after	a	neo-colonial	power	struggle	in	the	Congo,	Black	radicals	in	the	United	States	were	incensed	by	what	they	(correctly)	assumed	was	a	calculated	political	assassination,	coordinated	by	the	Belgian	government	with	support	from	the	United	States	and	United	Nations.73	The	fallout	from	Lumumba’s	assassination	in	the	US	was	fast	and	furious,	particularly	in	New	York	City,	as	radical	activists	and	organizers	of	all	stripes	coalesced	to	protest	the	active	roles	played	by	the	American	government	and	United	Nations	in	suppressing	the	interrelated	struggles	for	African	independence	abroad	and	Black	liberation	domestically.	“Suddenly…Lumumba	became	Emmett	Till	and	all	the	other	black	victims	of	lynch	law	and	the	mob,”	John	Henrik	Clarke	wrote.	“The																																																									71	Lowell	“Pete”	Beveridge,	“The	Death	of	Lumumba,”	Liberator	1,	no.	1	(March	1961).			72	Maya	Angelou,	The	Heart	of	a	Woman	(New	York:	Bantam	Books,	1997),	170.		 73	Christopher	M.	Tinson,	Radical	Intellect:	Liberator	Magazine	and	Black	
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plight	of	the	Africans	still	fighting	to	throw	off	the	yoke	of	colonialism	and	the	plight	of	the	Afro-Americans,”	Clarke	continued,	“became	one	and	the	same.”74	As	had	the	murder	of	Emmett	Till	nearly	six	years	prior,	the	assassination	of	Patrice	Lumumba	galvanized	Black	communities,	who	recognized	the	culprit	of	this	foul	deed	as	the	global	system	of	white,	Euro-American	supremacy,	and	sparked	a	momentous	protest	at	the	United	Nations	headquarters	in	New	York	City	just	days	after	the	word	got	out.		With	the	U.N.	Security	Council	set	to	meet	on	February	15th,	1961,	members	of	the	HWG	and	Cultural	Association	for	Women	of	African	Heritage	(CAWAH)	drew	upon	their	expansive	connections	with	Black	leftist	and	nationalist	groups	to	quickly	mobilize	a	diverse	coalition	of	radical	organizations	and	local	people	for	a	demonstration	at	the	UN.	This	network	was	illustrative	of	the	resurgent	radical	milieu	in	Harlem,	which	had	begun	to	establish	a	semblance	of	cohesion	through	active	common	support	for	the	militant	struggles	waged	by	the	likes	of	Robert	F.	Williams,	Fidel	Castro,	and	Patrice	Lumumba.	Though	Richard	Gibson	would	later	claim	“it	was	Williams	who	inspired	that	much	publicized	and	highly	effective	demonstration	in	the	United	Nations,”	it	was	Black	women	who	turned	that	inspiration	into	organized	action.75		
																																																								74	John	Henrik	Clarke,	“The	New	Afro-American	Nationalism,”	285.		75	Tinson,	Radical	Intellect,	18.	Like	Gibson,	Timothy	Tyson	also	credits	Williams	with	“inspiring”	the	demonstration	at	the	UN,	citing	a	“fiery”	speech	Williams	gave	at	a	Harlem	street	rally	the	night	of	February	14,	1961,	before	leaving	to	speak	in	Michigan	the	next	morning.	While	Williams’	rhetoric	may	have	spurred	more	than	a	few	Harlem	residents	to	action	the	next	morning,	credit	for	breaking	the	news	of	Lumumba’s	assassination	and	initiating	the	demonstration	at	the	UN	
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One	of	the	key	architects	of	this	ad	hoc	coalition	was	novelist	and	trade-union	activist	Rosa	Guy,	a	co-founder	of	the	HWG	and	CAWAH,	who	had	migrated	to	Harlem	from	Trinidad	as	a	young	girl.76	Over	the	previous	year,	Guy’s	fluency	in	French	had	allowed	her	to	foster	a	close	relationship	between	HWG	members	and	the	Congolese	UN	delegation,	which	had	felt	otherwise	isolated	in	New	York	because	French	was	the	only	European	language	most	of	the	delegation	spoke.77	The	intimate	connection	Guy,	the	HWG,	and	their	extended	network	had	established	with	their	brothers	and	sisters	from	the	Congo	made	Lumumba’s	assassination	all	the	more	personal	and	sharpened	their	resolve	to	protest	this	international	injustice.78		In	response,	Guy,	Maya	Angelou,	Sarah	Wright,	and	Abbey	Lincoln,	all	founding	members	of	the	recently	formed	nationalist	women’s	group	CAWAH	(as	well	as	members	of	HWG),	organized	a	mass	demonstration	at	the	United	Nation’s	headquarters	on	42nd	Street	in	about	two	day’s	time.79	According	to	Angelou,	the	women	had	initially	settled	on	staging	a	symbolic	protest	at	the	UN	donning	black																																																																																																																																																																						must	be	given	to	the	Black	women	of	CAWAH	who	orchestrated	the	event.	Tyson,	
Radio	Free	Dixie,	237.		 76	Williams,	Concrete	Demands,	70.		77	Smethurst,	The	Black	Arts	Movement,	118.		 78	Angelou,	The	Heart	of	a	Woman,	170.	In	fact,	it	was	through	her	friends	in	the	Congolese	delegation	that	Rosa	Guy	first	received	word	of	the	assassination,	which	she	passed	along	to	her	comrades	in	CAWAH.		 79	Smethurst	and	Williams	both	credit	CAWAH	for	organizing	the	protests	at	the	UN.	Peniel	Joseph	states	that	the	demonstration	“partially	originated	from	meetings	held	at	the	penthouse	apartment	of	jazz	singer	Abbey	Lincoln	and	jazz	drummer	Max	Roach.”	Joseph,	Waiting	‘Til	the	Midnight	Hour,	39-40.		
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veils	and	rising	from	their	seats	in	a	solemn	protest	when	Adlai	Stevenson	began	his	announcement	of	Lumumba’s	death.	Recognizing	a	need	to	connect	their	demonstrations	with	the	masses,	however,	the	women	decided	to	put	the	word	out	in	Harlem—with	the	help	of	Lewis	Michaux—to	inform	the	people	of	Lumumba’s	death	and	drum	up	support	for	a	much	larger	demonstration.	Two	days	before	the	UN	Security	Council	was	scheduled	to	meet,	Angelou,	Guy,	Lincoln,	and	other	CAWAH	members	addressed	an	evening	rally	in	front	of	Michaux’s	bookstore	at	the	intersection	of	125th	Street	and	7th	Avenue.	After	Michaux	warmed	up	the	crowd,	Abbey	Lincoln	stepped	to	the	microphone,	and	told	the	thousands	gathered	in	Harlem	Square	that	Lumumba	was	dead.	“The	whites	killed	a	black	man,”	she	icily	informed	the	crowd,	“another	black	man.”	The	crowd	was	livid,	and	seized	on	the	opportunity	to	join	the	women	in	their	demonstration	at	the	U.N.	that	Friday.80		When	the	UN	Security	Council	convened	the	morning	of	February	15th,	about	75	activists,	many	wearing	black	armbands	or	black	veils,	sat	in	small	groups	in	the	gallery	having	made	their	way	through	the	swirling	crowd	of	protestors	outside	the	building.	Harlem	had	turned	out	for	the	demonstration,	with	thousands	milling	about	on	the	sidewalks	seeking	an	outlet	to	channel	their	righteous	anger.	Just	outside	the	chamber	doors,	scores	of	other	activists	representing	CAWAH,	HWG,	On	Guard	Committee	For	Freedom	(OGFF),	the	Liberation	Committee	for	Africa	(LCA),	and	the	Crusader	Family	waited	in	line	to	gain	entrance	to	the	council	chamber.81	
																																																								80	Angelou,	The	Heart	of	a	Woman,	169-180.		
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Despite	the	picket	lines	marching	outside	the	building	and	the	bustling	crowds	trying	to	gain	entry	to	the	chamber,	the	Council	session	came	to	order	and	proceeded	in	normal	fashion	until	Adlai	Stevenson	took	to	the	podium	and	began	his	first	formal	speech	as	U.S.	representative	to	the	United	Nations.	When	Stevenson	declared	his	support	for	U.N.	secretary	general	Dag	Hammarskjöld,	the	man	responsible	for	Lumumba’s	protection,	the	session	quickly	went	south.82		As	Stevenson	glibly	announced	US	support	for	the	man	who	many	African	and	African	Americans	saw	as	complicit	in	the	murder	of	Lumumba,	a	member	of	OGFF	rose	from	her	seat	in	the	gallery	in	protest.	Any	intentions	that	CAWAH	had	of	staging	a	peaceful	protest	were	thwarted	when	the	gallery	quickly	erupted	as	security	guards	“rushed”	at	the	woman	and	protestors	lashed	out	at	the	Council	with	cries	of	“Killers!”	and	“Murderers!”	As	the	crowd	chanted	“Lumumba!	Lumumba!”	in	unison,	the	chamber	doors	swung	open	and	the	throngs	of	activists	who	had	been	waiting	outside	rushed	in,	“bowling	over”	guards	and	shutting	down	the	council	session.83	Bedlam	roared	in	the	chamber	as	a	wave	of	guards	swept	in	to	clear	the	room	while	protestors	inside	tussled	with	guards	and	white	bystanders.	Carlos	Moore,	an	Afro-Cuban	nationalist	well	known	in	the	streets	of	Harlem,	jumped	on	the	back	of	a	white	man	and	brought	him	to	the	ground,	while	Maya	Angelou																																																																																																																																																																						81	“Riot	in	Gallery	Halts	U.N.	Debate,”	New	York	Times,	February	16,	1961;	Joseph,	Waiting	‘Til	The	Midnight	Hour,	38-42;	Tinson,	Radical	Intellect,	17-18;	Williams,	Concrete	Demands,	70.			 82	Tinson,	Radical	Intellect,	17-18.		 83	“Riot	in	Gallery	Halts	U.N.	Debate,”	New	York	Times,	February	16,	1961;	Joseph,	Waiting	‘Til	the	Midnight	Hour,	38-42;	Angelou,	The	Heart	of	a	Woman,	182-187.	
		212	
watched	as	a	“stout	black	woman”	grabbed	another	white	man	by	the	jacket	and	“shook	him	like	a	dishrag.”84	OGFF	leader	Calvin	Hicks	was	dragged	from	the	gallery	by	a	group	of	guards,	as	a	photographer	snapped	a	picture	that	landed	on	the	front	cover	of	the	next	day’s	edition	of	the	New	York	Times.	Though	Angelou	did	not	identify	this	woman	by	name	in	her	autobiography,	it	is	possible	that	she	was	describing	Mae	Mallory,	who	had	been	involved	in	coordinating	the	protests	and	had	made	her	way	inside	the	chambers	that	morning.85	Despite	having	previously	organized	picket	lines	and	similar	demonstrations	in	New	York,	Mallory	rarely	participated	in	nonviolent	direct	action	herself.	“I	couldn’t	follow	any	discipline	of	non-violent	demonstration,”	Mallory	later	said,	“so	I	never	bothered	to	go	out	on	any	of	the	picket	lines	or	anything.”86	Described	as	“a	very	physical	woman,	a	block	of	granite”	by	Conrad	Lynn,	a	notable	New	York	civil	rights	activist-attorney	who	had	represented	Robert	F.	Williams,	Mallory	did	not	take	kindly	to	being	accosted	by	guards	inside	the	U.N.	When	a	guard	grabbed	her	as	she	pushed	her	way	into	the	chambers,	Mallory	swiftly	took	
																																																								84	Angelou,	The	Heart	of	a	Woman,	187.		85	Tinson,	Radical	Intellect,	18.	Tinson’s	claim	that	Mallory	“influenced	the	protest	from	the	beginning”	is	not	contradictory	to	Angelou’s	account	of	the	leading	role	that	CAWAH	played	in	instigating	and	orchestrating	the	demonstrations.	It	is	likely	that	Mallory	heard	the	news	of	Lumumba’s	assassination	at,	or	shortly	after,	the	rally	in	Harlem	Square	and	quickly	mobilized	members	of	The	Crusaders	to	participate	in	cooperation	with	organizers	within	her	network,	which	included	OGFF,	HWG,	OYM,	and	LCA.			 86	Mae	Mallory	interview	with	Malaika	Lumumba,	February	27,	1970.	
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off	her	shoe	and	“cracked	his	head	with	my	shoe	heel.	Then	I	wrapped	my	fist	in	the	necktie	of	another	guard.”87		As	protestors	and	bystanders	alike	surged	out	of	room	to	escape	the	brawl	and	influx	of	security	guards,	the	conflict	spilled	out	onto	the	sidewalk,	where	the	thousands	of	protestors	who	had	not	been	able	to	enter	the	building	became	enlivened	by	the	news	that	a	“riot”	had	taken	place	inside.	Though	the	crowd	wanted	“an	extravagant	disorder,”	as	Maya	Angelou	remembered,	the	police	on	the	scene	“yearned	for	vindication.”88	From	the	steps	of	the	building,	a	group	of	officers	looked	down	on	the	crowd,	“their	eyes	glittering”	before	charging	at	Mae	Mallory,	Calvin	Hicks,	and	LeRoi	Jones	(Baraka)	who	were	now	marching	on	the	sidewalk.	“They	attacked	us,	clubs	flying,”	Baraka	later	recalled.89	Once	again,	Mallory	capably	demonstrated	her	right	to	self-defense.	“Mae	put	up	a	terrific	battle,”	Baraka	continued,	“the	police	were	sorry	they	ever	put	their	hands	on	her.	It	took	several	of	them	to	subdue	her.”90	According	to	Conrad	Lynn,	Mallory	“took	two	policemen	and	cracked	their	heads	together	and	knocked	them	unconscious.”91		Though	Baraka	and	Mallory	were	forcefully	stuffed	into	a	paddy	wagon	and	several	security	guards	were	left	injured	inside	the	building,	the	protests	continued																																																									87	Tyson,	Radio	Free	Dixie,	237.		 88	Angelou,	The	Heart	of	a	Woman,	187-88.		89	Angelou,	The	Heart	of	a	Woman,	188;	Baraka,	The	Autobiography	of	LeRoi	
Jones,	267-68.		 90	Baraka,	The	Autobiography	of	LeRoi	Jones,	268.		 91	Conrad	Lynn,	There	Is	A	Fountain:	The	Autobiography	of	Conrad	Lynn	(Brooklyn:	Lawrence	Hill	Books,	1993),	163.	
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throughout	the	day	on	the	west	side	of	1st	Avenue	between	42nd	and	43rd	Streets.	As	the	afternoon	wore	on,	crowds	shepherded	by	various	nationalist	and	leftist	groups	braved	the	cold	and	a	zealous	mounted	police	force	to	bring	their	protests	to	the	Belgian	Consulate	and	to	Times	Square	before	regrouping	in	Harlem	for	a	rally	later	that	evening.		At	the	end	of	the	day,	Lumumba	remained	in	his	grave	and	the	raucous	demonstrators	at	the	UN	were	no	closer	to	bringing	to	justice	those	responsible	for	the	African	leader’s	assassination.	To	be	fair,	few	expected	from	the	outset	that	the	protests	would	yield	these	types	of	results,	and	many	had	merely	sought	a	vehicle	for	channeling	their	anger	and	demonstrating	their	opposition	to	global	white	supremacy	through	direct	action.	If	there	was	an	element	of	catharsis	in	the	protest,	however,	it	was	a	useful	byproduct	of	an	organized	action	that	marked	a	watershed	moment	in	Black	Freedom	Struggles	in	the	city.	Not	only	did	the	protestors	shed	light	on	the	destructive	potential	of	the	active	political	fault	lines	that	ran	between	Black	communities	and	white-dominated	power	structures	on	an	international	stage;	they	also	revealed	the	rapidly	expanding	gulf	between	mainstream,	middle-class	civil	rights	organizations	which	were	presumed	to	represent	Black	communities,	and	the	radical	activists	and	grassroots	organizations	that	were	once	again	proving	more	capable	of	playing	that	role.	“Harlem	was	in	commotion,”	Angelou	testified,	“and	the	rage	was	beyond	the	control	of	the	NAACP,	the	SCLC	or	the	Urban	League.”92		
																																																								92	Angelou,	The	Heart	of	a	Woman,	196.	
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The	heated	debates	that	helped	carve	these	divisions	played	out	in	newspaper	coverage	of	the	demonstrations	in	the	following	days	and	weeks.	Hinging	fundamentally	on	conflicting	analyses	of	local,	national,	and	global	white	supremacy	and	what	means	constituted	acceptable	Black	responses,	radical	intellectuals	including	James	Baldwin	and	Lorraine	Hansberry	challenged	the	typical	narratives	spun	by	white	commenters	and	moderate	Black	“leaders.”	Columns	in	the	
New	York	Times	described	the	protests	as	“disgraceful”	and	chided	the	“race	consciousness”	of	Black	nationalism	as	“an	enemy	of	democracy.”93	NYPD	commissioner	Stephen	Kennedy	once	again	set	his	sights	on	Malcolm	X,	who	he	claimed	was	the	chief	instigator	of	the	whole	ordeal.	In	Washington,	the	New	York	
Times	reported,	US	officials	characteristically	blamed	“Communist	agitators”	for	fomenting	pro-Lumumba	sentiments	and	orchestrating	unrest,	while	President	Kennedy	affirmed	his	support	for	the	UN	and	alluded	to	Soviet	involvement	in	the	Congo.94		Joining	the	papers	and	politicians	in	their	condemnation	of	the	UN	protestors	were	City	Councilman	Earl	Brown	and	head	of	the	National	Urban	League	Lester	Granger.	Caping	for	the	white	power	structure	and	moderate	Black	leadership,	Brown	decried	the	“disgraceful,”	Communist-backed	protestors,	while	Granger	described	in	his	Amsterdam	News	column	the	“sick	shame”	he	felt	while	“screaming	men	and	women	milled	around	the	U.N.	venting	their	ignorant	frustrations	or	
																																																								93	“The	Hoodlums,”	New	York	Times,	February	16,	1961;	“Harlem	‘Nationalism,”	New	York	Times,	March	5,	1961.		94	“Riot	in	Gallery	Halts	U.N.	Debate,”	New	York	Times,	February	16,	1961.	
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malicious	anger.”95	United	Nations	Under	Secretary	Dr.	Ralph	Bunche	went	so	far	as	to	apologize	for	the	behavior	of	his	“duped”	and	“misled”	fellow	citizens.	The	conduct	of	the	protestors,	Dr.	Bunche	assured	his	colleagues,	“was	in	no	way	representative	of	the	American	Negro’s.”96	Over	the	next	several	weeks,	however,	Baldwin	and	Hansberry	took	turns	assuring	readers	of	the	New	York	Times	that	the	conduct	of	the	demonstrators	at	the	UN	was	a	much	more	authentic	representation	of	the	climate	in	Black	America	than	Dr.	Bunche	professed	in	his	condemnation.	In	a	lengthy	article	titled	“A	Negro	Assays	the	Negro	Mood,”	Baldwin	swiftly	rebuked	the	accounts	of	white	pundits	and	“prominent	Negroes”	who	blamed	Communist	infiltration	for	the	disruptive	protests	and	used	his	platform	to	draw	attention	to	the	domestic	issues	which	fueled	the	vigor	of	the	demonstration.	“What	I	find	appalling—and	really	dangerous,”	Baldwin	opined,	“is	the	American	assumption	that	the	Negro	is	so	contented	with	his	lot	here	that	only	the	cynical	agents	of	a	foreign	power	can	rouse	him	to	protest.”	Baldwin	characteristically	challenged	white	readers	to	look	introspectively	at	their	society	which	denied	any	semblance	of	agency	to	their	Black	compatriots,	while	also	calling	attention	to	the	complicity	of	northern	white	liberals	for	their	gradualist	mentality	toward	Black	equality.	At	bottom,	Baldwin	argued,	the	UN	demonstrations	sent	a	clear	message	to	white	America.	“Any	effort,	from	here	on	out,	to	keep	the	Negro	in	
																																																								95	“Negroes	Picket	U.N.	Without	Riots,”	Washington	Post,	February	17,	1961;	Lester	Granger,	“Manhattan	and	Beyond,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	February	25,	1961.		 96	“Bunche	Deplores	Riot	By	Negroes	in	Council,”	New	York	Times,	February	18,	1961.	
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his	‘place,”	he	warned,	“can	only	have	the	most	extreme	and	unlucky	repercussions.”97		In	her	letter	to	the	editor	of	the	New	York	Times	two	weeks	later,	Hansberry	piggybacked	on	Baldwin’s	assessment	of	African	American	identification	with	African	liberation	struggles,	calling	for	Pan-African	unity	and	placing	the	blame	for	Lumumba’s	assassination	squarely	on	Euro-American	imperialism.	A	gifted	young	playwright	who	had	enjoyed	international	acclaim	following	her	landmark	Broadway	debut	of	A	Raisin	in	the	Sun	two	years	prior,	Hansberry	pulled	no	punches	when	it	came	to	her	rebuke	of	Dr.	Bunche.	Whereas	Baldwin	alluded	to	the	remarks	of	the	UN	Under	Secretary,	Hansberry	called	him	out	by	name	and	challenged	his	assumed	right	to	speak	on	behalf	of	African	Americans.	“As	so	many	of	us	were	shocked	and	outraged	at	reports	of	Dr.	Ralph	Bunche’s	‘apologies’	for	the	demonstrators,”	she	wrote,	“we	were	also	curious	as	to	his	mandate	from	our	people	to	do	so.”	If	Hansberry’s	condemnation	of	the	leadership	role	assumed	by,	or	bestowed	upon,	Bunche	and	others	of	his	ilk	were	not	clear	enough,	she	concluded	her	letter	with	an	apology	to	Pauline	Lumumba	and	the	Congolese	people	for	Bunche’s	remark.98	Through	this	apology,	Hansberry	not	only	disavowed	the	leadership	of	moderate	male	“leaders,”	but	also	claimed	such	a	role	for	herself	and	the	masses	of	disaffected	African	Americans	who	were	more	capable	of	authentically	representing	their	own	interests	and	analyses.		
																																																								97	James	Baldwin,	“A	Negro	Assays	the	Negro	Mood,”	New	York	Times,	March	12,	1961.		98	Lorraine	Hansberry,	“Congolese	Patriot,”	New	York	Times,	March	26,	1961.	
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While	the	mainstream	media	and	various	levels	of	government	explained	away	the	explosive	political	significance	of	the	UN	demonstrations,	activists	in	Harlem	mobilized	the	sentiments	expressed	by	Baldwin	and	Hansberry	and	calculated	their	next	steps	for	channeling	this	momentum	into	sustained,	organized	action.	Most	organizers	recognized,	as	Baldwin	had	in	his	New	York	Times	article,	that	the	mass	participation	and	explosive	nature	of	the	protests	had	as	much	to	do	with	the	assassination	of	Lumumba	as	they	did	with	the	socio-economic	conditions	in	Harlem	created	by	systemic	racism.	Drawing	inspiration	from	the	protest,	HWG	members	Calvin	Hicks	and	Sarah	Wright	expanded	their	organizing	efforts	for	their	nascent	organization	On	Guard	For	Freedom.	As	a	member	of	both	OYM	and	OGFF,	Hicks	managed	to	orchestrate	a	merger	of	the	groups	to	strengthen	the	coalitions	formed	over	the	demonstrations.	Like	Jones	(Baraka),	Hicks	urged	downtown	Black	artists	to	engage	in	organized	struggle	and	understand	the	vital	links	between	art	and	politics.	Through	OGFF,	which	operated	out	of	Harlem,	“downtown	black	bohemians”	were	brought	together	with	uptown	artists	with	roots	in	the	older	leftist	movements	in	Harlem.99		Dan	Watts,	a	former	architect	turned	journalist,	effectively	used	the	furor	over	the	protests	to	formally	announce	the	formation	of	the	Liberation	Committee	for	Africa	(LCA),	which	had	been	organized	the	previous	year.	The	radical	Pan-Africanist	organization,	Tinson	notes,	“distinguished	itself	from	the	Civil	Rights	establishment”	through	its	critiques	of	gradualism,	demands	for	“immediate	liberation,”	and	embrace	of	the	activism	of	more	militant	leaders	like	Rob	Williams,																																																									99	Smethurst,	The	Black	Arts	Movement,	119.	
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Malcolm	X,	and	Mae	Mallory.100	In	the	wake	of	the	UN	demonstrations,	the	LCA	carved	out	a	major	role	in	the	production	and	dissemination	of	leftist	and	nationalist	political	thought	and	analysis	through	its	literary	organ,	Liberator.	Through	the	monthly	magazine,	Watts,	editor	Lowell	“Pete”	Beveridge,	and	a	cadre	of	intellectuals,	artists,	and	writers,	exposed	and	opposed	global	white	supremacy	and	analyzed	domestic	and	international	struggles	for	self-determination.	In	the	following	years,	the	writings	of	this	talented	collective	of	writers,	many	of	whom	would	influence	the	emergence	of	the	Black	Arts	and	Black	Power	movements	in	the	years	to	come,	would	play	a	formative	part	in	promoting	and	shaping	a	popular	radical	political	consciousness	in	New	York	City	and	beyond.101	For	Harlem	historian	John	Henrik	Clarke,	the	UN	demonstrations	marked	the	emergence	of	a	new	era	in	African	American	freedom	struggles.	Indeed,	the	protests	had	brought	together	a	coalition	of	Black	leftist	and	nationalist	groups	in	New	York,	which	Smethurst	notes,	“had	not	been	seen	for	years,	if	ever.”102	This	was	a	powerful	manifestation,	given	the	often-contentious	sectarian	disputes	between	nationalist	and	leftist	groups	in	Harlem	that	often	precluded	cooperative	action.	In	an	article	in	
Freedomways	that	fall,	Clarke	declared	that	this	formative	moment	signaled	the	arrival	of	“the	new	Afro-American	Nationalism.”	Though	incubated	for	decades	in	Harlem,	the	New	Afro-American	Nationalism	had	been	rekindled	by	the																																																									100	Christopher	M.	Tinson,	“The	Voice	of	the	Black	Protest	Movement:’	Notes	on	the	Liberator	Magazine	and	Black	Radicalism	in	the	Early	1960s,”	Black	Scholar	37,	no.	4	(Winter	2008),	3-4.		 101	Tinson,	Radical	Intellect,	20.		 102	Smethurst,	The	Black	Arts	Movement,	118.	
		220	
“international	lynching	of	a	black	man	on	the	altar	of	colonialism	and	white	supremacy”	when	the	collective	wounds	from	the	murders	of	Emmett	Till	and	Mack	Parker	were	still	fresh.103		Fostered	by	the	grassroots	efforts	of	various	organizations,	including	the	NOI,	UANM,	CAWAH,	LCA,	and	OGFF,	the	New	Afro-American	Nationalism	was	characterized	by	a	collective	identification	with	Pan-African	anticolonial	liberation	struggles,	an	appreciation	of	cultural	heritage,	demands	for	self-determination,	and	a	rejection	of	bourgeois	leadership	and	integration	as	a	panacea	for	American	apartheid.	Clarke	understood	this	resurgent	political	consciousness	to	be	an	inherently	proletarian	movement	against	internal	colonialism;	a	movement	to	achieve	national	and	personal	liberation	through	the	efforts	of	independent,	indigenous	leadership.	“In	taking	this	historical	step,”	Clarke	prophesized,	“they	have	turned	away	from	a	leadership	that	was	begging	and	pleading	to	a	more	dynamic	leadership	that	is	insisting	and	demanding.”	Though	the	coalition	of	leftist	and	nationalist	organizations	that	comprised	the	UN	demonstrations	may	have	sounded	the	clarion	call	of	this	new	consciousness,	one	of	its	key	progenitors	had	abstained	from	involvement.		
“The	one	that	is	most	feared	by	white	people”:	The	Resistance	and	Repression	
of	Malcolm	X	A	few	days	after	the	watershed	protests	at	the	United	Nations,	Maya	Angelou	and	Rosa	Guy	visited	Malcolm	X	at	the	Nation	of	Islam’s	restaurant	on	116th	Street	in	Harlem.	Having	witnessed	the	explosive	anger	over	racial	injustice	swelling	in																																																									103	John	Henrik	Clarke,	“The	New	Afro-American	Nationalism,”	285.	
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Harlem,	the	two	young	writers	feared	that	such	fury	would	turn	inward	on	the	community	if	not	channeled	into	organized	progressive	action.	Almost	immediately,	Angelou	and	Guy	decided	to	consult	the	Nation	of	Islam	for	guidance	on	the	matter.	“With	their	exquisite	discipline	and	their	absolute	stand	on	black-white	relations,”	Angelou	wrote,	the	Nation	would	surely	“know	how	to	control	and	use	the	ferment	in	Harlem.”104	It	was	their	first	time	meeting	Malcolm	X	and	Angelou	was	immediately	struck	by	the	minister’s	radiant	aura	and	“masculine	force.”	The	two	women	explained	their	involvement	in	the	protest	over	tea,	seeking	Malcolm	X’s	counsel	on	how	they	should	proceed.		The	response	they	received,	however,	was	not	what	either	had	expected.	“You	were	wrong	in	your	direction,”	Malcolm	X	stated	bluntly.	He	conceded	that	the	people	of	Harlem	were	rightfully	enraged,	but	advised	that	“going	to	the	United	Nations,	shouting	and	carrying	placards	will	not	win	freedom	for	anyone,	nor	will	it	keep	the	white	devils	from	killing	another	African	leader.	Or	a	black	American	leader.”105	Restraining	her	frustration	with	Malcolm’s	response,	Guy	pushed	him	to	explain	what,	then,	should	be	done.	After	briefly	reciting	aspects	of	the	Nation’s	theology	and	Elijah	Muhammad’s	stance	on	noninvolvement	with	demonstrations	and	rejection	of	integration,	Malcolm	offered	a	degree	of	support.	He	would	not	ask	the	people	of	Harlem	to	march	or	to	confront	violent	white	authorities,	but	he	also	would	not	deny	the	validity	of	the	protests	and	vowed	to	make	a	statement	of	veiled	support.	“I	will	say	that	yesterday’s	demonstration	is	symbolic	of	the	anger	in	this																																																									104	Angelou,	The	Heart	of	a	Woman,	196.		105	Ibid,	198.	
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country,”	Angelou	recalled	Malcolm	saying,	“That	black	people	are	saying	they…will	not	always	allow	whites	to	spit	on	them	at	lunch	counters	in	order	to	eat	hot	dogs	and	drink	Coca-Cola.”106		Though	Angelou	and	Guy	left	the	restaurant	feeling	defeated,	Malcolm	kept	his	word.	When	the	mainstream	press	and	moderate	leaders	lambasted	the	“riots”	at	the	UN,	as	he	had	predicted	at	the	restaurant,	it	was	not	Angelou	nor	Guy	who	bore	the	brunt	of	the	media	backlash,	but	Malcolm	and	the	Nation	of	Islam.	In	the	media	firestorm	of	fingerpointing	and	scapegoating	that	implicated	Communists	and	Black	nationalists,	the	“Black	Muslims”	were	frequently	targeted	as	the	key	instigators	of	the	most	recent	racial	unrest	in	New	York	City.	After	a	briefing	with	NYPD	commissioner	Stephen	Kennedy	and	deputy	commissioner	Walter	Arm,	Adlai	Stevenson	singled	out	the	“Black	Muslims”	as	having	been	responsible	for	the	disorder	during	his	speech	at	the	UN.	Kennedy	was	reported	to	have	described	the	NOI	as	“a	fanatic	Negro	national	cult,	which	is	one	of	the	most	dangerous	gangs	in	the	city,”	adding	that	the	NYPD	had	been	actively	investigating	the	group	for	the	past	few	years.107		In	a	national	wave	of	fear	mongering,	news	columns	like	the	Norfolk	Journal	
and	Guide,	picked	up	where	Kennedy	left	off,	describing	the	Nation	of	Islam	as	“the	most	sinister	of	all	Negro	cults	in	the	United	States.”108	The	Washington	Post	
																																																								106	Ibid,	198-200.		107	“Muslims	to	Sue	Adlai	Stevenson,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	February	25,	1961.		
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explained	to	their	readers	in	no	uncertain	terms	that	members	of	the	Nation	of	Islam	were	“being	conditioned	and	trained	for	the	‘War	of	Armageddon’	when	the	blacks—as	they	refer	to	themselves—will	kill	the	whites.”109	While	insisting	that	the	Nation	of	Islam	abstained	from	any	local,	national,	or	international	political	involvement,	and	therefore,	should	not	be	implicated	in	the	fallout	from	the	protests,	Malcolm	X	refused	to	condemn	the	demonstrators	at	the	United	Nations.	“I	am	not	Moise	Tshombe,”	he	told	inquiring	reporters,	“and	I	will	permit	no	one	to	use	me	against	the	nationalists.”110	Though	his	active	support	for	the	demonstrations	was	constrained	by	Muhammad’s	conservative	political	doctrine,	Malcolm	supported	them	in	spirit	and	offered	the	limited	support	that	he	was	afforded	in	his	capacity	as	a	minister	of	the	Nation	of	Islam.		Despite	their	lack	of	involvement	in	political	action	during	the	UN	protests,	Malcolm	X	and	the	Nation	of	Islam	were	fundamentally	a	part	of,	and	making	undeniable	contributions	to,	the	surging	militancy	of	Black	freedom	struggles	in	New	York	City.	That	Malcolm	X	was	the	first	person	the	initiators	turned	to	for	advice	in	the	wake	of	the	protest	is	telling	of	his	increasingly	prominent	role	within	Harlem’s	convoluted	radical	milieu—an	often	contentious	terrain	that	he	had	taken	initial	steps	toward	bringing	a	degree	of	unity	to	months	earlier.		
																																																																																																																																																																					108	Jack	Fox,	“What	Was	Behind	Riot	at	UN?,”	New	Journal	and	Guide,	March	4,	1961.		 109	George	E.	Sokolsky,	“These	Days:	The	Nation	of	Islam,”	The	Washington	
Post,	February	25,	1961.		 110	“Muslim	Vows	He’ll	Sue	N.Y.	Papers,	Adlai	Stevenson,”	Philadelphia	
Tribune,	March	4,	1961.	
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To	Mae	Mallory,	the	treatment	that	the	NOI	and	various	nationalist	groups	received	from	the	news	media	and	government	officials	was	meant	to	drive	a	wedge	between	the	working	coalition	present	at	the	UN	that	February.	“The	attempt	on	the	part	of	the	White	Supremacists	to	split	the	Muslim	Afro	American	from	the	non	Muslim	Afro	American	is	doomed	to	failure	because	their	(sic.)	is	one	thing	that	we	have	in	common	that	supersedes	other	differences,”	Mallory	warned,	“and	that	is	a	desire	to	rid	ourselves	of	White	Domination	and	exploitation.”	In	her	response	to	the	misrepresentations	of	the	protests	in	the	mainstream	media,	Mallory	echoed	Malcolm’s	earlier	calls	for	a	Black	united	front	that	reached	across	borders,	oceans,	and	ideologies.	The	death	of	Lumumba	signaled	to	Mallory	“that	the	price	of	division	is	death	and	defeat	for	Black	people”	and	that	only	a	united	front	could	“ensure	us	of	complete	victory	and	liberation	from	the	white	exploiters.”111	It	was	this	type	of	demonstrable	influence	on	political	thought	and	praxis	that	the	Nation	and	its	powerful	Harlem	minister	wielded	that	led	John	Henrik	Clarke	to	describe	their	movement	as	“the	most	dynamic	force	for	protest	and	change	in	the	United	States”	a	few	months	later.			Of	all	the	groups	comprising	the	New	Afro-American	Nationalism	in	Harlem,	the	frequent	attacks	upon	the	Nation	of	Islam	from	mainstream	media	outlets	and	government	officials	demonstrated	that	the	NOI	had	quickly	become	“the	one	that	is	
																																																								111	Letter	from	Mae	Mallory	to	Sir,	February	1961,	Box	2,	Folder	10,	Mallory	Papers.	If	the	similarities	in	their	analyses	were	coincidental,	Mallory’s	later	writings	leave	little	doubt	about	the	influence	that	Malcolm	X	had	upon	her	political	development	and	political	analysis.	
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most	feared	by	white	people.”112	This	white	fear	was	explicit	in	the	increasingly	repressive	tactics	employed	by	the	NYPD	in	the	four	years	since	the	beating	of	Johnson	X	to	check	the	rapid	growth	of	the	Nation	with	heightened	surveillance	and	counterintelligence	programs.	“We	were	watched.	Our	telephones	were	tapped,”	Malcolm	X	later	told	Alex	Haley.	“When	I	was	speaking	publicly	sometimes	I’d	guess	which	were	FBI	faces	in	the	audience…the	police	and	the	FBI	intently	and	persistently	visited	and	questioned	us.”113	Although	the	NYPD	and	FBI	had	kept	a	watchful	eye	on	the	NOI	since	the	early	1950s,	the	tense	standoff	outside	the	28th	Precinct	in	1957	had	created	a	sense	of	urgency	to	curb	the	growing	power	of	its	Harlem	minister.	“He	was	regarded	mostly	as	a	rabble-rouser	among	white	police,”	Detective	William	DeFossett	recalled,	“a	source	or	possibility	for	trouble.”114		In	their	efforts	to	keep	pace	with	the	growing	militancy	that	the	NOI	so	clearly	embodied,	the	NYPD	employed	two	primary	tactics.	First,	as	they	had	after	the	1959	“near	riot,”	the	department	made	nominal	efforts	to	improve	police-community	relations	through	the	use	of	precinct	councils	and	police	liaisons	to	improve	communication	and	trust	between	the	NYPD	and	Harlem	community.115	DeFossett,	a	Black	detective	in	the	BOSS	unit	who	had	grown	up	in	Harlem,	acted	as	
																																																								112	Clarke,	“The	New	Afro-American	Nationalism,”	286-87.		 113	Malcolm	X	and	Alex	Haley,	The	Autobiography	of	Malcolm	X	as	told	to	Alex	
Haley	(New	York:	Ballantine	Books,	1992),	257-58.		 114	Interview	with	William	DeFossett,	June	23,	1992,	Henry	Hampton	Collection,	Washington	University	Libraries.		115	Malcolm	X	actually	served	as	a	member	of	the	28th	Precinct	Council	along	with	James	Hicks,	James	Lawson,	and	several	others	notable	Harlem	residents.	
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liaison	between	the	NYPD	and	the	NOI.	“I	was	no	secret	to	the	Nation	of	Islam,”	DeFossett	recalled.	“They	knew	who	I	was,	they	knew	where	I	lived,	they	knew	all	about	me…it	wasn’t	a	secret	operation.	It	wasn’t	cloak	and	dagger.”116	Though	DeFossett	downplayed	in	his	oral	history	the	NYPD’s	interest	in	the	Nation	of	Islam	as	a	matter	of	keeping	peace	and	maintaining	order,	the	records	of	the	Bureau	of	Special	Services	bear	a	much	different	story.	In	addition	to	the	use	of	precinct	councils	and	community	liaisons,	the	NYPD	also	employed	secretive	surveillance	tactics	to	keep	a	watchful	eye	on	the	NOI	and	other	civil	rights	and	nationalist	groups.	“I	had	heard	that	there	were	all	kinds	of	means	used	to	infiltrate	the	Muslims,”	former	deputy	commissioner	Robert	Mangum	recalled,	“they	used	every	means	they	could	to	acquire	as	much	information	as	they	could	about	the	Muslim	movement.”117	Scattered	amongst	the	crowd	at	nearly	every	meeting	or	rally	the	NOI	held	in	Harlem	in	the	late	1950s	and	early	1960s	were	a	handful	of	plainclothes	detectives	from	the	Bureau	of	Special	Services	(BOSS),	the	NYPD’s	counterintelligence	squad	that	targeted	individuals	and	organizations	deemed	“subversive.”	At	the	Harlem	Freedom	Rally,	for	example,	BOSS	sent	six	undercover	detectives	to	observe,	record,	and	report	on	the	speeches	made	and	people	in	attendance.118		
																																																								116	Interview	with	William	DeFossett,	June	23,	1992.		 117	Interview	with	Robert	Mangum,	June	23,	1992,	Henry	Hampton	Collection,	Washington	University	Libraries.		118	Marable,	Malcolm	X,	170.	
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At	dozens	of	other	meetings,	BOSS	detectives	would	stake	out	down	the	block,	jotting	down	license	plate	numbers	of	vehicles	carrying	passengers	to	NOI	gatherings.	Detectives	then	cross-checked	these	license	plate	numbers	with	vehicle	registrations	and	conducted	background	checks	on	the	owners	of	the	vehicles,	often	soliciting	support	from	neighboring	states.	Through	this	type	of	indiscriminately	invasive	surveillance,	local	people	were	unwittingly	caught	in	a	national	dragnet	cast	by	agents	charged	with	protecting	the	interests	of	the	white	State.	Rather	than	keeping	peace	and	maintaining	order,	as	DeFossett	contended,	BOSS	engaged	in	a	concerted	effort	to	suppress	dissent	in	the	city	through	the	active	surveillance	of	a	wide	range	of	individuals	and	organizations	that	sought	to	upset	the	racial,	economic,	or	social	status	quo.	The	counterintelligence	programs	that	BOSS	waged	against	the	NOI	and	others	in	New	York	City	were	part	of	a	national	surveillance	network	of	local	and	federal	law	enforcement	agencies	aimed	at	infiltrating,	disrupting,	discrediting,	and	dismantling	groups	involved	in	the	Black	Freedom	Struggle.	As	the	counterintelligence	agency	of	the	nation’s	largest	city,	BOSS	played	a	major	role	in	shaping	this	national	network	through	sharing	information	and	strategies	with	other	municipalities	and	federal	agencies.	In	an	August	1961	memo	to	the	Chief	of	Police	in	Portland,	Oregon,	BOSS	commander	Sanford	Garelick	laid	bare	the	unit’s	confidential	counterintelligence	methods	used	against	the	NOI:	“Infiltration	of	the	organization’s	ranks;	Direct	contact	with	the	organization	leaders	by	Negro	police	officers;	Close	cooperation	and	exchange	of	data	with	Federal	and	State	
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investigative	agencies;	Intensive	investigation	and	constant	surveillance	of	the	members	and	activities	of	the	members	of	the	cult.”119		In	addition	to	the	national	surveillance	campaign	BOSS	was	contributing	to,	the	House	Un-American	Activities	Committee	announced	shortly	after	the	UN	protests	that	it	would	conduct	investigations	into	the	activities	of	Pan-African,	Muslim,	and	Black	nationalist	groups	in	an	attempt	to	prove	communist	infiltration,	as	they	had	tried	the	previous	year	with	Jesse	Gray.	Though	critical	of	the	NOI	and	other	nationalist	organizations,	the	inherent	contradictions	of	these	inquisitions	were	glaring	to	the	editors	of	the	Baltimore	Afro-American.	“We	are	unable	to	share	the	committee’s	alarm	over	the	activities	of	the	black	supremacists	as	long	as	the	Congressional	red	hunters	hear	and	see	no	evil	in	the	subversive	practices	of	the	white	supremacists.”120	As	white	violence	continued	unabated	throughout	the	South	and	images	of	white	barbarism	against	peaceful	sit-ins	flashed	steadily	across	television	screens,	many	Black	communities,	if	not	fully	supportive	of	the	NOI,	fully	understood	the	inherent	hypocrisy	of	law	enforcement	targeting	Black	freedom	fighters.	Though	Malcolm	actively	disassociated	the	NOI	from	explicit	political	involvement	amidst	the	whirlwind	of	abuse	from	the	media	and	law	enforcement,	he	nonetheless	utilized	the	elevated	platform	the	protests	provided	to	expound	his	positions	on	Black	nationalism,	the	Civil	Rights	Movement,	and	Pan-African	
																																																								119	Memo	from	Sanford	D.	Garelick	to	Commanding	Officer,	August	7,	1961,	BOSS	Records.		 120	“We’re	Not	Alarmed,”	The	Baltimore	Afro-American,	March	25,	1961.	
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liberation	struggles.	At	a	debate	sponsored	by	the	NAACP	Youth	Council	at	City	College	the	following	month,	Malcolm	X	again	denounced	integration	as	a	solution	to	American	racism	and	called	for	reparations	in	the	form	of	land	for	a	separate	Black	nation.	“All	over	the	world,”	Malcolm	told	the	crowd	of	300,	“dark	people	are	rejecting	integration	with	their	former	oppressors.”121	If	Malcolm	was	unable,	or	unwilling,	to	provide	organizational	support	for	Angelou	and	Guy	in	the	wake	of	the	UN	demonstrations,	he	left	little	doubt	that	he	stood	in	solidarity	with	their	Pan-African	analysis	and	shared	this	perspective	with	crowds	by	the	hundreds	and	thousands	that	spring.	Reflecting	the	surging	militancy	in	Harlem	that	the	UN	protests	very	clearly	illustrated,	Malcolm	bluntly	explained	to	the	crowd	"it'll	take	more	than	a	cup	of	tea	in	a	white	restaurant	to	make	us	happy.”		Though	Malcolm’s	outright	rejection	of	integration	had	substantial	backing	in	Harlem,	it	remained	a	primary	objective	of	national	civil	rights	organizations.	This	national	primacy	placed	upon	direct	action	to	achieve	integration	was	on	full	display	three	days	later,	when	CORE	national	director	James	Farmer	issued	a	call	for	Freedom	Riders	to	test	the	federal	government’s	resolve	in	enforcing	the	Supreme	Court’s	ruling	against	segregation	in	interstate	travel	in	Morgan	v.	Virginia	fifteen	years	earlier.				 As	the	Freedom	Riders	prepared	for	their	journey	through	the	south	in	the	early	spring,	with	a	handful	departing	from	New	York	City,	Malcolm	was	touring	the	nation	during	a	wave	of	speaking	tours	on	college	campuses.	After	besting	historian	
																																																								121	“In	City	College	Debate:	Muslims’	Malcolm	X	and	NAACP’s	Wright	Clash,”	
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and	presidential	advisor	Arthur	Schlesinger,	Jr.	during	an	impromptu	exchange	at	Atlanta	University	earlier	that	year,	Malcolm	X	embarked	on	a	national	campaign	of	public	lectures	and	debates	to	face	the	NOI’s	critics	and	elevate	their	theology	through	the	spotlight	the	events	provided.122	A	week	after	the	NAACP	debate	at	CCNY,	Malcolm	traveled	up	to	his	old	stomping	grounds	for	a	public	forum	at	the	Harvard	Law	School.	In	his	address,	Malcolm	denounced	the	folly	of	“token	integration”	while	explaining	the	growing	impatience	of	the	Black	masses	for	anything	short	of	sweeping,	systemic	change.	“There	is	no	such	thing	as	a	second	class	citizen,”	Malcolm	declared	after	citing	the	violent	white	objections	to	demands	for	educational	equality,	“we	are	full	citizens	or	we	are	not	citizens	at	all.”123		Among	those	in	attendance	at	the	forum	were	Louis	X,	the	minister	of	Boston’s	Temple	No.	11,	and	William	Strickland,	a	Marine	Corps	veteran	and	student	at	Harvard.	A	native	of	Roxbury	and	former	member	of	the	NAACP	Youth	Council,	Strickland	had	known	both	Malcolm	Little	(Malcolm	X)	and	Louis	Eugene	Walcott	(Louis	X)	from	around	the	neighborhood	growing	up.	Immediately	drawn	to	Malcolm’s	rhetoric	and	analysis,	Strickland	used	their	shared	Roxbury	connections	to	re-introduce	himself	after	the	event.	The	meeting	marked	the	beginning	of	a	lifelong	friendship	that	profoundly	shaped	Strickland’s	political	development.	While	finishing	his	degree,	Strickland	frequented	Temple	No.	11	and	arranged	for	Malcolm	X	to	speak	on	Harvard’s	radio	station	when	he	was	in	town.	When	travelling	to	New	York	City	on	school	recess,	he	would	stop	into	the	NOI’s	restaurant	on	116th	Street																																																									122	Marable,	Malcolm	X,	184-85.		 123	Lomax,	When	The	Word	Is	Given,	123-126.	
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to	see	if	Malcolm	was	around.	“Though	I	never	joined	the	Nation,	it	was	Malcolm’s	political	perspective	that	I	imbibed,”	Strickland	remembers,	“because	in	the	same	way	that	Karl	Marx	is	the	fundamental	critic	of	capitalism	and	Frantz	Fanon	is	the	fundamental	critic	of	colonialism,	Malcolm	X	is	the	fundamental	critic	of	American	racism.”124	Malcolm	had	even	prophesied	the	kind	of	profound	personal	impact	that	Strickland	experienced	during	his	speech	at	Harvard.	“The	same	Negro	students	you	are	turning	out	today,”	Malcolm	X	predicted,	“will	soon	be	demanding	the	same	things	you	now	hear	being	demanded	by	Mr.	Muhammad	and	the	Black	Muslims.”125	By	the	end	of	1963,	the	Roxbury	connection	that	Malcolm	X	and	Strickland	shared	would	come	to	influence	the	course	of	grassroots	struggles	for	rights	and	power	in	Harlem	when	Strickland	became	national	director	of	the	Northern	Student	Movement	that	fall.			 The	explosive	demonstrations	at	the	UN	in	the	beginning	of	1961	had	clearly	shaped	the	landscape	of	struggles	for	rights	and	power	in	New	York	City.	Though	not	physically	involved,	Malcolm	and	the	NOI	had	tilled	the	ground	from	which	such	radical	analyses	and	actions	had	begun	to	sprout.	In	turn,	the	ever-expanding	focus	on	the	NOI	in	the	wake	of	the	UN	“riots”	provided	Malcolm	with	an	elevated	platform	in	Harlem	and	throughout	the	Nation	from	which	to	awaken	the	masses	with	his	forceful	deconstruction	of	white	supremacy	and	compelling	advocacy	of	
																																																								124	William	L.	(Bill)	Strickland,	“Remembering	Malcolm:	A	Personal	Critique	of	Manning	Marable’s	Non-Definitive	Biography	of	Malcolm	X,”	in	A	Lie	of	
Reinvention:	Correcting	Manning	Marable’s	Malcolm	X,	eds.	Jared	A.	Ball	and	Todd	Steven	Burroughs	(Baltimore:	Black	Classic	Press,	2012),	81-83.		 125	Louis	Lomax,	When	the	Word	is	Given,	126.	
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self-determination,	self-defense,	and	Black	nationalism.	Despite	the	increasingly	suppressive	actions	of	local	and	federal	“law	enforcement”	agencies	and	the	theological	restrictions	from	Elijah	Muhammad	that	hamstrung	Malcolm’s	political	activism,	he	was	nonetheless	fundamentally	impacting	local,	national,	and	global	freedom	struggles	throughout	the	year	of	1961.		Furthermore,	along	with	inspiring	a	new	generation	of	militant	activists	and	intellectuals	at	the	grassroots,	the	popularity	of	Malcolm’s	analysis	was	also	pushing	Muhammad	to	toe	the	line	of	political	advocacy.	Speaking	to	the	thousands	gathered	at	Harlem’s	369th	Infantry	Armory	that	August,	Muhammad	declared	“Harlem	should	elect	its	own	leaders	and	should	not	accept	the	leaders	set	up	for	them	by	the	white	man.”	Though	still	adamant	about	precluding	the	NOI	from	active	political	involvement,	surging	demands	for	self-determination	in	Harlem	forced	Muhammad	to	concede	to	the	collective	mood.	“We	must	elect	our	leaders	and	if	they	do	not	do	right,”	Muhammad	warned,	“we	should	cut	their	heads	off.”126	Though	Muhammad’s	analysis	was	couched	in	demands	for	a	separate	Black	nation,	Malcolm	had	nonetheless	succeeded	in	nominally	sliding	the	scale	of	the	NOI’s	involvement.	It	would	not	be	long,	however,	before	Malcolm	would	no	longer	be	willing	to	accept	the	continued	constraints	on	his	political	involvement.	
“Unleashing	this	Black	power”:	Self-Defense	and	Self-Determination	in	Harlem	On	a	personal	level,	the	demonstrations	at	the	UN	proved	to	have	a	galvanizing	influence	upon	Mae	Mallory’s	political	development.	Though	she	had	long	claimed	the	right	to	self-defense	dating	back	to	her	childhood	in	Macon	and	had																																																									126	Marable,	Malcolm	X,	192.	
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actively	organized	in	support	of	the	Williams’	armed	struggle	in	Monroe,	Mallory’s	analysis	of	the	centrality	of	armed	struggle	in	service	of	Black	liberation	evolved	in	the	months	immediately	following	her	clash	with	police	outside	the	United	Nations	building.127	In	a	little	over	a	year’s	time,	Mallory	had	gone	from	fighting	City	Hall	for	educational	equality	in	Harlem	to	openly	advocating	armed	revolutionary	struggle	in	the	United	States	and	throughout	the	African	Diaspora.		Mallory’s	personal	experiences	in	challenging	the	dominant	white	power	structure	in	New	York	City	and	her	association	with	an	emerging	network	of	revolutionary	organizations	operating	out	of	Harlem	can	help	account	for	her	radical	political	development	during	this	period.128	In	her	writings,	Mallory	had	laid	bare	her	critiques	of	the	oppressive	powers	of	the	State	following	her	earlier	arrest	for	welfare	fraud	and	the	contradictions	she	observed	during	Castro’s	visit.	Following	the	UN	demonstration,	however,	her	analysis	had	evolved	from	a	condemnation	of	the	white	power	structure	to	an	advocacy	of	its	destruction.	In	a	letter	to	the	editor	of	the	New	York	Times	on	behalf	of	Crusaders	for	Freedom,	On	Guard,	and	Black	Liberation	Movement	shortly	after	the	demonstration,	Mallory																																																									127	Though	Mallory	does	not	appear	to	have	mentioned	the	outcomes	of	her	altercation	with	the	NYPD	outside	the	U.N.	in	her	correspondence	or	oral	history	interviews,	Conrad	Lynn	stated	in	his	autobiography	that	Mallory	was	arrested	and	charged	with	assault.	“I	represented	her	against	the	assault	charge	and	we	won,”	Lynn	claimed,	“The	police	were	to	embarrassed	to	admit	what	a	woman	had	done	to	them,	and	their	case	fell	apart.”	Lynn,	There	Is	A	Fountain,	163.			 128	In	his	autobiography,	Baraka	states	that	Mallory	was	a	member	of	On	Guard.	Though	her	records	do	not	indicate	any	formal	association	with	OGFF,	it	is	evident	that	she	worked	in	close	cooperation	with	the	group,	as	evidence	by	a	joint	letter	she	wrote	on	behalf	of	Crusaders	for	Freedom,	On	Guard,	and	Black	Liberation	Movement.	Baraka,	The	Autobiography	of	LeRoi	Jones,	267;	Letter	from	Mae	Mallory	to	Sir,	February	1961,	Box	2,	Folder	10,	Mallory	Papers.	
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stated	in	no	uncertain	terms	that	not	only	did	the	Crusaders	call	for	“death	to	the	murders	of	Patrice	Lumumba,”	but	that	they	would	henceforth	“dedicate	ourselves	to	the	task	of	unleashing	this	Black	power	until	the	world	is	rid	of	White	domination	and	exploitation.”129	The	organizing	activities	that	Mallory	dedicated	herself	to	in	the	following	weeks	and	months	demonstrated	that	this	was	no	hollow	threat,	but	rhetoric	that	she	was	prepared	to	back	up	with	action.	After	JFK’s	failed	attempt	at	overthrowing	Castro	during	the	Bay	of	Pigs	invasion	two	months	later,	Mallory	joined	a	national	group	of	militant	Black	leaders	in	issuing	a	manifesto	warning	the	Kennedy	administration	that	any	attempt	to	overthrow	the	Cuban	government	would	be	met	with	an	armed	struggle	in	the	US.130	Though	Mallory’s	politics	were	clearly	within	the	vein	of	international	revolutionary	struggle,	her	organizing	on	the	ground	in	Harlem	continued	to	revolve	mainly	around	supporting	the	armed	struggle	in	Monroe.	Mallory’s	intentions	in	her	support	of	Williams	were	clear.	Her	immediate	interest,	of	course,	was	to	aid	the	armed	struggle	in	Monroe	as	a	means	of	protecting	and	liberating	Black	communities	from	racial,	economic,	and	sexual	terrorism.	At	
																																																								129	Letter	from	Mae	Mallory	to	Sir,	February	1961,	Box	2,	Folder	10,	Mallory	Papers.		 130	This	group	included	the	likes	of	Conrad	Lynn,	James	Boggs,	John	Henrik	Clarke,	Julian	Mayfield,	William	Worthy,	Ossie	Davis,	Ora	Mobley,	and	Calvin	Hicks.	Lynn,	There	Is	A	Fountain,	171.	Although	the	manifesto	was	largely	ignored	by	the	media,	and	consequently	the	federal	government,	Mayfield	argued	that	“it	was	a	significant	straw	in	the	winds	of	change	sweeping	the	earth,	a	warning	that	some	Americans	of	African	descent	are	prepared	to	lock	arms	with	combatants	against	racism	everywhere,	even	those	who	do	not	enjoy	the	approval	of	our	State	Department.”	Julian	Mayfield,	“The	Cuban	Challenge,”	Freedomways	1,	no.	2	(Summer	1961):	189.	
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the	same	time,	Mallory	hoped	that	her	efforts	in	Monroe	would	inspire	a	more	widespread	embrace	of	self-defense	and	armed	resistance.	“Remember	the	school	struggle	started	with	just	one	then	nine,”	Mallory	wrote	to	a	friend,	“perhaps	the	idea	of	self-defense	will	bear	fruit	the	same	as	the	idea	of	the	school	boycott.”131	As	proven	by	the	“near	riot”	in	1959	and	more	recently	at	the	UN,	Harlem	was	fertile	territory	for	Mallory’s	analyses,	and	throughout	the	spring	and	summer	of	1961	she	and	the	Crusaders	organized	rallies	and	events	to	raise	consciousness	and	support	for	armed	struggles	in	the	South.		Mallory’s	organizing	in	this	period	was	representative	of	not	only	a	widespread	embrace	of	militancy	in	Harlem,	but	also	a	widening	gap	between	moderate,	middle-class	civil	rights	organizations	and	poor	and	working-class	Black	communities.	In	May,	the	Crusaders	held	a	mass	rally	in	Harlem	Square	to	protest	“southern	injustice	and	brutality”	and	criticize	the	ineffective	responses	of	“so-called	leaders”	in	the	face	of	unabated	racial	terror.	The	Crusaders	circulated	leaflets	throughout	Harlem	ahead	of	the	event,	referring	to	the	2nd	Amendment	as	the	“first	condition	for	our	freedom”	and	inviting	the	community	to	join	in	the	hanging	in	effigy	of	Alabama	Governor	John	Patterson.132	Earlier	that	month,	the	Crusaders	led	local	people	in	shutting	down	an	NAACP	rally	in	Harlem	Square,	featuring	Roy	Wilkins,	Daisy	Bates,	Manhattan	Borough	President	Edward	Dudley,	and	others,	for	refusing	to	allow	Rob	Williams	to	speak.	The	majority	of	the	3,000	in	attendance,																																																									131	Letter	from	Mae	Mallory	to	Jeanne,	June	23,	1963,	Box	1,	Folder	2,	Mallory	Papers.		 132	“How	Long	Will	We	Turn	The	Other	Cheek?,”	Box	2,	Folder	10,	Mallory	Papers.	
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some	carrying	placards	of	Patrice	Lumumba,	shouted	down	speaker	after	speaker—even	throwing	eggs	at	Roy	Wilkins—until	the	NAACP	leaders	conceded	their	demands	to	hear	Williams.	The	militant	leader	was	met	with	a	thunderous	applause	as	he	denounced	the	“Uncle	Tom”	leadership	of	the	NAACP	and	urged	Black	communities	to	defend	themselves.133	In	other	leaflets	that	spring,	the	Crusaders	cited	the	unpunished	murders	of	Emmett	Till	and	Mack	Parker	as	evidence	that	“passive	resistance	is	a	fraud,”	while	referring	to	Martin	Luther	King,	Jr.	as	a	“phoney”	and	a	“passive	handkerchief	head.”		The	militant	rhetoric	of	the	Crusaders	in	condemning	moderate	civil	rights	leadership	and	its	enthusiastic	reception	in	Harlem	that	spring	is	illustrative	of	the	disillusionment	with	gradualist	programs	and	leaders	that	was	flourishing	at	the	grassroots.	This	power	struggle	within	the	Black	freedom	struggle	in	Harlem	drew	national	attention	and	contributed	to	a	broader	shift	toward	localized	leadership	and	self-determination—hallmarks	of	Ella	Baker’s	leadership	in	New	York	City	and	with	SNCC.	Writing	to	congratulate	Mae	Mallory	on	shutting	down	the	NAACP	rally,	Clark	Atlanta	University	professor	Dr.	Lonnie	Cross	(Abdulalim	A.	Shabazz)	declared,	“the	rout	of	the	NAACP	in	Harlem…proves	beyond	the	shadow	of	a	doubt	that	the	NAACP	and	the	whole	of	the	black	bourgeoisie	do	not	speak	for	the	black	masses.	They	never	did.	They	simply	filled	the	void	of	the	absence	of	the	masses’	own	chosen	leadership.”134	Cross,	an	active	supporter	of	Williams	and	The	
																																																								133	Crusaders	For	Freedom,	“Militant	Mass	Protest	Causes	NAACP	To	Abandon	Rally	And	Turn	It	Over	To	Robert	Williams!,”	May	17,	1961,	Box	2,	Folder	10,	Mallory	Papers.		
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Crusaders	who	would	join	the	Atlanta	Temple	of	the	Nation	of	Islam	by	the	year’s	end,	understood	self-determination	for	poor	and	working-class	Black	communities	within	freedom	struggles	as	a	pre-requisite	for	achieving	liberatory	societal	transformation.	For	Mallory	and	many	Harlem	residents,	the	adherence	of	mainstream	civil	rights	organizations	to	nonviolence	in	the	face	of	unabated	racial	terrorism	demonstrated	that	the	NAACP	and	SCLC	were	out	of	touch	with	the	realities	of	their	lives	and	incapable	of	effectively	advocating	for	rights	and	power	on	their	behalf.	Furthermore,	the	successes	that	Mallory	and	The	Crusaders	had	in	mobilizing	thousands	of	local	people	demonstrated	that	self-defense	was	an	issue	that	Harlem	residents	could	be	effectively	organized	around.		The	escalation	of	white	terrorism	that	summer	in	Monroe	solidified	for	Mallory	and	other	supporters	of	Williams	in	Harlem	the	impotence	of	nonviolent	resistance	and	the	need	for	greater	involvement	in	the	armed	struggle	in	the	South.	Furthermore,	these	organizing	efforts	led	Harlem	intellectuals	and	activists	to	an	increased	militancy	in	their	analyses	of	white	supremacy	and	liberation	struggles.	By	June,	members	of	OGFF,	OYM,	the	Crusaders,	and	HWG	had	formed	an	ad	hoc	coalition	called	the	Afro-American	Alliance	for	Action	(AAAA)	to	coordinate	efforts	in	active	support	of	armed	liberation	struggles	in	Monroe	and	beyond.	In	a	June	meeting	attended	by	Mallory,	Williams,	John	Henrik	Clarke,	Ossie	Davis,	Calvin	Hicks,	Conrad	Lynn,	Julian	Mayfield,	and	Ora	Mobley,	the	AAAA	debated	the	topics	of	“integration	or	separation,”	“methods	of	protest,”	“economic	aspects	of	struggle,”																																																																																																																																																																						134	Letter	from	Lonnie	Cross	to	Mae	Mallory,	May	22,	1961,	Box	1,	Folder	1,	Mallory	Papers.	Cross	was	an	active	supporter	of	Rob	Williams,	as	well	as	The	Crusaders	for	Freedom,	who	would	join	the	Nation	of	Islam	in	Atlanta	that	year.		
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and	“propaganda	and	legal	problems.”	The	minutes	of	the	meeting	illustrate	a	clear	concern	with	economic	inequality	as	a	central	pillar	of	the	Black	freedom	struggle,	debates	over	the	creation	of	a	landed	Black	state,	and	a	near-consensus	on	the	position	that	“in	forging	their	struggle	Afro-Americans	must	separate	themselves	from	whites.”135	The	influence	of	the	post-war	leftist	and	nationalist	roots	of	these	activists	are	evident	here,	as	well	as	the	growing	influence	of	Malcolm	X	and	the	Nation	of	Islam,	whose	positions	on	these	questions	were	used	as	a	foil	against	which	these	activist-intellectuals	clarified	their	own	positions	on	economic	inequality,	racial	violence,	and	Black	nationalism.	Subsequent	meetings	focused	on	how	these	analyses	could	be	put	into	action,	with	an	immediate	interest	in	raising	local,	national,	and	global	awareness	of	the	struggle	in	Monroe	and	recruiting	Harlem	residents	to	become	actively	involved	through	rallies	and	picket	lines.136	In	early	July,	the	AAAA	distributed	25,000	leaflets	in	Harlem	that	briefly	described	the	history	of	Klan	violence	in	Monroe,	and	extolled	the	successes	of	armed	self-defense	in	curbing	white	supremacist	terrorism.			The	right	to	armed	self-defense	was	one	position	that	was	taken	for	granted	in	the	meetings	of	the	AAAA,	and	raising	funds	for	arms	in	Monroe	remained	a	primary	mission	for	the	group.	Mayfield	and	Clarke	had	previously	made	trips	to	Monroe	to	deliver	weapons,	but	the	escalation	of	violence	that	spring	and	summer	made	the	task	all	the	more	pressing.	“Finally	in	1961	when	[Williams]	was	under																																																									135	“Meeting	of	Afro-Americans,	June	14,	1961,”	Box	2,	Folder	4,	Mallory	Papers.		 136	“Preparations	for	Activity	for	Action	for	Gaining	Support	for	Rob	Williams,	June	29,	1961,”	Box	2,	Folder	4,	Mallory	Papers.	
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heavy	attack	by	the	Klan,	he	called	and	asked	for	financial	help,”	Mallory	reflected,	“so	again,	I	went	out	and	organized	a	rally	to	buy	guns.”137	The	same	evening	that	Conrad	Lynn	and	Julian	Mayfield	addressed	a	rally	at	the	United	Mutual	Auditorium	in	Harlem	to	spread	the	word	about	the	situation	in	Monroe,	Mallory	and	the	AAAA	held	a	meeting	with	the	explicit	purpose	of	raising	money	to	purchase	guns	for	Williams	and	his	allies.	Contributions	were	received	from	an	array	of	individuals	and	organizations,	including	Vincent	Copeland	of	the	Marxist-oriented	Workers	World	Party,	Dan	Watts	of	Liberation	Committee	for	Africa	and	Liberator	magazine,	
Negro	Digest	editor	Hoyt	Fuller,	several	members	of	the	OYM	and	Socialist	Workers	Party,	and	a	handful	of	local	people	from	Harlem	and	the	Lower	East	Side.138	Through	donations	of	$12.50	per	gun,	the	AAAA	was	able	to	collect	a	total	of	$167.50	that	evening—enough	to	send	thirteen	firearms	to	Monroe.139	While	the	AAAA	achieved	some	modest	success	in	drumming	up	local	support	for	the	militant	southern	struggle,	their	activities	also	drew	the	eye	of	the	FBI.	If	Mallory	was	aware	of	the	FBI’s	increasingly	active	surveillance	programs	at	the	time,	she	showed	little	regard	for	their	actions	when	asked	years	later.	“I	didn’t	hide	the	fact	that	I	was	raising	money	to	buy	guns	for	black	people	in	the	South.”140	
																																																								137	Mae	Mallory	interview	with	Malaika	Lumumba,	February	27,	1970.		 138	Pledges	for	Donations	from	July	10,	1961	Meeting	of	AAAA,	Box	2,	Folder	3,	Mallory	Papers;	“LCA	Finances	Arms	for	Defense	of	Afro	Americans	in	Monroe,	N.C.,”	Liberator	1	(July	1961).		 139	It	is	worth	noting	that	$12.50	in	1961	is	equivalent	to	$102.72	at	the	time	of	this	writing	(December	2017),	according	to	the	CPI	Inflation	Calculator.		 140	Mae	Mallory	interview	with	Malaika	Lumumba,	February	27,	1970.	
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Like	Williams	in	the	South,	Mallory	refused	to	censor	her	right	to	self-defense	in	the	face	of	governmental	and	extrajudicial	repression.	Even	if	Mallory	had	been	less	forward	in	her	embrace	of	armed	self-defense,	it	is	doubtful	that	she	would	have	been	able	to	evade	the	reach	of	local	and	federal	surveillance	programs.	The	FBI	had	already	begun	keeping	tabs	on	most	of	the	activists	in	her	network,	including	Williams,	Julian	Mayfield,	LeRoi	Jones,	John	Henrik	Clarke,	Hoyt	Fuller,	and	John	O.	Killens,	and	had	an	informant	in	the	July	fundraising	meeting	of	the	AAAA.141	At	the	local	level,	the	NYPD’s	Bureau	of	Special	Services	(BOSS),	its	counterintelligence	department	tasked	with	surveilling,	infiltrating,	and	subverting	civil	rights	organizations,	had	been	keeping	a	watchful	eye	on	The	Crusaders	and	various	other	organizations	through	undercover	agents	and	confidential	informants.142	Her	earlier	arrest	for	alleged	welfare	fraud	had	provided	Mallory	with	a	first-hand	lesson	on	the	powers	that	law	enforcement	agencies	wielded	to	suppress	those	who	challenged	the	white-dominated	power	structure.	In	the	month	following	the	AAAA’s	Harlem	rally,	Mallory’s	education	on	the	repressive	powers	of	the	State	would	continue	when	Rob	and	Mabel	Williams	called	for	reinforcements	to	come	to	Monroe.		
	
																																																								141	FBI	record	of	Julian	Mayfield,	“F.B.	Eyes	Digital	Archive,”	Washington	University	Libraries.		 142	Minutes	of	a	meeting	of	the	Crusaders	for	Freedom	on	June	10,	1961	suggest	that	the	group	may	have	suspected	they	had	been	infiltrated.	According	to	the	notes	taken	by	Mallory,	“Clarence	Scott	was	present	and	behaved	in	a	manner	that	lead	us	to	believe	that	he	was	sent	to	cause	dissension.”	“Meeting	Minutes	of	the	Crusaders	for	Freedom,”	June	10,	1961,	Box	2,	Folder	10,	Mallory	Papers.	
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“Yours	for	Freedom	Now”:	The	Monroe	Defense	Committee	and	Harlem’s	
Radical	Milieu	Throughout	that	summer,	the	correspondence	that	Mae	Mallory	received	from	Mabel	and	Rob	Williams	became	increasingly	alarming,	warning	of	impending	danger	to	Monroe’s	Black	community	from	racial	terrorists.	“He	called	me	up	one	day	and	he	told	me	that	they	expected	an	attack	by	the	Ku	Klux	Klan	and	that	he	would	suggest	that	all	of	the	people	that	wanted	to	come	down	there	come,”	Mallory	later	recalled,	“so	Julian	Mayfield	and	I	went	down.”143	She	had	made	it	known,	however,	that	she	would	not	be	participating	on	any	picket	lines	because	of	her	steadfast	adherence	to	self-defense.	On	August	27th,	Mallory	was	tending	to	business	at	the	Williams	family	home	as	Freedom	Riders	and	local	people	trickled	in	from	a	nonviolent	demonstration	downtown.	“Some	people	had	come	in	from	downtown	all	agitated	and	said	all	hell	had	broken	loose	downtown	and	white	folks	were	trying	to	kill	the	blacks,”	Mallory	recalled,	“and	people	just	came	from	nowhere,	they	wanted	to	fight,	they	wanted	directions.”144		At	the	urging	of	the	local	police	chief,	over	a	thousand	armed	and	hostile	whites	had	come	in	droves	to	forcefully	suppress	the	protests	of	the	Freedom	Riders.	As	the	mob	attacked	the	peaceful	demonstrators	that	afternoon,	including	SNCC	leader	James	Forman	who	had	his	head	split	open	by	the	butt	of	a	rifle,	Mayfield	and	the	self-defense	guard	quickly	drove	to	town,	breaking	through	
																																																								143	Mae	Mallory	interview	with	Malaika	Lumumba,	February	27,	1970.		 144	Ibid,	20.	
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blockades	to	whisk	the	protestors	away	from	the	crazed	mob	and	police	to	the	Williams	home	where	hundreds	of	Black	folks	were	beginning	to	gather.145		The	crowd	outside	the	Williams	house	had	already	begun	arming	themselves	in	anticipation	of	a	white	onslaught	as	the	sun	began	to	set	and	a	black	car	carrying	a	white	couple	came	rolling	down	the	block.	Charles	and	Mabel	Stegall	were	known	to	be	members	of	the	local	Klan	who	had	paraded	through	the	neighborhood	the	previous	day	with	a	banner	on	their	car	reading	“Open	Season	on	Coons.”	By	this	point,	Mallory	had	come	outside	and,	according	to	Tyson,	was	in	the	front	of	a	“crowd	of	angry	blacks”	that	surrounded	the	car	and	yanked	the	Stegalls	out.146	Realizing	the	implications	of	the	crowd	actually	killing	a	white	couple,	Rob	Williams	brought	the	Stegalls	into	the	house	where	Mallory	brusquely	kept	watch	of	them.		As	word	of	a	hostage	situation	got	out	and	circulated	through	the	county,	it	appeared	to	Williams	as	though	a	pogrom	were	on	the	horizon	as	state	and	federal	law	enforcement	prepared	for	a	raid	on	the	house.	Though	the	Stegalls	left	safely	under	the	own	power,	Williams	was	a	marked	man.	To	avoid	the	all	but	certain	fate	of	being	lynched,	whether	legally	or	extrajudiciously,	Williams	made	the	decision	to	flee	Monroe.	He	called	Julian	Mayfield	who	was	stationed	at	a	house	across	town	to	coordinate	the	escape,	quickly	explaining	“if	he	didn’t	leave	Monroe	there	would	be	a	bloodbath.”	Armed	with	several	guns,	Williams	stealthily	led	his	wife,	two	sons,	
																																																								145	For	more	expansive	narratives	of	the	conflicts	in	Monroe,	see	Robert	F.	Williams,	Negroes	With	Guns	(New	York:	Marzani	&	Munsell,	Inc,	1962),	75-110;	Tyson,	Radio	Free	Dixie,	262-286;	James	Forman,	The	Making	of	Black	
Revolutionaries	(Seattle:	University	of	Washington	Press,	2000),	193-211.		146	Tyson,	Radio	Free	Dixie,	278.	
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and	Mae	Mallory	to	a	designated	meeting	place	where	Mayfield	was	waiting	in	his	car.147	“Rob	told	me	to	get	out	in	the	event	that,	you	know,	nobody	else	can	make	it,”	Mallory	later	recalled.	“Somebody	had	to	get	out,	come	back	to	New	York	and	tell	everybody	what	happened.”148	The	five	sped	north	out	of	Union	County	in	Mayfield’s	red	Dodge	Rambler,	arriving	in	Harlem	the	next	morning.	News	of	the	situation	in	Monroe	traveled	like	wildfire.	By	the	morning,	the	Williams	family	and	Mae	Mallory	had	learned	that	they	were	wanted	on	kidnapping	charges	and	acted	quickly	to	evade	southern	“justice.”	While	the	Williams	family	covertly	made	their	way	to	Cuba	as	political	fugitives,	Mallory	fled	to	Cleveland,	Ohio	to	hide	out	with	family	and	friends.	For	Mallory,	going	underground	was	not	merely	a	means	of	staying	out	of	jail,	but	a	means	of	staying	alive.	The	horrors	of	the	southern	“justice”	system	were	well	documented,	and	Mabel	Stegall	may	as	well	have	been	speaking	on	behalf	of	the	majority	of	Monroe’s	white	population	when	she	told	reporters	a	few	months	later	that	“Mae	Mallory	ought	to	be	strung	up	and	if	she	ever	come	up	to	Union	County	she	might	get	just	that.”149		Over	the	next	month,	the	FBI	conspired	with	local	police	to	dig	up	information	on	Mallory	and	set	up	a	national	dragnet	for	her	capture.	Federal	agents	in	New	York	interrogated	Mallory’s	friends,	family,	and	coworkers,	and	made	several	visits	to	her	mother’s	home,	where	they	harassed	and	intimidated	the	elderly	woman	and	Mallory’s	daughter,	Patricia.	Mallory’s	face	circulated																																																									147	Ibid,	282-3.		148	Mae	Mallory	interview	with	Malaika	Lumumba,	February	27,	1970.		 149	Tyson,	Radio	Free	Dixie,	280.	
		244	
throughout	the	country	on	posters	marked	“Wanted	By	FBI,”	describing	the	34-year-old	mother	of	two	as	someone	with	“a	violent	nature”	who	“reportedly	carries	a	.22	caliber	pistol	concealed	on	her	person.”	After	tapping	phones	lines	and	intercepting	mail,	the	FBI	finally	got	a	lead	in	early	October	through	their	surveillance	of	Conrad	Lynn,	who	had	addressed	a	letter	to	Mallory	in	Cleveland.150	Federal	agents	acted	quickly	to	put	the	screws	to	members	of	Mallory’s	extended	family	in	Cleveland	to	ascertain	her	whereabouts,	and	on	October	12th,	agents	were	at	the	door	of	her	cousin’s	home	where	she	was	staying.	“That	Thursday	about	25	members	of	the	FBI	came	into	the	house	with	guns	drawn	and	everything	to	arrest	me,”	Mallory	recalled.	At	that	moment,	Mallory’s	mind	raced	back	to	when	she	was	a	young	girl	in	Macon	and	white	police	surrounded	her	aunt’s	house	for	punching	a	white	girl	in	self-defense.151	This	time,	however,	the	police	didn’t	leave	and	Mallory	was	taken	to	the	Cuyahoga	County	Jail.	Though	she	was	released	on	bond	for	five	months,	Mallory	would	spend	the	following	year	in	the	jail	fighting	extradition	to	Monroe.	With	Williams	exiled	in	Cuba,	Mallory	jailed	in	Cleveland,	and	three	others	jailed	in	Monroe,	a	network	of	activists	in	New	York	City,	as	well	as	Cleveland,	rallied	to	defend	their	comrades	and	continue	their	freedom	struggles.	Within	a	matter	of	days,	newspaper	advertisements	in	several	major	northern	cities	announced	the	formation	of	the	Monroe	Defense	Committee	(MDC).	Described	as	a	“broad,	non-partisan	defense	committee,”	by	executive	secretary	Calvin	Hicks,	the	
																																																								150	Yie	Foong,	“Frame	Up	in	Monroe:	The	Mae	Mallory	Story,”	(Master’s	Thesis,	Sarah	Lawrence	College,	2010),	45-46,	69.		 151	Mae	Mallory	interview	with	Malaika	Lumumba,	February	27,	1970.	
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national	organization	with	its	headquarters	on	125th	Street	included	an	array	of	New	York	activists,	artists,	and	intellectuals	with	ties	to	leading	radical	groups,	such	as	the	Crusaders,	OGFF,	CAWAH,	AAAA,	LCA,	HWG,	and	other	leftist	and	nationalist	groups.	Among	the	MDC’s	many	notable	sponsors	were	James	Baldwin,	John	Henrik	Clarke,	Richard	Gibson,	LeRoi	Jones,	Shirley	Graham,	Julian	and	Ana	Mayfield,	Gerald	Quinn,	Bayard	Rustin,	Dan	Watts,	Max	Roach,	Abbey	Lincoln,	Ruby	Dee,	Ossie	Davis,	Sylvester	Leaks,	Ramona	Garrett,	and	Jesse	Gray.	“The	committee	was	organized	and	is	sponsored	by	many	individuals	who	may	not	agree	with	each	other	on	the	way	in	which	full	equality	for	Afro-Americans	is	to	be	achieved,”	Hicks	explained	in	a	letter	seeking	support	for	the	group.	“However,	they	do	agree	that	the	oppression,	brutality	and	travesty	of	justice	in	Monroe,	N.C.	which	forced	Robert	F.	Williams	to	flee	for	his	life	must	be	rectified.”152	While	the	MDC	may	not	have	constituted	a	singular	united	front,	the	cooperative	convergence	of	this	array	of	activists	and	organizations	in	Harlem	did	offer	a	promising	sign	for	those	who	had	been	calling	for	a	Black	united	front	for	many	years.	Initially,	the	MDC	positioned	itself	as	an	information	organ	responsible	for	countering	the	dominant	narratives	of	white-owned	media	outlets	and	politicians	while	raising	national	and	global	awareness	of	the	true	situation	in	Monroe.	Through	explaining	the	depths	of	racial	violence	in	Monroe	and	exposing	the	culpability	of	government	officials,	including	US	Attorney	General	Robert	F.	Kennedy,	to	Black	communities	throughout	the	nation,	the	MDC	aspired	to	“achieve	mass	solidarity	behind	the	fighting	spirit	of	Monroe	citizens	and	Robert	F.																																																									152	Tinson,	Radical	Intellect,	34.	
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Williams.”153	Articles	from	MDC	members	offering	radical	analyses	on	the	situation	in	Monroe	circulated	throughout	New	York	and	the	nation	on	the	pages	of	Liberator	and	Freedomways.	Posters	with	a	headline	of	“Save	Mae	Mallory!”	appeared	on	utility	poles	throughout	Harlem,	reminding	local	people	that	their	neighbor	had	fought	and	won	against	segregated	schools	in	New	York	and	was	now	“being	persecuted	because	of	her	militant	fight	for	Black	Liberation.”154	Street	rallies	were	organized	in	Harlem	to	educate	the	masses	on	the	local,	national,	and	global	contexts	and	implications	of	the	struggle	in	Monroe.	Fundraisers	were	also	organized	to	contribute	to	legal	expenses	and	Ossie	Davis	dedicated	a	performance	of	his	widely	successful	play	Purlie	Victorious,	starring	Ruby	Dee,	as	a	fundraiser	for	the	MDC.155		In	Cleveland,	the	MDC	that	Mallory	had	helped	organize	while	initially	out	on	bond	had	an	even	more	active	presence	on	the	ground	under	the	leadership	of	Audrey	Proctor	and	Clarence	Seniors,	organizing	picket	lines,	holding	mass	rallies,	and	tirelessly	pressuring	the	governor,	along	with	national	and	international	leaders,	to	prevent	Mae	Mallory’s	extradition	to	Monroe.156	Though	the	“unknown”	
																																																								153	“Monroe,	North	Carolina	Victims	of	Racial	Injustice	Need	Your	Help,”	
Baltimore	Afro-American,	October	21,	1961.		154	Abiola	Sinclair,	“Mae	Mallory	Harlem	Activist,”	in	Klytus	Smith	and	Abiola	Sinclair,	eds.,	The	Harlem	Cultural/Political	Movements	1960-1970:	From	Malcolm	X	
to	“Black	is	Beautiful”	(New	York:	Gumbs	and	Thomas	Publishers,	Inc.,	1995),	61.		 155	Flyer	for	Benefit	Performance	of	Purlie	Victorious	for	Monroe	Defense	Committee,	Robert	F.	Williams	Papers,	Black	Power	Movement	Microform	Collection	(henceforth	referred	to	as	Williams	Papers).		
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Mallory	and	her	“group	with	a	way	out	philosophy	of	self-defense”	were	initially	met	with	a	cold	reception	in	Cleveland—particularly	from	the	“so-called	respectable	organizations”—the	MDC’s	active	presence	in	the	city’s	quickly	garnered	the	support	of	Black	communities	and	contributed	to	the	flowering	of	a	militant	grassroots	milieu	in	the	Midwestern	city.157	The	influence	of	the	MDC	in	Cleveland	was	apparent	to	Mallory	in	the	results	of	the	1962	elections,	when	“every	candidate	that	had	publicly	supported	us	won	except	one.”158		Mallory’s	fight	also	captured	the	attention	and	imagination	of	aspiring	revolutionaries	in	Cleveland,	such	as	Donald	Freeman,	a	graduate	of	Western	Reserve	University	and	member	of	Students	for	a	Democratic	Society	(SDS).159	Freeman	and	the	Afro-American	Institute	collaborated	with	the	MDC	and	Cleveland	CORE	on	demonstrations	at	the	Cuyahoga	County	Jail	to	demand	Mallory’s	release	and	even	secured	the	endorsement	of	the	local	NOI	mosque	for	the	protest.160	By	the	end	of	1962,	Freeman	and	Max	Stanford	(Muhammad	Ahmad),	another	Ohio	student	inspired	by	the	armed	struggle	waged	by	Williams	and	Mallory,	had	formed	the																																																																																																																																																																						156	The	Cleveland	MDC	was	also	responsible	for	publishing	a	collection	of	Mallory’s	writings	from	the	Cuyahoga	County	Jail,	which	offers	remarkable	insights	into	her	political	ideologies	and	analyses	of	Black	liberation	struggles.	Mae	Mallory,	
Letters	From	Prison	by	Mae	Mallory:	The	Story	of	a	Frame-Up	(Cleveland:	Monroe	Defense	Committee,	1963).		157	Mae	Mallory,	“Memo	From	a	Monroe	Jail,”	Freedomways	4,	no.	2	(Spring	1964),	210.		 158	Ibid.		 159	Williams,	Concrete	Demands,	78-79.		 160	Donald	Freeman,	“The	Cleveland	Story,”	Liberator	3,	no.	6	(June	1963),	7-8.	
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Revolutionary	Action	Movement	(RAM),	a	nascent	revolutionary	nationalist	organization	that	would	profoundly	influence	Black	freedom	struggles	in	the	years	to	follow.161		Though	the	MDC’s	formation	in	New	York	offered	a	glimmer	of	hope	for	a	Black	united	front	of	nationalist	activists	and	organizations,	the	organization	quickly	became	entangled	in	factionalist	disputes	with	another	organization	called	the	Committee	to	Aid	the	Monroe	Defendants	(CAMD).	While	a	detailed	account	of	the	bitter	rivalry	of	the	individuals	and	organizations	comprising	the	two	groups	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	dissertation,	the	contestations	over	ideology,	representation,	and	influence	offer	important	insights	into	the	deeply	rooted	histories	of	leftist	and	nationalist	organizing	in	New	York	City	during	this	period.	Effectively	operating	as	an	arm	of	the	Socialist	Workers	Party	(SWP)	through	the	leadership	of	Berta	Green	and	George	Weissman,	the	CAMD	was	at	odds	from	the	start	with	many	of	the	MDC’s	nationalist	members	and	those	who	had	ties	(former	or	existing)	with	the	Communist	Party.162		The	conflict,	however,	was	much	larger	than	leftist	sectarianism.	In	the	estimation	of	Dr.	Albert	Perry,	an	associate	of	the	Williams’	in	Monroe	and	the																																																									161	Ibid.		162	As	Smethurst	notes,	“The	Trotskyist	SWP	alienated	many	young	black	miliants	on	the	Lower	East	Side	and	in	Harlem	for	what	was	perceived	as	a	proclivity	for	heavy-handed	sectarian	attempts	to	control	organizations	liked	the	Monroe	Defense	Committee	and	Fair	Play	for	Cuba.”	Smethurst,	The	Black	Arts	
Movement,	144-45.	In	Cleveland,	this	factionalism	was	more	acute,	as	the	Cleveland	MDC	had	aligned	itself	with	the	Workers	World	Party	which	had	defected	from	the	SWP	in	Buffalo,	NY	in	1959.	Paul	Boutelle,	interview	with	Robert	Wright,	August	2,	1970,	Ralph	Bunche	Oral	History	Collection,	Moorland-Spingarn	Research	Center,	Howard	University.		
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titular	head	of	the	CAMD,	the	four	main	debates	that	undergirded	the	division	between	the	two	committees	were	over	interracial	organizing,	support	for	the	Freedom	Riders,	the	ban	of	the	word	“Negro,”	and	salaried	officers.163	More	broadly,	the	division	hinged	upon	the	MDC’s	steadfast	dedication	to	Black	self-determination	and	the	rejection	of	white	leadership	in	Black	political	organizations,	as	well	as	their	general	disavowal	of	nonviolence	as	the	only	strategy	for	Black	liberation.	Conrad	Lynn	explained	the	matter	quite	frankly	to	Berta	Green,	the	organization’s	white	executive	secretary	in	a	letter	from	May	1963.	“The	basic	reason	is	plain…politically,	the	black	people	are	no	longer	willing	to	accept	white	leadership	of	their	cause.”164		Though	the	CAMD	was	more	successful	in	garnering	financial	and	reputational	support	from	organizations	like	the	NAACP,	UAW,	and	the	Baptist	Ministers	Conference	of	Greater	New	York	and	Vicinity,	Inc.—organizations	which	had	ardently	opposed	Williams	previously—the	militancy	that	the	MDC	represented	was	more	in	step	with	the	“New	Afro-American	Nationalism”	John	Henrik	Clarke	described	that	was	surging	at	the	grassroots	in	Harlem	and	elsewhere.	To	be	fair,	the	CAMD’s	fundraising	was	indispensable	in	securing	legal	representation	and	
																																																								163	Letter	from	Albert	E.	Perry	to	Calvin	Hicks,	September	30,	1961,	Williams	Papers.	Though	many	supporters	of	the	MDC	applauded	the	Freedom	Riders	for	escalating	the	tempo	of	the	Movement	through	exposing	the	naked	brutality	of	southern	racism,	Dan	Watts	and	others	also	criticized	the	Freedom	Riders	for	announcing	their	plans	and	adherence	to	nonviolence	in	advance,	so	as	to	welcome	violence	upon	helpless	demonstrators.		164	Letter	from	Conrad	J.	Lynn	to	Berta	Green,	May	7,	1963,	Williams	Papers.	Though	Lynn	had	remained	a	member	of	CAMD	while	representing	the	Monroe	defendants,	his	decision	to	do	so	was	likely	strategic,	as	the	interracial	organization	was	more	successful	in	its	fundraising	efforts	and	was	paying	for	Lynn’s	legal	services.	
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raising	bail	for	the	Monroe	defendants	and	also	coordinated	a	landmark	debate	at	the	Palm	Gardens	on	May	1,	1962	featuring	Malcolm	X,	William	Worthy,	and	James	Farmer,	among	its	other	contributions	to	the	Monroe	struggle.165	These	forums,	Smethurst	notes,	“brought	young	black	militants	from	the	Lower	East	Side,	Harlem,	and	elsewhere	in	the	city	in	contact	with	each	other”	and	contributed	to	“the	growth	of	community	and	communication	among	new	radical	black	artists,	intellectuals,	and	activists.”166	However,	that	the	CAMD	welcomed	the	support	of	mainstream	civil	rights	organizations	and	focused	much	of	its	organizing	efforts	downtown,	where	it’s	office	was	located,	indicates	a	fundamental	difference	in	organizational	approach	between	the	CAMD	and	MDC.		While	acknowledging	the	important	roles	played	by	the	CAMD	in	a	letter	she	wrote	to	Mabel	and	Robert	Williams	in	April	1963	after	being	released	on	$15,000	bond	from	the	Cuyahoga	County	Jail,	Mae	Mallory	argued	that	“it	is	obvious	to	all	who	care	to	see	that	in	spite	of	all	our	disadvantages	it	was	The	Monroe	Defense	Committee	that	offered	the	leadership.”167	Though	the	Cleveland	MDC	played	a	much	larger	role	in	the	defense	of	Mae	Mallory,	she	credited	the	leadership	of	the	national	organization	in	New	York	City	with	inspiring	Congressman	Adam	Clayton	
																																																								165	Though	conceived	as	a	fundraiser	for	the	CAMD,	Malcolm	X	requested	that	the	group	not	be	mentioned	explicitly	to	remain	“clear	of	any	political	charge.”	See	Flyer	for	The	Challenge	of	Racism,	May	1,	1962,	Williams	Papers;	Letter	from	William	Worthy	to	Robert	F.	Williams,	April	18,	1962,	Williams	Papers.	For	more	information	on	the	debate,	see	Joseph,	Waiting	‘Til	the	Midnight	Hour,	65-67.		 166	Smethurst,	The	Black	Arts	Movement,	145.		 167	Mae	Mallory,	“Memo	From	a	Monroe	Jail”,	211;	Letter	from	Mae	Mallory	to	Mabel	and	Rob	Williams,	April	10,	1963,	Williams	Papers.	
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Powell,	Jr.	to	“denounce	the	NAACP,	CORE,	SCLC,	etc.	for	the	white	domination	in	the	leadership	of	Black	organizations.”	Mallory	was	referring	to	a	bold	declaration	Powell	had	made	in	Washington,	D.C.	just	weeks	earlier.	“The	white	man	has	given	the	Negro	in	America	just	about	as	much	as	he	intends	to,”	Powell	stated,	“we	will	achieve	only	that	which	we	fight	for	and	it	can	only	be	done	by	those	organizations	that	are	totally	owned,	controlled	and	maintained	by	the	Negro	people.”168	While	Mallory	qualified	her	commentary	on	the	“opportunist”	Powell’s	advocacy,	she	also	credited	the	Harlem	congressman	with	being	“able	to	recognize	the	trend	the	liberation	movement	is	taking.”169	This	“trend”	of	Black	self-determination	that	Mallory	described	was	a	hallmark	of	the	“New	Afro-American	Nationalism”	that	Clarke	had	heralded	on	the	pages	of	Freedomways	two	years	earlier	following	the	UN	demonstrations.	“No	people	are	really	free,”	Clarke	wrote,	“until	they	become	the	instrument	of	their	own	liberation.”170	Though	Mallory	would	continue	fighting	extradition	throughout	that	year,	it	was	clear	to	her	and	many	other	radical	Black	leaders	that	the	physical	and	legal	fights	she	and	the	Monroe	defendants	had	waged	for	nearly	two	years	had	helped	to	galvanize	the	radical	liberation	movement	in	Harlem	and	throughout	the	nation	by	1963.		
The	New	Afro-American	Nationalism	in	Theory	and	Praxis	While	Mallory,	Williams,	and	the	Monroe	defendants	continued	their	struggles	in	the	courts	and	in	the	streets,	the	ideological	and	organizational	debates																																																									168	“Welcome	home,	Adam,”	Liberator	3,	no.	5	(May	1963),	2.		 169	Ibid.		 170	John	Henrik	Clarke,	“The	New	Afro-American	Nationalism,”	295.	
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that	swirled	around	their	activism	and	defense	were	taken	up	in	leftist	and	nationalist	journals.	In	Clarke’s	Freedomways	article,	he	argued	that	the	new	wave	of	Black	nationalism	that	Mallory	and	her	network	of	radical	activists	in	Harlem	embodied	represented	a	proletarian	“revolutionary	force”	in	the	United	States.	Characterized	by	a	collective	identification	with	Pan-African	anticolonial	liberation	struggles,	an	appreciation	of	cultural	heritage,	and	a	rejection	of	bourgeois	leadership	and	integration	as	a	panacea,	the	“New	Afro-American	Nationalism”	was	also	based	upon	the	foundational	analysis	that	African	Americans	represented	an	internal	colony	of	the	United	States.		In	an	era	where	revolutionary	nationalist	movements	were	throwing	off	the	chains	of	European	colonialism	and	re-mapping	the	globe,	Black	leftist	and	nationalist	critic	Harold	Cruse	noted,	it	was	only	logical	that	an	analysis	of	domestic	colonialism	would	spur	African	American	nationalist	mobilization.	In	Cruse’s	analysis,	however,	the	self-defense	movements	waged	by	Williams	specifically,	and	Mallory	by	association,	did	not	constitute	a	veritable	nationalist	or	revolutionary	struggle.	Rather,	he	argued	in	a	1962	article	in	Studies	on	the	Left,	Williams	personified	a	third	trend	between	proletarian	Black	nationalism	and	bourgeois	integrationism—a	“rebel”	who	had	been	forced	to	disavow	the	NAACP	over	differences	in	approach	rather	than	objectives.171	Williams	had	only	adopted	armed	self-defense	as	a	tactic	to	achieve	equality	through	integration,	Cruse	maintained,	but	the	militancy	of	the	tactic	had	been	popularly	mistaken	for	a	“revolutionary”	
																																																								171	Harold	Cruse,	Rebellion	or	Revolution	(New	York:	William	Morrow	&	Company,	Inc.,	1968).	
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struggle	despite	Williams’	own	insistence	at	that	time	that	he	was	not	a	“Black	Nationalist,”	but	rather	an	“Inter	Nationalist”	concerned	with	fighting	for	the	liberation	of	oppressed	people	throughout	the	world.172	Nonetheless,	Cruse	took	it	upon	himself	to	ensure	that	would-be	revolutionaries	would	not	mistake	Williams’s	iconic	struggle	for	something	it	was	not,	and	thus	set	unrealistic	expectations	for	activism	based	upon	a	false	premise.		While	aspects	of	Cruse’s	critiques	of	Williams	read	as	scornful	or	dismissive	of	the	profound	impacts	of	his	struggle	upon	the	broader	Black	Freedom	Struggle,	his	analysis	did	raise	vital	questions	about	the	relationship	between	revolutionary	theory,	program,	and	action	in	movements	for	African	American	liberation	and	societal	transformation.	In	a	1963	article	in	Liberator,	Cruse	described	the	Monroe	movement	as	an	example	of	a	local	“rebellion”	against	“the	American	racial	status	quo”	and	argued	“a	rebellion	is	not	a	revolutionary	movement	unless	it	changes	the	structural	arrangements	of	the	society	or	else	is	able	to	project	programmatic	ideas	toward	that	end.”	Cruse	rejected	the	possibility,	or	even	the	value,	of	African	American	communities	becoming	fully	integrated	into	the	social,	economic,	political,	and	cultural	institutions	of	the	United	States,	and	thus	deemed	the	programmatic	ideas	of	the	moderate,	mainstream	civil	rights	organizations	like	the	NAACP,	SCLC,	Urban	League,	and	CORE	insufficient	for	achieving	Black	equality	and	liberation.	While	dismissing	the	integrationist	programs	of	these	organizations,	Cruse	also	argued	that	sound	theoretical	analysis	and	“programmatic	ideas”	were	crucially	absent	within	the	praxis	of	more	militant	organizations,	and	in	their	absence,																																																									172	Robert	F.	Williams,	Negroes	With	Guns,	119-120.	
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“neither	arms	nor	demonstrations	nor	protest	marches	mean	very	much.”173	In	other	words,	a	social	revolution	was	required	for	African	Americans	to	truly	achieve	liberation	and	self-determination,	and	this	could	only	be	achieved	by	seizing	control	of	the	levers	of	economic,	political,	and	cultural	power	in	society.	And	to	Cruse,	the	more	militant	factions	of	the	Black	Freedom	Struggle	had	no	comprehensive	program	for	gaining	control	or	influence	over	these	power	structures	and	therefore	could	not	succeed	in	bringing	a	social	revolution	to	pass.	Though	arguably	patronizing,	these	critiques	that	Cruse	posited	in	his	essays	offer	a	useful	framework	for	analyzing	the	radical	thought	and	praxis	of	Mae	Mallory	and	the	“New	Afro-American	Nationalists”	in	New	York	City	in	the	early	1960s.	On	the	one	hand,	Cruse’s	critique	has	merit	in	that	Mallory	seemingly	lacked	a	comprehensive	program	for	translating	her	analyses	of	institutional	racism,	economic	inequality,	gender	discrimination,	nationalism,	self-determination,	and	armed	self-defense	into	organized	action	for	fundamental	societal	transformation	and	Black	liberation.	In	her	writings,	Mallory	frequently	pointed	to	the	potential	for	armed	self-defense	to	inspire	the	masses	and	provide	the	basis	for	organized	struggle.	However,	the	records	of	her	correspondence	and	organizational	activities	during	this	period	do	not	indicate	that	Mallory	had	developed	an	analysis	of	how	self-defense	would	programmatically	achieve	economic,	social,	and	political	self-determination	for	Black	communities.		
																																																								173	Harold	Cruse,	“Rebellion	or	Revolution?	(1	of	3),”	Liberator	3,	no.	10	(October	1963),	20.	
		255	
A	letter	Mallory	wrote	to	Lorraine	Hansberry	in	June	1963	is	indicative	of	her	general	analysis	on	self-defense	that	she	expressed	in	correspondence	to	various	individuals	involved	in	the	Black	Freedom	Struggle:		There	is	a	very	important	principle	involved	here;	one	that	must	be	resolved.	The	whole	question	of	self-defense.	Passive	resistance	may	work	for	peripheral	things	such	as	the	right	to	eat	at	a	lunch	counter,	the	right	to	use	comfort	stations	and	waiting	rooms	on	a	non-segregated	basis.	Passive	resistance	has	helped	to	show	the	need	for	more	militant	action.	No	people	under	the	sun	ever	won	complete	liberation	by	completely	passive	means.174		Mallory	went	on	to	describe	the	limitation	of	“passive	resistance”	for	adequately	confronting	the	growing	economic	crises	for	African	Americans	amidst	rampant	automation,	employment	discrimination,	and	cuts	to	welfare.	While	pointing	to	the	need	for	“more	militant	action”	and	a	more	expansive	arsenal	of	tactics	to	achieve	economic,	political,	and	social	equality,	however,	Mallory	did	not	explain	in	this	or	other	letters	how	the	“question	of	self-defense”	could	be	utilized	to	reach	these	ends	aside	from	protecting	communities	who	faced	racial	terrorism	in	their	struggles	for	such.175				On	the	other	hand,	that	Mallory	may	not	have	had	a	comprehensive	program	for	utilizing	armed	self-defense	for	achieving	Black	liberation	and	self-determination	should	not	discount	its	immediate	necessities	and	tangible	contributions.	To	criticize	Williams,	and	Mallory	by	association,	for	not	developing	a	
																																																								174	Letter	from	Mae	Mallory	to	Lorraine	Hansberry,	June	1,	1963,	Box	1,	Folder	2,	Mallory	Papers.		 175	Though	in	other	correspondence	she	expressed	her	support	for	armed	revolutionary	struggles	in	Africa,	there	is	no	evidence	to	suggest	that	Mallory	advocated	a	similar	approach	in	the	United	States	during	this	time.	Letter	from	Mae	Mallory	to	Richard	Gibson,	August	24,	1963,	Box	1,	Folder	2,	Mallory	Papers.	
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revolutionary	analysis	while	using	armed	self-defense	to	protect	the	livelihoods	of	Black	communities	fighting	for	equality	is	to	ignore	the	realities	of	life	under	a	violently	oppressive	society	and	devalue	bold	action	to	meet	immediate	needs.	Furthermore,	by	lumping	the	range	of	personalities	involved	with	the	“Monroe	Movement”	into	a	singular	category,	Cruse	ignored	the	variations	in	analyses	that	those	involved	in,	or	inspired	by,	the	struggle	in	Monroe	had	developed.	Mallory,	specifically,	had	put	forth	critical	analyses	of	the	institutional	intersections	of	racial	oppression	through	economic	exploitation,	gender	discrimination,	and	political	disenfranchisement.	Additionally,	through	her	organizing	experiences	in	New	York,	she	had	advocated	for	Black	self-determination	within	movements	and	in	society	writ	large,	while	also	supporting	Black	political	parties	and	pondering	the	formation	of	a	Black	state.	These	types	of	analyses,	rooted	in	prior	nationalist	and	leftist	struggles	in	New	York,	re-emerged	within	the	public	lexicon	in	Harlem	and	the	nation	through	the	organizational	networks	that	Mallory	occupied	and	shaped.		So	while	Cruse’s	critique	of	Williams	as	a	glorified	integrationist	may	have	had	merit	for	signaling	the	need	for	critical	analysis	of	liberation	struggles	to	advance	more	revolutionary	theories	and	actions,	it	devalued	not	only	the	vital	contributions	that	the	Williams’,	Mallory,	and	the	Monroe	defendants	made	to	protecting	Black	life,	but	also	the	formative	influences	that	their	struggles	had	upon	the	development	of	more	militant	and	revolutionary	analyses	and	praxis	at	the	grassroots.				Emerging	within	the	context	of	an	increasingly	radical	political	milieu	charged	by	the	Cuban	Revolution,	the	demonstrations	at	the	UN,	and	escalating	local	
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and	national	struggles	for	human	rights	and	self-determination,	the	MDC	and	CAMD	effectively	parlayed	Mallory’s	national	persecution	into	a	public	referendum	on	armed	struggle,	state	violence,	Black	nationalism,	and	political	empowerment	in	Harlem	and	beyond.	Through	street	rallies,	mass	meetings,	public	forums,	and	Black	media	outlets,	these	organizations	brought	local	people	into	the	dynamic	conversations	and	organized	actions	that	were	shaping	national	struggles	for	Black	liberation.	This	type	of	grassroots	outreach	and	organizing	was	an	imperative	for	many	organizers,	including	Rosa	Guy,	who	saw	“untapped”	revolutionary	potential	within	the	Black	communities	of	Harlem.	In	Guy’s	analysis,	the	militant	spirit	embodied	in	the	Monroe	movement	had	inspired	local	people	to	push	local	and	national	freedom	struggles	in	more	assertive	and	radical	directions.	“Certainly,”	she	wrote	to	Robert	Williams	in	1963,	“the	militant	but	limited	stance	the	leaders	are	now	taking	is	because	of	the	millions	of	Robert	Williamses	behind	them.”176		In	addition	to	mobilizing	local	people	to	embrace	and	act	upon	militant	demands	for	economic,	political,	and	social	justice,	the	organized	struggle	to	free	Mae	Mallory	and	vindicate	Williams	also	“fostered	relationships	between	older	and	younger	black	radicals,”	as	Ashley	D.	Farmer	notes,	“and	introduced	them	to	the	nationalist	aspects	of	the	black	freedom	struggle.”	These	“younger	black	radicals”	that	Farmer	describes	included	Donald	Freeman,	who	established	working	coalitions	with	CORE,	the	MDC,	and	the	Nation	of	Islam	through	his	organizing	to	support	Mallory	with	the	Afro-American	Institute	in	Cleveland,	and	Max	Stanford	(Muhammad	Ahmad),	who	met	his	future	mentor,	Queen	Mother	Audley	Moore,	at	a																																																									176	Letter	from	Rosa	Guy	to	Robert	F.	Williams,	July	4,	1963,	Williams	Papers.	
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“Free	Mae	Mallory	Meeting”	in	her	home	in	Philadelphia.177	Stanford	was	introduced	to	Queen	Mother	Moore	through	another	mentor	in	Philadelphia,	Ethel	Azalea	Johnson,	a	comrade	of	Robert	and	Mabel	Williams	and	a	confidante	of	Mae	Mallory.178		Mallory,	however,	was	not	merely	an	inspiration	or	coincidental	connection	for	the	budding	revolutionaries.	When	Stanford	and	Stan	Daniels	were	beaten	and	arrested	at	a	protest	against	economic	discrimination	at	a	Philadelphia	construction	site	in	the	summer	of	1963,	Mallory	wrote	to	Johnson	offering	guidance,	legal	advice,	and	strategies	for	coordinating	the	pair’s	defense.179	As	Mallory’s	political	development	had	been	shaped	by	older	generations	of	leftist	and	nationalist	thinkers	and	organizers	in	New	York	City,	it	was	clear	by	the	summer	of	1963	that	her	own	brand	of	grassroots	militancy	was	now	inspiring	and	influencing	the	evolution	of	freedom	struggles	across	the	country.		
Ronald	Stokes	and	Malcolm	X’s	Political	Thought	in	Transition,	1962-1963	Though	his	affiliation	with	the	Nation	of	Islam	continued	to	constrict	his	involvement	with	the	types	of	direct	political	action	that	Mae	Mallory	had	engaged	in	during	these	years,	Malcolm	X	was	very	much	in	the	thick	of	the	radical	networks	that	Mallory	was	involved	with.	By	this	time,	Malcolm	had	established	close	
																																																								177	Ashley	D.	Farmer,	Remaking	Black	Power:	How	Black	Women	Transformed	
an	Era	(Chapel	Hill:	University	of	North	Carolina	Press,	2017),	48;	Donald	Freeman,	“The	Cleveland	Story,”	Liberator	3,	no.	6	(June	1963),	7-8.		 178	Williams,	Concrete	Demands,	80-81.		 179	Letter	from	Mae	Mallory	to	Ethel	Azalea	Johnson,	June	9,	1963,	Box	1,	Folder	2,	Mallory	Papers.	
		259	
personal	relationships	with	many	of	the	most	influential	leftist	and	nationalist	activists	and	intellectuals	in	Harlem,	many	of	whom	had	played	active	roles	in	the	defense	of	Mallory	and	Williams.	Whether	on	stages	at	Harlem	Square,	in	television	studios,	or	in	private	meetings,	Malcolm	made	frequent	contact	with	a	cross-section	of	political	thought	in	New	York	City,	including	such	notable	figures	such	as	Max	Roach,	Abbey	Lincoln,	William	Worthy,	Percy	Sutton,	Anna	Arnold	Hedgeman,	Adam	Clayton	Powell,	Jr.,	Vicki	Garvin,	Hope	Stevens,	Eloise	Moore,	John	Henrik	Clarke,	Sylvester	Leaks,	Bayard	Rustin,	and	James	Baldwin.	Through	these	relationships	and	many	others,	Malcolm	forged	and	sharpened	his	political	analysis	as	he	inched	toward	an	embrace	of	secular	Black	nationalism	and	revolutionary	internationalism.	Though	the	theological	nationalism	and	program	of	the	NOI	had	empowered	Malcolm	to	transform	his	life	and	connected	him	with	the	Garveyite	roots	of	his	childhood,	as	Sales	notes,	“by	1962	they	also	represented	the	major	barriers”	to	his	“intellectual	and	activist	development.”180	It	was	through	this	network	of	activists	and	intellectuals	he	had	cultivated	in	Harlem,	however,	that	Malcolm	was	able	to	continue	his	development	in	the	early	1960s,	in	spite	of	the	restrictions	imposed	by	the	NOI.		 While	the	impacts	of	Malcolm’s	prodigious	oratory	and	organizing	skills	upon	the	trajectory	of	local	and	national	freedom	struggles	have	received	a	substantial	amount	of	scholarly	analysis,	less	attention	has	been	given	to	the	influence	that	Harlem	activists,	intellectuals,	and	local	people	had	upon	the	evolution	of	Malcolm’s	political	thought.	Notably	absent	in	many	narratives	of	Malcolm’s	political	evolution																																																									180	Sales,	From	Civil	Rights	to	Black	Liberation,	60-61.	
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are	the	significant	roles	that	Black	women	played	in	shaping	his	radical	consciousness	and	praxis.	With	deep	roots	in	Harlem’s	Left	and	nationalist	movements	during	the	Great	Depression	and	post-war	eras,	as	Eric	S.	McDuffie	and	Komozi	Woodard	note,	Queen	Mother	Moore	and	Vicki	Garvin	had	significant	influences	on	the	radical	political	milieu	that	Malcolm	would	enter	upon	his	return	to	Harlem	in	1954.		A	Pan-Africanist	and	former	Garveyite	like	Malcolm’s	parents,	Moore	had	established	herself	as	a	legendary	street	corner	speaker	during	the	Depression	in	Harlem	and	was	active	in	tenant	organizing	and	anti-eviction	campaigns.	Garvin	had	migrated	north	to	Harlem	during	the	Depression,	where	she	was	a	pillar	in	the	formative	Boycott	Movement	and	People’s	Committee	that	launched	Adam	Clayton	Powell,	Jr.	into	local	and	national	political	power.	By	the	1950s,	Garvin	was	continuing	the	grassroots	organizing	methods	that	she	had	helped	to	cultivate	in	Harlem	throughout	the	North	and	West	through	the	National	Negro	Labor	Council.181	In	fact,	Garvin	had	attempted	to	recruit	Malcolm	Little	into	the	Communist	Party	in	the	1940s	during	his	days	as	a	hustler	in	Harlem.	As	Malcolm	was	beginning	to	make	a	name	for	himself	with	the	Nation	of	Islam	in	the	early	1950s,	Moore	spread	the	word	about	his	budding	potential	to	her	network	of	revolutionary	nationalists,	including	Cyril	Briggs	and	Harry	Haywood.182	Through	
																																																								181	Eric	S.	McDuffie	and	Komozi	Woodard,	“If	You’re	In	A	Country	That’s	Progressive,	The	Woman	Is	Progressive,”	Biography	36,	no.	3	(Summer	2013),	514-519.	 	182	Ibid,	507-516.	
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their	maintained	contact	with	Malcolm,	these	radical	Black	women	were	“forging	his	approach	to	community	organizing	in	Harlem	during	the	1950s	and	early	1960s.”183			 Although	both	Moore	and	Garvin	had	left	Harlem	by	the	turn	of	the	decade,	they	had	laid	the	groundwork	for	a	network	of	radical	intellectuals,	including	Eloise	Moore	and	John	Henrik	Clarke,	who	would	serve	as	Malcolm’s	informal	secular	advisors	in	the	early	1960s.	“I	became	a	part	of	a	shadow	cabinet	that	Malcolm	had,”	Clarke	later	said.	“I	was	the	man	in	history	and	historical	information,	and	historical	personalities.	There	were	other	people	on	politics,	another	person	occasionally	on	sociology,	the	diversity	of	people	in	this	shadow	cabinet,	none	of	them	Muslims,	was	equivalent	to	the	faculty	of	a	good	university.”184	Although	Clarke	was	cautious	in	withholding	names	for	fear	of	misrepresentation	of	the	nature	of	these	advisors,	Queen	Mother	Moore’s	younger	sister	Eloise	occupied	one	of	these	roles.		Before	her	death	in	1963,	Eloise	Moore	played	a	formative	role	in	shaping	Malcolm’s	budding	Pan-Africanist	consciousness.	While	Elijah	Muhammad’s	insistence	on	the	Asiatic	origins	of	Black	Americans	and	condescending	views	toward	Africans	had	hamstrung	Malcolm’s	outward	embrace	of	Pan-African	thought	in	the	1950s,	the	elder	Moore	later	explained	in	multiple	interviews	that	her	younger	sister	had	fueled	Malcolm’s	international	perspective	by	the	end	of	the	decade.185	“Eloise	taught	Malcolm	about	Africa,”	Moore	recalled,	“and	I	can	tell	you	
																																																								183	Ibid,	514.		184	Interview	with	John	Henrik	Clarke,	June	30,	1992,	Henry	Hampton	Collection,	Washington	University	Libraries.		
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that	when	I	wanted	to	talk	to	Malcolm	about	Africa,	he	couldn’t	mention	the	word.”	According	to	Audley	Moore,	she	made	the	trip	to	Chicago	to	confront	Elijah	Muhammad	about	his	disavowal	of	the	African	heritage	of	Black	Americans,	but	was	unsuccessful	in	changing	his	perspective	after	three	days	of	debate	in	his	home.	“We	had	to	teach	Malcolm,	you	hear,	and	that’s	how	he	was	able	to	get	a	new	insight,	put	that	to	work.”186		Though	this	type	of	intellectual	prowess	that	grassroots	intellectuals	like	Audley	and	Eloise	Moore	and	John	Henrik	Clarke	brought	to	Malcolm’s	“shadow	cabinet”	profoundly	influenced	his	political	development	in	the	early	1960s,	Malcolm	alone	was	responsible	for	distilling	their	guidance	into	his	own	analysis	and	action.	“None	of	us	ever	told	Malcolm	what	to	say,”	Clarke	insisted,	“he	asked	for	correct	information	on	the	subject	and	he	did	his	own	interpretation.”187	Nevertheless,	the	influence	of	Malcolm’s	secular	advisors	point	to	the	profound	impacts	that	Harlem’s	radical	grassroots	political	milieu	had	upon	the	political	consciousness	and	praxis	of	a	leader	who	was	fundamentally	shaping	the	course	of	local,	national,	and	global	freedom	struggles	in	the	early	1960s.	
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		263	
	 By	early	1962,	it	was	becoming	increasingly	evident	that	Malcolm	X	was	identifying	more	with	the	expansive	secular	nationalist	ideologies	that	his	cabinet	espoused	than	the	Nation	of	Islam’s	narrow	theology.	According	to	Manning	Marable,	the	sermons	and	lectures	that	Malcolm	delivered	in	early	1962	“rarely	mentioned	the	core	values	of	the	Nation’s	theology.”188	As	the	naked	brutality	against	sit-ins,	Freedom	Rides,	and	voter	registration	campaigns	in	the	South	captivated	northern	audiences,	Malcolm	was	regularly	pressed	by	reporters	and	college	students	to	give	his	positions	on	these	campaigns	and	the	broader	Civil	Rights	Movement.	When	northern	Freedom	Riders	journeyed	into	the	South	in	the	spring	of	1961,	for	instance,	Malcolm	X	denounced	the	notion	of	activists	taking	up	the	problems	of	the	South	when	trouble	abounded	in	northern	ghettoes.	Reflecting	on	his	statements	to	reporters	at	the	time,	Malcolm	X	told	Alex	Haley	“if	the	Northern	Freedom	Riders	wanted	more	to	do,”	they	could	stay	in	their	communities	and	“light	some	fires	under	Northern	city	halls,	unions,	and	major	industries	to	give	more	jobs	to	Negroes.”189		This	type	of	political	commentary	that	was	occupying	greater	space	in	Malcolm’s	public	life	drew	reproach	from	Elijah	Muhammad,	who	wrote	to	Malcolm	in	February	1962	instructing	him	to	abstain	from	delving	into	political	analysis,	including	any	discussions	of	the	Nation’s	position	on	the	“nation	question”	which	had	been	the	crux	of	many	of	his	speeches	throughout	the	previous	year.190	With	the	
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pace	of	local	and	national	freedom	struggles	seeming	to	accelerate	by	the	day,	Elijah	Muhammad’s	move	to	re-assert	control	as	the	sole	Messenger	of	Allah	and	the	Nation	of	Islam	fostered	a	nascent	frustration	within	Malcolm	X	over	the	NOI’s	policy	of	political	non-engagement.				Despite	the	restrictions	placed	upon	him	by	Elijah	Muhammad,	Malcolm	X	continued	to	engage	in	critical	dialogue	about	Black	liberation	through	his	classes	at	Mosque	No.	7	and	in	public	appearances.	The	curriculum	that	Malcolm	developed	for	his	grueling	weekly	public	speaking	class,	according	to	NOI	member	Benjamin	Karim	(Benjamin	2X	Goodman),	was	grounded	in	“geography,	current	events…American	history,	the	history	of	colonialism.”191	Aspiring	ministers	were	assigned	readings	from	local,	national,	and	global	newspapers	to	promote	an	expansive	worldview	and	foster	the	skills	of	critical	inquiry	and	analysis	that	were	central	to	Malcolm’s	own	development	and	effectiveness	as	an	intellectual	and	organizer.		That	spring,	Malcolm	X	also	debated	the	merits	of	integration	with	James	Farmer	at	Cornell	and	shared	a	pulpit	with	Adam	Clayton	Powell,	Jr.	at	his	Abyssinian	Baptist	Church	in	Harlem.	Speaking	to	the	congregation	of	2,000	packed	inside	Abyssinian,	Malcolm	characteristically	cast	doubt	upon	the	viability	of	integration	while	also	defending	the	Nation	of	Islam	against	charges	of	not	backing	up	their	militant	rhetoric	with	concrete	action.	“Just	because	a	man	doesn’t	throw	a	
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punch	doesn’t	mean	he	can’t	do	so	whenever	he	gets	ready,”	Malcolm	warned,	“so	don’t	play	the	Muslims	and	the	nationalists	cheap.”192		Though	Malcolm	toed	the	line	for	the	Nation	in	public,	he	privately	sympathized	with	the	premise	of	this	kind	of	criticism	that	was	swirling	within	Black	communities	by	1962.	“Privately	I	was	convinced	that	our	Nation	of	Islam	could	be	an	even	greater	force	in	the	American	black	man’s	overall	struggle—if	we	engaged	in	more	action,”	Malcolm	later	confessed.	Malcolm	privately	predicted	that	if	the	Nation	did	not	relax	their	non-engagement	policy	and	actively	participate	in	the	national	liberation	movement,	the	Nation	would	find	itself	“one	day	suddenly	separated	from	the	Negroes’	front-line	struggle.”193	Malcolm’s	concerns	would	prove	to	be	prophetic.	Just	weeks	after	he	had	defended	the	Nation	against	charges	of	inaction	in	the	face	of	injustice,	the	brutal	murder	of	NOI	member	Ronald	Stokes	by	the	Los	Angeles	Police	Department	threw	down	a	formative	challenge	for	the	Nation	to	back	up	its	militant	rhetoric	of	self-defense	with	action.			Shortly	after	midnight	on	April	27,	1962,	NOI	member	Ronald	Stokes	was	killed	by	the	LAPD	after	two	officers	provoked	a	confrontation	with	a	group	of	Muslims	outside	Mosque	No.	27.	Over	seventy	officers	arrived	at	the	scene,	indiscriminately	beating	and	opening	fire	upon	members	of	the	Mosque	that	Malcolm	himself	had	organized	in	1957.	In	the	aftermath	of	the	police	siege	of	the	temple,	dozens	were	injured	and	seven	men	were	shot,	leaving	one	paralyzed	and	
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one	dead.194	Ronald	Stokes,	the	Mosque’s	secretary	and	Korean	War	veteran	who	had	grown	up	only	a	few	blocks	from	Malcolm’s	sister	Ella	Collins	in	Boston,	had	been	unarmed	and	in	the	process	of	surrendering	when	an	officer	shot	him	in	the	back	while	his	arms	were	raised	above	his	head.195		The	brutal	killing	sent	shockwaves	through	the	Nation	of	Islam	and	Black	communities	across	the	country	waited	with	bated	breath	to	see	how	the	Muslims,	for	all	of	their	fiery	rhetoric,	would	respond.	“Malcolm	was	furious,”	recalled	photographer	Gordon	Parks,	who	Malcolm	X	had	urged	to	meet	him	in	LA	immediately	after	the	shooting.	“I	expected	that	particular	moment	something	really	explosive	to	take	over.”196	Parks	remembered	an	anxious	Malcolm	in	Los	Angeles,	pacing,	shaking	his	head,	and	repeating,	“they’re	gonna	pay	for	it,	they’re	gonna	pay	for	it.”	Already	cognizant	by	this	time	of	the	murmurs	within	Black	communities	that	the	Nation	of	Islam	was	a	paper	tiger,	Malcolm	X	was	preparing	for	a	direct	confrontation	with	the	LAPD.	However,	a	pit	stop	to	the	Messenger’s	Phoenix	home	en	route	back	to	the	east	coast	once	again	stifled	any	designs	Malcolm	had	for	organized	political	action.	Muhammad	ordered	his	minister	to	stand	down,	instead	blaming	Stokes’	death	on	Malcolm’s	lack	of	faith	and	even	Stokes’	own	cowardice	in	surrendering.197		
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Malcolm	X	was	fuming	when	he	returned	to	New	York	City	for	a	public	forum	hosted	by	the	Socialist	Workers	Party	on	May	1st.	Joining	Malcolm	X	in	the	event	to	raise	funds	for	the	Monroe	Defendants	were	William	Worthy	and	James	Farmer.	As	the	last	speaker	to	address	the	packed	meeting	hall,	Malcolm	X	pulled	no	punches	in	his	excoriation	of	the	white	supremacist	society	that	had	stolen	the	life	of	his	friend.	Making	frequent	comparisons	between	the	LAPD	and	the	Gestapo	forces	of	Nazi	Germany,	Malcolm	described	what	had	happened	in	Los	Angeles	as	“one	of	the	worse	crimes,	one	of	the	most	inhuman	acts	of	atrocity	that	have	ever	been	committed	in	a…so-called	civilized	society.”	To	Malcolm,	the	murder	of	Stokes	was	the	type	of	damning	evidence	of	a	morally	bankrupt	society	that	made	the	Nation’s	position	against	integration	not	merely	justifiable,	but	imperative	for	Black	survival.	“I’d	rather	be	dead,”	Malcolm	declared,	“than	integrate	into	a	society	like	this.”198		Furthermore,	as	the	abuses	of	Black	women	in	Monroe	had	for	Robert	Williams,	the	murder	of	Ronald	Stokes	solidified	for	Malcolm	the	necessity	of	Black	Americans	to	defend	themselves	against	the	violence	of	white	supremacy	by	any	means	necessary.	“In	America	when	a	Black	man	resists	letting	a	white	man	put	a	rope	around	his	neck,	the	Black	man	is	accused	of	violence,”	Malcolm	explained.	“In	America	when	a	Black	man	says,	‘I	have	to	defend	myself,’	you	should	call	that	what	it	is,	self-defense.	And	if	America	has	the	right	to	defend	herself	from	her	enemies,	the	Black	man	in	America	has	a	right	to	defend	himself	from	his	enemies.”	Citing	the	armed	anti-colonial	revolutionary	struggles	waged	in	Angola,	Algeria,	and	the	
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Congo,	Malcolm	X	argued	that	as	a	colonized	people,	Black	Americans	had	the	right	to	“defend	ourselves	from	the	atrocities	that	these	white	American	colonialists	have	been	inflicting	against	us.”	To	Malcolm,	Black	Americans	had	been	colonized	by	a	people	that	had	“perfected	the	art	of	hypocrisy	to	such	high	degree	they’ll	stand	up	and	make	themselves	look	like	angels	in	disguise	when	they’ve	got	blood	of	black	people	dripping	from	their	mouths	and	dripping	from	their	fingers.”	This	rampant	hypocrisy	practiced	by	explicit	white	supremacists	and	liberals	alike	was	the	fundamental	basis	for	Malcolm’s	argument	against	integration,	which	he	concluded	his	fifteen-minute	address	with.	“We	believe,	that	as	you	sow,	so	shall	you	reap.	And	if	you’re	going	to	reap	what	you	have	sown,	then	we	don’t	want	to	integrate	with	you.”199	Though	he	had	not	called	for	Black	communities	to	take	any	specific	direct	action,	thereby	abiding	by	Muhammad’s	edict,	it	was	clear	that	his	patience	with	the	Messenger’s	inaction	and	restrictions	had	nearly	worn	out.		As	the	murmurs	about	the	Nation	steadily	turned	to	roars	following	the	Stokes’	murder,	it	quickly	became	evident	that	Malcolm	was	hardly	alone	in	his	disillusionment	with	Muhammad’s	non-engagement	policies.	Though	their	action	in	defense	of	Johnson	X	had	endeared	the	NOI	to	the	Black	masses	in	Harlem,	many	had	grown	impatient	with	their	rhetoric	that	now	appeared	toothless.	Dan	Watts	captured	this	collective	mood	in	an	editorial	in	the	May	1962	volume	of	Liberator,	in	which	he	challenged	Malcolm	X	to	“reconcile	his	militant	talk	with	the	non-militant	action	of	his	followers.”	While	Watts	expressed	his	support	for	the	minister’s	truth-telling	about	the	“savagery	and	uncivilized	nature	of	the	white	man,”	he	noted	that																																																									199	Ibid.	
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members	and	supporters	of	the	Nation	of	Islam	needed	“more	substantial	weapons	than	the	truth	of	Allah”	to	defend	themselves	against	the	police	and	other	white	supremacist	forces.200	This	frustration	with	the	Nation’s	inaction	was	not	limited	to	those	outside	the	religion,	as	many	within	the	NOI	used	Muhammad’s	refusal	to	act	upon	Stokes’	murder	as	a	critique	of	his	broader	policy	of	non-involvement.	“A	lot	of	us	sort	of	became	dissatisfied	because…we	weren’t	doing	anything	to	help	our	people	who	were	being	brutalized	by	the	whites	and	the	police	during	the	Civil	Rights	Movement,”	Benjamin	Karim	recalled.	One	of	Malcolm	X’s	most	trusted	assistant	ministers	at	Mosque	No.	7,	Karim	said	that	he	and	others—Malcolm	X	particularly—felt	that	they	“should	have	gotten	involved…we	should	have	been	able	to	retaliate	or	train	those	people	to	retaliate.”201	Though	Malcolm	remained	silent	in	his	welling	frustration	with	the	Nation’s	continued	inaction	after	Stokes’	death,	this	moment	proved	a	watershed	in	his	relationship	with	Elijah	Muhammad.		As	both	Marable	and	Sales	note,	this	contestation	that	arose	between	Malcolm	and	Muhammad	over	the	Nation’s	response	to	Stokes’	death	marked	the	emergence	of	a	new	period	in	Malcolm’s	political	development	that	would	culminate	in	his	departure	from	the	Nation	two	years	later.	This	period,	Sales	argues,	was	characterized	by	Malcolm’s	efforts	at	defining	his	ideology	of	Black	nationalism	through	an	“extraction	of	the	secular	Black	nationalist	core	of	Muslim	ideology	from	
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its	religious	form.”202	In	addition	to	redefining	his	political	analysis	intellectually,	Malcolm	X	was	also	taking	steps	toward	redefining	his	role	in	struggles	for	rights	and	power	in	Harlem.	Although	he	had	ceded	to	Elijah	Muhammad’s	command	that	he	take	no	part	in	organized	protest	activity	in	Los	Angeles,	he	began	to	take	greater	political	liberties	in	Harlem	by	the	year’s	end.		As	his	renewed	calls	for	a	Black	united	front	in	the	wake	of	the	Stokes	murder	illustrated,	Malcolm	increasingly	saw	himself	and	the	Nation	of	Islam	as	a	fundamental	part	of	the	national	Black	Freedom	Struggle.	In	fact,	after	another	nearly	explosive	confrontation	between	the	NYPD	and	the	Black	community	in	Harlem	the	previous	summer,	Malcolm	had	joined	a	group	of	civil	rights,	religious,	and	labor	leaders	as	part	of	a	committee	to	combat	the	symptoms	of	institutional	racism	in	Harlem.203	As	part	of	the	Emergency	Committee	for	Unity	on	Social	and	Economic	Problems,	which	included	the	likes	of	A.	Philip	Randolph,	L.	Joseph	Overton,	Anna	Arnold	Hedgeman,	and	Percy	Sutton,	Malcolm	X	cooperated	with	moderate	leaders	to	demand	a	broad	platform	of	policy	initiatives	to	rectify	racial	inequality	in	employment,	housing,	education,	and	policing.204	In	the	months	
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following	the	Stokes	murder,	Malcolm	drew	upon	these	connections	to	call	for	greater	protest	and	political	activity	in	Harlem.	At	a	July	rally	convened	by	Mosque	No.	7	in	Harlem	Square,	Malcolm	X	shared	the	stage	with	Cleveland	Robinson	(Negro	American	Labor	Council),	Bayard	Rustin,	Eddie	“Porkchop”	Davis,	and	Anna	Arnold	Hedgeman,	demonstrating	this	nascent	cooperation	between	Malcolm	X	and	mainstream	leaders	in	the	service	of	building	a	Black	united	front.205		One	of	the	primary	targets	of	Malcolm’s	rhetoric	at	rallies	throughout	that	year	was	the	NYPD,	who	had	stepped	up	its	harassment	of	the	Nation	that	summer	amidst	a	broader	crackdown	on	nationalist	organizations	and	activities.	After	the	“near	riots”	in	the	summer	of	1961,	the	NYPD	had	flooded	Harlem	with	members	of	its	paramilitary	Tactical	Patrol	Force	and	announced	new	regulations	on	nationalist	street	rallies,	including	a	curfew.206	The	following	summer,	officers	began	harassing	members	of	the	Nation	while	selling	Muhammad	Speaks	with	greater	frequency,	leading	Malcolm	to	predict	that	“the	time	will	come	when	the	Muslims	will	not	be	
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able	to	leave	their	homes.”207	By	the	end	of	the	year,	this	surveillance	and	harassment	had	progressed	to	such	a	degree	that	Malcolm	made	his	first	foray	into	civil	disobedience,	demonstrating	his	budding	embrace	of	direct	action	in	open	defiance	of	Elijah	Muhammad.		On	Christmas	Day,	two	Muslim	men	were	arrested	at	gunpoint	at	42nd	Street	for	allegedly	blocking	a	subway	entrance	while	selling	copies	of	Muhammad	Speaks.	When	the	men	went	to	trial	two	weeks	later,	30	members	of	the	Nation	picketed	outside	the	courthouse,	carrying	signs	that	read	“America	Is	Against	Human	Rights”	and	“We	Are	Living	In	A	Police	State.”	After	the	two	men	were	found	guilty,	the	250	Muslims	who	had	packed	the	courthouse	spilled	outside,	where	Malcolm	X	compared	New	York’s	criminal	justice	system	to	that	of	Mississippi	and	announced	“if	the	Muslims	can’t	get	justice	in	court	then	they	will	hold	court	in	the	street.”208	A	month	later,	Malcolm	made	good	on	his	promise	when	he	led	a	demonstration	in	Times	Square	to	protest	the	Christmas	Day	arrests	and	the	recent	police	siege	of	the	Rochester	Mosque	that	resulted	in	the	brutal	arrests	of	over	a	dozen	Muslims.	In	the	middle	of	rush	hour	the	evening	of	February	13th,	Malcolm	X	and	Joseph	X	(Yusef	Shah)	led	200	members	of	the	Fruit	of	Islam	as	they	marched	along	the	sidewalks	from	Times	Square	to	Rockefeller	Center	with	signs	reading	“America	Violates	the	UN	Charter	on	Human	Rights”	and	“We	Charge	Genocide.”	Joining	the	protestors	were	William	Worthy	and	Socialist	Workers	Party	leader	Fred	
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Halstead.	As	the	pickets	disrupted	the	flow	of	rush	hour	traffic,	Malcolm	and	others	distributed	leaflets	under	a	heading	that	declared	“America	has	become	a	Police-State	for	20	Million	Negroes.”	Exhorting	Black	communities	in	Harlem	and	throughout	“the	whole	Dark	World”	to	act	in	support	of	their	jailed	brothers	in	Rochester,	the	flyers	boldly	professed,	“We	will	all	go	to	jail	today	for	what	we	believe.	We	will	all	fight	for	what	we	believe.	We	will	all	die	for	what	we	believe.”	If	the	protest	was	an	act	of	nonviolent	direct	action,	the	flyers	also	made	it	explicitly	clear	that	the	demonstrators	were	prepared	to	return	any	violence	inflicted	upon	them.	“We	must	let	the	white	man	know…that	we	don’t	endorse	the	foolish	philosophy	of	‘turning	the	other	cheek’…We	demand	Justice	or	Death!!!!”209	Fortunately,	there	was	no	need	to	act	upon	these	professions,	as	BOSS	detectives	kept	a	watchful	eye	on	the	illegal	demonstration	but	did	not	intervene.		The	protest	was	uncharacteristic	of	both	the	Nation	of	Islam	and	the	Times	Square	area.	Demonstrations	were	technically	illegal	in	New	York’s	commercial	hub,	a	fact	that	was	pointed	out	to	Malcolm	the	day	prior	by	Det.	DeFossett.	The	detective’s	report	on	his	meeting	with	Malcolm	X	that	day	illustrates	Malcolm’s	intentions	to	engage	in	an	act	of	civil	disobedience—a	tactic	that	betrayed	the	Nation’s	doctrines	of	non-engagement	and	obeying	the	law.	Despite	his	clear	intentions	to	coordinate	a	mass	protest	against	police	brutality,	Malcolm	X	shielded	himself	from	accusations	of	such	with	feigned	coyness.	Referring	to	the	planned	march	as	a	“walk,”	Malcolm	explained	to	DeFossett	that	he	intended	to	merely	
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“exercise	his	rights	as	an	individual	citizen	to	walk	on	the	sidewalk	in	Times	Square.”	If	anyone	were	to	walk	in	front	or	behind	him,	Malcolm	explained,	“that	is	his	business.”	Malcolm	explained	that	this	“walk”	would	take	place	“in	the	height	of	rush	hour	when	people	are	getting	out	of	work.”	As	DeFossett	continued	to	badger	him	about	the	next	day’s	obvious	protest,	however,	Malcolm	X	eventually	conceded	the	nature	of	his	plans.	“If	we	are	going	to	get	in	trouble	for	nothing,”	he	explained	to	DeFossett,	citing	the	arrest	of	the	two	Muslims	in	Times	Square,	“we	might	as	well	get	in	trouble	for	something.”210	If	Malcolm	X	felt	constrained	by	Muhammad’s	order	to	stand	down	in	Los	Angeles	following	the	Stokes	murder,	the	Times	Square	protest	represented	an	effort	to	loosen	these	reigns.	In	his	move	toward	secular	nationalism,	Malcolm	was	beginning	to	consider	and	embrace	not	only	new	political	analyses,	but	new	tactics	as	well.	And	these	tactics,	it	must	be	noted,	proved	at	least	mildly	successful	in	achieving	immediate	and	longer-range	results.	As	Liberator	contributor	Rose	Finkenstaedt	noted	in	her	coverage	of	the	protests	the	following	month,	whereas	“anonymous	black	men	are	murdered,	beaten,	and	convicted	with	impunity	day	after	day,”	Malcolm’s	actions	had	resulted	in	dropped	charges	for	one	of	the	arrested	Muslims	and	forced	a	parlay	between	he	and	Mayor	Wagner	regarding	the	NYPD’s	suppression	of	the	Nation	of	Islam.		In	Finkenstaedt’s	estimation,	in	these	minor	victories	scored	by	Malcolm’s	use	of	direct	action	and	civil	disobedience	were	major	lessons	for	those	involved	in	the	Black	Freedom	Struggle.	“The	fact	is	that	the	Black	Muslims	are	an	indication	of																																																									210	Ibid.	
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what	can	be	done	against	another	power	structure	in	America,”	Finkenstaedt	wrote.	“For	those	of	us	who	might	want	a	little	more	from	this	rich	and	powerful	society,”	she	added,	“there	might	be	much	to	learn	from	our	brothers,	the	Muslims,	in	how	we	can	beat	the	white	man	at	his	game.”211	While	Finkenstaedt’s	appraisal	speaks	to	the	influence	of	Malcolm	and	Mosque	No.	7	on	radical	political	consciousness	in	New	York	City,	it	is	also	clear	that	Malcolm	and	the	Nation	of	Islam	had	been	learning	much	from	the	people	of	Harlem	at	the	dawn	of	the	1960s.	The	surging	militancy	of	the	Black	masses	who	demanded	action	to	achieve	rights	and	power,	along	with	the	ideological	leadership	of	grassroots	intellectuals	who	helped	shape	collective	political	analyses,	had	fundamentally	impacted	Malcolm’s	political	development	in	theory	and	praxis	by	1963.	
The	Freedom	Now	Party	and	the	Politics	of	Black	Nationalism	Though	the	Amsterdam	News	had	kept	relatively	quiet	about	this	swelling	militancy	and	nationalism	in	Harlem,	Freedomways,	Muhammad	Speaks,	and	
Liberator	dutifully	chronicled	and	analyzed	the	groundswell	of	Black	radical	politics	that	Mae	Mallory	and	Malcolm	X	represented	to	ensure	its	proliferation	at	the	grassroots.	“The	space	Liberator	created	and	the	voices	it	represented,”	Tinson	argues,	“reveal	the	critical	concern	of	everyday	citizens	for	the	political,	economic,	and	cultural	spatial	and	power	relations	remapping	the	world.”212	The	surging	
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grassroots	militancy	in	Harlem	reflected	on	the	pages	of	these	publications	was	also	forcing	more	mainstream	presses	to	focus	their	attention	uptown.		In	early	June	of	1963,	The	New	Yorker	sent	staff	reporters	to	Harlem	to	observe	and	describe	the	social,	economic,	and	political	conditions	there	for	the	magazine’s	predominantly	white,	middle-class	subscribers.	In	their	walking	tour,	the	reporters	happened	upon	a	crowd	of	800	people	gathered	at	Harlem	Square	for	a	mass	rally	sponsored	by	the	Harlem	Anti-Colonial	Committee.213	The	small	group	led	by	Bill	Jones	and	Selma	Sparks,	a	veteran	of	the	Negro	American	Labor	Council,	counted	amongst	its	few	but	distinguished	members	John	Henrik	Clarke,	Sylvester	Leaks,	William	Worthy,	and	Pernella	Wattley,	each	of	whom	had	played	an	active	role	in	supporting	the	Monroe	defendants.214	Billed	as	a	protest	against	“	black	people’s	treatment	in	the	white	man’s	court,”	the	rally	had	been	organized	to	spread	critical	awareness	of	Mae	Mallory’s	extradition	fight,	the	murder	of	Ronald	Stokes	by	LAPD	the	previous	year,	and	William	Worthy’s	scurrilous	arrest	for	the	Cold	War	crime	of	“failing	to	travel	with	a	valid	passport.”215	Among	the	speakers	at	the	rally	were	Jones,	Sparks,	Worthy,	Conrad	Lynn,	Leaks,	and	Mae	Mallory’s	mother,	Willie	Lee	Brown.	In	their	speeches	to	the	enlivened	crowd,	Leaks	and	Lynn	both	extolled	the	use	of	armed	self-defense	in	
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‘Til	the	Midnight	Hour,	47-51.	
		277	
struggles	for	Black	self-determination.	“We	have	guns,	and	we’re	going	to	make	our	presence	felt,”	Lynn	declared	after	deriding	Dr.	King’s	adherence	to	nonviolence	in	spite	of	the	recent	vicious	attacks	on	protestors	and	bombings	of	his	hotel	room	and	his	brother’s	home	in	Birmingham.	“We	have	power,”	Lynn	went	on	to	say,	as	the	crowd	grew	in	size	and	vigor,	“and	we’re	going	to	use	it!"216	Leaks,	who	had	been	writing	as	a	featured	columnist	for	Muhammad	Speaks	at	the	time,	expounded	Lynn’s	point	in	his	address	by	declaring	that	African	Americans	in	the	South	would	have	little	trouble	voting	if	they	brought	their	rifles	when	they	went	to	register.217		Whereas	Lynn	and	Leaks	spoke	on	the	need	for	Black	communities	to	seize	political	power	by	any	means	necessary,	Worthy	used	his	platform	to	decry	the	repressive	two-party	system	and	call	upon	Black	voters	to	chart	a	new	direction.	To	Worthy,	the	right	to	vote	wasn’t	worth	dying	for	if	the	candidates	on	the	ballot	were	white	men	with	no	interest	in	Black	liberation.	Reflecting	the	spirit	of	the	“New	Afro-American	Nationalism,”	Worthy	argued	that	Black	communities	must	be	in	positions	of	power	to	control	their	own	liberation,	and	thus	proposed	the	formation	of	an	independent	Black	political	party.	“Do	you	know	what	would	happen	if	Fidel	Castro	were	President	of	the	United	States	instead	of	John	F.	Kennedy?”	Worthy	asked	the	audience	to	illustrate	his	point.	“Bull	Connor	would	be	given	a	fair	trial	and	then	shot.	Ninety-five	per	cent	of	the	police	would	have	to	flee	to	South	Africa	for	political	asylum.	J.	Edgar	Hoover	would	be	thrown	into	an	integrated	cell.	If	that	didn’t	cure	him,	he’d	be	left	there	for	life.”																																																										216	“The	Talk	Of	The	Town,”	The	New	Yorker,	June	15,	1963.		 217	“Harlem,”	Liberator	3,	no.	7	(July	1963):	19.	
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Worthy’s	point	was	well	received	by	the	sizable	crowd	who	laughed	in	appreciation	and	cheered	in	agreement.	By	this	point,	few	amongst	any	crowd	at	Harlem	Square	had	any	illusions	of	racial	liberation	being	bestowed	upon	Black	communities	by	the	national	two-party	system	or	the	predominantly	white	liberal	government	of	New	York	City.	“There’s	going	to	be	trouble,”	one	observer	stated	plainly,	citing	the	decades	of	systemic	inequality	and	police	violence	that	the	powers-that-be	had	refused	to	address	in	Harlem.	“On	a	hot	summer	night,”	she	predicted,	“it	wouldn’t	take	much	to	set	off	a	riot—not	isolated	violence	but	a	kind	of	revolution.”218		Although	in	numerous	interviews	Lynn	credited	Worthy’s	speech	as	the	impetus	for	creating	the	Freedom	Now	Party,	the	idea	of	forming	an	independent	Black	political	party	had	deep	roots	in	New	York’s	history	of	Black	radical	thought	and	had	been	discussed	amongst	nationalist	activists	and	intellectuals	in	New	York	City	for	some	time	before	the	June	rally	at	Harlem	Square.	However,	the	grotesque	racist	brutality	visited	upon	the	SCLC’s	Birmingham	campaign	that	spring	by	southern	Democrats	added	a	greater	sense	of	urgency	and	spurred	the	masses	to	earnestly	consider	rejecting	the	national	Democratic	Party	in	favor	of	a	progressive	third	party.219	During	a	meeting	of	the	AAAA	in	Harlem	two	years	earlier,	Calvin	Hicks	had	floated	the	idea	of	forming	a	political	party	and	several	other	members	
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suggested	that	membership	be	limited	to	Afro-Americans.220	In	the	fall	of	1962	Dan	Watts	and	William	Worthy	had	appeared	on	a	panel	discussion	televised	by	CBS,	where	Watts	queried	if	the	interests	of	Afro-Americans	could	only	be	served	by	“a	political	party	of	his	own.”		In	her	reporting	on	the	program,	which	aired	two	days	before	President	Kennedy’s	own	televised	pronouncement	of	an	embargo	of	Cuba,	Liberator	columnist	Rose	Finkenstaedt	argued	“the	interests	of	the	black	will	never	be	considered	until	he	becomes	an	independent	political	force.”	To	Finkenstaedt,	however,	independent	Black	political	power	was	not	just	a	vehicle	by	which	to	achieve	African	American	liberation.	“If	the	meaning	of	America	is	freedom,	democracy,	and	anti-colonialism,”	Finkenstaedt	proposed,	“the	true	interests	of	America	will	only	be	served	through	effective	Black-led	political	power.”221	Finkenstaedt,	Watts,	and	Worthy	had	no	lofty	illusions	about	the	“meaning	of	America”	after	300	years	of	racial	oppression,	political	inequality,	and	capitalist-imperialism.	Rather,	as	part	of	a	global	anti-colonial	struggle	of	oppressed	peoples	for	liberation	and	self-determination,	they	argued	that	independent	African	American	political	power	wielded	the	potential	to	supplant	the	global	system	of	Euro-American	hegemony	in	the	United	States	with	a	society	built	upon	“man’s	
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attainable	ideals”	of	“freedom,	justice	and	equality	for	all	in	a	classless,	hate-free	society.”222		Though	Watts	and	Worthy	may	have	had	atmospheric	aspirations	for	such	a	party,	they	were	also	pragmatic	in	their	expectations.	Speaking	at	a	mass	rally	organized	by	Donald	Freeman	and	the	Afro-American	Institute	in	Cleveland	that	March,	Worthy	conceded	that	the	party	“cannot	realistically	anticipate	meaningful	1964	victories	at	the	polls.”	Explaining	this	first	election	cycle	as	a	“training	ground”	for	independent	Black	politics,	Worthy	declared	“1964	should	therefore	be	regarded	as	the	year	for	uniting	and	educating	all	militant	forces	in	the	black	community.”223	The	idea	was	already	floating	around	Harlem,	where	Progressive	Labor	Party	leader	Bill	Epton	had	begun	formulating	his	campaign	for	Councilman-at-Large	“as	a	means	of	introducing	the	concept	of	independent	Negro	political	activity	and	action.”224		With	a	groundswell	of	militancy	reverberating	through	its	streets,	Harlem	was	the	logical	choice	for	establishing	the	FNP’s	national	headquarters	after	the	party	was	officially	formed	at	the	March	on	Washington	that	August.	Alongside	SNCC	activists	who	had	planned	more	disruptive	protests	at	the	March	to	leverage	the	power	of	the	masses	gathered	at	the	nation’s	capital	for	more	immediate	and	substantive	federal	action	on	civil	rights,	the	steering	committee	of	the	FNP	
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represented	the	more	radical	factions	of	national	Black	freedom	struggles	in	Washington	that	day.	As	the	steady	flow	of	demonstrators	made	their	way	toward	the	Lincoln	Memorial,	Conrad	Lynn,	William	Worthy,	and	several	other	FNP	organizers	distributed	leaflets	calling	for	a	new	political	party	with	“an	all-black	slate	and	a	platform	for	liberation.”	In	their	manifesto,	titled	“The	Declaration	of	Washington,”	the	organizers	called	for	“all-black	political	action”	that	could	“deliver	knock-out	punches	to	the	enemies	of	equality”	and	promote	economic	justice,	adequate	housing,	educational	equality,	and	global	self-determination.225		As	the	crowds	filtered	out	of	the	capital,	the	fledgling	group	met	at	the	Park	Sheraton	Hotel	to	plan	their	next	actions	and	establish	the	formal	organization.	After	five	hours	of	deliberations,	a	national	committee	was	formed	with	Conrad	Lynn	as	acting	chairman	and	Harlem	Nine	veteran	Pernella	Wattley	as	corresponding	secretary.	The	group	also	emerged	with	plans	for	a	sit-in	at	the	FBI’s	headquarters	to	protest	the	agency’s	inaction	amidst	the	unabated	racial	terrorism	sweeping	through	the	South	that	had	claimed	the	life	of	Medgar	Evers	two	months	prior.226	The	formation	of	the	FNP	was	met	with	predictably	polarizing	receptions	from	white	commenters,	moderate	civil	rights	leaders,	and	Black	communities.	In	an	editorial	published	two	days	before	the	MOW,	the	New	York	Times	declared	that	the	FNP	would	“extend	racism	into	politics,”	increase	divisiveness,	and	embolden	white	
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racists	in	the	South.	Further,	the	editorial	cited	the	great	progress	African	Americans	had	made	in	recent	years	and	arrogantly	stated	that	the	party’s	formation	“implies	a	total	misunderstanding	of	the	nature	of	our	political	parties	and	the	great	flexibility	of	the	American	political	system.”227	Similar	sentiments	were	expressed	in	a	letter	to	the	editor	of	the	Amsterdam	News	from	a	Long	Island	City	resident,	who	reflected	the	general	concerns	and	opposition	of	white	communities	to	the	FNP	that	would	come	to	characterize	popular	responses	to	“Black	Power”	three	years	later.	“You	are	fighting…for	freedom,	equality,	etc.	and	now	fighting	for	segregation?”	the	writer	pointedly	queried,	while	offering	a	prediction	that	“confusion	and	violence	will	lose	the	gains	made.”228		These	sentiments	echoed	in	the	responses	of	some	conservative	Black	leaders,	such	as	novelist	and	Pittsburgh	Courier	editor	George	Schuyler,	who	referred	to	Lynn	and	Worthy	as	“crackpots.”229	Roy	Wilkins,	however,	was	notable	for	his	lukewarm	embrace	of	the	FNP,	demonstrating	the	successes	that	the	militant	Black	masses	had	in	shifting	the	scales	of	“acceptable”	political	thought	and	action.	While	stating	that	he	“would	hate	to	see	purely	racial	political	action	in	this	country,”	Wilkins	also	conceded	that	“white	people	in	the	South	have	made	the	
																																																								227	“Racism	in	Politics,”	The	New	York	Times,	August	26,	1963.		 228	Justus	Seebode,	“Why	3rd	Party?,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	September	14,	1963.		 229	George	S.	Schuyler,	“The	World	Today,”	New	Pittsburgh	Courier,	September	7,	1963.	
		283	
parties	white	parties,	and	the	only	logical	answer	for	the	Negro	is	to	raise	a	black	party."230		Though	Malcolm	X	and	the	NOI	had	played	a	significant	role	in	promoting	Black	separatism	at	the	grassroots	and	prompted	local	organizations	to	adopt	similar	political	analyses,	the	response	of	Wilkins	is	significant	for	its	demonstration	of	Black	nationalist	thought	entering	the	discourse	of	mainstream	of	civil	rights	leadership.	Although	the	NOI’s	continued	abstinence	from	political	involvement	prevented	Malcolm	X	from	giving	an	explicit	endorsement	when	asked	for	comment	on	the	FNP,	he	did	point	toward	the	latent	power	the	eight	million	unregistered	Black	voters	across	the	nation	possessed.	If	this	massive	base	was	activated	and	organized,	Malcolm	posited,	“they	would	upset	the	entire	political	picture.”231		At	a	Harlem	rally	that	June,	Malcolm	had	made	his	position	on	the	oppressive	nature	of	the	American	political	system	characteristically	plain.	“The	Conservative	is	a	wolf,	he	lets	you	know	that	he	does	not	want	you	around.	The	Liberal	is	a	fox,	he	pretends	to	be	your	friend,”	Malcolm	explained	to	the	crowd	of	2,500	gathered	at	the	corner	of	115th	and	Lenox.	“Both	are	dogs,	and	whatever	the	Negro	chooses	he	is	still	in	the	doghouse.”232	Though	Malcolm	himself	played	no	formal	role	in	the	organization	of	the	FNP,	it	was	abundantly	clear	that	his	brand	of	nationalist	
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thought	and	analysis	had	formatively	influenced	this	new	direction	in	Black	political	action.	As	the	collective	high	from	the	MOW	quickly	receded,	particularly	in	the	wake	of	the	bombing	of	the	16th	Street	Baptist	Church	in	Birmingham	two	weeks	later,	the	FNP’s	national	committee	got	to	work	in	Harlem.	In	the	minds	of	the	more	radical	factions	of	the	Movement,	and	even	in	some	of	the	mainstream	leadership,	the	March	had	created	an	“impasse”	from	which	organizations	would	need	to	emerge	with	new	tactics	and	broader	objectives	or	risk	losing	precious	momentum	and	leverage.	From	their	office	on	125th	Street,	Lynn,	Wattley,	and	the	FNP	worked	to	move	the	focus	of	the	national	movement	from	protest	to	politics	by	coordinating	a	national	grassroots	political	campaign	ahead	of	the	1964	election	cycle.	In	contrast	to	the	hierarchal	status	quo	of	the	national	two-party	system,	the	national	office	of	the	FNP	was	designed	to	serve	as	a	facilitating	body,	while	the	party’s	platform	and	policies	were	to	be	defined	collaboratively	at	the	grassroots.	Worthy	described	his	visions	for	the	process	in	an	article	in	Liberator	that	fall,	in	which	he	invited	every	reader	to	form	“a	study	and	action	group	of	six	to	ten	persons	meeting	regularly	in	homes,	maintaining	contact	with	other	such	groups	in	the	same	community,	federating	to	form	local	committees	for	a	Freedom	Now	Party,	and	working	towards	a	founding	congress	of	the	new	party.”233	Over	the	next	several	months,	local	and	regional	committees	worked	to	develop	a	draft	of	the	FNP’s	first	platform,	which	
Liberator	would	publish	in	early	1964.		
																																																								233	William	Worthy,	“An	All	Black	Party,”	Liberator	3,	no.	10	(October	1963),	18-19.	
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Through	the	economic,	political,	and	cultural	aspects	of	the	platform,	the	FNP	put	forth	a	national	program	to	transform	the	groundswell	of	Black	nationalist	thought	into	a	workable	“political	vehicle”	to	unite	the	masses	and	effect	systemic	social	change.234	The	economic	platform	contained	provisions	for	collective	ownership	of	multiple	dwelling	housing	in	cities,	nationalization	of	industries	threatened	by	automation,	a	universal	healthcare	program,	and	federal	aid	for	the	“economic	and	cultural	rehabilitation”	of	all	Black	communities.	The	political	platform	cited	the	necessity	of	unified	political	action	at	local,	regional,	and	national	levels,	flexibility	and	democratic	participation	in	defining	policies	and	programs,	and	the	primacy	of	functional	policies	over	emotional	positions.		The	cultural	platform	was	the	most	extensive	and	centered	around	a	program	of	“Cultural	Revolution.”	Likely	influenced	by	FNP	member	Harold	Cruse’s	analysis	of	the	primacy	of	African	American	cultural	institutions	in	social	revolution,	the	program	called	for	the	democratization	and	nationalization	of	cultural	production	in	American	society	and	pointed	to	the	necessity	of	progressive	cultural	production	for	advancing	unification	of	the	African	American	masses.235	Through	this	platform,	which	showed	the	influence	of	the	leftist	and	nationalist	movements	of	prior	generations	as	well	as	the	“New	Afro-American	Nationalism”	surging	in	Harlem	and	beyond,	the	FNP	evinced	their	intentions	for	a	clean	break	with	the	“liberal	wing	of	the	Democratic	Party”	and	mainstream	civil	rights	leadership	to	
																																																								234	“Freedom	Now	Party:	Draft	National	Platform,”	Liberator	4	(February	1964),	4-5.		235	Ibid.	
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bring	about	fundamental	economic,	political,	and	cultural	changes	in	American	society.		
Freedom	Now,	Malcolm	X,	and	Revolutionary	Nationalism	at	the	Grass	Roots	While	the	national	committee	was	at	work	in	New	York	City	on	both	building	a	political	party	and	coordinating	public	protests	to	draw	local	attention	to	national	politics,	the	most	influential	of	the	regional	committees	was	organizing	its	base	in	Michigan.236	Under	the	direction	of	Rev.	Albert	Cleage,	Jr.,	the	militant	preacher	in	Detroit	who	had	been	leading	campaigns	there	against	urban	renewal,	educational	inequality,	and	police	brutality,	the	Michigan	Committee	of	the	FNP	effectively	mobilized	the	state’s	radical	milieu	for	political	action.	At	the	fore	of	Cleage’s	network	of	associations	was	the	Group	on	Advanced	Leadership	(GOAL),	one	of	the	city’s	most	radical	organizations,	which	he	had	founded	alongside	Milton	and	Richard	Henry	(Gaidi	and	Imari	Obadele)	in	1961.	By	the	summer	of	1963,	the	militant	and	nationalist	politics	that	Cleage	and	the	Henry	brothers	embraced	had	earned	GOAL	such	notable	allies	as	Malcolm	X	and	James	and	Grace	Lee	Boggs,	but	also	drew	the	scorn	of	mainstream	civil	rights	leaders	whose	gradualist	positions	they	openly	criticized.237		The	rift	between	mainstream	leadership	and	grassroots	radicalism	that	was	sweeping	the	nation	that	summer	was	stark	in	Detroit,	as	Cleage	clashed	with	Rev.	
																																																								236	In	October	1963,	William	Worthy	was	arrested	along	with	eight	others	for	blocking	the	entrance	of	the	Waldorf-Astoria	in	midtown	where	Robert	F.	Kennedy	was	slated	to	deliver	an	address.	“Pickets	Seized	Before	Speech	By	Robert	Kennedy,”	
New	York	Times,	October	6,	1963.		 237	Joseph,	Waiting	‘Til	The	Midnight	Hour,	56-58.	
		287	
C.L.	Franklin	over	the	involvement	of	leftists	and	nationalists	in	a	coordinating	conference	for	northern	civil	rights	leaders	planned	for	the	fall.	Conceived	as	a	follow-up	to	the	Walk	for	Freedom,	a	widely	successful	dress	rehearsal	for	the	March	on	Washington,	the	Northern	Negro	Leadership	Conference	was	planned	as	a	national	forum	on	the	state	of	the	Civil	Rights	Movement	with	Cleage	as	chair	of	the	planning	committee.	However,	as	Peniel	Joseph	notes,	Cleage’s	invitation	of	Dan	Watts,	William	Worthy,	and	Conrad	Lynn	as	speakers	drove	a	wedge	between	the	conference	chair	and	Franklin,	a	close	associate	of	Dr.	King	who	objected	to	“black	nationalists	and	other	radical	groups”	taking	over	the	event.238	As	a	result	of	the	split,	Cleage	opted	to	organize	his	own	conference	that	was	more	reflective	of	the	calls	for	“Freedom	Now,”	self-determination,	economic	justice,	and	revolutionary	nationalism	that	were	resonating	at	the	grassroots.		It	was	this	split	that	launched	the	Northern	Negro	Grass	Roots	Leadership	Conference	and	provided	the	impetus	for	the	delivery	of	Malcolm	X’s	most	powerful	and	significant	public	address	to	this	point.	While	Worthy,	Lynn,	and	Wattley	were	busy	building	the	framework	for	a	national	Freedom	Now	Party,	Malcolm	had	been	actively	promoting	secular	political	action	and	the	need	for	a	Black	united	front	at	a	series	of	street	rallies	in	New	York	City	that	summer.	“Around	1963,	if	anyone	had	noticed,	I	spoke	less	and	less	of	religion,”	Malcolm	X	later	told	Alex	Haley.	“I	taught	social	doctrine	to	Muslims,	and	current	events,	and	politics.	I	stayed	fully	off	the	subject	of	morality.”239	Speaking	to	a	crowd	of	500	at	a	rally	in	Brooklyn	that	July	
																																																								238	Ibid,	87.		
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amidst	mass	demonstrations	against	hiring	discrimination	at	the	Downstate	Medical	Center	construction	site,	Malcolm	renewed	his	calls	for	Afro-American	unity	and	announced	that	he	would	“no	longer	malign	other	black	leaders.”240	Though	members	of	the	NOI	did	not	participate	in	the	demonstrations	due	to	their	professed	rejection	of	nonviolent	direct	action,	a	BOSS	detective	reported,	Malcolm	X	“made	it	clear	that	if	at	any	time	the	non-violent	pickets	are	in	need	of	Muslim	aid	they	would	be	present	to	heed	their	call.”241		At	a	Harlem	rally	two	weeks	prior,	Malcolm	X	was	joined	by	Akbar	Muhammad,	the	Messenger’s	youngest	son	who	had	just	returned	from	a	semester	at	university	in	Egypt.	After	Malcolm	explained	Harlem’s	dire	housing	conditions	as	symptomatic	of	institutional	racism,	Muhammad	issued	a	call	“for	unity	for	all	black	men	in	America	and	eventually	for	black	men	all	over	the	world.”	Displaying	a	revolutionary	Pan-African	vision	that	would	lead	the	younger	Muhammad	to	split	from	his	father,	Akbar	Muhammad	informed	the	crowd	of	2,500	that	several	African	nations	were	prepared	to	break	diplomatic	relations	with	the	United	States.	Muhammad	reported	that	one	of	these	nations	was	even	“ready	to	support	the	black	
																																																																																																																																																																					239	Though	Malcolm	X	attributed	this	change	to	the	revelations	of	Elijah	Muhammad’s	sexual	transgressions,	this	transition	to	a	more	secular	analysis	had	been	years	in	the	making	as	Malcolm	became	increasingly	disillusioned	with	Muhammad’s	policy	of	non-engagement	in	the	national	Black	Freedom	Struggle.	Malcolm	X	and	Alex	Haley,	The	Autobiography	of	Malcolm	X,	294.		240	It	is	worth	noting	that	just	a	month	before	this	profession,	Malcolm	X	had	derided	the	Urban	League	as	a	“bourgeois”	organization	and	called	Martin	Luther	King,	Jr.	an	“Uncle	Tom”	before	a	crowd	of	2,500	at	a	rally	at	115th	St.	and	Lenox	Ave.	Memo	from	Ernest	B.	Latty	to	Commanding	Officer,	June	30,	1963,	BOSS	Records.		241	Memo	from	John	L.	Kinsella	to	Chief	Inspector,	July	29,	1963,	BOSS.	
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struggle	in	the	US	with	money,	arms,	and	know	how.”242	Through	his	close	rapport	with	leaders	of	newly	independent	African	nations,	Muhammad	had	brought	visions	of	Malcolm’s	earlier	rhetoric	about	an	African	American	armed	anti-colonial	struggle	in	the	wake	of	the	Stokes	murder	out	of	the	abstract	and	into	the	realm	of	possibility	for	those	at	the	rally.	Like	Mae	Mallory,	whose	experiences	with	incessant	racial	violence	had	inspired	an	embrace	of	armed	revolutionary	struggle,	the	continued	State-sanctioned	violence	inflicted	against	members	of	the	Nation	of	Islam,	Medgar	Evers,	and	protestors	in	Birmingham	that	year	pushed	Malcolm	to	support	such	a	struggle	in	more	explicit	terms.	This	revolutionary	rhetoric,	in	turn,	was	attracting	the	attention	of	more	militant	activists	who	gravitated	toward	Malcolm	X.	One	such	activist	was	Sherron	Jackson	(Amina	Rahman),	a	high	school	student	from	Harlem	who	had	been	a	member	of	SNCC,	Harlem	Youth	Opportunities	Unlimited	(HARYOU),	and	the	Northern	Student	Movement	(NSM).	After	an	impromptu	debate	with	Malcolm	X	at	protests	at	the	Harlem	Hospital	construction	site	that	summer	challenged	her	to	reconsider	her	positions	on	nonviolence	and	integration,	Rahman	disavowed	her	involvement	with	the	Civil	Rights	Movement	and	joined	the	Nation	of	Islam—despite	her	apprehensions	about	the	Nation’s	theology,	gender	roles,	and	reticence	toward	political	action.243	For	Rahman,	Malcolm	X	was	the	draw	and	over	
																																																								242	Ibid.		243	Interview	with	Amina	Rahman,	1992,	Henry	Hampton	Collection,	Washington	University	Libraries.	
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the	next	several	months	she	was	a	regular	fixture	with	him	on	stage	at	street	rallies	in	Harlem.		At	these	rallies,	Rahman	routinely	criticized	her	prior	participation	in	nonviolent	demonstrations	to	achieve	integration,	arguing	that	freedom	is	not	the	right	to	dine	at	an	integrated	restaurant,	but	rather	the	right	to	“own	the	land	on	which	the	lunch	counter	stands.”244	In	addition	to	this	type	of	economic	nationalism	derived	from	Malcolm’s	analysis,	Rahman	also	demonstrated	an	embrace	of	the	revolutionary	nationalism	that	was	beginning	to	characterize	Malcolm’s	rhetoric.	Speaking	at	a	mass	rally	at	114th	Street	and	Lenox	Avenue	that	September,	Rahman	told	the	crowd	of	700	that	Black	Americans	“will	never	gain	anything	until	they	see	the	light	and	place	their	faith	in	a	god	who	will	represent	them.	When	this	is	done	black	people	will	then	be	united	in	the	world	wide	black	revolution	and	will	then	stop	turning	the	other	cheek	and	fight	force	with	force.”245		Though	the	words	were	her	own,	Rahman’s	address	echoed	the	sentiments	of	a	statement	made	by	Malcolm	X	at	a	rally	they	both	spoke	at	a	week	earlier.	“You	don’t	get	freedom	non-violently,	without	bloodshed	or	by	turning	the	other	cheek,”	Malcolm	explained	to	the	thousands	gathered	near	Mosque	No.	7.	“You	don’t	get	freedom	without	being	willing	to	fight	for	it.”246	Malcolm’s	call	to	action	would	take	
																																																								244	Memo	from	Ernest	B.	Latty	to	Commanding	Officer,	September	9,	1963,	BOSS	Records.		 245	Memo	from	Frederick	Jenoure	to	Commanding	Officer,	September	14,	1963,	BOSS	Records.		 246	Memo	from	Ernest	B.	Latty	to	Commanding	Officer,	September	9,	1963,	BOSS	Records.	
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on	an	even	greater	sense	of	urgency	a	week	later	when	a	white	supremacist’s	bomb	ripped	through	the	16th	Street	Baptist	Church	in	Birmingham,	stealing	the	lives	of	four	young	Black	girls.			Coming	amidst	a	national	wave	of	heightened	militancy,	direct	action	confrontations,	and	white	reactionary	violence,	Malcolm’s	speeches	at	these	rallies	in	New	York	City	throughout	the	spring	and	summer	of	1963	laid	the	groundwork	for	his	address	at	the	Northern	Negro	Grass	Roots	Leadership	Conference	in	Detroit	that	November.	As	Malcolm	X	strode	to	the	pulpit	of	the	King	Solomon	Baptist	Church	on	November	10th,	he	was	greeted	by	the	applause	of	nearly	2,000	Black	people	of	all	political	stripes	who	had	gathered	there	instead	of	at	the	more	moderate	conference	being	held	at	Cobo	Hall.	Among	the	thousands	packed	into	the	church’s	pews	were	138	of	the	500	civil	rights	leaders	that	had	been	invited	to	C.L.	Franklin’s	conference—along	with	many	others	who	had	been	purposefully	excluded—	dwarfing	the	meager	22	who	had	showed	up	to	the	NNLC.247		That	the	Grass	Roots	Leadership	Conference	had	attracted	greater	participation	than	the	NNLC	was	indicative	of	the	increasingly	popular	identification	with	the	grassroots	militancy	represented	by	the	Conference’s	conveners,	including	Rev.	Cleage,	James	and	Grace	Lee	Boggs,	and	the	Henry	brothers,	as	well	as	the	invited	speakers,	such	as	William	Worthy,	Donald	Freeman,	and	Malcolm	X.	During	a	series	of	workshops	the	previous	day,	radical	leaders	from	across	the	country,	including	Gloria	Richardson,	Selma	Sparks,	Dan	Watts,	Rev.	Milton	Galamison,																																																									247	Lowell	“Pete”	Beveridge,	“King’s	Dilemma,”	Liberator	3	(December	1963),	3;	Sterling	Gray,	“Architect	of	a	Revolution,”	Liberator	3,	no.	12	(December	1963),	8-9.	
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Lawrence	Landry,	Stanley	Branche,	and	Jesse	Gray	had	collectively	analyzed	the	problems	confronting	urban	Black	communities	and	discussed	organizing	strategies	around	self-defense,	independent	political	action,	educational	equality,	and	economic	empowerment.248		By	the	time	Malcolm	X	took	to	the	rostrum	that	Sunday	evening,	participants	had	already	passed	a	series	of	resolutions	that	included	endorsements	of	the	Freedom	Now	Party,	advocacy	of	self-defense,	and	support	for	Mae	Mallory’s	ongoing	fight	against	extradition	to	North	Carolina.	In	many	ways	the	resolutions	passed	by	this	impressive	network	of	leading	radical	activists,	as	Stephen	Ward	notes,	indicated	“a	direct	connection	to	the	nationalist	organizations	and	black	radical	politics	that	had	developed	over	the	preceding	two	years.”249	Thus,	when	it	came	time	for	Malcolm	X	to	speak,	he	was	addressing	a	crowd	that	was	bearing	the	fruits	of	the	“New	Afro-American	Nationalism”	that	he	and	many	of	the	other	participants	had	cultivated	in	Harlem.	The	speech	that	Malcolm	X	delivered	that	evening,	now	immortalized	as	his	“Message	to	the	Grass	Roots,”	represented	a	synthesis	of	the	varying	strands	of	secular	nationalism,	anti-colonialism,	Pan-Africanism,	and	revolutionary	nationalism	that	had	been	bubbling	up	to	the	surface	of	his	speeches	over	the	
																																																								248	Sharon	Harley,	“Chronicle	of	a	Death	Foretold”:	Gloria	Richardson,	the	Cambridge	Movement,	and	the	Radical	Black	Activist	Tradition,”	in	Sisters	in	the	
Struggle:	African	American	Women	in	the	Civil	Rights-Black	Power	Movement,	eds.	Bettye	Collier-Thomas	and	V.P.	Franklin	(New	York:	NYU	Press,	2001),	190;	Stephen	Ward,	In	Love	and	Struggle:	The	Revolutionary	Lives	of	James	and	Grace	Lee	Boggs	(Chapel	Hill:	University	of	North	Carolina	Press,	2016),	311.		249	Ward,	In	Love	and	Struggle,	312.	
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previous	several	years.	Indeed	many	of	the	comments,	analogies,	and	turns	of	phrase	he	would	use	that	night	had	been	heard	by	crowds	in	Harlem	months	earlier.	After	reiterating	his	calls	for	a	Black	united	front	in	opposition	to	a	white	“common	enemy,”	Malcolm	swiftly	took	up	the	complex	topic	of	revolution	and	characteristically	“made	it	plain”	for	those	in	the	pews.		Drawing	from	the	histories	of	various	successful	revolutions	across	the	globe,	including	ongoing	anti-colonial	liberation	struggles	on	the	African	continent,	Malcolm	distilled	their	lessons	to	offer	a	biting	rebuke	of	the	limited	scope	of	integrationists	and	moderate	civil	rights	leaders,	as	well	as	a	charge	to	would-be	Black	revolutionaries.	In	his	analysis,	there	existed	within	the	Afro-American	Freedom	Struggle	a	decisive	contestation	between	those	who	advocated	for	a	“Negro	revolution”	and	those	who	sought	a	“black	revolution.”	The	former	represented	the	middle-class,	moderate	leadership,	while	the	latter	more	closely	resembled	the	radical	consciousness	surging	at	the	grassroots.	“There’s	no	such	thing	as	a	nonviolent	revolution,”	Malcolm	explained,	“the	only	kind	of	revolution	that	is	nonviolent	is	the	Negro	revolution.”	In	real	revolutions,	he	continued,	oppressed	communities	did	not	seek	integration	with	their	oppressors,	but	rather	sought	self-determination	by	breaking	free	from	such	a	society	by	any	means	necessary	and	asserting	their	right	to	independence	by	claiming	land	through	armed	struggle.	“A	revolutionary	wants	land	so	he	can	set	up	his	own	nation,	an	independent	nation,”	he	argued,	“these	Negroes	aren’t	asking	for	any	nation—
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they’re	trying	to	crawl	back	on	the	plantation.”250	Malcolm’s	espousal	of	Black	liberation	and	nation-building	through	an	armed	revolution	marked	a	distinct	evolution	in	his	political	thought	and	program.	Whereas	his	previous	speeches	under	the	aegis	of	Elijah	Muhammad	had	called	for	the	United	States	to	grant	Black	Americans	monetary	and	territorial	reparations	to	establish	an	independent	Black	nation	under	threat	of	Allah’s	destructive	wrath,	he	was	now	calling	for	Black	Americans	to	act	as	their	own	liberators	and	take	up	the	necessary	tools	to	dismantle	an	oppressive	society	and	build	their	own	anew.		After	laying	out	his	analysis	of	revolutionary	struggle,	Malcolm	X	invited	the	audience	to	consider	what	he	saw	as	the	historical	roots	of	the	division	amongst	the	ranks	in	Black	America	that	was	stifling	the	nascent	revolutionary	fervor	of	the	masses.	It	was	here	that	Malcolm	most	famously	put	forth	his	analogy	of	the	“house	Negro”	and	the	“field	Negro,”	which	he	had	raised	on	occasion	in	years	prior.	In	his	analysis,	the	moderate,	middle-class	leadership	of	the	Civil	Rights	Movement	were	the	heirs	of	“house	Negroes,”	who	Malcolm	argued	identified	with	their	white	masters	and	protected	his	interests	as	their	own.	“That	house	Negro	loved	his	master,	but	that	field	Negro—remember,	they	were	in	the	majority,	and	they	hated	the	master,”	Malcolm	explained,	“when	the	master	got	sick,	the	field	Negro	prayed	that	he’d	die.”		To	Malcolm,	this	dichotomy	between	the	“house	Negro”	and	the	“field	Negro”	was	analogous	to	the	differences	between	middle-class	civil	rights	moderates	and	
																																																								250	George	Breitman,	ed.,	Malcolm	X	Speaks:	Selected	Speeches	and	Statements		(New	York:	Grove	Press,	1990),	4-10.	
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the	disenfranchised	Black	masses—a	type	of	divergence	that	been	playing	out	in	Harlem	over	the	previous	decade	and	was	coming	to	define	a	broader	rift	that	was	widening	within	the	national	movement.	Driving	his	point	home,	Malcolm	argued	that	as	the	slavemasters	of	old	had	used	the	“house	Negroes”	to	“keep	the	field	Negroes	in	check,”	the	“same	old	slavemaster	today	has	Negroes	who	are	nothing	but	modern	Uncle	Toms…to	keep	you	and	me	in	check,	to	keep	us	under	control,	to	keep	us	passive	and	peaceful	and	nonviolent.”251	To	support	his	claim,	Malcolm	pointed	to	the	co-optation	of	the	March	on	Washington	by	the	Kennedy	administration	and	white	religious	and	labor	groups	who	he	argued	had	defanged	the	mass	mobilization	of	its	planned	disruptive	militancy.	Through	this	analogy,	Ward	notes,	Malcolm	delivered	his	central	message	to	the	Black	masses:	“the	civil	rights	movement	and	its	leadership	could	only	offer	a	‘Negro	revolution’;	it	could	not	bring	black	liberation.	It	was	up	to	the	black	masses—the	grass	roots—the	descendants	of	field	Negroes,	to	move	the	struggle	ahead	and	to	achieve	full	and	complete	liberation.”252	
v 	Malcolm	X’s	keynote	address	marked	the	apogee	of	a	two-day	conference	that	sought	to	re-evaluate	and	redefine	the	Black	Freedom	Struggle	in	the	midst	of	what	Liberator	magazine	dubbed	“the	year	of	violence.”	Despite	the	federal	government’s	professed	support	for	the	ideals	of	equal	rights,	the	slow	pace	of	reform	coupled	with	the	increasingly	repressive	measures	and	reactionary	violence																																																									251	Ibid,	10-12.		252	Ward,	In	Love	and	Struggle,	313.	
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meted	out	by	those	with	a	vested	interest	in	white	supremacy	had	forced	a	referendum	within	the	national	Civil	Rights	Movement	on	the	ideologies	of	nonviolence,	integration,	self-defense,	self-determination,	nationalism,	and	revolution.	Far	from	an	organic	response	to	systemic	violence,	this	reckoning	was	spurred	by	local	people	and	radical	activists	who	had	been	engaged	in	militant	grassroots	struggles	for	economic	justice,	fair	housing,	equal	education,	and	political	power	in	Harlem	and	other	communities	across	the	nation.	In	many	ways,	these	grassroots	struggles	had	both	spawned	and	advanced	the	New	Afro-American	Nationalism	which	John	Henrik	Clarke	had	described	two	years	earlier,	and	was	now	beginning	to	chart	the	course	of	the	national	Black	Freedom	Struggle.	And	while	Malcolm’s	“Message	to	the	Grass	Roots”	speech,	as	Cedric	Johnson	notes,	“conveys	the	critical	spirit	of	the	New	Afro-American	Nationalism,”	the	influence	of	the	local	people	and	grassroots	intellectuals	who	served	as	midwife	for	this	strain	of	the	movement	must	be	acknowledged.253		Though	the	grassroots	organizing	of	Mae	Mallory	and	Malcolm	X	during	this	period	largely	marked	a	disavowal	of	working	within	the	confines	of	the	political	system,	their	contributions	to	the	evolution	of	the	Black	Freedom	Struggle	in	Harlem	and	throughout	the	nation	were	based	less	on	scoring	piecemeal	victories	through	policy	reform	than	on	empowering	a	Black	radical	consciousness	that	would	become	a	revolutionary	force	in	America.	This	emphasis	on	psychological	liberation	and	radical	imagination	was	central	to	the	organizing	efforts	of	Mae	Mallory	during																																																									253	Cedric	Johnson,	Revolutionaries	to	Race	Leaders:	Black	Power	and	the	
Making	of	African	American	Politics	(Minneapolis:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	2007),	50.	
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this	formative	period	of	struggles	for	rights	and	power	in	Harlem.	As	Ashley	D.	Farmer	contends,	through	her	intersectional	political	analysis	and	praxis,	Mae	Mallory	“argued	that,	for	black	working-class	women,	adopting	a	nationalist	political	agenda	and	militant	persona	was	a	viable	path	to	liberation,	but	only	if	they	were	willing	to	reimagine	themselves	as	vital	nationalist	political	actors.”254		While	both	weathered	the	criticism	of	moderate,	middle-class	leaders	of	the	Civil	Rights	Movement	and	radical	intellectuals	alike	for	what	they	perceived	as	a	dearth	of	a	practical	program	for	bringing	forth	their	radical	political	analysis,	these	types	of	critiques	failed	to	appreciate	the	formative	psychological	contributions	that	Mallory	and	Malcolm	X	made	to	the	evolution	of	the	Black	Freedom	Struggle.	As	William	Sales	has	pointed	out,	these	types	of	contributions	were	minimized	by	Mallory	and	Malcolm’s	contemporaries—as	well	as	scholars—because	such	analyses	overlooked	the	significance	of	“intellectual	and	emotional”	mobilization	within	liberation	struggles.	Citing	sociologist	Max	Weber,	Sales	argues	that	the	social	movements	that	Malcolm	X	and	Mallory	orchestrated	during	this	period	“provide	the	strong	emotional	support	necessary	to	make	the	initial	break	with	the	dominance	of	oppressive	ideas	over	the	thinking	of	the	exploited.	Once	that	break	is	made,	organizational	development	seems	to	accelerate.”255	Like	Jesse	Gray,	who	saw	tenant	organizing	as	a	vehicle	by	which	to	draw	local	people	into	broader	struggles	for	Black	liberation	and	political	transformation,	Mae	Mallory	and	Malcolm	X	sought	to	unleash	the	revolutionary	potential	of	the	Black	masses	through	their	grassroots																																																									254	Farmer,	Remaking	Black	Power,	48.		255	Sales,	From	Civil	Rights	to	Black	Liberation,	43.	
		298	
organizing,	radical	rhetoric,	and	practical	embodiment	of	the	New	Afro-American	Nationalism	in	Harlem.	While	Malcolm’s	“Message	to	the	Grass	Roots”	heralded	this	radical	evolution	of	Black	Freedom	Struggles	nationally,	it	also	marked	a	watershed	moment	in	his	personal	evolution.	As	they	sat	listening	to	his	gripping	speech	that	day,	Gloria	Richardson	and	Grace	Lee	Boggs	could	not	help	but	notice	something	different	in	Malcolm	X.	“It	seemed	to	me	that	he	was	coming	just	a	little	bit	away	from	the	sectarian	kind	of	religion	thing,”	Richardson	later	recalled.	“It	sounded	like	the	preface	that	he	always	gave	to	those	speeches	was	becoming	more	rote.”256	Richardson	was	now	hearing	firsthand	what	careful	observers	in	Harlem	would	have	surely	noticed	throughout	that	spring	and	summer.	Boggs	also	took	notice	of	this	curt	way	in	which	Malcolm	delivered	his	ordinarily	effusive	homage	to	Elijah	Muhammad	in	his	speech	that	evening.	To	Boggs,	this	seemingly	trivial	aspect	of	his	powerful	address	was	telling	of	a	deeper	evolution	in	Malcolm’s	political	consciousness	and	analysis.	“The	tribute	to	Mr.	Muhammad	was	so	nominal	and	mechanical	as	contrasted	with	the	passion	and	urgency	in	his	‘off-the-cuff,	down-to-earth	chat’	that	I	whispered	into	the	ear	of	Rev.	Cleage	who	was	sitting	next	to	me	on	the	platform,	‘Malcolm’s	going	to	split	with	Mr.	Muhammad.”257	Though	Grace	Lee	Boggs	had	no	way	of	knowing	the	impending	firestorm	that	would	embroil	the	Nation	of	Islam	in	the	days	to	come	following	the	assassination	of	John	F.	Kennedy																																																									256	Interview	with	Gloria	Richardson,	July	1,	1992,	Henry	Hampton	Collection,	Washington	University	Libraries.		257	Grace	Lee	Boggs,	Living	for	Change:	An	Autobiography	(Minneapolis:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	2016),	129.	
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and	the	revelations	of	Elijah	Muhammad’s	infidelities,	her	intuition	proved	prescient.	“After	two	decades	of	attending	political	meetings,”	Boggs	later	reflected,	“my	ear	had	become	sensitized	to	the	rhetorical	changes	that	suggest	that	a	radical	political	change	is	in	the	offing.”258			
																																																								258	Ibid.	
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CHAPTER	6		
“TALKING	AND	ACTING	IN	OUR	INTEREST”:	INTERRACIAL	ORGANIZING	AND	
BLACK	COMMUNITY	POWER	IN	HARLEM,	1960-1963	
If	we	are	successful…in	getting	the	support	of	the	Black	Nationalists	including	
Malcolm	X	we	will	need	to	offset	the	impact	of	their	participation	by	involving	
as	much	of	the	white	community	as	possible.	We	are	playing	with	dynamite.	
The	nationalists	have	a	stronghold	in	Harlem;	and	we	may	have	to	choose	
between	the	possibility	of	having	them	with	us	or	against	us.	–Carl	Anthony	
(1962)1	
	
If	bigotry	would	slow	down,	then	it	might	be	possible	to	consider	the	argument	
of	gradualism.	The	fact	is	that	bigotry	and	indifference	makes	steady	inroads	
into	our	communities	and	our	fight	must	be	hard,	constant	and	effective.	The	
Negro	is	like	a	man	being	strangled.	We	say	stop	the	choking	now,	at	once.	You	
can’t	afford	to	be	gradual	about	stopping	a	strangulation.	–Gladys	Harrington	
(1963)2	
	
		 In	the	fall	of	1959,	thousands	of	New	York	City	residents	received	a	letter	from	James	Robinson,	the	executive	director	of	the	Congress	of	Racial	Equality	(CORE).	“Many	say	that	the	Battle	for	Brotherhood	is	being	lost	in	the	great	cities	of	the	North,”	the	letter	read,	“while	advances	are	painfully	made	in	the	South.”	From	their	national	headquarters	in	downtown	Manhattan,	Robinson	and	other	CORE	officials	had	surely	borne	witness	to	the	turmoil	that	was	swelling	uptown	that	summer	as	Black	communities	fought	for	their	liberation	in	the	chambers	of	the	NAACP’s	national	convention,	on	the	airwaves	of	local	television	stations,	and	in	the	streets	of	Harlem.	Though	Robinson	tacitly	acknowledged	the	progresses	which	had																																																									1	Letter	from	Carl	Anthony	to	Peter	Countryman,	June	19,	1962,	Box	8,	Folder	10,	Northern	Student	Movement	Records,	Schomburg	Center	for	Research	in	Black	Culture	(henceforth	referred	to	as	NSM	Records).		 2	Thomas	A.	Johnson,	“Freedom	Now	Or	Gradualism	Fight	on	in	L.I.,”	
Pittsburgh	Courier,	January	12,	1963.	
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been	made	in	New	York,	largely	through	the	efforts	of	local	people	in	Harlem	and	elsewhere,	he	also	noted	“there	is	no	doubt	that	much	segregation	remains	here,	and	racial	tensions	have	been	rising.”3		A	white,	Catholic	pacifist	from	upstate	New	York,	Robinson	was	a	founding	member	of	CORE	in	1942	and	had	spearheaded	the	New	York	chapter’s	direct	action	campaigns	in	support	of	the	Sharkey-Brown-Isaacs	fair	housing	bill	in	1957	shortly	after	he	was	named	executive	director	of	the	national	organization.4	Though	CORE	claimed	credit	for	the	passage	of	this	landmark	housing	legislation	and	garnered	much	media	attention	for	their	efforts,	the	local	chapter	and	the	national	organization	had	been	largely	moribund	in	the	late	1950s—despite	the	dramatic	resurgence	of	struggles	for	African	American	rights	and	power	locally	and	nationally.	Even	as	tenant	organizing	and	fair	housing	campaigns	had	come	alive	by	the	end	of	the	decade	in	ways	unseen	since	the	Left-led	housing	activism	of	the	Depression-era,	NY	CORE	was	largely	a	bystander	to	this	heightened	mobilization.	To	Robinson,	CORE’s	marginalization	during	these	years	demonstrated	a	need	to	re-tool	the	interracial	organization’s	programs	to	more	adequately	combat	the	institutional	nature	of	Jim	Crow	society	in	the	urban	North.	“The	challenge	lies	in	
																																																								3	Letter	from	James	R.	Robinson	to	New	Yorkers,	November	30,	1959,	The	Papers	of	the	Congress	of	Racial	Equality,	1941-1967	(microfilm),	Schomburg	Center	for	Research	in	Black	Culture	(henceforth	referred	to	as	CORE	Papers).		 4	August	Meier	and	Elliott	Rudwick,	CORE:	A	Study	in	the	Civil	Rights	
Movement,	1942-1968	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	1973),	5-6,	94-95.	
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making	CORE	work	in	large	northern	cities,”	Robinson	wrote	in	the	fall	of	1959,	“and	unless	we	can	do	this,	CORE	is	outmoded	except	in	the	border	and	southern	states.”5		 All	this	would	change	at	the	turn	of	the	decade,	as	a	new	wave	of	southern	student	activism	reinvigorated	the	Civil	Rights	Movement	and	launched	CORE	back	into	national	prominence	at	the	forefront	of	the	Movement.	Through	their	active	support	of	the	sit-ins	in	early	1960	and	their	inception	of	the	Freedom	Rides	the	following	spring,	CORE	mobilized	communities	throughout	the	nation—Black	and	white—to	engage	in	direct	action	campaigns	in	support	of	the	southern	movement	and	in	service	of	freedom	struggles	in	their	own	neighborhoods.	While	the	initial	“sympathy	strikes”	brought	individuals	into	the	fold	of	organized	action,	northern	CORE	chapters	quickly	seized	on	the	momentum	generated	by	the	southern	movement	to	wage	local	campaigns	for	fair	housing	practices,	equal	employment	opportunities,	and	police	reform.		At	the	same	time,	however,	local	people	in	New	York	City	and	throughout	the	nation	were	pushing	their	local	CORE	chapters,	and	consequently	the	national	organization,	to	adopt	more	militant	tactics	to	achieve	more	immediate	and	expansive	liberation	in	their	own	communities.	In	Harlem,	specifically,	where	a	deeply	rooted	radical	political	milieu	had	begun	to	flower	at	the	grassroots,	Black	communities	saw	CORE	not	as	a	messianic	force	in	civil	rights	struggles,	but	rather	as	a	vehicle	by	which	they	could	realize	their	demands	for	human	rights	and	self-determination.	New	York	native	and	CORE	member	Jimmy	McDonald	succinctly	expressed	the	way	many	Black	residents	of	Harlem	felt	about	interracial,	nonviolent																																																									5	Ibid,	94.	
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organizations	like	CORE	during	these	years	when	he	told	an	interviewer,	“to	hell	with	the	way	you	go	as	long	as	you	are	on	the	road	towards	my	freedom.”6		 In	the	wake	of	the	Freedom	Rides	in	1961,	another	interracial	organization	joined	CORE	“on	the	road”	toward	Black	liberation	in	Harlem.	Growing	out	of	a	shared	concern	for	supporting	the	student-led	movement	in	the	South,	the	Northern	Student	Movement	(NSM)	drew	waves	of	college	students	from	their	campuses	into	northern	cities	beginning	in	1962.	Largely	organized	by	white	college	students	on	the	pristine	campuses	of	liberal	arts	colleges	in	New	England,	the	formation	of	the	NSM	in	the	fall	of	1961	marked	the	emergence	of	a	network	of	students	outside	of	the	South	who	saw	their	fate	in	America	as	intertwined	with	their	southern	counterparts	fighting	for	equality	and	justice	many	miles	away.		Though	many	of	these	students	were	drawn	into	the	fledgling	organization	through	its	early	fundraising	campaigns	for	SNCC,	most	came	to	see	northern	cities	as	the	next	frontier	of	the	Civil	Rights	Movement.	“New	York	is	the	most	important	city	in	America,”	Columbia	University	student	Carl	Anthony	wrote	in	the	summer	of	1962.	“A	really	dynamic	student	civil	rights	movement	here	would	set	the	North	on	fire.”7	Like	CORE,	however,	the	ideologies	that	initially	guided	NSM’s	organizational	praxis	quickly	evolved	as	its	members	established	“projects”	in	several	northern	
																																																								6	Jimmy	McDonald	interview	with	James	Mosby,	November	5,	1969,	Ralph	Bunche	Oral	History	Collection,	Moorland-Spingarn	Research	Center,	Howard	University.		 7	Letter	from	Carl	Anthony	to	Peter	Countryman,	June	19,	1962,	Box	8,	Folder	10,	NSM	Records.	
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cities	and	became	immersed	in	the	Black	radical	traditions	of	communities	in	Harlem,	Philadelphia,	Boston,	and	New	Haven.			 This	chapter	traces	the	development	of	both	CORE	and	NSM	in	Harlem	from	1960-1963	to	analyze	the	ways	in	which	local	people	shaped	the	emergence	and	evolution	of	national	organizations	in	ways	that	transformed	broader	struggles	for	Black	liberation.	Beginning	as	interracial	organizations	dedicated	to	supporting	the	southern	Civil	Rights	Movement	through	fundraising	and	nonviolent	direct	action	campaigns,	by	1963	these	organizations	had	shifted	their	focus	to	community-based	organizing	for	Black	equality	and	empowerment	in	the	urban	north.	Through	the	active	involvement	and	influence	of	grassroots	organizations	and	indigenous	leaders,	these	organizations	would	transform	their	positions	on	integration,	community-based	organizing,	self-determination,	nationalism,	and	nonviolence,	and	in	the	process,	emerge	as	leading	forces	in	northern	Black	freedom	struggles.	
“I	should	get	on	that	line”:	Sympathy	Strikes	and	CORE’s	National	Revival	News	of	the	sit-ins	in	Nashville	and	Greensboro	swept	across	the	nation	in	the	early	months	of	1960,	leaving	few	places	or	people	untouched	by	the	bold	actions	of	young	African	American	students	willing	to	put	their	bodies	on	the	line	for	desegregation	and	civil	rights.	Even	in	communities	like	Harlem	where	African	American-led	struggles	for	rights	and	power	were	already	in	motion,	the	southern	students	energized	and	inspired	local	people	to	greater	action	in	their	shared	struggle.	As	the	sit-ins	spread	across	the	South,	civil	rights	organizations	in	New	York	mobilized	protests	of	department	stores	like	Woolworth’s	and	S.H.	Kress	to	pressure	the	national	chains	to	end	their	segregationist	policies.	With	many	in	its	
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Black	community	already	in	step	with	the	tempo	of	organizing	set	during	the	summer	of	1959,	Harlem	became	the	locus	for	the	emergence	of	sympathy	protests	in	New	York.		From	February	through	October	of	that	year,	New	York	CORE	was	among	a	handful	of	organizations	that	led	pickets,	demonstrations,	and	sit-ins	at	department	stores	in	Harlem	and	throughout	the	city.	Two	weeks	after	the	sit-ins	in	Greensboro,	NC	captivated	the	nation,	members	of	NY	CORE	and	Columbia	University	CORE	launched	their	first	sympathy	protest	in	New	York	City	at	the	Woolworth’s	store	on	125th	Street	and	Lenox	Avenue	in	Central	Harlem.	“Within	a	half	hour	the	store	was	cleared	of	customers,”	Columbia	University	student	and	CORE	picket	captain	Martin	Smolin	wrote.	“Hardly	anybody	on	this	busy	thoroughfare	crossed	our	picket	lines.”8		Over	the	next	several	weeks,	CORE	collaborated	with	a	range	of	community	leaders	and	organizations,	including	radical	attorney	and	State	Assemblyman	Mark	Lane,	Mae	Mallory	and	the	New	York	Crusader	Family,	Congressman	Adam	Clayton	Powell,	Jr.,	the	NAACP,	the	International	Ladies’	Garment	Workers’	Union,	and	Jesse	Gray	and	the	Lower	Harlem	Tenants	Council	(LHTC),	as	part	of	an	ad	hoc	coalition	to	coordinate	protests	throughout	the	city.	With	his	flair	for	spectacle,	Gray	and	LHTC	Director	Horace	Townsend	led	one	of	the	more	colorful	protests	that	February	when	demonstrators	carried	a	casket	on	a	picket	line	in	front	of	the	Woolworth’s	on	116th	Street	to	signify	the	death	of	Jim	Crow.9		
																																																								8	Martin	Smolin,	“The	North:	‘We	Walk	So	They	May	Sit,”	in	CORE,	“Sit	Ins:	The	Student	Report,”	May	1960,	NYPD	Inspectional	Services	Bureau	Records,	New	York	City	Municipal	Archives	(henceforth	referred	to	as	BOSS	Records).		
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	 Among	those	on	the	initial	picket	lines	was	Jimmy	McDonald,	a	Yonkers	native	who	had	become	involved	with	the	local	NAACP	as	a	teenager	in	the	late	1940s	after	a	trip	to	Richmond,	VA	where	he	“saw	a	black	man	hanging”	and	Klansmen	roaming	about.	“It	was	from	that	day	on,”	McDonald	later	recalled,	“that	I	began	to	become	conscious	of	my	blackness,	in	the	fact	that	I	was	a	14	year	old	kid	out	here	who	had	to	make	it	in	this	white	man’s	world.”	By	the	late	1950s,	McDonald	had	become	a	fixture	as	a	singer	and	actor	in	the	café	scene	in	Greenwich	Village,	where	he	first	caught	wind	of	CORE’s	planned	“sympathy	strikes”	in	Harlem.	The	national	coverage	of	the	Greensboro	sit-ins	captivated	McDonald,	who	by	this	time	had	become	disillusioned	with	the	perceived	inactivity	of	the	civil	rights	establishment	he	had	previously	been	involved	with.	“The	NAACP	wasn’t	doing	a	goddamn	thing,”	he	later	recalled,	“they	were	still	having	their	cocktail	sips	and	it	was	the	elite	organization	of	the	black	bourgeoisie.”		Having	participated	in	earlier	CORE	struggles	to	desegregate	a	public	pool	in	the	Palisades	in	New	Jersey,	McDonald	was	anxious	to	re-engage	in	direct	action	struggles	after	serving	in	mainly	a	fundraising	capacity	through	his	performances	over	the	past	several	years.	So	when	NY	CORE	announced	their	plans	to	picket	Woolworth’s	on	125th	Street,	McDonald	recalled,	“it	was	only	natural	before	I	went	to	work	that	night	I	should	get	on	that	line.	And	I	did	that.”	For	McDonald,	joining	in	the	picket	line	alongside	CORE	veterans	James	Peck	and	Marvin	Rich	proved	an	impetus	for	his	greater	engagement	in	the	organization.	In	the	following	weeks	and	
																																																																																																																																																																					9	Memo	from	Ernest	B.	Latty	to	Commanding	Officer,	February	25,	1960,	BOSS	Records.	
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months,	McDonald	would	spend	his	days	in	the	CORE	office	and	his	nights	in	the	cafés	of	Greenwich	Village.10				 As	the	weather	began	to	warm	that	spring,	members	of	NY	CORE	expanded	their	campaigns	against	Woolworth	stores	throughout	the	city.	Aroused	to	action	by	the	disturbing	images	of	white	mobs	attacking	peaceful	students	at	southern	lunch	counters	and	the	increased	mobilization	in	the	streets	of	Harlem,	Black	communities	throughout	New	York,	along	with	some	whites,	heeded	the	call	to	“get	in	step	with	our	brother	and	sister	youth	in	the	South.”	By	early	April,	CORE	members	were	coordinating	pickets	and	sit-ins	at	scores	of	Woolworth’s	in	all	five	boroughs	of	the	city.	The	high	point	of	the	protests	came	the	first	weekend	of	that	month,	when	CORE	spearheaded	the	picketing	of	over	80	Woolworth’s	across	the	city,	culminating	in	a	mass	rally	in	front	of	the	Hotel	Theresa	where	Bayard	Rustin,	Jackie	Robinson,	and	A.	Philip	Randolph	addressed	a	crowd	of	3,000.11		Though	the	pickets	had	mobilized	thousands	and	drastically	reduced	Woolworth’s	patronage	in	New	York	City	that	weekend,	illustrated	by	photos	of	an	empty	lunch	counter	at	the	125th	Street	store	in	the	Amsterdam	News,	many	CORE	leaders	saw	these	northern	protests	as	little	more	than	a	means	to	an	end	of	dismantling	southern	segregation.	“We	don’t	want	to	put	Woolworth	stores	and	others	out	of	business	in	the	North	by	our	picket	lines,”	CORE	field	secretary	Gordon	
																																																								10	Jimmy	McDonald	interview	with	James	Mosby,	November	5,	1969.		 11	T.R.	Bassett,	“3,000	Picket	in	Harlem	To	Aid	South	Sitdowners,”	New	York	
Herald	Tribune,	April	3,	1960;	“First	Sit-In	Staged	At	Store	Here,”	New	York	Herald	
Tribune,	April	3,	1960.	
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Carey	told	reporters	that	weekend.	“We	just	want	to	put	justice	in	business	in	the	South.”12		 Though	the	contributions	of	CORE	chapters	and	supporters	in	New	York	City	in	reaching	their	goal	of	southern	desegregation	are	immeasurable,	as	Meier	and	Rudwick	note,	the	national	leadership	believed	that	their	national	boycott	campaign	had	been	directly	responsible	for	the	8.9	per	cent	drop	in	sales	from	the	previous	year	that	Woolworth’s	reported	in	March	1960.13	These	economic	sanctions,	in	turn,	had	compelled	southern	stores	to	reconsider	their	racially	discriminatory	policies.	By	July,	when	the	stores	in	Greensboro	began	serving	Black	customers,	Woolworth’s	had	begun	to	desegregate	its	stores	in	27	southern	cities.	Within	the	next	few	weeks,	ninety	towns	in	eleven	southern	states	had	reported	changes	in	their	local	store’s	racist	policies.14	Locally,	the	sympathy	strikes	also	had	the	significant	impact	of	drawing	students	and	local	people,	like	Jimmy	McDonald,	into	the	active	ranks	of	NY	CORE	and	into	direct	action	campaigns	in	their	communities.			 Although	their	vanguard	efforts	in	Harlem	had	helped	the	national	organization	coerce	the	desegregation	of	southern	department	stores	and	lunch	counters,	NY	CORE	struggled	to	find	their	place	within	Harlem’s	activist	milieu	in	1960.	While	predominantly	Black	organizations	like	the	LHTC	and	NY	Crusader	Family	had	mobilized	Harlem	communities	to	join	picket	lines	at	local	Woolworth’s	as	part	of	their	broader	programs,	the	mostly	white	demonstrators	from	NY	CORE																																																									12	“Plan	Stepped	Up	Picketing,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	April	9,	1960.		13	Meier	and	Rudwick,	CORE,	111.		 14	Ibid,	112.	
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and	Columbia	CORE	were	essentially	viewed	as	interlopers	in	a	majority	Black	neighborhood	when	they	launched	their	protests	against	southern	segregation.	When	the	group	of	students	first	began	walking	the	picket	lines	in	Harlem	that	February,	according	to	Brian	Purnell,	“many	black	pedestrians	looked	askance	at	the	overwhelmingly	white	group.”	In	a	neighborhood	where	Black	nationalist	rhetoric	resonated	from	street	corners	and	was	increasingly	characterizing	political	thought	at	the	grassroots,	the	white	students	stuck	out	like	a	sore	thumb.	However,	through	active	outreach	to	local	churches,	civic	groups,	and	politicians,	NY	CORE	eventually	earned	the	endorsement	of	prominent	leaders	such	as	Adam	Clayton	Powell,	who	agreed	that	the	problem	of	segregation	was	a	national	issue	and	urged	that	all	“American	citizens	interested	in	democracy	stay	out	of	these	stores.”	Through	their	outreach	and	continued	presence	in	front	of	multiple	Woolworth’s,	the	NY	CORE	picket	lines	drew	a	larger	proportion	of	Black	demonstrators	by	the	early	spring.15		Despite	the	greater	racial	parity	along	the	picket	lines,	however,	the	middle-class	orientation	of	NY	CORE’s	organizational	policies	and	emphasis	on	respectability	politics	stood	in	the	way	of	building	authentic	coalitions	with	grassroots	organizations	and	poor	and	working-class	communities	in	Harlem.	At	a	February	meeting	of	the	chapter,	CORE’s	white	executive	director	James	Robinson	stressed	that	“well-dressed	pickets	were	received	more	favorably	by	the	public	than	those	who	carried	casual	dress	to	the	extreme,”	while	others	debated	the	merits	of	having	quiet,	orderly	picket	lines.	Two	days	later,	the	national	office	issued	
																																																								15	Brian	Purnell,	Fighting	Jim	Crow	in	the	County	of	Kings:	The	Congress	of	
Racial	Equality	in	Brooklyn	(Lexington:	The	University	of	Kentucky	Press,	2013),	38.	
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guidelines	for	all	CORE	pickets,	which	closely	resembled	these	discussions	of	the	NY	chapter	and	instructed	demonstrators	to	abstain	from	any	disruptive	actions	or	“abusive”	chants	or	slogans.16		So	when	Jesse	Gray,	Horace	Townsend,	and	the	LHTC	staged	more	raucous	demonstrations	at	the	picket	line	on	125th	Street,	CORE	demonstrators	were	quick	to	confront	the	LHTC	leaders	about	the	“extremely	noisy”	protest	and	their	organization’s	“lack	of	discipline.”	When	Gray	and	Townsend	defended	their	chanting	of	slogans,	which	“had	at	certain	points	turned	into	jeering	and	wisecracking,”	Robinson	hesitantly	conceded	but	proposed	that	the	groups	sing	instead.17	Although	NY	CORE	had	scored	a	modicum	of	success	in	mobilizing	Black	communities	in	Harlem	through	their	sympathy	protests,	it	was	clear	that	the	organization	would	need	to	reconsider	its	programs	and	policies	at	the	local	and	national	levels	in	order	to	get	in	step	with	the	rhythm	of	grassroots	organizing	in	Harlem.	As	a	result	of	their	efforts	to	actively	support	the	southern	sit-in	movement,	CORE	witnessed	an	exponential	growth	in	1960.	From	July	through	December	of	that	year,	the	number	of	chapters	grew	from	24	to	49	nationwide.	Despite	this	national	growth,	however,	there	remained	only	a	handful	of	chapters	outside	the	South,	and	most	of	these	chapters	were	predominantly	white.18	Furthermore,	the	flurry	of	activity	that	year	strained	the	capacities	of	the	national	office	and	exposed																																																									16	Meier	and	Rudwick,	CORE,	111.		 17	Ibid.		 18	Ibid,	126.	
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rifts	over	leadership	styles	and	organizational	philosophies.	To	Marvin	Rich,	a	white	Army	veteran,	member	of	NY	CORE	and	the	National	Action	Committee,	and	CORE’s	national	community	relations	director,	the	bureaucratic	leadership	style	of	national	director	James	Robinson	was	inhibiting	CORE’s	emergence	as	a	front-line	civil	rights	organization.19	According	to	Rich,	the	decision	to	name	James	Farmer	as	national	director	in	1961	was	the	culmination	of	extensive	internal	efforts	to	shift	CORE	from	“essentially	a	leader	organization	to	a	mass	organization.”	At	the	same	time,	the	national	office	realized	that	Black	leadership	was	critical	to	actualizing	this	shift	to	a	“mass	organization.”20		As	a	predominantly	white,	middle-class	organization	as	late	as	1961,	Rich	and	others	in	the	national	office	understood	that	for	CORE	to	build	a	mass	movement	they	needed	to	appeal	to	greater	numbers	of	African	Americans,	specifically	poor	and	working-class	communities.	Jimmy	McDonald	was	just	one	of	many	who	“resented	the	fact”	that	the	interracial	civil	rights	organization	was	led	primarily	by	white	men	like	Rich,	Robinson,	and	field	staffer	Gordon	Carey.21	By	hiring	Farmer,	a	dynamic	speaker	with	a	magnetic	personality,	CORE	sought	to	draw	upon	the	successes	of	charismatic	leaders	like	Martin	Luther	King,	Jr.	and	energetic	college	students	who	were	effectively	mobilizing	and	empowering	Black	communities	in	the	South	in	the	late	1950s.	“Lots	of	things	were	done	to	make	the																																																									19	Ibid,	126-131.		 20	Marvin	Rich	interview	with	James	Mosby,	November	6,	1969,	Ralph	Bunche	Oral	History	Collection,	Moorland-Spingarn	Research	Center,	Howard	University.		 21	Jimmy	McDonald	interview	with	James	Mosby,	November	5,	1969.	
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organization	more	appealing	to	black	masses,”	Rich	recalled.	Hiring	Farmer	to	succeed	James	Robinson	“was	done	in	part	with	that	in	mind.”22	Though	the	organization	remained	steadfast	in	its	position	on	building	an	interracial	mass	movement,	CORE’s	selection	of	James	Farmer	as	national	director	represented	a	tacit	acknowledgement	of	the	organizational	imperative	of	rising	calls	at	the	grassroots	for	Black	self-determination	within	civil	rights	organizations	in	the	early	1960s.		
“We	have	much	to	learn	as	well	as	do”:	New	York	CORE	Moves	Uptown			Though	the	sit-in	campaigns	marked	the	emergence	of	NY	CORE	and	spawned	the	formation	of	other	chapters,	most	notably	Brooklyn	CORE,	it	was	also	clear	that	the	northern	chapters	of	CORE	needed	to	chart	their	own	course	of	action	if	they	were	to	confront	the	racism	deeply	embedded	within	northern	cities.	That	February,	when	CORE’s	National	Action	Committee	appointed	James	Farmer	as	the	organization’s	new	national	director,	the	twenty-year	veteran	of	struggles	for	civil	rights	made	clear	his	intentions	to	bring	the	organization	into	step	with	the	demands	of	northern	Black	communities	whose	interests	in	southern	sympathy	campaigns	had	waned.	Speaking	at	the	national	convention	that	year,	Farmer	explained	that	the	northern	chapters	of	the	organization	could	not	survive	solely	“on	sympathy	with	the	South,”	but	needed	to	engage	in	local	struggles	that	addressed	the	range	of	pressing	needs	in	the	North.23	“CORE’s	method	of	direct,	non-violent	action	will	be	used	in	aggressive	efforts	during	the	coming	year	to	end	the	evil	of																																																									22	Marvin	Rich	interview	with	James	Mosby,	November	6,	1969.		 23	Meier	and	Rudwick,	CORE,	131,	182.	
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segregation	not	only	at	lunch	counters,”	Farmer	announced,	“but	also	in	theaters,	housing,	employment	and	transportation.”24	Despite	the	ongoing	dramatic	struggles	for	civil	rights	in	the	south,	Farmer	and	others	in	the	national	office	put	a	premium	on	organizing	in	the	urban	north,	particularly	in	New	York	City	where	CORE’s	national	headquarters	was	located.	Farmer	wasted	little	time	in	setting	the	organization’s	northern	agenda,	telling	Amsterdam	News	reporters	just	days	after	his	appointment	that	CORE’s	top	priorities	would	be	“the	complete	wiping	out	of	discrimination	in	housing”	and	“the	end	of	segregation	in	employment”	in	the	city.25		
	 By	the	time	Farmer	dedicated	the	national	office	to	open-housing	campaigns	in	the	city,	NY	CORE’s	housing	secretary	Gladys	Harrington	had	already	laid	the	groundwork	for	such	efforts.	Born	in	Gainesville,	Florida	in	1928,	Harrington	had	graduated	from	Florida	A&M	and	participated	in	the	1956	Tallahassee	bus	boycotts	before	moving	to	Corona,	Queens	in	the	late	1950s.26	A	social	worker	by	day,	Harrington	quickly	established	herself	amongst	the	leadership	ranks	of	NY	CORE,	and	by	the	spring	of	1960	she	was	coordinating	open	housing	drives	throughout	New	York	City.	Although	NY	CORE	had	been	an	active	supporter	of	the	1957	Sharkey-Brown-Issacs	Bill	which	outlawed	racial	discrimination	in	housing	rentals,	discriminatory	rental	practices	persisted	in	the	city	and	Harrington	used	the	momentum	of	the	sit-in	campaigns	as	a	springboard	to	promote	integrated																																																									24	“CORE	Gets	New	National	Director,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	February	4,	1961.		25	Ibid.		 26	Letter	from	Marvin	Rich	to	Paul	Berger,	April	20,	1961,	accessed	at	www.harlemcore.com	/.	
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neighborhoods	in	the	city.	In	the	spring	of	1960,	Harrington	announced	NY	CORE’s	plans	to	test	the	city’s	enforcement	of	its	fair	housing	law	by	having	white	CORE	members	apply	for	rental	units	after	Black	applicants	had	been	denied.	In	cases	where	Black	applicants	were	denied,	but	white	applicants	were	accepted	for	a	rental,	Harrington	led	CORE	members	in	demonstrations	and	sit-ins	at	rental	offices	to	protest	the	discrimination,	while	also	filing	complaints	with	the	city’s	Commission	On	Intergroup	Relations.27			 Harrington	and	NY	CORE’s	approach	to	tackling	the	housing	crisis	facing	Black	communities	in	New	York	City	was	fundamentally	different	than	that	of	Jesse	Gray	and	other	tenants	rights	activists	in	the	city.	Whereas	Gray	and	the	LHTC	organized	tenants	to	fight	against	exploitative	landlords	and	for	humane	housing	conditions	and	political	empowerment	within	Black	communities,	Harrington’s	mission	was	to	break	down	the	barriers	that	restricted	Black	residents	to	neighborhoods	where	poor	housing	predominated.	Upon	announcing	these	early	housing	efforts,	Harrington	pointed	out	that	CORE	did	not	intend	to	wage	a	“broadside	campaign,”	but	rather	to	assist	those	who	wanted	to	obtain	housing	“outside	ghetto	areas.”28		Despite	a	handful	of	successes	in	securing	housing	for	middle-class	Black	renters	in	Brooklyn,	including	future	NY	CORE	chairman	Clarence	Funnyé	in	the	summer	of	1961,	CORE’s	open	housing	drive	was	limited	in	its	impacts	for	two																																																									27	“CORE	Starts	Direct	Action	Drive	Here,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	May	14,	1960;	“Housing	Bias	Victims	Stage	Realty	Sit-In,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	August	20,	1960.		 28	Ibid.	
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primary	reasons.	First,	as	Meier	and	Rudwick	note,	“few	blacks	had	the	money,	inclination,	and	stamina	to	move	into	white	neighborhoods,”	therefore	restricting	the	benefits	of	CORE’s	efforts	to	those	in	the	Black	middle-class	while	failing	to	engage	poor	and	working-class	communities	whose	interests	were	outside	the	scope	of	CORE’s	organizing.29	Second,	by	leaning	heavily	on	the	city’s	Commission	on	Intergroup	Relations	CORE	fell	into	the	trap	of	advocating	for	civil	and	human	rights	through	an	apparatus	of	the	liberal	governance	which	had	already	proven	wholly	incapable	of	bringing	forth	any	meaningful	political	or	social	reform.	Despite	these	obvious	shortcomings	in	CORE’s	early	housing	programs,	Harrington	was	influential	in	employing	confrontational	direct	action	tactics	to	protest	housing	conditions—a	tactic	which	would	come	to	define	CORE’s	approach	to	community	organizing	in	Harlem	after	she	was	elected	chair	of	the	NY	chapter	later	that	year.		 Though	the	sit-in	movement	and	open	housing	campaigns	of	1960-61	buoyed	CORE’s	national	and	local	reputation,	the	membership	of	NY	CORE	remained	dismally	low.	With	a	total	membership	base	of	less	than	50	people,	NY	CORE	was	still	the	largest	active	chapter	outside	of	the	South,	but	paled	in	comparison	to	the	number	of	members	and	supporters	that	other	organizations	in	the	city	claimed.30	In	addition	to	the	middle-class	bias	of	their	organizing	efforts	and	protest	ethos,	NY	CORE’s	bureaucratic	membership	policies	largely	discouraged	the	active																																																									29	Meier	and	Rudwick,	CORE,	183-84.	It	is	worth	noting	that	the	two-bedroom	apartment	CORE	helped	Clarence	Funnyé	to	secure	was	rented	for	$141	per	month	in	1961.	The	median	income	for	residents	of	Central	Harlem	in	1960	was	$3,480.	See	HARYOU,	Youth	in	the	Ghetto:	A	Study	of	the	Consequences	of	Powerlessness	and	a	
Blueprint	for	Change	(New	York:	HARYOU,	1964),	133.		 30	Meier	and	Rudwick,	CORE,	151.	
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participation	of	the	grassroots.	According	to	Meier	and	Rudwick,	field	staff	were	“instructed	to	zealously	maintain	CORE’s	tradition	of	‘closed	membership”	by	mandating	that	chapters	restrict	formal	membership	to	“those	who	served	a	probationary	period,	participated	in	action	projects,	received	approval	from	two-thirds	of	the	chapter,	and	committed	themselves	to	following	the	CORE	Rules	For	Action.”31	In	addition	to	its	reputation	as	a	white	organization,	this	rigid	membership	process	contributed	to	popular	perceptions	in	Harlem	that	CORE	only	accepted	people	with	a	college	education.32		Furthermore,	operating	out	of	a	donated	office	space	in	mid-town	Manhattan,	NY	CORE	was	a	civil	rights	organization	with	no	brick	and	mortar	presence	within	the	borough’s	largest	African	American	community.	Though	the	members	of	other	groups	like	the	Organization	of	Young	Men	and	On	Guard	For	Freedom	largely	lived	downtown	or	in	Brooklyn,	they	also	recognized	the	importance	of	locating	their	organizational	efforts	in	the	streets	of	Harlem.	Despite	the	momentum	generated	by	the	sit-ins	and	the	minor	victories	scored	in	housing	integration,	these	factors	left	NY	CORE	floundering	in	a	city	where	the	Black	masses	were	ready	to	move.	This	began	to	change,	however,	when	Farmer	became	national	director	in	early	1961	and	embarked	on	one	of	the	most	impactful	and	iconic	campaigns	of	the	Civil	Rights	
																																																								31	Ibid.		32	Doris	Innis	interview	with	August	Meier,	October	12,	1971,	Box	56,	Folder	9,	August	Meier	Papers,	Schomburg	Center	for	Research	in	Black	Culture,	New	York	Public	Library	(henceforth	referred	to	as	Meier	Papers).	
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Movement.	“When	Jim	came	in,”	Jimmy	McDonald	recalled,	“a	whole	new	thing	took	place.”33	Farmer’s	appointment	that	winter	coincided	with	the	organization’s	search	for	a	new	national	campaign	that	would	allow	CORE	to	penetrate	the	Deep	South	with	nonviolent	direct	action	while	launching	the	organization	into	the	vanguard	of	the	Civil	Rights	Movement.	“That	began	another	era	in	CORE,”	McDonald	later	said,	“Jim	came	in	and	they	began	talking	about	a	freedom	ride.”34	The	same	week	that	Harrington	announced	NY	CORE’s	plans	to	apply	the	Ghandian	tactics	of	non-violent	resistance	to	housing	desegregation	in	New	York	City,	a	group	of	thirteen	CORE	members	left	the	nation’s	capital	on	two	Trailways	buses	headed	South.	The	interracial	group,	which	included	NY	CORE	members	James	Peck	and	Jimmy	McDonald,	set	out	to	test	the	Supreme	Court’s	recent	decision	in	Boynton	v.	Virginia,	which	outlawed	segregation	in	interstate	bus	and	train	terminals.		As	the	Freedom	Rides	grew	that	spring	and	summer	amid	bus	bombings,	brutal	beatings,	and	relentless	violence,	activists	from	throughout	the	country	joined	the	campaign	in	waves,	departing	from	points	across	the	South.	It	was	during	these	latter	waves	of	Freedom	Rides	that	John	Lowry,	a	white	student	from	New	York,	made	the	trip	to	Monroe,	NC	in	early	August	in	an	attempt	to	prove	that	nonviolent	direct	action	could	work	in	a	crucible	of	white	supremacist	violence.	After	dozens	were	beaten	and	arrested	during	nonviolent	demonstrations,	including	SNCC	leader	James	Forman,	Lowry	was	charged	with	kidnapping	alongside	Mae																																																									33	Jimmy	McDonald	interview	with	James	Mosby,	November	5,	1969.		34	Ibid,	19.	
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Mallory	and	Robert	F.	Williams	and	spent	months	in	jail	and	years	battling	the	spurious	criminal	charges.	Despite	their	failure	to	curb	racial	violence	and	segregation	in	Monroe,	the	Freedom	Riders	did	largely	succeed	in	eliminating	segregation	in	interstate	travel	facilities	by	provoking	confrontations	that	exposed	the	naked	brutality	of	southern	racism	and	forced	federal	intervention.		While	the	Freedom	Rides	and	their	impacts	upon	the	Civil	Rights	Movement	have	been	extensively	documented	and	analyzed,	the	specific	ways	in	which	this	watershed	campaign	influenced	the	development	of	NY	CORE	and	local	struggles	in	New	York	City	have	received	less	scholarly	attention.	Like	the	sit-ins,	the	Freedom	Rides	energized	and	inspired	Black	communities	in	Harlem—particularly	the	poor	and	working	classes—to	engage	more	actively	in	local	struggles	for	rights	and	power.	Whereas	the	sympathy	strikes	and	other	demonstrations	had	previously	drawn	the	support	of	predominantly	white,	middle-class	protestors,	by	the	summer	of	1961	CORE	saw	an	influx	of	working-class	Black	participation.		With	this	changing	demographic	came	a	shift	in	organizational	priorities	and	policies,	which	came	to	more	closely	resemble	the	grassroots	militancy	that	was	beginning	to	flower	in	Harlem	at	this	time.	Increasingly	disillusioned	with	gradualist	approaches	to	Black	equality	and	empowerment	and	recognizing	CORE	as	a	potential	vehicle	for	social	transformation	in	the	wake	of	the	Freedom	Rides,	this	new	wave	of	activists	would	push	the	organization	to	adopt	more	militant	tactics	to	achieve	more	immediate	and	fundamental	goals	in	the	months	and	years	to	follow.	This	groundswell	of	poor	and	working-class	local	activists,	furthermore,	was	forcing	local	and	national	CORE	officials	and	members	to	wrestle	with	the	debates	over	
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nonviolence,	grassroots	community	organizing,	self-determination,	integration,	and	Black	nationalism	that	were	shaping	the	broader	Black	Freedom	Struggle.35			 While	NY	CORE	remained	dedicated	to	its	principles	of	nonviolence	and	integration	during	this	period,	some	organizers	were	also	sewing	the	seeds	of	a	militant	nationalism	that	would	flower	in	the	years	to	follow	and	cause	a	major	rift	amongst	the	New	York	chapters.	As	Farmer’s	appointment	in	early	1961	indicated,	there	were	growing	demands	in	New	York	and	across	the	nation	for	increased	Black	representation	in	the	national	decision-making	bodies	of	CORE	and	other	civil	rights	organizations.	At	the	same	time,	NY	CORE	and	other	local	chapters	were	fighting	for	the	decentralization	of	the	national	leadership,	seeking	greater	representation	in	the	decision-making	process	and	greater	autonomy	for	local	chapters.	Gladys	Harrington	herself	expressed	concern	“that	participation	in	the	arm	that	is	responsible	for	the	day	to	day	decisions	(program	and	policy)	of	CORE	by	the	areas	and	persons	most	affected	is	noticeably	absent.”36		These	struggles	came	to	a	head	in	the	fall	of	1961,	when	Harrington	and	former	executive	director	James	Robinson	waged	a	successful	struggle	to	democratize	the	national	organization	through	restructuring	CORE’s	governing	body,	the	National	Action	Council.37	More	importantly,	however,	these	internal	debates	were	reflective	of	broader	demands	for	Black	community	control	and	self-
																																																								35	Meier	and	Rudwick,	CORE,	144-46.		36	Letter	from	Gladys	Harrington	to	Alan	Gartner,	January	6,	1962,	CORE	Papers.		 37	Meier	and	Rudwick,	CORE,	144-46.	
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determination	within	both	civil	rights	organizations	and	American	society	writ-large.	“Perhaps,	we	are	still	in	the	throes	of	birth	pains	as	a	National	Civil	Rights	organization	and	we	have	much	to	learn	as	well	as	do,”	Harrington	suggested	in	early	1962.	“In	the	process,	let	us	not	lose	faith	with	the	people	we	are	fighting	with	and	for.”38	With	these	ends	in	mind,	Harrington	and	other	CORE	leaders	in	the	NY	metropolitan	area	increasingly	identified	their	organizational	approaches	with	the	needs	and	aspirations	of	poor	and	working-class	Black	communities	who	were	fueling	these	calls	for	more	immediate	self-determination,	human	rights,	and	political	empowerment.		Though	Harrington	and	NY	CORE	struggled	throughout	1961	and	the	following	year	to	devise	comprehensive	direct	action	programs	that	could	effectively	challenge	the	systemic	racism	of	the	urban	north,	they	did	take	important	steps	in	this	direction.	The	earlier	open	housing	campaigns	had	scored	only	minor,	piecemeal	victories,	but	had	provided	useful	lessons	on	the	programmatic	limitations	of	open-housing	campaigns	that	catered	to	the	middle-class.	Recognizing	the	need	to	develop	new	programs	that	would	attract	the	active	support	of	the	grassroots,	who	were	quickly	becoming	the	most	dynamic	force	within	the	Black	Freedom	Struggle,	Harrington	announced	in	September	1961	that	NY	CORE	would	be	moving	its	office	to	Harlem.		By	November,	NY	CORE	had	set	up	shop	in	a	building	on	125th	Street	that	also	housed	the	New	York	branch	of	the	NAACP.		To	the	editorial	staff	of	the	Amsterdam	
																																																								38	Letter	from	Gladys	Harrington	to	Alan	Gartner,	January	6,	1962,	CORE	Papers.	
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News,	the	close	proximity	of	these	two	major	civil	rights	groups	held	the	promise	of	a	dynamic	collaboration	that	could	mobilize	the	masses	in	Harlem.	“A	hard-hitting	youthful	NAACP	branch,	working	side	by	side	from	the	same	offices,	with	a	free-swinging,	two-fisted	CORE	unit,”	an	early	November	editorial	predicted,	“should	cause	many	who	have	been	too	long	walking	on	their	heels	in	this	community	to	get	back	up	on	their	toes	again.”39	While	Malcolm	X’s	calls	for	a	Black	united	front	at	this	time	had	largely	gone	unanswered	by	integrationist	leaders	and	organizations,	the	
Amsterdam	News	saw	the	makings	of	a	similar,	if	more	moderate,	coalition	in	CORE’s	move	uptown.	Though	the	editorial	staff	may	have	overestimated	the	influence	of	the	NAACP	in	Harlem	at	this	time,	they	nonetheless	recognized	the	impacts	that	a	youthful	organization	that	championed	direct	action	could	have	upon	the	progression	of	the	Movement	and	the	realization	of	economic,	political,	and	social	justice	in	Harlem.			 More	than	a	symbolic	gesture,	the	move	to	Harlem	represented	a	formative	moment	in	NY	CORE’s	evolution	as	a	community-based	organization.	Though	some	of	the	chapter’s	members	objected	to	the	move,	arguing	that	an	organization	advocating	an	open	society	should	not	move	into	the	“heart”	of	a	“ghetto,”	the	majority	of	its	membership	felt	otherwise.	“We	are	desperately	trying	to	get	more	Negroes	involved.	That’s	why	we	moved	to	Harlem,”	one	of	the	chapter’s	leaders	said,	while	also	acknowledging	that	most	of	the	organization’s	efforts	to	that	point	had	been	geared	toward	“the	bourgeois,	the	educated.”40	Though	Meier	and	
																																																								39	“Welcome,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	November	4,	1961.		
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Rudwick	credited	the	Freedom	Rides	with	stimulating	CORE	chapters	in	the	North	to	take	a	greater	interest	in	grassroots	organizing	within	Black	communities,	such	attribution	fails	to	acknowledge	how	the	existing	groundswell	of	activism	in	such	communities	influenced	this	organizational	shift.	In	actuality,	the	move	to	Harlem	really	signified	a	tactical	recognition	of	a	powerful	radical	grassroots	milieu,	nurtured	by	Black	communities	and	leaders,	which	had	been	fueling	Black	freedom	struggles	in	northern	cities.		The	grassroots	base	that	CORE	sought	to	attract	with	their	move	uptown	was	part	and	parcel	of	this	radical	milieu.	While	participating	in	CORE’s	nonviolent	direct	action	protests,	members	of	the	organization	like	Harlem	native	Peggy	Trotter	Dammond	Preacely	were	also	deeply	moved	by	the	Black	nationalism	that	was	surging	in	their	communities.	“We	heard	Malcolm	X	speak	at	the	local	Muslim	mosque,	and	we	hung	out	late	into	the	night	at	Micheaux’s	famous	black	bookstore	on	125th	Street,”	Preacely	later	wrote.41	In	order	to	truly	get	their	organization	“off	the	ground”	in	New	York	City,	the	organization	would	need	to	tap	into	this	wellspring	of	radical	Black	activism	in	Harlem	that	was	informing	grassroots	political	consciousness	and	action	throughout	New	York	City	and	the	nation.	In	the	years	to	follow,	however,	this	local	radical	milieu	that	NY	CORE	sought	to	mobilize	into	a	nonviolent	movement	for	an	open	society	would	end	up	pushing	the	local	and	national	organization	to	reconsider	many	of	its	positions	on	integration,	self-																																																																																																																																																																					40	Meier	and	Rudwick,	CORE,	198.		41	Peggy	Trotter	Dammond	Preacely,	“It	Was	Simply	In	My	Blood,”	in	Hands	
on	the	Freedom	Plow:	Personal	Accounts	By	Women	In	SNCC,	ed.	Faith	S.	Holsaert	et	al.	(Urbana:	University	of	Illinois	Press,	2010),	166.	
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determination,	and	nonviolence	in	the	service	of	a	more	expansive	program	for	Black	liberation	and	social	transformation.			
“Their	fight	is	now	our	fight”:	The	Genesis	of	the	Northern	Student	Movement		By	the	time	NY	CORE	made	the	move	uptown,	it	had	become	clear	that	they	weren’t	the	only	interracial	group	with	their	sights	set	on	Harlem.	As	the	Civil	Rights	Movement	surged	across	the	nation	in	the	summer	of	1961,	an	interracial	group	of	Cornell	University	students	left	the	scenic	gorges	of	Ithaca,	New	York	to	get	a	first	hand	glimpse	of	what	was	happening	on	the	front	lines	of	the	Movement.	As	part	of	an	initiative	called	“Project	Understanding,”	the	group	of	seven	students	visited	Harlem	that	summer	to	“learn	from	Lenox	Avenue.”	“More	than	most	streets	in	America,”	group	member	Danny	Schechter	wrote,	Lenox	Avenue	had	“a	lesson	to	offer.”42		Led	by	Schechter,	a	Jewish	labor-relations	major	at	Cornell	and	Bronx	native,	the	group	sought	out	lessons	on	the	realities	of	the	Jim	Crow	North	in	the	classrooms	of	the	streets	of	Harlem.	During	their	brief	trip,	the	students	saw	churches	and	bars,	Sugar	Hill	and	tenement	blocks.	They	visited	the	Nation	of	Islam’s	Temple	No.	7,	and	ate	bean	pies	while	Malcolm	X	“spoke	about	soul.”	But	the	most	effective	teachers	of	Harlem,	Schechter	reflected,	were	“the	men	who	do	nothing	more	than	stroll	down	this	broad	promenade.”	If	Malcolm	X	and	other	observers	were	right	in	their	assessment	of	urban	Black	underclasses	as	the	most	
																																																								42	Danny	Schechter,	News	Dissector:	Passions,	Pieces,	and	Polemics,	1960-2000	(New	York:	Akashic	Books,	2001),	32.	
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explosive	element	in	American	society,	then	the	students	had	learned	from	some	of	the	most	capable	teachers	of	northern	racism	in	the	nation.		Though	a	relatively	minor	undertaking,	“Project	Understanding”	was	part	of	a	rising	tide	of	concern	about	American	racism	and	civil	rights	that	was	sweeping	across	college	campuses	throughout	the	nation.	The	prior	year,	Black	students	across	the	South	had	galvanized	the	Civil	Rights	Movement	with	widely-publicized	sit-ins,	and	ushered	in	a	new	phase	of	nonviolent	civil	disobedience	and	student	activism.	In	1961,	the	Freedom	Rides	launched	by	CORE,	and	continued	by	SNCC,	sent	shockwaves	through	the	nation	as	footage	of	burning	buses	and	bloodied	Freedom	Riders	flashed	continuously	across	television	screens	in	American	households.	SNCC’s	emergence	as	an	independent,	grassroots	student	organization	marked	a	clear	departure	from	the	bourgeois	leadership	that	had	long	dominated	mainstream	civil	rights	organizations.	With	the	new	decade	still	in	its	infancy,	this	generation	of	students—the	age	peers	of	Emmett	Till—had	sparked	what	James	Baldwin	described	as	“a	revolution	in	the	consciousness	of	this	country	which	will	inexorably	destroy	nearly	all	that	we	now	think	of	as	concrete	and	indisputable.”43	Inspired	by	the	bold	actions	of	their	southern	counterparts,	college	students	in	the	North	began	to	engage	in	mobilization	efforts	to	aid	in	the	southern	struggle.		As	the	Freedom	Rides	were	underway	through	the	South	in	the	spring	of	1961,	stirrings	amongst	concerned	white	college	students	in	the	North	began	to	coalesce	into	coordinated	action	for	involvement	in	the	national	Civil	Rights	
																																																								43	James	Baldwin,	The	Price	of	the	Ticket:	Collected	Nonfiction	1948-1985	(New	York:	St.	Martin’s-Marek,	1985),	262.		
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Movement.	In	New	Haven,	Connecticut,	a	meeting	with	three	Black	students	from	Virginia	Theological	Seminary	and	College	proved	inspirational	for	Yale	University	sophomore	Peter	Countryman.	A	white	philosophy	major	from	Chicago,	Illinois,	Countryman	had	been	assisting	youth	workers	with	programs	for	Black	children	in	a	local	neighborhood	when	the	three	young	women	from	Virginia	came	to	discuss	their	experiences	at	a	recent	sit-in	demonstration.	“I	was	very	impressed	with	their	honesty	and	integrity	and	sacrifice,”	Countryman	said	of	the	encounter,	“it	made	the	academic	world	seem	pretty	sterile,	and	I	decided	I	had	to	do	something.”	Moved	by	the	experience,	and	told	of	the	dire	condition	of	the	school’s	library	by	one	of	the	young	women,	Countryman	cut	class	for	the	next	two	weeks	to	wage	a	personal	campaign	to	send	six	thousand	books	to	Virginia.44	Countryman’s	chance	encounter	with	the	students	from	Virginia	Theological	Seminary	proved	a	formative	moment	in	his	personal	and	political	development.	More	importantly,	however,	it	provided	the	impetus	for	the	organization	of	northern	college	students	for	collective	involvement	in	the	Civil	Rights	Movement.	At	a	conference	sponsored	by	the	New	England	Student	Christian	Movement	that	June,	Countryman	was	chosen	as	chairman	of	a	committee	to	“investigate	the	possibility	of	creating	a	Northern	student	civil	rights	movement.”45	The	committee	
																																																								44	R.W.	Apple,	Jr.,	“The	Ivy	League	Integrationists,”	The	Reporter,	February	14,	1963.		 45	Ibid;	“Northern	Student	Movement,”	Box	5,	Folder	4,	NSM	Records;	As	Elizabeth	Tobierre	notes,	this	meeting	featured	keynotes	speeches	by	Dr.	John	Maguire	of	Wesleyan	University	and	Yale	law	student	Marian	Wright,	who	spoke	about	their	experiences	with	Freedom	Rides	and	sit-ins.	Elizabeth	Tobierre,	“Black	Power	Does	Not	Come	Out	of	the	Sky’:	The	Emergence	of	Black	Power	Politics	in	the	
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initially	decided	to	coordinate	a	fundraising	campaign	to	support	the	Freedom	Riders	in	the	South,	but	by	October,	Countryman	had	pressured	the	committee	to	pursue	a	more	expansive	program.	That	October,	representatives	from	twenty	college	campuses	gathered	in	New	Haven	under	the	auspices	of	the	Northern	Student	Movement	Coordinating	Committee	to	develop	a	program	and	structure	for	a	national	movement	of	northern	college	students.	“As	students	we	can	no	longer	disregard	the	challenge	put	to	us	by	the	indomitable	spirit	of	the	Southern	student	movement,”	the	members	of	the	fledgling	“movement”	declared	in	their	founding	document.	“We	are	not	free	until	they	are	free;	their	fight	is	now	our	fight;	their	burdens,	ours	also.”46		The	first	year	of	the	Northern	Student	Movement’s	(NSM)	involvement	in	civil	rights	activities	was	characterized	by	a	two-pronged	approach:	providing	support	for	the	Southern	student	movement	and	developing	programs	to	confront	“Northern	Civil	Rights	Problems.”		By	1962,	the	NSM	had	raised	$9,000	for	SNCC’s	voter	registration	campaigns	in	the	South	and	sent	10,000	books	to	Miles	College	in	Birmingham,	Alabama.47	The	major	sources	of	these	contributions	came	from	college	and	church	organizations,	as	well	as	minor	individual	donations.48	In	
																																																																																																																																																																					Northern	Student	Movement,	1961-1968,”	(BA	thesis,	Duke	University,	2014),	23-24.	 	46	“Definitive	Statement	of	the	Northern	Student	Movement	Coordinating	Committee	of	New	England	(in	New	Haven),	Box	8,	Folder	5,	NSM	Records.		 47	“Northern	Student	Movement,”	Box	5,	Folder	4,	NSM	Records.		 48	Bill	Strickland,	“NSM	Goals	&	History,	and	Other	Reflections,”	Box	4,	Folder	13,	NSM	Records.	
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addition	to	raising	financial	support	for	the	southern	movement,	the	NSM	also	understood	the	importance	of	raising	individual	awareness	of	the	“urgency	of	the	racial	problem”	in	communities	that	were	largely	untouched	by	the	conflicts	sweeping	the	nation.		As	a	northern	campus	movement	of	predominantly	white	students	at	its	inception,	the	NSM’s	initial	target	population	was	other	white	students	who	were	not	directly	impacted	by	racial	oppression	and	had	few	ties	to	the	southern	struggle.	Countryman	and	other	NSMCC	organizers	understood	the	problem	of	American	racism	as	“basically	psychological”	and	“rooted	in	the	individual,”	and	therefore	designed	their	early	organizing	efforts	to	confront	racism	and	inspire	political	action	on	college	campuses	at	a	personal	level.49	“The	motivation	then,	was	essentially	personal,”	Bill	Strickland	later	wrote	of	NSM	recruitment	in	this	period.	“There	was…a	strongly	felt	need	to	educate	college	students	to	the	reality	of	the	racial	situation.”50	To	activate	this	latent	demographic,	NSM	organizers	promoted	a	moral	imperative	based	upon	their	identities	and	privileges	as	college	students	to	inspire	empathy	and	compel	students	to	become	actively	involved	in	struggles	for	civil	and	human	rights.	In	a	flyer	to	drum	up	financial	support	for	SNCC’s	voter	registration	drive,	the	NSM	described	the	experience	of	a	student	from	Trinity	College	who	was	left	scarred	by	a	shotgun	blast	while	participating	in	voter	registration	work.	“There	
																																																								49	Letter	from	Peter	Countryman	to	Anne	Marting,	February	16,	1962,	Box	11,	Folder	8,	NSM	Records.		 50	Ibid.	
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are	constant	threats	of	beatings,	shootings,	and	lynchings—but	these	students	stay	there,”	the	flyer	read.	Students	reading	the	flyer	on	northern	campuses	were	then	prompted	to	ask	themselves	why	their	southern	counterparts	would	stay	there	despite	the	great	risk	to	life	and	limb.	“Mainly	because	they	believe	that	what	they’re	doing	is	right	and	is	important,”	the	flyer	concluded,	“and	because	it	sometimes	seems	that	if	they	don’t	try	to	help,	no	one	else	will.”51		Over	the	next	several	months,	the	NSMCC	focused	its	energies	on	outreach	and	organizing	on	college	campuses	in	the	Northeast,	primarily	liberal	arts	colleges	in	New	England.	To	Peter	Countryman,	who	himself	had	undergone	the	type	of	political	awakening	that	he	was	trying	to	replicate,	recruiting	students	into	a	northern	movement	required	that	students	first	be	drawn	into	the	southern	Civil	Rights	Movement	vicariously	through	these	campus	solidarity	campaigns.	Once	this	level	of	consciousness	had	been	established	and	mobilized,	Countryman	believed,	students	could	then	be	organized	“to	concentrate	on	the	less	spectacular”	problems	of	racial	oppression	in	the	North.52	By	the	summer	of	1962,	the	NSMCC	had	mobilized	this	approach	on	dozens	of	college	campuses	and	took	its	first	steps	toward	organized	direct	action	campaigns	in	the	urban	north.	In	April	1962,	300	delegates	from	60	colleges	converged	on	the	Bronxville	campus	of	Sarah	Lawrence	College	for	an	Inter-collegiate	Conference	on	Northern	
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Civil	Rights	convened	by	the	NSMCC.53	As	the	founding	convention	of	the	NSM,	the	conference	was	called	to	educate	students	on	the	realities	of	racial	discrimination	in	the	urban	north	and	to	build	a	program	for	organized	student	participation	in	the	northern	Civil	Rights	Movement.	To	develop	such	a	program,	the	NSMCC	called	upon	the	expertise	of	leaders	in	northern	Black	Freedom	Struggles,	such	as	Kenneth	Clark,	Mark	Lane,	Paul	Zuber,	and	Rev.	Leon	Sullivan,	to	explain	how	a	northern	brand	of	Jim	Crow	shaped	conditions	in	housing,	education,	employment,	and	policing	in	Black	communities.54	Clark,	Lane,	and	Zuber	were	all	seasoned	veterans	of	ongoing	struggles	for	equal	justice	in	education,	housing,	and	politics	in	Harlem.	Sullivan,	a	stalwart	in	civil	rights	struggles	in	Philadelphia	and	uncle	of	Sarah	Lawrence	student	Joan	Cannady,	spoke	to	students	about	a	series	of	“selective	patronage”	campaigns	that	he	coordinated	to	successfully	protest	discriminatory	hiring	practices	of	several	businesses	in	his	city.55	Sullivan	encouraged	the	students	to	undertake	similar	campaigns	in	their	own	cities,	while	also	building	more	expansive	programs	for	African	American	empowerment.		While	focusing	specifically	on	engaging	with	northern	struggles	for	rights	and	power,	Countryman	and	the	NSMCC	coordinators	understood	their	“movement”	as	intrinsically	linked	with	the	southern	struggles	that	they	had	been	supporting																																																									53	Tobierre,	“Black	Power	Does	Not	Come	Out	of	the	Sky,”	26-28.		 54	Ibid;	United	States	National	Student	Association	Press	Release,	April	11,	1962,	BOSS	Records.		 55	R.W.	Apple,	Jr.,	“The	Ivy	League	Integrationists,”	The	Reporter,	February	14,	1963;	Tobierre,	“Black	Power	Does	Not	Come	Out	of	the	Sky,”	38-40;	Matthew	Countryman,	Up	South:	Civil	Rights	and	Black	Power	in	Philadelphia	(Philadelphia:	University	of	Pennsylvania	Press,	2006),	181.	
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from	afar	for	several	months	prior.	At	the	Sarah	Lawrence	conference,	NSM	organizers	demonstrated	that	they	not	only	looked	south	for	personal	inspiration	to	engage	in	similar	struggles	in	their	own	communities,	but	also	for	guidance	in	translating	that	inspiration	into	strategic	organizing	as	part	of	a	national	student	movement.	Countryman	had	been	in	frequent	correspondence	with	southern	organizers	as	he	worked	to	build	the	NSM,	and	had	invited	Charles	Sherrod	and	Chuck	McDew	of	SNCC	to	speak	to	northern	students	at	the	conference	about	their	organizing	experiences	in	the	South.56	McDew,	chairman	of	SNCC	at	the	time,	and	Sherrod,	director	of	the	organization’s	Southwest	Georgia	Voter	Registration	Project,	provided	the	students	with	materials	on	SNCC’s	organizational	structure	and	leadership	principles,	and	explained	how	voter	registration	campaigns	emerged	from	a	collective	belief	that	liberatory	societal	change	was	possible	in	the	Jim	Crow	South	through	individual	empowerment	and	collective	action.57	With	this	education	and	inspiration,	delegates	at	the	Sarah	Lawrence	conference	resolved	that	NSM	would	expand	upon	their	supporting	role	in	the	southern	Movement	to	officially	begin	organizing	campaigns	in	northern	Black	communities.			
																																																								56	Tobierre,	“Black	Power	Does	Not	Come	Out	of	the	Sky,”	27.		 57	Ibid;	Also	in	attendance	at	the	conference	was	Philadelphia-native	John	Churchville,	who	had	dropped	out	of	Temple	University	to	pursue	a	career	as	a	jazz	composer	and	pianist	in	New	York	City.	While	in	New	York,	Churchville	was	a	regular	visitor	of	the	NOI’s	Temple	No.	7,	where	he	met	Malcolm	X	and	underwent	a	political	and	psychological	transformation	through	his	introduction	to	“the	black	nationalist	thing.”	At	the	conference,	Churchville	was	recruited	by	SNCC	staff	to	drive	a	donated	bus	to	SNCC	headquarters	in	Atlanta,	where	he	stayed	as	a	member	of	the	organization’s	field	staff.	Countryman,	Up	South,	181-182.	
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The	Northern	Student	Movement	Comes	to	Harlem	The	students	of	the	NSM	were	certainly	not	alone	in	their	ambitions	to	organize	northern	campaigns	for	African	American	rights	and	power	within	the	framework	of	a	broader	national	movement.	Rather,	the	NSM’s	efforts	were	symptomatic	of	escalating	efforts	of	northern	organizers	to	connect	their	struggles	in	the	Jim	Crow	North	more	prominently	within	the	surging	national	Civil	Rights	Movement.	For	the	past	several	years,	New	Yorkers	had	mobilized	in	support	of	southern	struggles	through	solidarity	protests	and	fundraising	campaigns,	while	also	framing	their	own	struggles	within	the	context	of	the	more	highly	publicized	southern	movement.		The	same	night	as	the	Sarah	Lawrence	Conference,	members	of	CORE	and	SNCC	organized	a	mass	meeting	at	the	Roosevelt	Auditorium	in	Union	Square	to	“protest	the	treatment	of	southern	freedom	fighters	and	to	call	attention	to	the	atrocities	going	on	at	present.”	Among	the	200	attendees	of	the	meeting	were	a	host	of	nationally	recognized	civil	rights	leaders,	including	Cleveland	Robinson	of	the	Negro	American	Labor	Council,	James	Farmer	and	Jim	Peck	of	CORE,	Elton	Cuff	and	Chuck	McDew	of	SNCC,	comedian	and	activist	Dick	Gregory,	and	Bayard	Rustin.	Rustin,	who	served	as	chair	of	the	meeting,	called	attention	to	the	under-recognized	national	scope	of	American	racism,	plainly	stating	that	“equality	of	housing,	government	jobs,	and	other	fields	of	endeavor	is	not	yet	prevalent	in	New	York.”	Though	hardly	news	to	those	in	attendance,	Rustin’s	declaration	was	a	call	to	action	for	a	national	coordination	of	civil	rights	organizations	to	confront	the	expansive	nature	of	an	American	apartheid	that	knew	no	geographic	borders.	“Inequalities	
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must	be	suppressed	not	only	in	the	South,”	Rustin	declared,	“but	also	in	New	York.”58		Rustin’s	charge	to	the	mass	meeting	at	Roosevelt	Auditorium	was	indicative	of	a	popular	recognition	of	a	northern	civil	rights	milieu,	nurtured	by	local	people	and	grassroots	organizers,	which	the	NSM	sought	to	engage	with.	Emerging	from	the	Sarah	Lawrence	conference	with	a	sense	of	purpose	and	direction,	members	of	the	NSM	launched	several	nonviolent,	direct	action	campaigns	to	protest	racial	discrimination,	and	began	organizing	community	projects	in	several	cities.	That	summer,	100	students	formed	a	day-long	picket	line	outside	an	apartment	complex	in	Rye,	NY	to	protest	the	landlord’s	refusal	to	rent	to	an	African	American	family.59	During	the	fall,	the	NSM	sent	busloads	of	students	to	the	Eastern	Shore	of	Maryland	to	participate	in	sit-ins	at	restaurants	that	refused	to	serve	African	American	customers.	Recognizing	the	systemic	nature	of	racial	inequality	in	the	region,	the	interracial	group	of	students	involved	in	the	Eastern	Shore	Project	escalated	their	organizing	efforts	to	focus	on	voter	registration	campaigns	in	Easton,	Cambridge,	and	Chestertown	with	the	broader	goal	of	building	a	self-sustaining	local	movement	through	the	promotion	of	“a	community	consciousness	and	an	indigenous	leadership	among	the	Negroes.”60		
																																																								58	Memo	from	Robert	L.	Cea	to	Commanding	Officer,	April	12,	1962,	BOSS	Records.		59	Ibid,	31;	“Northern	Student	Movement,”	Box	5,	Folder	4,	NSM	Records.		 60	Tobierre,	“Black	Power	Does	Not	Come	Out	of	the	Sky,”	32;	“Northern	Student	Movement,”	Box	5,	Folder	4,	NSM	Records.	
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The	most	expansive	initiative	that	the	NSM	began	in	1962,	however,	was	aimed	at	leveraging	the	skills,	privileges,	and	access	to	resources	that	college	students	possessed	to	confront	the	gross	racial	inequalities	in	public	education	in	northern	cities.	In	Philadelphia,	Harlem,	and	Prince	Edward	County,	Virginia,	NSM	field	staff	established	tutorial	programs	that	summer	to	provide	underserved	high	school	students	with	greater	access	to	educational	opportunities,	as	well	as	to	organize	communities	against	the	oppressive	conditions	of	public	education	that	pervaded	African	American	communities.61	Despite	the	organizing	efforts	of	community	leaders	such	as	Ella	Baker,	Kenneth	and	Mamie	Clark,	Mae	Mallory,	and	Paul	Zuber	over	the	previous	decade,	African	American	students	in	Harlem—and	throughout	New	York	City—largely	remained	in	segregated,	underfunded,	and	overcrowded	schools.	NSM	organizers	understood	these	persistent	conditions	of	Harlem’s	schools	as	symptomatic	of	the	systemic	racial	oppression	that	created	and	enforced	the	institutional	restraints	of	urban	ghettos.62	At	the	same	time,	NSM	organizers	believed,	this	systemic	denial	of	educational	opportunity	was	inherently	oppressive	by	design	and	served	to	perpetuate	a	ghetto	pathology	marked	by	resignation,	apathy,	unemployment,	criminality,	and	hopelessness.	Therefore,	
																																																								61	“Northern	Student	Movement,”	Box	5,	Folder	4,	NSM	Records;	Bill	Strickland,	“NSM	Goals	&	History,	and	Other	Reflections,”	Box	4,	Folder	13,	NSM	Records.		 62	The	broader	analysis	of	systemic	racial	oppression	held	by	NSM	organizers	was	succinctly	summarized	by	Harlem	Education	Project	staff	member	Kathie	Rogers	in	an	undated	essay	in	which	she	wrote,	“Our	economics,	our	politics	and	our	prejudiced	social	values	are	responsible	for	the	underdeveloped	ghetto.”	Kathie	Rogers,	“Some	facts	about	the	N.Y.C.	public	school	system,”	Box	8,	Folder	12,	NSM	Records.	
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organizing	to	improve	and	expand	educational	opportunity	held	the	potential	to	disrupt	this	“vicious	circle,”	and	the	possibility	to	inspire	“the	awakening	of	the	ghetto	to	the	extent	of	its	own	power.”63		With	grand	visions	and	modest	beginnings,	student	members	of	the	NSM	formally	launched	the	tutorial	program	in	Central	Harlem	in	July	1962.64	In	the	months	following	the	Sarah	Lawrence	conference,	a	coordinating	committee	of	student	organizers	worked	with	the	Harlem	Neighborhood	Association	(HANA),	a	community	coalition	of	80	church	and	civic	groups,	to	build	the	organizational	framework	for	what	would	become	the	Harlem	Education	Project	(HEP).	At	its	inception	that	summer,	HEP’s	tutorial	program	consisted	of	25	tutors	recruited	by	NSM	members	from	various	colleges	and	universities	and	50	students.	Twice	a	week,	tutors	would	meet	with	small	groups	of	students	at	HANA	headquarters	and	the	nearby	Harlem	YMCA	for	tutoring	sessions	in	basic	academic	subjects.65	By	September,	215	college	students	were	tutoring	Harlem	students	in	bi-weekly	sessions	at	five	community	centers.	In	addition	to	the	tutoring	sessions,	HEP	also	
																																																								63	“A	Statement	of	the	Aims	and	Philosophy	of	the	Harlem	Education	Project	and	a	Prospectus	for	the	Summer	of	1963,”	Box	8,	Folder	11,	NSM	Records;	Bill	Strickland,	“NSM	Goals	&	History,	and	Other	Reflections,”	Box	4,	Folder	13,	NSM	Records.		64	Though	the	idea	for	a	tutorial	program	in	Harlem	was	first	conceived	in	the	fall	of	1961,	the	project	“did	not	gain	support”	until	the	Sarah	Lawrence	conference.	Harlem	Educational	Project,	“GET	HIP	WITH	HEP,”	Box	8,	Folder	10,	NSM	Records.		 65	NSM,	“Summer	Tutorials—1962,”	Box	76,	Folder	24,	Meier	Papers.	
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launched	a	student	newspaper,	The	Harlem	Voice,	and	held	workshops	in	art,	dance,	and	drama.66	One	overlooked,	but	central	aspect	of	HEP’s	educational	programming	was	a	series	of	public	lectures	and	discussions	on	African	American	history	and	the	Civil	Rights	Movement.	These	weekly	sessions	were	led	by	prominent	Black	intellectuals	and	activists	in	Harlem,	including	intellectual-activist	and	Freedomways	associate	editor	Dr.	John	Henrik	Clarke,	sociologist	Dr.	Robert	Johnson,	and	SNCC	chairman	Chuck	McDew.	Discussions	focused	on	“the	historical	and	cultural	heritage	and	contributions”	of	African	American	communities,	as	well	as	ongoing	campaigns	for	rights	and	power	led	by	civil	rights	organizations	such	as	CORE,	the	NAACP,	SNCC,	and	NSM.	According	to	an	informational	leaflet	distributed	by	HEP,	these	community	sessions	were	designed	“to	draw	the	Harlem	students	into	these	activities	in	their	own	community	through	such	action	programs	as	voter	registration	projects	and	selective	patronage	campaigns.”67	Though	the	turnout	for	these	sessions	was	generally	smaller	than	the	tutorial	sessions,	the	impact	upon	the	consciousness	of	students	and	tutors	alike	was	no	less	significant.	“I	enjoyed	the	programs	very	much,”	one	student	testified,	“they	had	almost	the	effect	of	a	revolution	on	my	mind.”68	
																																																								66	Andrea	Cousins	and	Quentin	R.	Hand,	“Harlem	Education	Program,	Inc.	Prospectus:	September	1963-September	1964,”	Box	8,	Folder	11,	NSM	Records.		67	Harlem	Educational	Project,	“GET	HIP	WITH	HEP,”	Box	8,	Folder	10,	NSM	Records.		 68	NSM,	“Summer	Tutorials—1962,”	Box	76,	Folder	24,	Meier	Papers.	
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Interracial	Organizing,	Black	Nationalism,	and	“Operational	Education	in	the	
Ghetto”	More	than	just	a	supplemental	element	of	HEP’s	educational	programming,	these	community	sessions	were	indicative	of	a	larger	organizational	focus	on	promoting	societal	transformation	through	educational	empowerment.	According	to	an	assessment	by	HEP	tutor	and	eventual	project	director	Andrea	Cousins,	one	of	the	fundamental	analyses	that	guided	NSM’s	involvement	in	Harlem	held	that	“the	power	of	community	organization	to	sustain	itself	grows	largely	out	of	the	sustained	education	of	its	constituents;	and	that	a	method	of	problem-solving	must	become	part	of	local	perspective,	if	that	community	is	to	become	politically	powerful.”69	Cousins	was	introduced	to	the	NSM	as	a	student	at	Sarah	Lawrence,	when	the	“very	charismatic”	Peter	Countryman	came	to	the	campus	“spreading	the	word	about	a	northern	civil	rights	movement.”	A	native	of	New	Canaan,	CT,	Cousins	had	grown	up	in	an	affluent,	white	liberal	family,	and	was	the	daughter	of	the	well-known	editor	of	
The	Saturday	Review,	Norman	Cousins.	Like	many	of	her	peers,	however,	Cousins	had	become	disillusioned	with	the	shortcomings	of	white	liberalism	to	meaningfully	remedy	the	political,	economic,	and	moral	crises	fostered	by	a	racist,	imperialist,	and	capitalist	American	society.	“In	that	time	of	my	life,”	Cousins	later	recalled,	“I	was	always	arguing	with	my	father.	Liberals	and	radicals	to	me	were	incompatible.”70	
																																																								69	Andrea	Cousins,	“Harlem:	The	Neighborhood	and	Social	Change,”	April	2,	1964,	Junius	Williams	Collection.		 70	Andrea	Cousins	interview	with	author,	October	19,	2017.	
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The	“radical”	political	education	and	awakening	that	Cousins	experienced	during	her	years	at	Sarah	Lawrence	represented	a	personal	embodiment	of	the	intersections	of	the	New	Left,	African	nationalism,	the	southern	Civil	Rights	Movement,	and	Black	Freedom	Struggles	in	the	urban	north,	and	shaped	her	organizing	in	Harlem.	During	the	summer	of	her	junior	year,	Cousins	traveled	to	the	recently	independent	nation	of	Guinea	with	Organization	Crossroads	Africa,	where	she	saw	Sékou	Touré	“in	the	streets	in	his	white	Cadillac.”71	While	she	was	in	Africa,	Tom	Hayden	and	the	Students	for	a	Democratic	Society	(SDS)	published	“The	Port	Huron	Statement,”	the	manifesto	of	the	New	Left	and	the	surging	student	movement,	which	had	a	formative	influence	on	Cousins’	political	thought	and	analysis.72	Upon	returning	to	Sarah	Lawrence	for	her	junior	year,	Cousins	started	volunteering	at	the	HEP	storefront	office	at	135th	Street	and	8th	Avenue,	where	she	met	SNCC	organizer	Stokely	Carmichael,	who	had	grown	up	in	New	York	City	and	was	an	occasional	visitor	to	the	office.73		
																																																								71	Ibid;	According	to	Elizabeth	Tobierre,	the	localized,	community-based	work	that	Cousins	participated	in	while	in	Guinea	influenced	her	analysis	of	the	centrality	of	neighborhood	organizing	as	director	of	HEP.	Tobierre,	“Black	Power	Does	Not	Come	Out	of	the	Sky,”	60.		 72	Cousins	credits	her	close	friend	Tom	Hayden	and	The	Port	Huron	Statement	with	shaping	her	political	ideology	and	identity.	“When	I	met	Tom	Hayden,”	Cousins	recalled,	“Tom	explained	to	me	I	was	not	a	liberal—I	was	a	radical.	We	were	radicals.”	When	asked	how	she	defined	the	term	“radical,”	Cousins	replied,	“The	Port	Huron	Statement…I	think	it	was	a	very	rosy	vision	of	students,	and	farmers,	and	poor	people,	and	Blacks,	and	American	Indians,	and	all	of	us	getting	together	and	getting	local	control…local	control,	people	power.”	Andrea	Cousins	interview	with	author,	October	19,	2017.		 73	Ibid.	Carmichael	came	by	the	HEP	offices	from	time	to	time,	even	participating	in	a	HEP	tutor	orientation	program	in	June	1963,	where	he	spoke	
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The	influences	of	this	cross-section	of	radical	political	activity	in	the	early	1960s	were	evident	in	the	analyses	that	Cousins	put	forth	in	her	1964	assessment	of	the	organizational	philosophies	and	actions	of	HEP	and	the	NSM	in	Harlem.	Demonstrating	the	centrality	of	community	empowerment	and	self-determination	that	undergirded	these	varying	freedom	struggles,	Cousins	wrote	that	one	of	the	two	primary	objectives	of	the	NSM	in	Harlem	was	“to	bring	the	local	population	into	greater	control	of	their	own	lives,	and	consequently	of	the	institutions	which	exerted	power	upon	them.”74	Though	this	organizational	focus	on	self-determination	was	complicated	by	the	outsider	status	of	many	of	the	NSM	and	HEP	staff,	who	also	saw	Harlem	as	a	possible	proving	ground	for	building	a	sustainable	interracial	movement,	the	project	endeavored	to	seek	out	the	involvement	of	indigenous	leadership	to	inform	their	organizing	initiatives	and	eventually	take	over	the	program.	“Our	idea	was	that	the	whole	thing	would	eventually	be	taken	over	by	local	people,”	Cousins	later	recalled.75		Despite	their	connections	with	Harlem	leaders	and	professed	dedication	to	supporting	community	leadership,	the	interracial	organization’s	entrée	to	Harlem	was	met	with	a	mixed	reception.	NSM’s	arrival	in	Harlem	coincided	with	a	period	of	resurgent	racial	consciousness	and	Black	Nationalist	organizing	in	the	city.	“Like	
																																																																																																																																																																					about	“Direct	Action”	on	a	panel	with	NSM	staffers	Carl	Anthony,	Bob	Knight,	Roger	Siegel,	and	Kathie	Rogers.	The	Harlem	Education	Project,	“Tutor	Orientation,”	June	28-29,	1963,	Box	8,	Folder	10,	NSM	Records.		74	Andrea	Cousins,	“Harlem:	The	Neighborhood	and	Social	Change,”	April	2,	1964,	Junius	Williams	Collection.		 75	Andrea	Cousins	interview	with	author,	October	19,	2017.	
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black	ghettoes	throughout	the	country,”	Danny	Schechter	observed	in	1962,	Harlem	“is	reasserting	its	blackness.”76	Though	still	a	student	at	Cornell	at	the	time,	Schechter	had	kept	a	watchful	eye	on	happenings	in	his	native	New	York	City.		That	March,	Schechter	had	invited	Malcolm	X	to	Cornell	for	a	debate	with	CORE	national	director	James	Farmer	in	a	program	titled	“Which	Way	Civil	Rights:	Separation	or	Integration?”	In	his	first	debate	with	a	national	civil	rights	leader,	Malcolm	X	chided	Farmer	for	being	married	to	a	white	woman,	while	also	characteristically	speaking	of	the	shortcomings	of	integration	and	nonviolent	direct	action	campaigns	for	achieving	justice	for	the	centuries	of	brutal	oppression	faced	by	African	Americans.	“We’ve	been	giving	slave	labor	for	400	years	and	we’re	not	going	to	get	sufficient	payment	through	any	Jackie	Robinsons,	Marian	Andersons	or	a	cup	of	coffee.”77	As	though	to	illustrate	Malcolm’s	analysis,	Jackie	Robinson	was	the	target	of	picketers	in	Harlem	three	months	later	after	he	criticized	nationalist	groups	for	alleged	anti-Semitic	chants	during	an	economic	boycott	of	a	Jewish	restaurateur	on	125th	Street.78	Though	Robinson	and	boycott	leaders,	including	Louis	Michaux,	later	buried	the	hatchet	during	a	radio	broadcast,	it	was	nonetheless	clear	that	Robinson’s	moderate	brand	of	civil	rights	advocacy	was	resonating	less	with	the	masses	in	Harlem	than	was	Malcolm’s.																																																										76	Danny	Schechter,	News	Dissector:	Passions,	Pieces,	and	Polemics,	1960-2000	(New	York:	Akashic	Books,	2001),	37.		77	Joe	Matasich,	“2	Negroes	With	Opposing	Views	Debate	Segregation-Integration,”	Ithaca	Journal,	March	8,	1962,	in	Manning	Marable	and	Garrett	Felber,	eds.,	The	Portable	Malcolm	X	Reader	(New	York:	Penguin	Books,	2013).		 78	“Negroes	in	Harlem	Picket	Ex-Dodger	Jackie	Robinson,”	Atlanta	Daily	
World,	July	15,	1962.	
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	Though	Schechter	was	still	a	year	away	from	joining	the	NSM,	his	appraisal	of	Harlem’s	rising	racial	consciousness	and	militancy	closely	resembled	those	of	organizers	on	the	ground	who	expressed	concern	about	the	efficacy	of	an	interracial	organization	within	this	radical	political	milieu.	Even	before	joining	NSM,	Andrea	Cousins	was	made	explicitly	aware	of	her	place	as	a	white	woman	within	this	political	climate	charged	with	revolutionary	fervor.	During	her	freshman	year	at	Sarah	Lawrence,	Cousins	went	with	her	African	American	“big	sister”	to	a	“huge	African	Nationalist	program”	in	New	York	City	where	Miriam	Makeba	performed	and	Hubert	Humphrey	spoke.	“As	I	was	riding	back	on	the	train	to	Sarah	Lawrence…with	my	big	sister…she	told	me	that	when	the	revolution	came,	she	would	have	to	kill	someone	like	me.	So	that	was	an	eye	opener,”	Cousins	later	recalled.79		The	realities	of	this	kind	of	racial	dynamic	in	Harlem	presented	members	of	the	interracial	organization	with	difficult,	and	often	contentious,	conversations	about	race	and	American	society	as	they	struggled	to	formulate	a	program	for	their	involvement	in	the	community.	NSM	organizers	in	Harlem,	including	Peter	Countryman	who	was	there	on	occasion,	were	often	confronted	by	local	people	who	challenged	their	positions	on	integration	and	the	assumed	leadership	roles	of	white	students	in	predominantly	Black	communities.	These	critiques	were	also	lobbied	by	
																																																								79	Andrea	Cousins	interview	with	author,	October	19,	2017.	It	is	likely	that	the	program	that	Cousins	described	was	the	Africa	Freedom	Day	Rally	at	Hunter	College	in	April	1961.	The	rally	was	attended	by	the	likes	of	Hubert	Humphrey,	Miriam	Makeba,	James	Baldwin,	Tom	Mboya,	Kenneth	Kaunda,	James	Farmer,	and	Dizzy	Gillespie.	See	“Kenneth	Kaunda	African	Freedom	Day	Speaker,”	New	York	
Amsterdam	News,	April	8,	1961.	
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individuals	within	the	organization,	including	Carl	Anthony,	an	African	American	student	at	Columbia	University	and	NSM	member,	who	had	worked	in	Harlem	throughout	the	summer	of	1962.	At	an	October	1962	meeting	of	the	NSM	in	New	Haven,	Anthony	expressed	his	frustrations	with	having	to	interpret	the	lived	realities	of	racial	oppression	that	informed	Black	political	consciousness	for	his	white	comrades,	and	criticized	Countryman	and	others	for	their	failure	to	truly	read	the	temperature	of	Harlem’s	political	climate.	“The	point	that	I’m	trying	to	make,”	Anthony	explained,	“is	that	something	is	happening	in	Harlem	which	is	causing	black	people	to	reject	your	kind	of	analysis.	It’s	as	simple	as	that.”80		As	an	organization	with	a	stated	goal	of	achieving	an	integrated	society,	however,	NSM	organizers	needed	to	find	a	way	to	reconcile	their	integrationist	ideals	with	rising	demands	for	Black	self-determination	in	Harlem.	From	the	outset	of	their	involvement	in	Harlem,	NSM	organizers	attempted	to	walk	what	they	saw	as	a	political	tightrope.	On	one	side,	organizers	recognized	that	if	they	were	to	be	successful	in	building	programs	in	Harlem,	they	would	need	to	tap	into	the	ideological,	if	not	organizational,	base	of	Black	Nationalist	groups.	“For,	the	Malcolm	X’s	of	the	generation	have	‘stirreth	the	eagles	nest,”	HEP	organizer	Bob	Knight	noted,	“now	it	becomes	our	role	to	challenge	that	anger	and	channel	that	massive	human	resource	into	a	sense	of	community.”81	On	the	other	side,	however,	many	organizers	believed	that	to	embrace	the	political	zeitgeist	of	Black	Nationalism	in																																																									80	Carl	Anthony,	“Harlem,”	in	Northern	Student	Movement,	“Negro	Militancy	in	the	North,”	October	21,	1962,	Box	76,	Folder	24,	Meier	Papers.		 81	Robert	F.	Knight,	“An	Analysis	of	the	Community,”	undated,	Box	8,	Folder	12,	NSM	Records.	
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Harlem	meant	to	risk	alienating	moderate	whites	that	they	sought	to	bring	into	the	fold	of	the	Civil	Rights	Movement.	“We	are	playing	with	dynamite,”	Carl	Anthony	wrote	to	Peter	Countryman	in	1962.	“The	nationalists	have	a	stronghold	in	Harlem;	and	we	may	have	to	choose	between	the	possibility	of	having	them	with	us	or	against	us.”	Anthony	and	other	organizers	feared	that	aligning	too	closely	with	radical	Black	organizations	would	cost	the	NSM	a	critical	opportunity	to	create	“a	really	dynamic	student	civil	rights	movement”	in	New	York	City,	which,	Anthony	believed,	had	the	potential	to	“set	the	North	on	fire.”82	To	walk	this	tightrope	meant	that	NSM	would	need	to	develop	an	analysis	and	approach	that	“could	encompass	extreme	points	of	view	and	communicate	with	either	a	nationalistic	negroe	[sic]	or	an	cautious	white.”83		 To	work	within	this	tenuous	political	and	organizational	territory,	HEP	embraced	a	broad	base	of	programs	beyond	the	initial	tutorial	program.	By	developing	a	variety	of	community-based	programs	under	the	broad	ideological	umbrella	of	empowerment	through	education,	HEP	organizers	were	able	to	reconcile	their	aspirations	of	creating	a	vibrant	student	movement	with	the	organizational	imperative	of	promoting	Black	self-determination.	Through	the	tutorial	program,	hundreds	of	college	students	were	recruited	from	local	campuses	to	come	into	Harlem	and	provide	needed	educational	support	for	students.	During	their	time	in	Harlem,	the	interracial	corps	of	tutors	gained	a	more	intimate																																																									82	Letter	from	Carl	Anthony	to	Peter	Countryman,	June	19,	1962,	Box	8,	Folder	10,	NSM	Records.		 83	Letter	from	Barbara	to	Tom,	October	15,	1962,	Box	8,	Folder	10,	NSM	Records.	
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understanding	of	the	complexities	of	life	in	the	Jim	Crow	North	and	many	were	inspired	to	take	larger	roles	in	local	struggles	for	rights	and	power.	“HEP	has	allowed	me	to	act	rather	than	just	study,”	one	tutor	testified,	“while	at	the	same	time	it	has	made	me	more	aware	of	the	complexities	of	America’s	race	problem	and	has	encouraged	me	to	look	further	and	do	more.”84	Another	student	who	experienced	a	similar	political	awakening	as	a	HEP	tutor	began	working	with	the	parents	of	his	tutee	to	organize	tenants	to	demand	repairs	of	their	building.	Although	the	tutorial	program	did	not	present	the	“dramatic”	mobilization	of	a	student	civil	rights	movement	that	Carl	Anthony	initially	hoped	for,	it	brought	hundreds	of	students	into	active	engagement	with	struggles	for	educational	justice	and	laid	the	groundwork	for	NSM’s	involvement	in	grassroots	struggles	for	rights	and	power	in	Harlem.	
The	Sealtest	Boycott	and	New	York	CORE’s	“Ghetto	Thrust”	
	 Like	the	NSM,	NY	CORE	in	1962	was	attempting	to	navigate	a	political	terrain	that	had	been	charged	by	the	militant	rhetoric	and	praxis	of	grassroots	organizers	like	Mae	Mallory,	Malcolm	X,	Jesse	Gray,	and	their	expansive	networks	of	radical	activists.	As	local	branches	and	the	national	organization	struggled	throughout	that	year	to	develop	an	effective	program	in	the	city,	CORE	leaders	repeatedly	pushed	the	organization	to	identify	with	the	needs	of	poor	and	working-class	Black	communities	who	were	fueling	this	grassroots	militancy	in	Harlem.	By	that	point,	nearly	all	of	CORE’s	northeastern	branches	had	Black	chairmen,	reflecting	the	
																																																								84	“The	Northern	Student	Movement,	HEP,	The	Harlem	Education	Project,”	Box	8,	Folder	11,	NSM	Records.	
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earlier	push	for	greater	Black	representation	in	leadership	positions.	However,	the	middle-class	focus	of	many	of	CORE’s	organizing	campaigns,	like	the	open-housing	drives,	did	little	to	win	the	allegiance	of	the	majority	in	Black	communities	in	New	York	and	elsewhere.	At	a	workshop	at	the	national	convention	that	year,	CORE	members	resolved	that	the	organization	was	“primarily	middle-class,	and	to	broaden	our	base,	we	must	begin	to	concentrate	on	the	needs	of	the	working	class.”85	In	many	ways,	this	resolution	represented	a	national	recognition	of	calls	that	had	resonated	from	the	streets	of	New	York	City,	where	CORE	leaders	like	Gladys	Harrington	and	Lincoln	Lynch	were	pushing	for	greater	attention	to	mass	movement	building.	Earlier	that	year	the	New	York	Metropolitan	Area	Coordinating	Council,	a	confederation	of	CORE	chapters	in	and	around	New	York	City,	“overwhelmingly	passed	a	motion	offered	by	Lincoln	Lynch	that	the	organization	must	make	itself	‘more	attractive	to	rank	and	file	Negroes.”86	For	Harrington,	Lynch,	and	other	CORE	leaders	in	New	York,	the	logical	move	to	bring	the	Black	working	classes	into	the	fold	of	organized	action	was	to	address	their	immediate	needs	of	fair	employment	opportunities.			 Though	NY	CORE	had	waged	earlier	protests	against	major	corporations	in	New	York	City	over	discriminatory	hiring	practices,	these	demonstrations	never	really	gained	the	same	type	of	organizational	attention	or	popular	traction	as	the	sympathy	strikes.	In	many	ways,	these	early	employment	campaigns	had	the	same	shortcomings	as	those	waged	by	the	NAACP	around	this	time,	in	that	the	primary																																																									85	Meier	and	Rudwick,	CORE,	196.		86	Ibid.	
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focus	was	on	breaking	the	color	barrier	through	placing	a	handful	of	Black	workers	into	middle-class	jobs	that	were	out	of	reach	to	most	of	the	community.	Meier	and	Rudwick	go	so	far	as	to	claim	that	from	1960-1962,	“not	one	of	New	York	CORE’s	employment	projects	brought	worthwhile	gains.”87	By	early	1962,	however,	local	grassroots	struggles	for	economic	justice	and	fair	hiring	practices	were	pushing	CORE	chapters	and	the	national	organization	to	reconsider	their	programs	for	confronting	employment	discrimination.	In	Philadelphia,	Rev.	Leon	Sullivan	had	been	engaged	in	a	years-long	selective	patronage	campaign	to	coerce	white-owned	national	companies	into	hiring	Black	employees.	In	Harlem,	where	economic	boycotts	had	a	rich	history	and	nationalist	organizations	routinely	mobilized	“Buy	Black”	campaigns,	an	ad	hoc	coalition	was	in	the	midst	of	boycotting	a	white-owned	steakhouse	on	125th	Street	in	the	heart	of	Central	Harlem	and	the	nascent	Northern	Student	Movement	was	helping	to	orchestrate	a	boycott	of	a	major	dairy	company.	So	when	the	national	office	announced	that	year	that	CORE	would	be	taking	a	different	line	on	issues	of	employment	discrimination,	its	leaders	were	largely	following	the	lead	of	Black	communities	that	were	already	in	motion.			 CORE’s	first	major	action	that	demonstrated	this	new	approach	to	discriminatory	hiring	practices	came	in	the	fall	of	1962	when	the	national	office	endorsed	a	boycott	of	Sealtest	Dairy	in	New	York	City.	That	summer,	Carl	Anthony	and	a	handful	of	other	NSM	members	began	organizing	a	coalition	of	religious,	civil	rights,	and	labor	leaders	to	coordinate	protests	against	the	national	dairy	company,	which	employed	only	twelve	Black	and	Puerto	Ricans	among	its	workforce	of	1,500																																																									87	Ibid,	188.	
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across	four	New	York	plants.	After	negotiations	between	the	NSM	and	Sealtest	stalled	that	August	when	representatives	claimed	the	company	was	“already	doing	everything	in	our	power	to	employ	qualified	Negroes	and	Spanish-Americans,”	the	students	announced	plans	for	a	boycott.88	CORE	chapters	in	New	York	joined	the	protest	campaign	that	fall	after	the	NSM’s	low	numbers	caused	the	boycott	to	flounder	and	by	December	the	national	office	had	thrown	its	weight	behind	the	campaign.		The	Sealtest	boycott	provided	the	national	office	with	an	opportunity	to	put	its	new	organizational	emphasis	on	“compensatory	hiring”	into	direct	action.	Recognizing	that	token	integration	was	insufficient	given	the	rampant	national	problem	of	racial	discrimination	in	hiring	practices,	the	National	Action	Council	earlier	that	year	had	debated	the	issue	of	preferential	hiring	practices.	“We	used	to	talk	simply	of	merit	employment,	i.e.,	hiring	the	best	qualified	person	for	the	job	regardless	of	race,”	field	secretary	Gordon	Carey	wrote	that	fall.	“Now,	National	CORE	is	talking	in	terms	of	‘compensatory’	hiring.	We	are	approaching	employers	with	the	proposition	that	they	have	effectively	excluded	Negroes	from	their	work	force	for	a	long	time	and	that	they	now	have	a	responsibility	and	obligation	to	make	up	for	their	past	sins.”89		This	new	emphasis	was	reflected	in	the	demands	that	CORE	and	their	allies	made	upon	Sealtest	that	December.	In	negotiations	with	Sealtest	representatives,	CORE	leaders	demanded	that	the	company	hire	at	least	ten	Black	or	Puerto	Rican																																																									88	“Sealtest	Fact	Sheet,”	January	1963,	CORE	Papers.		89	Meier	and	Rudwick,	CORE,	191-92.	
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laborers	within	30	days,	and	a	minimum	of	50	within	a	year’s	time;	implement	an	affirmative	action	hiring	plan	to	rectify	the	racial	imbalance	of	their	workforce;	and	meet	with	CORE	representatives	at	90-day	intervals	to	evaluate	progress	made	toward	these	ends.90	Although	Sealtest	representatives	initially	rejected	these	demands	outright,	the	pressures	that	CORE,	NSM,	and	the	New	York	Selective	Patronage	Coordinating	Committee	put	upon	the	company	through	the	two-month	boycott	brought	Sealtest	back	to	the	bargaining	table	in	early	1963.	Though	Sealtest	maintained	that	it’s	hiring	practices	“had	not	been	discriminatory,”	they	agreed	to	immediately	hire	ten	Black	or	Puerto	Rican	workers	and	pledged	to	give	“initial	exclusive	priority”	in	all	job	openings	in	1963	to	Black	and	Puerto	Rican	applicants.91	Satisfied	with	this	compromise	as	“evidence	of	the	company’s	good	faith,”	CORE	called	off	the	boycott	in	early	February.92		 The	Sealtest	boycott,	as	Meier	and	Rudwick	note,	marked	a	turning	point	for	CORE’s	national	office	in	its	embrace	of	more	progressive	programs	to	rectify	systemic	racial	inequalities	in	employment	opportunities.	For	NY	CORE,	the	boycott	marked	the	emergence	of	mass	protests	against	employment	discrimination	that	would	take	center	stage	in	the	city	by	the	summer	of	1963.	Implicit	within	this	shift	away	from	demands	for	token	hiring	and	toward	affirmative	action	programs	was	an	organizational	recognition	of	grassroots	demands	for	systemic	change,	rather	than	piecemeal	reform.	Harlem	residents	were	no	longer	satisfied	with	a	handful	of																																																									90	CORE,	“Sealtest	Fact	Sheet,”	January	1963,	CORE	Papers.		91	Meier	and	Rudwick,	CORE,	192.		 92	Unmarked	clipping	of	CORE	press	release,	1963,	CORE	Papers.	
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white-collar	Black	workers	being	hired	by	a	company	while	the	unemployment	rate	in	Harlem	remained	double	that	of	white	communities.		While	the	thrust	for	this	change	in	CORE’s	approach	came	from	the	grassroots,	the	shift	was	put	into	praxis	in	NY	CORE	largely	through	the	efforts	of	Velma	Hill,	the	chair	of	the	branch’s	employment	committee,	and	her	husband	Norman	Hill,	a	member	of	the	national	office’s	field	staff.	The	Hills	came	to	New	York	in	the	fall	of	1962	from	Chicago,	where	Velma	had	been	the	president	of	the	NAACP	Youth	Council	and	Norman	was	the	executive	secretary	of	the	Illinois	Socialist	Party.93	From	their	respective	leadership	roles	in	the	local	and	national	organization,	the	Hills	sought	to	make	CORE	“more	appealing	to	grass-roots	people”	through	loosening	membership	restrictions,	focusing	on	community-organizing	and	indigenous	leadership,	and	undertaking	campaigns	that	would	benefit	poor	and	working-class	Black	communities.94		As	chair	of	the	employment	committee,	Velma	Hill	pushed	NY	CORE	to	use	the	momentum	generated	by	the	Sealtest	boycott	to	propel	the	chapter	into	greater	involvement	in	employment	campaigns	as	part	of	a	broader	“ghetto	thrust.”95	It	was	clear	through	their	rhetoric	and	programs	that	both	Velma	and	Norman	Hill	viewed	
																																																								93	Norman	Hill	interview	with	August	Meier,	May	24,	1969,	Box	56,	Folder	8,	Meier	Papers.		94	Velma	Hill	interview	with	August	Meier,	July	1971,	Box	56,	Folder	8,	Meier	Papers;	Norman	Hill	interview	with	August	Meier,	December	15,	1970,	Box	56,	Folder	8,	Meier	Papers;	Norman	Hill	interview	with	August	Meier,	August	2,	1971,	Box	56,	Folder	8,	Meier	Papers.		 95	Velma	Hill	interview	with	August	Meier,	July	1971,	Box	56,	Folder	8,	Meier	Papers.	
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the	Black	poor	and	working-classes	as	the	most	powerful	force	in	the	Black	freedom	struggle,	particularly	as	seen	in	the	successes	of	radical	organizations	in	mobilizing	Black	people	in	Harlem	by	the	thousands	in	the	early	1960s.	To	Norman	Hill,	the	Sealtest	boycott	represented	a	template	that	could	be	used	to	not	only	combat	the	“pattern	of	discrimination	in	all	job	categories,”	but	also	to	“provide	a	direct	alternative	to	the	Muslims	in	terms	of	aims,	programs,	and	results.”96		Like	Carl	Anthony	and	the	NSM,	the	Hills	and	NY	CORE	remained	weary	of	cooperating	with	radical	organizations	like	the	NOI,	even	while	they	tried	to	court	the	same	demographics	that	such	organizations	had	proven	so	popular	with.	As	leaders	of	NY	CORE	continued	to	shift	their	focus	to	community	organizing	in	the	following	months,	however,	the	grassroots	militancy	of	the	poor	and	working-class	residents	that	the	chapter	sought	to	recruit	would	push	the	organization	to	adopt	more	radical	ideologies	and	militant	actions,	thereby	setting	the	stage	for	dramatic	confrontations	with	the	city’s	power	structure	in	the	summer	of	1963.	
Nurturing	Indigenous	Leadership	through	the	Neighborhood	Commons	
Project	While	Velma	Hill	worked	with	Gladys	Harrington	and	the	other	leaders	of	NY	CORE	in	an	effort	to	help	develop	this	sense	of	community	leadership	and	action,	NSM	began	supporting	neighborhood	improvement	and	“social	action”	projects	that	had	the	potential	to	foster	indigenous	leadership.	Like	Jesse	Gray,	who	NSM	staffers	would	soon	become	intimately	acquainted	with,	NSM	organizers	did	not	see	“quality	of	life”	problems	as	marginal	within	the	framework	of	the	Black	Freedom	Struggle,																																																									96	Meier	and	Rudwick,	CORE,	208.	
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but	rather	as	issues	around	which	communities	could	be	organized	and	empowered	through	collective	action.	One	of	the	earliest	“social	action	projects”	that	NSM	organizers	became	involved	with	was	the	Sealtest	boycott	in	1962.	Inspired	by	Carl	Anthony’s	work	with	the	New	York	Selective	Patronage	Coordinating	Committee	that	summer,	as	well	as	the	boycotts	led	by	Rev.	Sullivan	in	Philadelphia,	Countryman	pushed	for	NSM	on	a	national	level	to	coordinate	“SNCC	drives,	sel.	pat.	[selective	patronage],	and	tutorial	in	one	package…in	Negro	communities	throughout	the	East.”97	Though	NSM	involvement	in	selective	patronage	campaigns	proved	to	be	short-lived,	the	efforts	provided	organizers	with	an	introduction	to	various	leaders	in	the	city,	including	Bayard	Rustin,	A.	Philip	Randolph,	James	Lawson,	and	Malcolm	X,	and	represented	an	early	foray	into	community	organizing	campaigns.	While	participating	in	the	selective	patronage	campaign,	Anthony	also	played	a	key	role	in	coordinating	HEP’s	first	social	action	project,	the	Neighborhood	Commons	Project.	Initially	proposed	in	May	of	1962,	the	“Commons”	sought	to	bring	together	college	students	with	local	laborers	and	teenagers	to	clean	up	and	develop	vacant,	city-owned	lots	in	Harlem	into	community	recreation	spaces.	The	location	chosen	for	the	project	was	a	large,	debris-filled	lot	on	147th	Street	between	Bradhurst	and	8th	Avenues.	One	of	the	fundamental	goals	of	the	project	was	to	supplement	the	education	of	local	students	with	practical	experience	in	architecture,	masonry,	carpentry,	horticulture,	and	commercial	art	in	the	service	of	
																																																								97	Letter	from	Peter	Countryman	to	Carl	Anthony,	October	3,	1962,	Box	8,	Folder	10,	NSM	Records.	
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developing	a	space	for	communal	gatherings.98	HEP	organizers	envisioned	the	Commons	as	a	meeting	space	where	community	concerns	could	be	discussed	and	plans	could	be	developed	for	collective	action.	In	addition	to	the	outdoor	recreational	space,	HEP	also	acquired	and	renovated	unused	basement-level	spaces	in	the	buildings	that	faced	the	lot	for	educational	programming.	By	the	fall	of	1963,	HEP	was	using	these	spaces	for	a	Science	Workshop,	where	students	learned	and	practiced	game	and	computer	theory,	an	office	space	for	the	Commons	staff,	and	plans	were	in	place	to	establish	a	low-cost	daycare	center,	music	workshop,	and	gymnasium.99		Though	conceived	as	a	plan	to	convert	vacant	lots	into	pocket	parks	for	badly	needed	recreational	space,	HEP	organizers	envisioned	the	project	as	a	means	of	fostering	community	empowerment	and	“indigenous	leadership”	through	active	involvement	in	all	aspects	of	its	development.	Using	their	connections	with	various	community	organizations,	HEP	staff	recruited	neighborhood	teenagers	and	adults	to	build	a	corps	of	local	leaders	who	would	work	in	cooperation	with	architectural	students	to	design	and	build	the	commons.	“All	of	their	lives	these	people	have	been	using	their	skills	working	for	other	people,”	Anthony	told	The	New	York	Times,	“we	want	to	show	them	what	they	can	do	if	they	use	their	skills	for	themselves.”100	The	
																																																								98	“A	Statement	of	the	Aims	and	Philosophy	of	the	HARLEM	EDUCATION	PROJECT	and	a	Prospectus	for	the	Summer	of	1963,”	Box	8,	Folder	11,	NSM	Records.		99	Letter	from	A.W.	Finch	and	James	D.	Cook	to	Hortense	Gabel,	in	Andrea	Cousins	and	Quentin	R.	Hand,	“Harlem	Education	Program,	Inc.	Prospectus:	September	1963-September	1964,”	Box	8,	Folder	11,	NSM	Records.		
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larger	goal,	then,	for	the	Neighborhood	Commons	Project	was	not	the	piecemeal	construction	of	recreational	spaces,	but	the	demonstration	of	“how	scattered	resources	can	be	brought	together	in	a	so-called	‘slum	community’	to	create	a	new	reality.”101		Through	the	Neighborhood	Commons	Project	and	the	visibility	gained	through	the	tutorial,	HEP	provided	a	springboard	for	the	empowerment	of	indigenous	community	leadership.	Though	the	Commons	took	about	a	year	to	finally	get	underway,	it	marked	the	start	of	a	concerted	shift	in	HEP’s	programmatic	focus	toward	dedicating	more	energy	and	resources	to	community	organizing.	By	the	end	of	1963,	with	the	plans	for	the	Commons	underway,	HEP	moved	from	their	storefront	office	on	8th	Ave.	and	135th	St.	up	to	a	railroad	apartment	in	a	tenement	on	147th	St.	that	bordered	the	vacant	lot.102	The	re-location	provided	HEP	organizers	with	a	base	within	a	community	from	which	they	could	expand	their	tutoring,	programming,	and	organizing	initiatives.	“There	was	a	lot	of	work	on	community	organization,”	Andrea	Cousins	recalled,	led	in	large	part	by	Roscoe	“Chick”	Bradley.103	A	neighborhood	resident	and	community	activist,	Bradley	began	working	with	HEP	in	the	spring	of	1963	with	another	local	resident,	Earl	Spence,	to	furnish	and	supervise	a	small	gymnasium	for	teenage	boys	as	part	of	the																																																																																																																																																																						100	“Harlem	Back	Lot	To	Become	A	Park,”	The	New	York	Times,	undated	clipping,	Box	76,	Folder	24,	Meier	Papers.		 101	“HEP	Prospectus	for	Neighborhood	Commons	Project,”	May	1962,	Box	8,	Folder	12,	NSM	Records.		102	Andrea	Cousins,	“Harlem:	The	Neighborhood	and	Social	Change,”	2-3.		 103	Andrea	Cousins	interview	with	author,	October	19,	2017.	
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Commons.104	Within	a	few	short	months,	Bradley	had	established	himself	as	the	head	of	the	147th	St.	Neighborhood	Council,	HEP’s	hyper-local	community	decision-making	body,	“which	in	democratic	fashion	was	to	determine	the	nature	of	block	redevelopment.”105	Bradley’s	involvement	with	the	Commons	spurred	a	life-long	dedication	to	community	empowerment	in	Harlem	and	demonstrated	that	HEP’s	seemingly	trivial	focus	on	local	issue-organizing	was	capable	of	supporting	the	development	of	impactful	local	leaders.		By	the	fall	of	1963,	many	HEP	organizers	were	dedicating	more	of	their	time	and	resources	to	community	organizing	than	the	operations	of	the	tutorial,	setting	the	stage	for	a	major	rift	in	the	movement	by	the	year’s	end.	Though	the	model	of	grassroots	empowerment	evident	in	the	Commons	did	influence	an	evolution	in	the	tutorial	program	toward	a	sustainable,	community-controlled	model,	staff	members	increasingly	recognized	the	educational	inequalities	that	they	had	been	battling	as	symptomatic	of	an	inherently	unjust	society.	HEP	and	NSM	continued	to	organize	around	educational	empowerment	in	various	ways,	including	the	establishment	of	Freedom	Schools	and	support	for	school	boycotts,	but	the	inherently	limited	scope	of	the	tutorial	program,	critiqued	by	some	as	a	“service	program,”	was	no	longer	seen	as	viable	for	creating	a	movement	for	societal	transformation.	“We	have	always	had	a	high	degree	of	success	in	the	educational	programs,”	NSM	staffer	Gordon	
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Davis	wrote	in	1964,	“but	this	only	partially	fulfilled	our	aspirations.”106	With	the	Civil	Rights	Movement	and	white	violence	raging	in	Birmingham	and	throughout	the	South	that	summer,	and	the	March	on	Washington	looming	large	in	public	consciousness,	NSM	organizers	felt	a	need	to	engage	more	assertively	in	the	northern	struggle	to	achieve	more	immediate	results.		
“Our	fight	must	be	hard,	constant	and	effective”:	NY	CORE’s	Construction	Site	
Protests,	1963		 While	NSM	members	and	local	people	labored	to	build	the	Neighborhood	Commons	and	foster	long-range	community	empowerment	through	education	and	collective	action,	Gladys	Harrington	and	NY	CORE	sought	to	speed	up	the	tempo	of	the	Black	Freedom	Struggle	in	New	York	City.	Despite	the	nearly	ten	years	of	continued	organizing	efforts	waged	by	local	people	and	national	organizations	in	New	York	City,	few	systemic	reforms	had	been	won	and	city	officials	and	white	citizens	continued	to	preach	patience	and	gradualism	amidst	growing	racist	violence	and	Black	discontent	nationwide.	Furthermore,	with	1963	marking	the	centennial	of	the	Emancipation	Proclamation,	many	civil	rights	leaders	were	sounding	the	call	for	“Freedom	Now”	after	one	hundred	years	of	waiting	for	the	rights	of	full	citizenship.	Though	many	white	New	Yorkers	prided	themselves	on	their	racial	liberalism	in	the	absence	of	explicitly	racist	laws	and	policies	in	the	city	and	claimed	the	legacies	of	Union	soldiers	who	had	supposedly	fought	for	the	emancipation	of	enslaved	people	of	African-descent,	few	understood	their	insistence	
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upon	gradual	equality	for	Black	people	as	inherently	complicit	in	the	continuation	of	racial	oppression.		Such	was	the	case	when	a	white	Long	Island	resident	publicly	criticized	Lincoln	Lynch	in	January	1963	after	the	LI	CORE	chairman	called	for	a	“massive	and	sustained	assault	on	the	bastions	of	degradation	and	debasement	of	Negroes	and	Puerto	Ricans.”	Accusing	Lynch	of	yelling	“Fire!”	in	a	crowded	theatre,	the	white	commentator	argued	such	an	approach	“is	not	the	way	to	win	equality	in	the	North,	which	is	acutely	aware	of	its	own	shortcomings	and	equally	aware	that	its	soldiers	freed	the	slaves."107	As	the	nation	entered	the	centennial	year	of	the	Emancipation	Proclamation,	this	defensive	criticism	of	Lynch	became	a	hot	topic	of	debate	in	newspapers	throughout	the	Northeast.	In	many	ways,	the	conversations	arising	from	this	exchange	captured	the	increasingly	tense	atmosphere	in	the	city,	as	Black	New	Yorkers	grew	impatient	with	the	pace	of	racial	reform	while	their	white	counterparts	tired	of	the	constant	commotion	and	responded	with	increasingly	hostile	rhetoric	and	governmental	policies.		Of	those	who	came	to	Lynch’s	defense,	Gladys	Harrington	was	among	the	most	vocal	and	assertive	in	her	appraisal	of	racial	tensions	and	the	state	of	the	Movement	in	New	York.	“If	bigotry	would	slow	down,	then	it	might	be	possible	to	consider	the	argument	of	gradualism,”	Harrington	told	reporters.	“The	fact	is	that	bigotry	and	indifference	makes	steady	inroads	into	our	communities	and	our	fight	
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must	be	hard,	constant	and	effective.”108	Under	Harrington’s	leadership,	NY	CORE	had	grown	substantially	in	the	year	leading	up	to	the	Sealtest	boycott.	Whereas	the	chapter	had	floundered	from	1960-1961	with	an	active	membership	of	less	than	60	people,	by	1962	NY	CORE’s	membership	had	nearly	quadrupled	as	the	ranks	swelled	with	working-class	Black	members.109	Described	by	CORE	member	Doris	Innis	(née	Doris	Funnyé)	as	“a	very	strong	woman”	who	had	an	innate	ability	to	motivate	people	to	action,	Harrington’s	emphasis	on	dramatic	nonviolent	protest	campaigns,	including	sit-ins,	fasts,	and	pickets	at	government	offices,	had	proven	effective	in	growing	the	ranks,	even	if	the	protests	achieved	few	tangible	policy	results.	Indeed,	it	was	the	sit-ins	that	Harrington	organized	at	a	Brooklyn	rental	office	in	1961	to	help	Clarence	Funnyé	secure	an	apartment	that	drew	his	sister,	Doris,	into	the	ranks	of	NY	CORE.	“She	had	a	technique	that	was	not	abrasive	or	overly	aggressive,	but	of	making	you	feel	she	was	asking	you	to	do	something	important,”	Innis	recalled,	“that	she	had	faith	in	you.”110		Despite	her	relatively	moderate	political	analysis	as	a	staunch	integrationist,	it	was	clear	that	Harrington	had	become	an	effective	organizer	who	was	capable	of	mobilizing	Harlem	residents	to	engage	in	collective	action.	Though	she	remained	dedicated	to	the	principles	of	nonviolence	and	integration	as	the	means	to	achieve	Black	equality	and	empowerment,	Harrington’s	presence	within	a	political	milieu	
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that	“encouraged	a	nationalist	thrust,”	as	CORE	field	secretary	Gordon	Carey	described	Harlem	in	the	early	1960s,	had	spurred	an	increased	militancy	in	her	political	praxis	by	1963.	From	1960-1962,	Harrington’s	organizing	campaigns	had	largely	consisted	of	interracial	nonviolent	direct	action	protests	aimed	at	coercing	public	officials	to	act	on	the	interests	of	Black	communities	through	moral	suasion.	By	1963,	however,	the	protests	waged	by	NY	CORE	under	Harrington’s	leadership	began	to	demonstrate	the	growing	influence	of	a	grassroots	militancy	that	was	coming	to	define	the	uptown	chapter	and	changing	the	course	of	local	and	national	Black	Freedom	Struggles.		Most	evident	in	a	series	of	protests	against	employment	discrimination	at	publicly	funded	construction	sites	that	summer,	this	evolution	in	Harrington’s	political	praxis	reflected	a	broader	shift	in	the	northern	Movement.	That	summer,	Harrington	and	NY	CORE	served	notice	to	the	city’s	white	power	structure	that	they	were	no	longer	patiently	asking	for	equality	to	be	granted	to	Black	people.	Rather,	through	civil	disobedience	and	disruptive	protests,	NY	CORE	and	their	supporters	signaled	their	intentions	to	gain	social,	economic,	and	political	justice	through	more	assertive	and	militant	means.	Though	Harrington	remained	apprehensive	about	leaders	like	Malcolm	X,	the	influence	of	the	radical	milieu	he	helped	to	shape	was	undeniable	in	Harrington’s	rhetoric	by	the	dawn	of	1963.	“The	Negro	is	like	a	man	being	strangled,”	Harrington	declared.	“We	say	stop	the	choking	now,	at	once.	You	can’t	afford	to	be	gradual	about	stopping	a	strangulation.”111	
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In	the	spring	of	1962,	Mayor	Wagner	had	announced	long-awaited	plans	for	a	major	construction	project	to	renovate	and	expand	Harlem	Hospital	on	135th	Street	and	Lenox	Avenue.	Promising	“decent	high-level	medical	and	hospital	care”	for	all,	Wagner	broke	ground	on	the	$48	million	project	that	fall	as	800	residents	looked	on	at	the	ceremonial	event.112	Though	better	healthcare	was	on	the	minds	of	many	community	members	who	for	years	had	pleaded	with	city	officials	to	make	improvements	to	the	public	hospital,	the	question	of	who	would	be	employed	in	the	projected	three-year	construction	project	was	also	a	pressing	concern.	In	a	community	where	the	unemployment	rate	was	over	twice	that	of	white	communities	due	to	racial	discrimination	in	hiring	practices	and	a	general	lack	of	adequate	training	and	educational	opportunities,	few	had	reasons	to	believe	that	the	economic	windfall	that	the	construction	project	would	bring	to	laborers	in	the	construction	trades	would	extend	to	Harlem	residents.113			The	building	and	construction	trade	unions,	which	largely	determined	those	employed	in	construction	projects	like	the	Harlem	Hospital,	were	notorious	for	discriminating	against	Black	and	Puerto	Rican	laborers.	So	when	the	plans	were	laid	for	this	major	project	in	the	heart	of	Harlem,	many	residents	assumed	that	the	site	would,	as	the	Pittsburgh	Courier	later	predicted,	become	a	“beehive	of	skilled	workers—lathers,	brick-layers,	electricians,	plumbers,	painters,	etc.,	among	whom	
																																																								112	“Mayor	Sets	October	to	Begin	Expansion	of	Harlem	Hospital,”	New	York	
Times,	June	6,	1962;	“New	Building	Begun	at	Harlem	Hospital,”	New	York	Times,	November	1,	1962.		113	HARYOU,	Youth	in	the	Ghetto,	246.	
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Negroes	would	have	been	as	scarce	as	hooded	Klansmen	on	Seventh	Ave.	and	125th	St.”114	 Though	racial	discrimination	in	employment	was	technically	illegal	in	New	York	City,	as	Dr.	Kenneth	Clark	noted,	the	laws	were	rarely	enforced	and	racial	discrimination	remained	a	particularly	common	practice	in	the	construction	industry.	Restrictive	apprenticeship	training	programs	and	union	membership	policies,	along	with	“gentleman’s	agreements”	and	other	forms	of	covert	racism,	largely	precluded	Black	laborers	from	employment	in	the	construction	trades.115	Local	28	of	the	Sheet	Metal	Workers,	for	example,	counted	zero	African	Americans	amongst	its	membership	of	3,300	at	this	time.116	When	Black	workers	were	hired	in	the	construction	trades,	it	was	usually	for	so-called	“Negro	jobs”—unskilled	positions	with	“menial	status,	minimum	wages,	and	little	if	any	security.”117		Adding	to	the	economic	anxieties	and	frustrations	of	Black	laborers,	a	study	put	out	by	the	New	York	City	Department	of	Labor	that	year	predicted	a	decline	of	70,000-80,000	unskilled	and	semi-skilled	jobs	by	the	end	of	the	decade.118	Within	the	local	and	national	context	of	surging	demands	for	Black	rights	and	power—
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particularly	in	a	community	with	a	tradition	of	supporting	economic	nationalism—such	economic	insecurity	in	the	face	of	a	major,	publicly	funded	construction	project	that	would	predictably	bring	white	laborers	into	Harlem	fueled	community	resentment	toward	the	Hospital	site.	“Such	a	situation	building	up,	this	mass	of	unemployed	and	frustrated	Negro	youth,	is	social	dynamite,”	the	anti-poverty	social	service	agency	Harlem	Youth	Opportunities	Unlimited	(HARYOU)	explained.	“We	are	presented	with	a	phenomenon	that	may	be	compared	with	the	piling	up	of	inflammable	material	in	an	empty	building	in	a	city	block.”119		 Though	HARYOU	was	primarily	concerned	with	the	pathological	implications	of	unemployment	in	Central	Harlem,	the	organization	also	noted	with	great	interest	the	propensity	of	economic	inequality	for	drawing	the	community	into	collective	struggles	for	equitable	employment	opportunities.	This	was	certainly	the	case	in	the	summer	of	1963,	as	a	coalition	of	civil	rights	groups	in	Harlem,	including	NY	CORE,	organized	mass	resistance	to	the	Harlem	Hospital	construction	to	demand	jobs	for	Black	and	Puerto	Rican	workers	on	the	project.	Just	weeks	after	police	forces	turned	their	dogs	and	hoses	on	peaceful	protestors	in	Birmingham,	Alabama,	and	days	after	William	Worthy	called	for	a	Freedom	Now	Party	in	Harlem,	the	Joint	Committee	for	Equal	Employment	Opportunity	announced	plans	to	picket	the	Harlem	Hospital	construction	site	in	early	June	after	city	officials	and	union	leaders	refused	a	meeting	to	discuss	charges	of	employment	discrimination	on	the	project.	“For	years,”	NAACP	labor	secretary	Herbert	Hill	declared,	“we	have	attempted	through	conferences,	memoranda	and	interminable	negotiations	to	make	progress	for	Negro																																																									119	Ibid,	247.	
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workers	in	the	AFL	building	trades	craft	unions.	This	has	been	an	exercise	in	futility.”120		As	spokesperson	for	the	coalition,	which	consisted	of	CORE,	the	NAACP,	the	Urban	League,	the	Negro	American	Labor	Council,	the	Workers	Defense	League,	and	the	Association	of	Catholic	Trade	Unionists,	Velma	Hill	(no	relation	to	Herbert)	announced	that	the	Joint	Committee	demanded	an	immediate	commitment	from	city	officials,	union	leaders,	and	contractors	“that	discrimination	against	Negro	and	Puerto	Rican	construction	workers	will	end.”	With	work	already	underway	on	laying	the	foundation	of	the	hospital	buildings,	Velma	Hill	noted	that	of	the	64	laborers	working	on	the	job,	only	nine	(14%)	were	African	American.	Building	on	the	affirmative	action	demands	of	the	Sealtest	boycott,	Hill	demanded	that	Black	and	Puerto	Rican	workers	be	hired	immediately	with	a	goal	of	reaching	35%	of	the	workforce.121		 Early	in	the	morning	of	June	12,	the	Joint	Committee	led	an	interracial	group	of	150	protestors	in	a	picket	line	at	the	entrance	of	the	construction	site	at	135th	Street	and	Lenox	Avenue.	The	previous	night,	members	of	the	six	organizations	distributed	leaflets	throughout	Harlem	as	a	soundtruck	drove	along	the	streets	urging	residents	to	join	the	demonstration.	When	workers	arrived	to	the	construction	site	that	morning,	they	were	greeted	with	chants	of	“If	we	don’t	work,	nobody	works,”	as	groups	of	protestors	sat	down	in	front	of	the	entrances	on	135th																																																									120	“Promise	Mass	Action	on	Building	Trade	Unions,”	New	York	Amsterdam	
News,	June	8,	1963.		121	Samuel	Kaplan,	“Race	Group	Plans	Hospital	Pickets,”	New	York	Times,	June	12,	1963.	
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and	136th	Streets,	barring	workers	and	delivery	trucks	from	entering	the	site.	The	predominantly	white	construction	crew	milled	about	outside	the	fenced	in	site,	awaiting	instructions	from	contractor	Julius	Nasso,	who	pleaded	with	Herbert	Hill	and	other	demonstrators	to	allow	the	workers	to	pass	through	their	lines.		The	pickets	were	resolute,	however,	and	a	scuffle	broke	out	when	Hill,	Urban	League	member	Ramon	Rivera,	and	several	others	broke	through	a	police	barricade	to	block	the	remaining	open	entrance.	As	officers	struggled	to	forcefully	remove	the	group,	which	also	included	CORE	member	William	Mahoney	and	NAACP	members	Morris	De	Lisser	and	Isaiah	Brunson,	reinforcements	of	300	officers	arrived	on	the	scene	to	forcefully	keep	the	entrance	clear.	In	the	ensuing	confrontation,	police	manhandled	the	group	of	nonviolent	demonstrators	and	shoved	De	Lisser	up	against	a	fence,	leaving	him	hospitalized	with	head	and	neck	injuries.		Coverage	of	the	demonstration	in	the	Amsterdam	News	included	a	photo	of	a	man	lying	on	the	ground	in	front	of	a	police	barricade	“after	being	kicked	and	assaulted”	during	the	confrontation.	Promising	to	file	a	formal	complaint	of	police	brutality	against	the	NYPD,	Hill	said	that	the	situation	was	“worse	than	Philadelphia,”	where	police	officers	had	beaten	and	arrested	RAM	leaders	Max	Stanford	and	Stan	Daniels	weeks	earlier.		Though	the	massive	police	presence	allowed	workers	to	enter	the	site	around	9am	after	the	scuffle,	the	confrontation	coerced	Deputy	Mayor	Paul	Screvane	to	warn	that	he	would	halt	construction	if	the	
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building	trade	unions	“did	not	act	immediately	to	end	any	discriminatory	practices	there.”122		 Screvane,	who	was	serving	as	acting	Mayor	while	Wagner	was	in	Hawaii	for	a	conference,	made	good	on	his	threat	the	following	day	as	protests	continued	at	the	construction	site.	While	demonstrators	were	back	on	the	picket	line	at	six	o’clock	that	morning,	again	attempting	to	block	the	entrances	to	the	site,	leaders	of	the	Building	and	Construction	Trades	Council	met	at	Screvane’s	request	to	discuss	the	allegations	of	racial	discrimination	against	their	unions.	The	Council’s	president,	Peter	Brennan,	was	to	report	to	Screvane	immediately	following	the	meeting	with	their	proposed	action	plan	to	address	the	allegations.	As	the	day	dragged	on	with	the	protestors	awaiting	word	from	the	acting	Mayor	about	the	outcomes	of	the	meeting,	the	atmosphere	at	the	construction	site	grew	increasingly	tense.	Several	of	Harlem’s	most	notable	nationalist	leaders,	including	Malcolm	X	and	James	Lawson,	along	with	journalist	Louis	Lomax,	looked	on	as	groups	of	bystanders	who	had	been	watching	from	the	sidewalks	joined	the	demonstration	and	protestors	laid	in	front	of	cement	trucks	in	an	effort	to	block	their	deliveries.123		In	the	early	afternoon,	police	clashed	with	protestors	for	the	second	time	in	as	many	days	when	a	group	tried	once	again	to	barricade	an	open	entrance	to	the	
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site.	Within	minutes	of	the	heavy	police	presence	forcefully	securing	the	entrance,	however,	word	spread	through	the	crowd	that	the	construction	workers	had	been	ordered	to	stop	and	the	site	was	officially	shutdown.	Citing	concerns	over	“public	safety,”	Screvane’s	order	to	halt	construction	pending	an	investigation	over	charges	of	discrimination	was	met	by	cheers	from	the	hundreds	of	protestors	at	135th	Street	and	Lenox	Avenue.		 Despite	the	initial	elation	at	the	construction	site,	City	Hall’s	intervention	was	met	with	mixed	reactions	from	community	leaders	in	Harlem.	After	conferring	with	Mayor	Wagner,	Screvane	announced	that	the	Mayor	would	appoint	a	three-person	committee	to	investigate	the	charges	of	racial	discrimination	in	the	construction	industry.	The	move	was	characteristic	of	Wagner’s	passive	approach	toward	resolving	issues	of	racial	inequality	and	tension	in	the	city	through	commissions,	evoking	memories	of	the	Committee	on	Harlem	Affairs	formed	in	the	wake	of	the	1959	“near	riot.”124	While	CORE’s	assistant	program	director	Norman	Hill	welcomed	Screvane’s	proposed	committee	investigation	as	“a	step	in	the	right	direction,”	NAACP	labor	secretary	Herbert	Hill	was	less	enthused.	To	Hill,	such	a	token	response	from	City	Hall	was	“sheer	fakery”	which	represented	only	“a	further	postponement	for	justice	to	the	Negro	worker	in	New	York	City.”125		Hill’s	assessment,	shared	by	other	leaders	of	the	Joint	Committee	for	Equal	Employment	Opportunity	including	Velma	Hill	and	Gladys	Harrington,	proved																																																									124	“Rights	Picketing	at	Fair	Construction	Is	Planned,”	New	York	Times,	June	15,	1963.	For	more	on	the	Committee	on	Harlem	Affairs,	see	Chapter	Four.		125	Samuel	Kaplan,	“City	Halts	Work	At	Site	In	Harlem,”	New	York	Times,	June	14,	1963.	
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prescient.	The	Mayor’s	“action	committee,”	which	had	no	representation	from	civil	rights	organizations	or	community	groups,	deliberated	for	nearly	a	month	while	the	site	remained	closed,	finally	releasing	a	public	report	in	mid-July.	Without	once	using	the	word	“discrimination,”	the	committee’s	report	detailed	the	exclusion	of	Black	and	Puerto	Rican	laborers	in	scores	of	construction	unions	in	the	city	while	lauding	others	for	“actively	trying	to	recruit	more	nonwhites.”	To	rectify	these	racial	disparities	in	union	labor,	the	committee	offered	a	series	of	recommendations	to	open	union	membership	to	qualified	Black	and	Puerto	Rican	workers	through	“voluntary	compliance”	from	the	building	and	construction	trades	unions.126	In	effect,	the	committee	proposed	that	unions	voluntarily	desegregate	with	minor	provisions	for	governmental	oversight	of	the	integration	process—the	type	of	resolution	that	few	Harlem	residents	had	any	faith	would	bring	any	meaningful	change	whatsoever.		 Hoping	to	salve	the	mounting	protests	by	striking	a	compromise	between	the	unions	and	the	communities	they	systematically	discriminated	against,	city	officials	quickly	found	themselves	facing	opposition	from	both	sides.	Building	and	Construction	Trades	Council	President	Peter	Brennan	maintained	that	the	122	unions	the	Council	represented	did	not	discriminate	and	would	not	tolerate	“dictation	by	any	outside	group”	as	to	their	membership	practices	and	policies.	In	a	statement	characteristic	of	union	defenses	against	charges	of	discrimination	in	membership	and	employment	at	the	time,	Brennan	told	a	press	conference	that	the	
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unions	were	against	discrimination,	but	“would	not	lower	its	standards	for	employees	to	accommodate	a	situation.”	Dismissing	the	legitimate	claims	of	racial	discrimination,	the	narrative	that	Brennan	and	other	union	leaders	put	forth	explained	the	lack	of	Black	and	Puerto	Rican	laborers	among	their	ranks	as	an	absence	of	qualified	applicants	rather	than	the	presence	of	discriminatory	policies	and	practices.	Furthermore,	Brennan	suggested	that	the	unions	were	so	“thoroughly	maligned”	by	such	accusations	that	they	“may	start	picketing	ourselves.”127	Rather	than	budging	on	any	policy	reforms	recommended	by	the	Mayor’s	committee,	the	unions	appeared	ready	to	dig	in	their	heels	and	fight	back	against	the	protests	that	were	spreading	throughout	the	city	by	mid-July.			 While	the	unions	fought	against	the	Mayor’s	committee,	community	leaders	criticized	the	shortcomings	of	their	recommendations	and	demanded	stronger	action	from	City	Hall.	Even	before	the	committee	released	their	report,	the	Joint	Committee	for	Equal	Employment	released	their	own	recommendations	for	rectifying	the	discriminatory	practices	of	the	unions.	Among	the	demands	of	the	Joint	Committee	were	the	admission	of	all	qualified	Black	and	Puerto	Rican	journeymen	into	the	unions,	the	opening	of	apprenticeship	programs	for	Black	and	Puerto	Rican	workers	at	twice	their	proportion	of	the	city’s	population,	and	that	such	skilled	workers	need	only	pass	a	test	to	gain	admission	to	a	building	trades	union.128		
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When	the	Mayor’s	committee	finally	released	their	report,	the	Joint	Committee	acknowledged	that	it	“showed	progress	in	thinking,”	but	asserted	that	any	program	based	on	voluntary	compliance	remained	weak	and	was	“no	substitute	for	meaningful	action.”129	Spokesman	Ramon	E.	Rivera	announced	that	the	Joint	Committee	would	give	the	unions	and	building	contractors	ten	days	to	study	the	recommendations	of	the	Mayor’s	committee	and	report	back	on	how	they	would	put	the	recommendations	into	action.	If	the	unions	failed	to	act,	Rivera	said,	the	Joint	Committee	would	escalate	their	protests	to	force	Mayor	Wagner	and	Governor	Rockefeller	to	shut	down	all	city	and	state	construction	projects	until	the	unions	adopted	a	“meaningful	program	of	integration.”	At	the	same	time,	the	Joint	Committee	asked	the	Mayor’s	committee	to	recommend	legislative	action	to	the	Mayor	to	force	union	adherence	to	the	committee’s	program.130			 While	representatives	of	the	Joint	Committee	convened	with	city	officials	and	union	leaders,	the	rank	and	file	of	the	organizations	within	the	Committee	had	been	escalating	their	protests	on	the	ground.	Hoping	that	the	Harlem	Hospital	shutdown	would	result	in	government	action	to	create	a	model	for	fair	employment	policies	throughout	the	city,	Amsterdam	News	editor	James	Hicks	urged	the	civil	rights	organizations	involved	in	the	protests	to	“immediately	turn	their	attentions	to	some	
																																																																																																																																																																					128	Samuel	Kaplan,	“Job-Equality	Group	Demands	Unions	Here	Admit	Minorities,”	New	York	Times,	July	8,	1963.		 129	Samuel	Kaplan,	“Job	Plan	Scored	By	Racial	Group,”	New	York	Times,	July	13,	1963.		 130	Ibid.	
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other	city	project	and	force	home	the	same	conditions.”131	Gladys	Harrington	and	NY	CORE	needed	little	encouragement	from	Hicks	to	expand	their	protests	against	employment	discrimination	in	the	construction	trades	throughout	the	city	that	summer.	“The	Harlem	Hospital	demonstrations,”	historian	Brian	Purnell	notes,	“made	fighting	against	racial	discrimination	in	the	building	trades	the	most	important	civil	rights	issue	in	the	city.”132		While	excluded	from	the	Mayor’s	“action	committee,”	Harrington	and	other	CORE	leaders	ensured	that	City	Hall	would	hear	from	them	in	other	ways.	In	the	second	week	of	July,	Harrington	led	a	handful	of	CORE	members	in	round-the-clock	sit-ins	at	the	offices	of	Mayor	Wagner	and	Governor	Rockefeller	to	demand	legislative	action	for	fair	employment	on	publicly-funded	construction	projects.	“We	feel	the	Governor	is	empowered	to	act	within	the	scope	of	present	discrimination	laws,”	Harrington	told	reporters.	“We	feel	that	with	strong	moral	leadership,	the	average	American	will	adopt	the	true	spirit	of	democracy.”133	The	moral	leadership	Harrington	was	appealing	to	faltered,	and	by	the	end	of	the	month,	the	sit-ins	escalated	to	fast-ins.	During	a	48-hour	fast	in	late	July,	both	Harrington	and	Bronx	CORE	member	Tina	Lawrence	collapsed	in	the	Mayor’s	office.134					
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	 While	Harrington’s	moral	appeal	failed,	other	CORE	chapters	throughout	the	Northeast	region	used	the	momentum	generated	by	the	Birmingham	campaign	and	the	Harlem	Hospital	demonstrations	to	launch	direct	action	protests	against	other	construction	sites.	CORE	chapters	led	similar	confrontational	protests	at	the	construction	sites	of	housing	developments	including	the	Rutgers	Houses	on	the	Lower	East	Side	and	Rochdale	Village	in	Queens.	In	nearby	Newark,	New	Jersey,	Newark-Essex	CORE	and	the	New	Frontier	Democrats,	led	by	Robert	Curvin	and	George	Richardson	respectively,	coordinated	a	major	protest	campaign	against	employment	discrimination	at	the	construction	site	of	a	public	high	school	that	spurred	the	emergence	of	sustained	civil	rights	activity	in	that	city.	In	early	July,	Brooklyn	CORE	began	picketing	the	construction	site	of	the	Downstate	Medical	Center,	drawing	thousands	of	protestors	to	the	site	and	into	the	Movement.	Emerging	in	the	wake	of	the	Harlem	Hospital	protests,	Purnell	argues,	Brooklyn	CORE’s	involvement	in	the	Downstate	demonstrations	“signaled	a	newer,	more	confrontational	approach	to	civil	rights	activism.”	Furthermore,	the	campaign	“attracted	many	young	people	and	first-time	activists,”	including	Sonny	Carson,	Frances	Crayton,	and	Yuri	Kochiyama,	who	were	drawn	to	the	militancy	and	dramatic	actions	of	the	protests.135		The	Downstate	protests	also	drew	the	attention	of	Malcolm	X,	who	again	kept	a	watchful	eye	on	the	demonstrations	as	a	heavy	police	presence	became	increasingly	repressive	and	confrontational.	Though	members	of	the	NOI	did	not	
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participate	in	the	protests	due	to	their	professed	rejection	of	nonviolent	resistance,	a	BOSS	detective	reported,	Malcolm	X	“made	it	clear	that	if	at	any	time	the	non-violent	pickets	are	in	need	of	Muslim	aid	they	would	be	present	to	heed	their	call.”136	Even	from	the	sidelines,	Malcolm’s	conversations	with	demonstrators	would	have	profound	impacts	on	the	political	development	of	protestors	like	Sonny	Carson,	a	former	gang	member	and	future	leader	of	Brooklyn	CORE,	who	thereafter	“began	to	direct	his	energies	and	leadership	abilities	toward	black	nationalist	politics	and	community	activism.”137	This	influx	of	militant	action	inspired	by	the	Harlem	Hospital	protests	marked	the	emergence	of	widespread	direct	action	protests	throughout	New	York	City	that	would	coalesce	into	a	powerful	social	force	in	the	months	to	come.		 Despite	such	dramatic	protests	throughout	the	city	that	summer,	the	building	and	construction	trades	unions	proved	resilient	in	their	efforts	to	maintain	their	lily-white	membership	while	city	and	state	officials	provided	little	more	than	lip	service	to	challenge	this	obvious	racial	inequality.	Though	over	2,000	Black	and	Puerto	Rican	workers	had	submitted	applications	for	union	membership	to	the	City	Labor	Department	by	the	end	of	the	summer,	only	ten	Black	workers	had	been	accepted	into	construction	unions	by	October.138	This	paltry	number	was	at	sharp	odds	with	
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predictions	made	by	the	city’s	Labor	Commissioner	weeks	earlier	that	at	least	600	Black	and	Puerto	Rican	workers	would	be	admitted	during	this	time.139	Denouncing	such	dismal	progress	as	“tokenism	at	its	very	worst,”	Gladys	Harrington	called	for	“a	renewed	attack	on	this	shameful	situation”	as	NY	CORE	began	protests	at	the	construction	site	of	a	new	federal	office	building	in	Foley	Square	that	fall.140			The	Foley	Square	demonstrations,	just	blocks	from	City	Hall,	marked	an	escalation	of	protest	tactics	as	well	as	police	repression.	In	mid-October,	Harrington	and	two	other	NY	CORE	members	were	arrested	for	climbing	atop	a	crane	to	halt	work	on	the	construction	site,	just	days	after	police	brought	out	their	mounted	unit	to	forcefully	suppress	protests	there.141	After	over	a	week	of	protests	at	the	site,	Harrington	led	a	200-person	march	from	NY	CORE’s	headquarters	on	125th	Street	to	City	Hall	to	protest	continued	inaction	from	the	Mayor	and	Governor	in	addressing	discrimination	in	the	construction	industry.	Joined	by	100	marchers	from	Brooklyn,	the	eight-mile	march	culminated	in	a	rally	at	City	Hall,	where	700	protestors	listened	to	speeches	by	Percy	Sutton,	James	Peck,	Mark	Lane,	Lincoln	Lynch,	and	SNCC	chairman	John	Lewis,	who	called	for	the	“mass	nonviolent	overthrow	of	
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segregation	and	racial	discrimination.”142	The	march	and	rally	at	City	Hall	represented	an	impressive	convergence	of	national	and	local	civil	rights	leaders	in	New	York	City	and	marked	an	apex	of	sorts	for	the	four	months	of	dramatic	protests	against	the	construction	industry	in	the	city.	Such	impressive	mass	action,	however,	failed	to	bring	about	the	kinds	of	tangible	changes	in	employment	discrimination	that	Harrington	and	the	Joint	Committee	demanded.	When	Mayor	Wagner	ordered	work	to	resume	on	the	Harlem	Hospital	project	two	weeks	later,	eleven	of	the	sixteen	workers	on	site	were	African	American,	but	neither	City	Hall	nor	the	Building	and	Construction	Trades	Council	had	agreed	to	any	meaningful	change	in	employment	policies	or	practices.	Again	haranguing	these	limited	gains	as	“tokenism,”	the	Joint	Committee	objected	to	the	resumption	of	work	without	a	more	systemic	commitment	to	racial	equality	from	labor	leaders	and	city	and	state	officials.143	Though	the	four-month	wave	of	militant	protests	that	the	Harlem	Hospital	demonstrations	inspired	failed	to	rectify	racial	discrimination	in	the	building	and	construction	trades,	they	nonetheless	had	profound	impacts	on	Black	freedom	struggles	in	New	York	City.	By	the	time	work	resumed	on	the	Harlem	Hospital	site,	the	151-day	shut	down	had	cost	the	city	over	$500	per	day	for	maintenance	and	security	at	the	site,	demonstrating	to	city	and	
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state	officials	the	economic	costs	that	continued	racial	inequality	could	incur.144	Furthermore,	the	confrontational	tactics	used	at	the	construction	sites	represented	an	escalation	of	protest	activities	throughout	the	city.	Whereas	national	CORE	leaders	had	counseled	local	pickets	during	the	“sympathy	strikes”	of	1960	to	remain	peaceful,	orderly,	and	to	not	obstruct	businesses,	by	1963	local	people	had	pushed	CORE	leaders	to	adopt	more	assertive	tactics,	including	civil	disobedience,	to	force	physical	confrontations	and	demand	concessions	from	various	levels	of	the	white	power	structure.	NY	CORE	and	their	allies	served	notice	that	if	Blacks	and	Puerto	Ricans	were	not	given	seats	at	the	table,	nobody	would	sit.		This	escalation	in	tactics	coincided	with	a	fundamental	shift	in	CORE’s	demands	in	the	early	1960s.	Whereas	previous	protests	had	sought	to	integrate	public	accommodations	or	break	the	color	barrier	in	employment	or	housing	on	a	case-by-case	basis,	CORE’s	swelling	grassroots	base	was	pushing	its	leaders	to	demand	more	systemic	changes	in	employment,	housing,	and	police	reform.	Like	Malcolm	X,	whose	insistence	on	governmental	reparations	for	enslavement	had	won	the	support	of	many	in	Harlem	and	beyond,	by	1963	CORE	leaders	were	demanding	that	employers	and	city	officials	rectify	their	complicity	in	past	employment	discrimination	through	preferential	hiring	and	training	programs	for	Black	and	Puerto	Rican	workers.	Inherent	within	this	organizational	evolution	was	a	growing	identification	with	the	analyses	and	demands	of	poor	and	working-class	Black	communities	in	New	York	City.	“What	would	have	been	big	gains	a	year	ago	no	
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longer	are	regarded	by	the	rank	and	file,”	Velma	Hill	said	in	early	1964.	“The	result	is	a	problem,	restiveness	among	the	members.	They	want	to	demonstrate	if	we	do	not	get	even	bigger	victories.”145		While	CORE’s	organizational	thrust	in	1960-1961	was	characterized	by	struggles	for	an	“open	society,”	by	1963	NY	CORE	and	other	local	chapters	were	forcing	the	national	organization	to	adopt	programs	that	focused	on	community	development	and	empowerment	within	predominantly	Black	neighborhoods.	Described	by	program	director	Norman	Hill	as	a	“ghetto	thrust,”	NY	CORE’s	evolution	during	this	period	set	the	stage	for	a	major	conflict	in	the	chapter	by	the	year’s	end.	At	the	same	time,	NY	CORE’s	growing	grassroots	base	brought	the	interracial	organization	into	the	fold	of	militant,	vanguard	struggles	for	human	rights,	self-determination,	and	political	power—the	radical	hallmarks	of	Black	nationalism	and	later	the	Black	Power	Movement.	
Toward	Community	Organizing	and	Black	Power	at	the	Grassroots		 The	surging	involvement	of	poor	and	working-class	Black	communities	that	was	pushing	NY	CORE	in	more	radical	directions	was	part	of	a	broader	evolution	of	Black	Freedom	Struggles	in	New	York	City	by	the	end	of	1963.	The	naked	brutality	of	white	racism	inflicted	upon	the	Birmingham	campaign	had	enraged	and	enlivened	individuals	and	communities	across	the	nation,	spurring	an	influx	of	new	activists	and	organizers	in	local	movements	throughout	that	summer.	Though	this	groundswell	of	working-class	activists	in	CORE	had	largely	begun	two	years	earlier	
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in	the	wake	of	the	Freedom	Rides,	the	militant	responses	of	the	Black	community	in	Birmingham	to	racial	terrorism	that	spring	had	inspired	more	confrontational	action	far	beyond	the	Mason-Dixon	Line.	Considered	by	some	observers	to	be	the	first	urban	rebellion	of	the	1960s,	the	clashes	between	Black	protestors	and	white	police	in	Birmingham	expedited	the	radical	evolution	of	northern	civil	rights	organizations	whose	growing	grassroots	base	had	less	tolerance	for	gradualism,	nonviolence,	and	negotiating	for	freedom	than	their	middle-class	counterparts.	Though	Meier	and	Rudwick	trace	this	evolution	of	CORE’s	ideologies	and	praxis	in	New	York	City	to	the	Freedom	Rides	in	1961,146	as	noted	above,	the	radical	political	milieu	nurtured	by	Black	nationalists,	radical	intellectuals,	and	grassroots	community	leaders	in	Harlem	during	this	same	period	played	a	substantial	role	in	shaping	the	political	consciousness	and	actions	of	this	groundswell	of	activism	embodied	in	CORE	and	NSM	alike.				 With	racial	violence	continuing	unabated	in	the	South	and	seemingly	basic	demands	for	equality	being	met	with	dogged	resistance,	official	indifference,	and	police	repression	in	Harlem	that	summer,	the	militant	rhetoric	and	analysis	of	Malcolm	X	became	increasingly	attractive	to	would-be	activists	and	seasoned	veterans	of	interracial	organizations	alike.		By	the	end	of	the	summer,	Gladys	Harrington	was	appearing	on	stage	with	Malcolm	X	at	street	rallies	in	Harlem.	At	an	August	rally	amidst	the	construction	protests,	Harrington	shared	a	stage	with	Dan	Watts,	Bessie	Phillips,	and	Cassius	Clay	(Muhammad	Ali),	where	she	echoed	Malcolm’s	calls	for	a	Black	united	front	and	criticized	President	Kennedy’s	co-																																																								146	Meier	and	Rudwick,	CORE,	145.	
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optation	of	the	March	on	Washington	in	front	of	a	crowd	of	2,000.147	The	previous	summer,	New	Haven	CORE	leader	Blyden	Jackson,	who	by	1963	would	join	NY	CORE	before	forming	a	rival	chapter	by	the	year’s	end,	began	speaking	at	street	rallies	sponsored	by	the	Harlem	Anti-Colonial	Committee.148	Led	by	Bill	Jones	and	Selma	Sparks,	the	small	radical	group	included	John	Henrik	Clarke,	Sylvester	Leaks,	William	Worthy,	and	Pernella	Wattley,	each	of	whom	had	played	an	active	role	in	supporting	the	Monroe	defendants	and	African	liberation	struggles	in	the	early	1960s.149			 	Like	NY	CORE,	which	drew	many	of	its	members	during	these	formative	years	from	the	same	grassroots	base	that	Malcolm	X	reached	so	effectively,	members	of	the	NSM	became	increasingly	involved	in	Harlem’s	radical	milieu.	Carl	Anthony,	who	recalled	hearing	Malcolm	X	speak	on	dozens	of	occasions	in	Harlem,	spent	countless	hours	in	Louis	Michaux’s	bookstore	where	he	immersed	himself	in	the	works	of	Carter	G.	Woodson,	J.A.	Rogers,	James	Baldwin,	Lorraine	Hansberry,	LeRoi	Jones	(Amiri	Baraka),	and	Harold	Cruse.150	Marilyn	Lowen,	a	Jewish	college	student	from	Detroit	who	was	drawn	to	the	NSM	after	hearing	Anthony	speak	in	
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New	Haven	in	the	fall	of	1962,	began	working	with	the	Harlem	Anti-Colonial	Committee	and	the	Freedom	Now	Party	before	joining	HEP	full	time	in	the	summer	of	1963.	In	Harlem,	Lowen	and	her	boyfriend	Bob	Fletcher	also	became	associated	with	members	of	the	radical	Black	literary	group	Umbra,	high	school	activist	Sherron	Jackson	(Amina	Rahman),	and	Stokely	Carmichael.151	Having	grown	up	in	the	Bronx,	Carmichael	came	by	the	HEP	offices	from	time	to	time	that	summer	while	on	respite	from	his	work	with	SNCC	in	the	South,	even	participating	in	a	HEP	tutor	orientation	program	in	June	1963,	where	he	spoke	about	“Direct	Action”	on	a	panel	with	NSM	staffers	Carl	Anthony,	Bob	Knight,	Roger	Siegel,	and	Kathie	Rogers.152			 Perhaps	the	most	dramatic	example	of	the	radicalization	of	NSM	members	during	this	period	was	Sherron	Jackson	(Amina	Rahman),	a	student	at	the	High	School	of	Music	and	Art,	who	had	been	involved	with	SNCC	and	CORE	protests	in	the	South,	volunteered	for	HARYOU,	and	was	a	correspondent	of	NSM’s	student	newspaper,	Harlem	Voice.	Though	only	a	teenager	at	the	time,	Jackson	was	deeply	involved	in	interracial,	nonviolent	struggles	for	Black	equality	and	empowerment.	A	meeting	with	Malcolm	X	at	the	Harlem	Hospital	protests	that	summer,	however,	had	transformative	impacts	on	the	young	activist’s	political	consciousness	and	involvement	in	struggles	for	Black	liberation.	As	the	demonstrations	got	underway	in	June,	Jackson	walked	the	picket	lines	for	a	couple	hours	before	getting	on	the	bus	
																																																								151	Marilyn	Lowen,	“I	Knew	I	Wasn’t	White,	but	in	America	What	Was	I?,”	in	
Hands	on	the	Freedom	Plow:	Personal	Accounts	By	Women	in	SNCC,	ed.	Faith	S.	Holsaert	et	al.	(Urbana:	University	of	Illinois	Press,	2010),	546-47.		 152	The	Harlem	Education	Project,	“Tutor	Orientation,”	June	28-29,	1963,	Box	8,	Folder	10,	NSM	Records.	
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to	head	to	school.	When	protestors	fought	to	block	cement	trucks	from	entering	the	construction	site	on	the	second	day,	Jackson	was	among	those	lying	down	in	the	street	when	she	realized	that	Malcolm	X	was	looking	on	from	across	the	way.	Moments	later,	Malcolm	sent	word	through	James	67X	that	the	minister	wanted	to	have	a	word	with	her.		Though	Jackson	initially	refused	citing	her	protest	duties,	she	eventually	ventured	across	the	street	to	speak	to	Malcolm	X	when	her	shift	was	finished.	“We	had	quite	an	argument	that	morning,”	then	14-year-old	Jackson	later	said.	As	he	had	with	Maya	Angelou	and	Rosa	Guy	in	the	wake	of	the	UN	demonstrations	two	years	earlier,	Malcolm	explained	to	Jackson	that	her	participation	in	nonviolent	demonstrations	was	misguided.	“I	was	trying	to	convince	him	of	the	rightness	of	what	I	was	doing	and	how	fearless	I	was	about	that	construction	truck	and	the	workers,	I	was	putting	my	body	on	the	line	for	the	cause,”	she	later	recalled.	“I	talked	about	what	we	were	doing	in	appealing	to	the	moral	conscience	of	the	truckdriver	by	laying	our	bodies	on	the	line	in	front	of	that	truck.”	Malcolm,	however,	challenged	the	young	activist	to	question	the	fundamental	assumptions	that	guided	her	actions	that	day.	Rahman’s	recollection	of	the	encounter	is	worth	quoting	at	length	for	the	formative	impact	that	it	had	on	her	political	thought:	Malcolm	said,	‘but	that’s	because	you	think	he	has	a	moral	conscience,	something	that	you	ought	to	question	given	the	history	of	what	white	people	in	this	country	have	done	to	Black	people.	If	these	are	people	who	could	lynch	Black	people,	murder	Black	children,	burn	down	churches,	starve	people,	enslave	people,	why	couldn’t	they	run	over	somebody	with	the	truck?	Oh,	they’d	say	it	was	an	accident.	He’d	say	‘oops!	My	foot	slipped,’	but	you’d	be	just	as	dead	from	an	accident	as	you	would	be	had	it	been	done	on	purpose.’	It	was	quite	a	conversation	and	admittedly	I’d	never	thought	about	that	kind	of	thing.	I’d	never	put	two	and	two	together	in	the	context	of	Black	
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people	and	white	people	at	that	point	in	time.	And	when	he	left	and	I	turned	around	to	go	back	across	the	street	to	the	demonstration,	I	went	back	and	I	got	on	the	picket	line	but	I	never	laid	down	in	the	street	in	front	of	a	truck	again.153		Though	she	retained	her	affiliations	with	HARYOU	and	NSM,	Rahman	became	a	regular	visitor	of	Mosque	No.	7	in	the	weeks	following	this	encounter	with	Malcolm	X.	By	early	September,	Rahman	was	sharing	a	stage	with	Malcolm	X	at	rallies	in	Harlem,	where	she	routinely	criticized	her	prior	participation	in	nonviolent	demonstrations	to	achieve	integration	and	called	for	immediate	liberation	and	self-determination	by	any	means	necessary.		Speaking	at	a	mass	rally	at	114th	Street	and	Lenox	Avenue	that	month,	Rahman	told	the	crowd	of	700	that	Black	Americans	“will	never	gain	anything	until	they	see	the	light	and	place	their	faith	in	a	god	who	will	represent	them.	When	this	is	done	black	people	will	then	be	united	in	the	world	wide	black	revolution	and	will	then	stop	turning	the	other	cheek	and	fight	force	with	force.”154	Though	a	dramatic	example,	Rahman’s	introduction	to	Malcolm	X	that	summer	is	illustrative	of	the	ways	in	which	Harlem’s	radical	milieu	was	shaping	the	direction	of	mainstream	civil	rights	organizations	and	challenging	popular	perceptions	of	integration	and	nonviolence	as	a	panacea	in	Black	Freedom	Struggles.	While	Malcolm’s	radical	analysis	and	rhetoric	inspired	greater	militancy	at	the	grassroots,	Jesse	Gray’s	emphasis	on	the	revolutionary	potential	of	grassroots	
																																																								153	Interview	with	Amina	Rahman,	1992,	Henry	Hampton	Collection,	Washington	University	Libraries,	9-11.		 154	Memo	from	Frederick	Jenoure	to	Commanding	Officer,	September	14,	1963,	BOSS	Records.	
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community	organizing	came	to	define	the	thrust	of	CORE	and	NSM	by	the	fall	of	1963.	Whereas	NY	CORE’s	earlier	housing	activism	campaigns	had	focused	primarily	on	desegregation	and	open	housing	legislation,	by	1963	chapters	throughout	the	city	began	to	focus	on	their	efforts	on	improving	housing	conditions	in	predominantly	Black	communities.	More	than	just	a	tactical	shift	in	advocating	for	better	housing	conditions,	CORE’s	emphasis	on	tenant	organizing	by	1963	represented	the	organization’s	continued	movement	toward	an	operational	advocacy	of	self-determination,	grassroots	empowerment,	and	community	organizing	among	poor	and	working-class	Black	New	Yorkers.		By	the	end	of	the	year,	these	trends	would	cause	a	rift	in	the	organization	as	Blyden	Jackson,	Norman	and	Velma	Hill,	and	a	group	of	NY	CORE	members	split	from	the	chapter	to	form	the	more	militant	East	River	CORE.	In	NSM,	the	rising	tide	of	grassroots	militancy	and	Black	nationalism	in	Harlem	led	the	organization	to	reconsider	education	as	its	primary	focus	in	the	neighborhood	as	community	members	pushed	for	greater	involvement	in	direct	action	and	community	organizing.	Like	NY	CORE,	such	trends	and	budding	relationships	with	other	community	leaders	like	Jesse	Gray	would	also	spur	the	emergence	of	a	new	wing	of	the	NSM,	known	as	the	Harlem	Action	Group	(HAG),	by	the	year’s	end.	With	the	emergence	of	Gray’s	widespread	rent	strikes	in	Harlem	and	throughout	the	city	in	the	early	fall	of	1963,	both	CORE	and	NSM	embraced	the	surging	grassroots	militancy	and	shifted	their	organizing	actions	to	keep	apace	with	Black	grassroots	demands	for	immediate	rights	and	power	in	New	York	City.	
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As	this	groundswell	was	pushing	the	NSM	to	reconsider	its	operational	analyses	and	directions,	historian	Matthew	Countryman	notes,	“there	was	a	growing	feeling	that	NSM	should	have	a	black	director.”	Despite	the	ongoing	interracial	struggles	in	the	South,	the	continuing	rise	of	Black	militancy	and	nationalist	politics	in	NSM’s	project	cities,	including	Harlem,	Detroit,	and	Philadelphia,	made	having	a	white	director	untenable.	Echoing	the	call	for	Black	self-determination	inherent	in	the	surging	militancy	of	the	time,	Joan	Countryman	later	recalled	the	“need	for	black	leadership	for	an	organization	that	[focused]	on	black	issues.”155	In	September	1963,	Peter	Countryman	stepped	down	from	his	post	as	national	director	to	return	to	Yale,	and	was	succeeded	by	Bill	Strickland,	a	Black	Harvard	graduate,	Marine	Corps	veteran,	and	old	friend	of	Malcolm	X.156		Coinciding	with	HEP’s	immersion	in	more	radical	grassroots	organizing	initiatives	in	Harlem,	Strickland’s	arrival	on	the	scene	ushered	in	a	new	era	for	the	NSM	in	New	York	and	the	nation.	“It	is	becoming	increasingly	evident	that	‘civil	rights’	is	no	longer	either	an	adequate	term	or	an	accurate	description	of	the	quest	for	full	freedom	which	is	now	challenging	our	society,”	Strickland	told	a	crowded	conference	at	Columbia	that	October.	“It	is	also	evident	that	an	institutionalized	system	of	disadvantage	provokes	just	as	dangerous	a	reaction	in	the	overcrowded	and	under-resourced	northern	ghetto	as	in	the	more	publicized	and	tragic	south.”157	
																																																								155	Tobierre,	“Black	Power	Does	Not	Come	Out	of	the	Sky,”	52.		 156	Countryman,	Up	South,	189.		157	William	Strickland,	Speech	at	College	Conference	at	Columbia,	October	25,	1963,	unmarked	clipping,	Box	76,	Folder	24,	Meier	Papers.	
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Strickland’s	stirring	speech	at	Columbia	illustrated	a	new	operational	analysis	of	the	systemic	nature	of	northern	racism	that	both	NSM	and	NY	CORE	members	alike	had	developed	through	their	experiences	in	Harlem	and	elsewhere.	Confronting	this	system	through	a	grassroots	struggle	for	human	rights	would	require	a	new	organizational	framework,	and	would	bring	NSM	and	NY	CORE	to	the	front	of	Harlem’s	flowering	radical	political	milieu	as	the	city	bounded	into	what	would	be	the	most	explosive	year	of	an	already	turbulent	decade.					
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CHAPTER	7		
“SOMETHING’S	GOTTA	BE	WRONG”:	RENT	STRIKES,	REPRESSION,	AND	
REBELLION	IN	HARLEM,	1963-1964	
People	ask	me	why	I	spend	all	my	time	on	heat	and	hot	water	and	I	say	heat	
and	hot	water	is	the	biggest	organizing	tool	we	have;	it	may	even	kick	off	the	
revolution	in	the	ghetto.	–Jesse	Gray	(1964)1	
	
Heretofore	Harlem	has	been	nonviolent.	I	think	the	leadership	of	Harlem	would	
prefer	that	we	remain	nonviolent.	As	long	as	we	can	press	for	equality	with	a	
nonviolent	technique	then	this	is	a	good	one.	The	problem	isn’t	the	leadership,	
the	problem	isn’t	even	the	masses	of	people,	the	problem	is	how	long	can	you	
keep	denying	a	people	freedom	and	expect	them	to	remain	nonviolent.	Turning	
your	cheek	once	is	fine,	turning	it	twice	is	alright,	but	the	third	time	you	get	a	
little	bit	sick	of	being	slapped	down.	And	you	know	if	you	don’t	hit	back	you’re	
in	trouble.	I’m	not	advocating	hitting	back.	I’m	only	saying	that	if	we	don’t	
break	through,	somebody	is	going	to	get	violent.	–Thelma	Johnson	(1963)2	
		 In	early	December	1963,	millions	of	Americans	tuned	in	to	their	local	CBS	station	to	watch	a	special	report	on	the	state	of	the	Black	Freedom	Struggle	in	Harlem	and	the	conditions	caused	by	racial	oppression	there.	For	months,	reporters	brought	their	cameras	through	the	streets	of	Harlem,	filming	street	scenes	and	interviews	with	a	cross-section	of	community	leaders	as	part	of	an	“examination	of	the	Negro	Revolution	as	it	exists	in	Harlem.”	While	the	dramatic	protests	and	violent	backlash	that	surged	throughout	the	South	that	summer	commanded	the	attention	of	most	national	media	outlets,	the	rising	grassroots	militancy	in	Harlem	demonstrated	through	confrontational	protests	at	construction	sites	and	the	uncompromising	rhetoric	of	nationalist	street	rallies	that	summer	had	drawn	the																																																									1	“Jesse	Gray	Tells	Plans	In	New	York:	The	rent-strike	season	is	on,”	National	
Guardian,	November	11,	1964.		 2	CBS,	“The	Harlem	Temper,”	December	11,	1963,	accessed	at	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gf9RDF6T4AY&t=350s/.	
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gaze	of	the	nation	to	its	most	famous	Black	community.	“Instead	of	focusing	on	the	Southern	race	problem,”	executive	producer	Fred	W.	Friendly	stated	in	a	press	release,	“The	Harlem	Temper”	was	intended	to	depict	struggles	for	rights	and	power	in	Harlem	“as	a	microcosm	of	the	Negro	in	the	North.”3		As	the	televised	report	opened	with	scenes	of	Black	people	moving	about	the	sidewalks	of	a	bustling	125th	Street	and	gathering	around	stoops	on	residential	blocks,	white	reporter	Harry	Reasoner	described	the	“invisible	barriers	of	prejudice”	that	created	“some	of	the	worst	of	city	slums.”	While	most	Americans	were	undoubtedly	familiar	with	the	explicit	conditions	of	racial	oppression	in	the	South,	having	seen	on	the	news	“whites	only”	signs,	police	dogs	set	upon	peaceful	protestors,	and	the	destruction	of	Black	churches,	far	fewer	truly	understood	the	problems	of	northern	“ghettoes”	as	part	of	a	national	system	of	institutional	racism	that	knew	no	geographic	bounds.	If	racial	injustices	existed	in	a	northern	community	where	“full	legal	equality…ostensibly	already	exists,”	Reasoner	posited,	then	the	question	begging	to	be	answered	was,	“how	do	we	achieve	real	equality?”			 From	footage	of	Malcolm	X,	Louis	Michaux,	and	Adam	Clayton	Powell,	Jr.	speaking	forcefully	at	street	rallies	to	formal	interviews	with	Jesse	Gray,	Gladys	Harrington,	Paul	Zuber,	Thelma	Johnson,	and	many	others,	the	hour-long	program	explored	this	question	through	the	voices	of	those	who	had	spent	years	in	search	of	its	answer.	The	diversity	of	analyses	and	programs	that	these	prominent	leaders	explained	during	the	course	of	the	program	was	representative	of	the	range	of	
																																																								3	“CBS	Will	Report	on	‘The	Harlem	Temper,”	Cleveland	Call	and	Post,	November	30,	1963.	
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competing	ideologies	at	play	in	Harlem’s	charged	political	milieu.	Though	the	timing	and	tone	of	the	report	suggested	that	Harlem	was	in	its	infancy	of	organized	political	action,	struggling	to	grapple	with	the	complexities	of	racism	in	the	urban	north,	the	program	aired	amidst	a	high	point	in	struggles	for	rights	and	power	in	Harlem.	James	Haughton,	chairman	of	the	NAACP’s	Labor	and	Industry	Committee,	made	this	point	clear	when	questioned	about	the	“new	militancy”	in	Harlem.	“I	don’t	think	there’s	anything	new	about	the	militancy	and	the	dignity	and	the	strength	and	the	pride	and	the	courage	of	the	Negro	people,”	Haughton	bluntly	told	Reasoner.	Despite	this	deep	tradition	of	militancy,	however,	Haughton	conceded	that	Harlem	remained	a	“sleeping	giant,”	yearning	for	organized	action	that	would	engage	the	grassroots	and	awaken	the	Black	Mecca’s	dormant	power.		While	“The	Harlem	Temper”	aptly	presented	the	breadth	of	political	thought	and	action	in	Harlem	through	the	community	leaders	it	featured,	its	producers	and	reviewers	were	critically	mistaken	in	their	conclusions	that	such	a	convoluted	political	milieu	precluded	collective	action.	“The	kaleidoscope	of	opinions	and	impressions	was	so	diverse	as	to	create	a	canvas	of	total	negation,”	a	Boston	Globe	reporter	noted.4	With	seemingly	irreconcilable	debates	around	nonviolence,	integration,	nationalism,	and	self-defense	predominating	in	the	program,	it	is	easy	to	understand	how	observers	could	make	such	assumptions.	In	many	ways,	these	debates	and	disagreements	had	characterized	the	movement	in	Harlem	over	the	past	decade	as	organizations	searched	for	ways	to	effectively	build	mass	movements	
																																																								4	Percy	Shain,	“Portrait	of	Disunity	In	Northern	Negroes,”	Boston	Globe,	December	12,	1963.	
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to	achieve	Black	equality	and	empowerment.	For	years,	activists	and	intellectuals	who	recognized	the	limitations	of	a	Balkanized	movement	had	called	for	a	Black	united	front	to	uproot	northern	racism	and	transform	their	society.		Though	conflicting	visions	of	the	means	and	ends	of	this	social	transformation	routinely	hamstrung	the	development	of	such	a	united	front	at	the	dawn	of	the	1960s,	by	the	time	the	CBS	report	aired,	inter-organizational	coalitions	had	emerged	around	various	protest	campaigns	with	much	greater	frequency.	At	the	insistence	of	local	people	and	indigenous	leaders,	relatively	moderate	middle-class	organizations	like	CORE	and	the	NAACP	had	embraced	an	ethos	of	working-class	community	action	and	entered	the	fold	of	militant	grassroots	organizing.	The	Northern	Student	Movement	had	begun	to	move	from	service-oriented	tutorial	programs	to	community	organizing	for	political	empowerment.	And	by	that	summer,	Malcolm	X	was	sharing	the	stage	with	leaders	from	along	the	spectrum	of	Black	political	thought	in	Harlem,	from	staunch	integrationist	Gladys	Harrington	to	radical	anti-colonial	editor-activist	Dan	Watts,	as	he	escalated	his	calls	for	united	action	for	Black	liberation.		Though	the	programs	and	analyses	embraced	by	these	organizations	may	have	differed,	they	shared	a	common	overarching	goal:	the	immediate	liberation	of	Black	communities	in	the	United	States.	To	James	Haughton,	this	nascent	unity	reflected	a	common	recognition	that	the	demands	of	the	people	must	be	reflected	in	the	organizations	who	claimed	to	represent	their	interests.	“It’s	a	matter	of	what	the	Negro	people	are	demanding,”	Haughton	said,	dismissing	questions	about	the	supposed	dichotomy	between	integration	and	separation	in	the	Black	Freedom	
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Struggle.	“It’s	my	understanding	that	they’re	neither	demanding	total	separation,	which	is	Malcolm’s	position,	nor	are	they	demanding	total	integration.	They’re	demanding	total	equality.”	By	the	fall	of	1963	these	demands	for	total	equality	became	manifest	in	a	citywide	rent	strike	which	had	emerged	from	the	grassroots	in	Harlem	and	galvanized	local	people,	community	groups,	political	leaders,	and	civil	rights	organizations	throughout	the	city	and	across	the	nation.	For	Jesse	Gray,	whose	radical	activism	in	Harlem	bridged	the	Left-led	movements	of	the	post-World	War	II	Era	with	the	radical	insurgencies	of	the	Civil	Rights	Movement,	the	rent	strikes	served	as	a	great	unifying	force	in	the	community’s	struggles	for	Black	liberation.	“Everybody	in	the	community	was	around	the	basic	struggle,”	Gray	later	said,	“struggle	unifies	the	community.”5	By	centering	the	needs	of	the	most	economically	and	politically	marginalized	communities	in	New	York	City,	the	rent	strike	movement	of	1963-64	drew	into	the	fold	of	Harlem’s	radical	political	milieu	the	poor	and	working-class	masses	that	Haughton,	Harrington,	and	Johnson	had	described	in	“The	Harlem	Temper”	as	the	key	to	building	a	mass	movement	in	Harlem.	Furthermore,	through	their	involvement	in	organized	struggle,	this	previously	untapped	well	of	political	power	came	to	realize	its	collective	strength	while	also	developing	a	more	radical	analysis	of	the	many	facets	of	the	white	power	structure	in	New	York	City.		
																																																								5	Jesse	Gray	interview	with	Katherine	M.	Shannon,	July	26,	1967,	Ralph	Bunche	Oral	History	Collection,	Moorland-Spingarn	Research	Center,	Howard	University.	
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For	the	past	decade,	poor	and	working-class	Harlem	residents	had	fueled	the	escalation	of	protest	activity	and	demands	for	human	rights	and	self-determination	that	pushed	local	and	national	civil	rights	organizations	in	more	assertive,	imaginative,	and	radical	directions.	Inspired	by	Harlem’s	deeply-rooted	Black	radical	tradition,	along	with	national	and	global	liberation	struggles,	local	people	had	begun	to	develop	a	revolutionary	consciousness,	which	through	the	rent	strikes	in	the	fall	of	1963,	had	stimulated	the	makings	of	a	promising,	if	shaky,	Black	united	front	in	Harlem.	Forged	through	school	boycotts,	rent	strikes,	economic	picket	lines,	and	protests	against	police	brutality	over	the	previous	decade,	this	popular	consciousness	and	political	action	reflected	frustrations	over	the	limitations	of	racial	liberalism	in	New	York	City	and	was	mobilized	to	fight	for	self-determination	and	a	more	progressive	form	of	urban	governance.	Through	participation	in	local	organizing	efforts	to	improve	living	conditions	and	combat	institutional	racism,	some	of	the	most	marginalized	communities	in	New	York	City	had	developed	a	radical	critique	of	urban	power	structures	that	challenged	the	legitimacy	of	an	inherently	oppressive	society.		This	chapter	examines	the	emergence,	evolution,	and	impacts	of	the	Harlem	rent	strikes	of	1963-64	within	the	context	of	escalating	demands	for	immediate	rights	and	power	in	New	York’s	Black	and	Puerto	Rican	communities.	Through	active	engagement	in	the	rent	strikes,	thousands	of	Black	and	Puerto	Rican	New	Yorkers	forged	an	urban	“movement	center”	that	mobilized	the	masses	in	struggles	for	racial	justice	in	the	city’s	economic,	political,	and	social	institutions.	Consequently,	as	many	activists	and	intellectuals	observed,	the	emergence	of	this	
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movement	center	in	Harlem	was	met	with	increasingly	hostile	and	repressive	actions	and	policies	from	the	city	government	and	its	police	force.	This	dogged	resistance	to	Black	empowerment,	in	turn,	spurred	grassroots	organizers	to	adopt	more	militant	analyses	and	tactics	as	they	fought	to	secure	human	rights	and	self-determination	for	Black	communities	in	Harlem	and	throughout	the	city.	This	chapter	thus	frames	the	outbreak	of	the	1964	Harlem	Rebellion	as	the	result	of	a	collective	disillusionment	with	the	repressive	limitations	of	liberal	governance	to	meaningfully	address	systemic	racial	oppression.	Though	a	spontaneous	act	of	police	brutality	provided	the	impetus	for	the	uprising,	this	fatal	shooting	occurred	within	a	volatile	political	climate	charged	by	increasingly	repressive	state	violence	that	was	employed	to	maintain	the	racial	status	quo	as	radical	and	revolutionary	analyses	were	inspiring	mass	mobilization	in	Harlem	and	beyond.		
v 		 	If	the	March	on	Washington	had	provided	a	sense	of	optimism	and	hope	for	many	African	Americans	who	looked	forward	to	the	promise	of	federal	civil	rights	legislation,	the	bombing	of	the	16th	Street	Baptist	Church	just	two	weeks	later	tempered	any	sense	of	elation.	Describing	the	racist	attack	as	“one	of	the	American	answers	to	the	march,”	James	Baldwin	and	MOW	organizer	Bayard	Rustin	swiftly	announced	plans	for	mass	demonstrations	nationwide	to	protest	the	seemingly	endless	violence	in	the	South.	“It	is	not	enough	to	mourn	the	dead	children,”	Baldwin	declared	from	Harlem,	“what	we	must	do	is	oppose	and	immobilize	the	power	that	
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put	them	to	death.”6	Joined	by	Blyden	Jackson	of	NY	CORE,	Baldwin	and	Rustin	mobilized	the	collective	anger	throughout	New	York	City	into	a	protest	of	10,000	New	Yorkers	at	the	federal	courthouse	in	Foley	Square	one	week	after	the	deadly	terrorist	attack	in	Birmingham.7		As	200	police	officers	looked	on,	including	mounted	units	and	members	of	the	notorious	Tactical	Patrol	Force,	Rustin	called	for	a	nonviolent	“uprising”	in	100	cities	“where	we	will	sit	and	stand	and	stand	and	sit	and	go	to	jail	and	jail	again,	until	there	are	no	color	barriers.”	Rustin’s	careful	insistence	on	nonviolent	action	served	as	a	rebuttal	of	sorts	to	comments	made	by	John	O.	Killens	and	Louis	Lomax	in	support	of	armed	self-defense	at	a	mid-town	memorial	service	two	nights	prior.8	With	justice	still	in	short	supply	amidst	wholesale	racist	violence,	Rustin	was	
																																																								6	Albin	Krebs,	“Day	of	Mourning	For	Bomb	Victims,”	Boston	Globe,	September	19,	1963.		 7	Terry	Smith,	“Nationwide	Throngs	Mourn	Child	Bomb	Victims,”	Boston	
Globe,	September	23,	1963;	Peter	Kihss,	“Rallies	In	Nation	Protest	Killing	Of	6	In	Alabama,”	New	York	Times,	September	23,	1963.		 8	According	to	the	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	Killens	told	the	crowd	gathered	at	Town	Hall	on	West	43rd	Street,	“as	a	tactic,	nonviolence	has	been	successful,	but	as	a	philosophy	we	need	to	get	rid	of	it.”	Following	Killens,	Lomax	warned	that	“the	time	is	coming	when	the	American	Negro	must	arm	himself	to	defend	his	home.”	Malcolm	Nash,	“Bomb	Victims	Mourned,”	New	York	Amsterdam	
News,	September	28,	1963.	Interestingly,	though	Lomax	took	a	militant	stance	on	armed	self-defense	that	weekend,	he	took	a	hard	line	on	integration	as	the	main	objective	of	such	efforts.	At	a	rally	in	Harlem	the	same	day	as	the	Foley	Square	demonstration,	where	900	gathered	for	another	demonstration	organized	by	James	Lawson’s	United	African	Nationalist	Movement,	Lomax	was	booed	off	the	stage	when	he	“advocated	a	moderate	course,”	telling	the	crowd	“to	fight	for	an	integrated	place	in	American	democracy.”	See	“Thousands	Rally,	Demonstrate,	Pray	As	City	Mourns	Birmingham	Children,”	Pittsburgh	Courier,	September	28,	1963.	
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fighting	an	uphill	battle	in	trying	to	check	the	growing	influence	of	those	who	advocated	armed	self-defense	to	protect	Black	communities.	While	Rustin	called	for	a	national	campaign	against	the	naked	brutality	of	southern	racism	that	afternoon,	Baldwin	ensured	that	the	less	visible,	yet	interrelated	evils	of	northern	Jim	Crow	went	neither	unspoken	nor	unchallenged.	Calling	New	York	a	“segregated	city,”	the	celebrated	writer	called	for	a	“mass	campaign	of	civil	disobedience”	to	expose	and	oppose	the	many	faces	of	racial	violence	in	the	city.	“We	have	got	to	bring	the	cat	out	of	hiding,”	Baldwin	declared,	pointing	to	the	veiled,	institutional	nature	of	northern	inequality.9		In	his	widely	published	essays	of	the	late	1950s	and	early	1960s,	Baldwin	had	demonstrated	a	deep	concern	for	explaining	and	analyzing	the	human	impacts	of	racial	discrimination	in	education,	employment,	policing,	and	housing	in	Harlem.	Now,	with	the	grisly	murder	of	four	young	Black	girls	in	Birmingham	as	a	backdrop,	Baldwin	urged	New	Yorkers	to	confront	these	local	manifestations	of	the	same	violent,	national	system	through	direct	action.	“What	would	happen,”	Baldwin	pointedly	asked	the	crowd	that	Sunday	afternoon,	“if	Harlem	refused	to	pay	the	rents	for	a	month?”	Unbeknownst	to	Baldwin,	a	small	group	of	tenants	nine	miles	uptown	had	begun	doing	just	that.	
The	Rebirth	of	the	Rent	Strike	The	notion	was	not	a	new	one	in	Harlem,	where	rent	strikes	had	been	a	staple	of	Left-led	tenant	movements	during	the	Great	Depression	before	reemerging	
																																																								9	Peter	Kihss,	“Rallies	In	Nation	Protest	Killing	Of	6	In	Alabama,”	New	York	
Times,	September	23,	1963.	
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with	Jesse	Gray’s	strikes	in	1959.	By	the	summer	of	1963,	rent	strikes	were	once	again	creeping	into	the	minds	of	many	in	Harlem	as	City	Hall	proved	unwilling	to	enforce	hard-won	housing	policies	secured	through	tenant	organizing	over	the	past	several	years.10	Weeks	before	the	March	on	Washington,	Gray	had	threatened	a	strike	at	a	rally	on	117th	Street	when	he	urged	the	residents	of	the	block’s	crumbling	tenements	to	march	on	City	Hall	and	tell	the	Mayor	“we	are	not	going	to	pay	any	more	rent	on	these	blocks	until	the	violations	in	our	homes	are	corrected.”11	Called	under	the	banner	of	“Civil	Rights	and	Tenants	Rights,”	the	rally	was	one	of	three	that	Gray	and	the	Community	Council	on	Housing	(CCH)	organized	in	lower	Harlem	that	month,	drawing	the	likes	of	Anna	Arnold	Hedgeman,	Hulan	Jack,	attorney	Cora	Walker,	Assemblyman	José	Ramos-Lopez,	and	Malcolm	X.	Sharing	the	stage	with	these	formidable	Harlem	leaders,	the	CCH	called	for	“stiff	fines	and	long	jail	terms	for	landlords	who	refuse	to	obey	the	law.”12	With	the	March	on	Washington	looming	large	in	public	consciousness,	the	rallies	attempted	to	draw	tenants	out	of	their	buildings	and	into	the	fold	of	organized	political	action	by	explicitly	linking	tenants	rights	with	civil	rights.		While	Gray	continued	to	tirelessly	organize	tenants	in	his	lower	Harlem	neighborhood,	members	of	the	Northern	Student	Movement	(NSM)	had	also	begun	
																																																								10	See	Chapter	Four.		 11	“Harlem	Housing	Ills	Laid	to	Landlords	and	Mayor,”	New	York	Times,	August	4,	1963.		 12	Community	Council	on	Housing,	“The	Tenants	News,”	August	1963,	Box	5,	Folder	9,	James	Haughton	Papers,	Schomburg	Center	for	Research	in	Black	Culture,	New	York	Public	Library	(henceforth	referred	to	as	Haughton	Papers).	
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moving	into	the	field	of	tenant	organizing	that	summer.	Dissatisfied	with	the	limited	scope	of	their	Harlem	Education	Project’s	(HEP)	tutorial	programs,	organizers	wanted	to	work	on	programs,	like	the	Neighborhood	Commons,	which	would	develop	indigenous	leadership	and	spur	autonomous	community	action.13	Inspired	by	the	successes	of	SNCC	in	working	with	local	people	to	build	community-led	movements,	NSM	members	moved	into	the	ripe	field	of	tenant	organizing	in	Harlem.	“Fannie	Lou	Hamer,	activist	share	croppers,	people	who	emerged	out	of	the	community,	who	became	the	voice	of	that	community,”	NSM’s	city	field	secretary	Danny	Schechter	later	said,	“that’s	what	we	believed	in,	bottom-up.”14	Like	Jesse	Gray	and	Jack	O’Dell,	whose	analysis	of	radical	grassroots	struggle	informed	their	move	into	tenant	organizing	years	earlier,	Schechter	and	other	NSM	members	saw	Harlem	tenements	as	the	next	frontier	of	the	Civil	Rights	Movement.	By	early	July,	HEP	workers	had	begun	conducting	housing	surveys	in	the	neighborhood	near	their	office	on	8th	Avenue	between	136th	and	137th	Streets.	While	canvassing	the	neighborhood,	HEP	staff	met	Granville	Cherry,	an	unemployed	shipping	clerk	who	lived	in	a	railroad	apartment	at	2560	8th	Avenue,	just	a	few	doors	from	the	HEP	office.15	The	apartment	that	Cherry	shared	with	his	pregnant	
																																																								13	“Northern	Student	Movement	Prospectus,	September	1963-	June	1964,”	Box	4,	Folder	2,	Northern	Student	Movement	Records,	Schomburg	Center	for	Research	in	Black	Culture,	New	York	Public	Library	(henceforth	referred	to	as	NSM	Records).		 14	Roberta	Gold,	When	Tenants	Claimed	The	City: The	Struggle	For	Citizenship	
in	New	York	City	Housing	(Urbana:	University	of	Illinois	Press,	2014),	120.		 15	“Successful	Rent	Strike	Rocks	Harlem,”	NSM	News,	December	1,	1963,	Box	76,	August	Meier	Papers,	Schomburg	Center	for	Research	in	Black	Culture	
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wife	and	six	children	was	riddled	with	code	violations,	including	broken	windows,	a	broken	toilet,	crumbling	walls,	a	leaking	ceiling,	and	a	horrible	rat	infestation.16	To	Cherry	and	the	other	tenants,	these	conditions	were	not	isolated,	but	rather	symptomatic	of	the	racial	oppression	inherent	within	northern	Black	communities.	“They	believe,”	the	New	York	Times	wrote	of	the	tenants,	“that	their	troubles	arise	directly	from	the	opportunities	for	exploitation	that	a	racial	ghetto	affords	white	owners.”17		Frustrated	by	the	unchecked	exploitation	of	their	landlord,	Daniel	Fardella,	an	Italian-American	Bronx	resident	who	charged	$34.70	a	month	for	the	apartment,	yet	provided	no	services	or	repairs,	Cherry	formed	a	tenants	council	with	the	assistance	and	encouragement	of	the	HEP	staffers.	While	Cherry	organized	his	neighbors,	Bob	Fletcher	and	the	HEP	staff	served	as	liaison	between	the	tenants	and	landlord	in	an	attempt	to	negotiate	repairs	of	the	building.18	After	two	meetings	with	Fardella	failed	to	bring	any	improvements	to	their	apartments,	however,	the	newly-formed	tenants	council	decided	to	withhold	their	rents	and	make	the	repairs	themselves.	When	Fardella	objected	to	the	tenants	making	improvements	upon	his	building,	the	tenants	council,	after	months	of	fighting	for	repairs	with	the	landlord	
																																																																																																																																																																					(henceforth	referred	to	as	Meier	Papers);	“HEP	Program	Report,”	August	7,	1963,	Box	8,	Folder	12,	NSM	Records.		 16	McClandish	Phillips,	“Harlem	Tenants	Open	Rent	Strike,”	New	York	Times,	September	28,	1963.		 17	Ibid.		 18	“HEP	Program	Report,”	August	7,	1963,	Box	8,	Folder	12,	NSM	Records.	
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and	city	agencies,	officially	began	a	rent	strike.19	Garnering	front-page	coverage	in	the	New	York	Times	by	the	end	of	September,	the	tenants	of	2560	8th	Avenue	cranked	up	the	heat	on	a	simmering	tenant	movement	and	answered	Baldwin’s	challenge	in	a	resounding	way.		
The	Rent	Strike	Spreads	Within	a	matter	of	weeks,	the	rent	strike	had	scored	immediate	victories	for	the	tenants	and	launched	grassroots	tenant	struggles	into	the	forefront	of	civil	rights	activity	in	the	city.	After	Fardella	failed	to	evict	the	tenants	through	court	proceedings	for	nonpayment	of	rent,	the	city’s	Rent	and	Rehabilitation	Administration	ordered	a	rent	reduction	in	mid-October	until	the	landlord	resolved	the	violations	in	the	building.	Cherry	and	his	neighbors	had	their	rents	reduced	from	$34	to	$1	per	month,	thereby	slashing	the	landlord’s	monthly	revenue	from	the	nine	apartments	in	the	building	from	$969.43	to	$9.20	While	the	tenants	claimed	victory	against	their	landlord,	believing	the	rent	reductions	would	compel	Fardella	to	make	the	necessary	repairs,	the	city	patted	itself	on	the	back	for	resolving	the	issue	and	curbing	the	rent	strike.	Informing	the	New	York	Times	that	the	rent	strike	had	been	made	“academic,”	the	RRA	pushed	the	narrative	that	tenants	need	only	work	through	the	prescribed	channels	of	governmental	agencies	to	solve	their	housing	issues.21		
																																																								19	“Rent	Strikes	Rocks	Harlem:	The	People	Take	The	Lead,”	January	28,	1964,	Box	76,	Meier	Papers.		 20	“Harlem	Rents	Cut	To	$1	After	Strike,”	New	York	Times,	October	12,	1963.		
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If	the	RRA	thought	they	had	dodged	a	bullet	with	the	rent	reductions,	any	sense	of	relief	was	short-lived.	Once	the	story	of	Cherry’s	rent	strike	made	the	front	page	of	the	Times,	there	was	no	putting	the	cat	back	in	the	bag.	In	a	sermon	at	Abyssinian	Baptist	Church	just	days	after	the	Times	article	was	published,	Adam	Clayton	Powell,	Jr.	celebrated	the	reemergence	of	the	rent	strikes	and	other	economic	protests	in	Harlem.	“The	way	to	make	a	man	holler	is	to	withhold	his	dollar,”	Powell	declared	from	the	altar.	Speaking	at	a	press	conference	after	the	service,	Powell	announced	that	he	would	meet	with	James	Baldwin	that	week	to	discuss	plans	for	a	national	rent	strike.	Drawing	upon	his	own	experience	of	leading	a	rent	strike	in	Harlem	in	the	early	1930s,	Powell	suggested	that	such	a	movement	“is	a	good	method	of	getting	Northerners	into	the	black	revolution.”22	While	Powell	used	his	pulpit	and	bombast	to	call	for	a	national	movement,	“rent	strike	fever”	was	spreading	rapidly	throughout	New	York	City.	As	word	of	Cherry’s	successful	rent	strike	got	out,	other	renters	in	that	neighborhood	began	organizing	their	own	buildings	to	join	the	tenants	council.	Just	days	after	the	RRA	ordered	the	rent	reductions,	Mary	King	and	Rita	Jackson	approached	Cherry	with	a	list	of	tenants	in	their	buildings	on	the	other	side	of	8th	Avenue	who	were	interested	in	joining	the	council.	Like	Cherry,	the	two	Black	women	complained	of	gaping	holes	in	the	walls	and	ceilings,	broken	toilets,	leaking	pipes,	fire	hazards,	and	rats	for																																																																																																																																																																						21	Ibid;	Michael	Lipsky,	Protest	In	City	Politics: Rent	Strikes,	Housing	and	the	
Power	of	the	Poor	(Chicago:	Rand	McNally	and	Company,	1970),	58-59.		 22	“Rep.	Powell	Preaches	Anti-Santa	Claus	Sermon,”	The	Hartford	Courant,	September	30,	1963;	Martin	Arnold,	“City	Aide	Chides	Building	Unions,”	New	York	
Times,	September	30,	1963;	“Adam	Powell	Joins	List	of	Boycott	Supporters,”	
Pittsburgh	Courier,	October	5,	1963.	
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roommates.	“I	wish	I	was	the	judge,	I’d	send	the	landlord	to	the	electric	chair,”	the	superintendent	of	Jackson’s	building	at	2577	8th	Avenue	told	a	reporter	from	the	
Daily	Worker.	“I’d	do	worse	than	that,”	Jackson	said,	“I’d	let	him	live	here.”23	Inspired	by	Cherry’s	success,	the	two	women	worked	diligently	in	the	next	several	months	to	organize	their	buildings	and	expand	the	nascent	rent	strike.	While	the	Worker	heralded	the	organizing	efforts	of	King	and	Jackson	as	evidence	that	“a	fuse	has	been	lit…by	the	rent	strike	victory,”	the	“spark”	was	also	spreading	to	other	sections	of	the	city.	In	early	October,	Brooklyn	CORE	chair	Oliver	Leeds	threatened	a	rent	strike	in	Bedford-Stuyvesant	if	tenants’	demands	for	repairs	were	not	met.	“No	one	expects	people	to	buy	stale	bread	or	rotten	meat,”	Leeds	said,	“housing	should	be	provided	on	the	same	basis.	It	should	be	decent,	or	it	shouldn’t	exist	at	all.”24	In	the	Lower	East	Side,	NYU	CORE	and	Mobilization	For	Youth,	a	social	agency	formed	two	years	earlier	to	combat	juvenile	delinquency	and	organize	poor	and	working-class	Black	and	Puerto	Rican	communities,	both	shifted	their	focus	from	service-based	housing	clinics	to	organizing	tenants	for	collective	action.25	Uptown	at	NY	CORE,	where	the	chapter	had	established	a	housing	clinic	in	
																																																								23	Fred	Gilman,	“Harlem	Strike	Makes	City	Act	On	a	Slumlord,”	Daily	Worker,	October	15,	1963;	Fred	Gilman,	“Victory	in	Harlem	Spreads	Struggle	Against	Slumlords,”	Daily	Worker,	October	22,	1963.		 24	Fred	Halstead,	et	al.,	Harlem	Stirs	(New	York:	Marzani	&	Munsell	Publishers,	Inc.,	1966),	50.		 25	Joel	Schwartz,	“Tenant	Power	in	the	Liberal	City,	1943-1971,”	in	The	
Tenant	Movement	in	New	York	City,	1904-1984,	ed.	Ronald	Lawson	and	Mark	Naison	(New	Brunswick:	Rutgers	University	Press,	1986),	173-176;	For	more	on	MFY,	see	Tamar	W.	Carroll,	Mobilizing	New	York:	AIDS,	Antipoverty,	and	Feminist	Activism	(Chapel	Hill:	University	of	North	Carolina	Press,	2015).	
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December	1962,	the	housing	committee	moved	away	from	conducting	independent	building	investigations	and	toward	organizing	tenants	associations	“to	confront	landlords	with	‘direct	action,’	including	pickets	and	rent	strikes.”26		Though	these	organizations	had	yet	to	organize	or	join	a	rent	strike	up	to	this	point,	their	collective	attention	to	the	housing	concerns	of	poor	and	working-class	tenants	in	the	months	leading	up	to	Cherry’s	opening	salvo	was	significant	for	two	primary	reasons.	First,	this	emphasis	on	tenant	organizing	over	open-housing	campaigns	was	reflective	of	a	broader	trend	in	the	city’s	Black	Freedom	Struggles	toward	grassroots	organizing,	community	empowerment,	and	self-determination	in	Black	and	Puerto	Rican	communities.	Second,	that	housing	was	seen	as	the	primary	vehicle	through	which	this	type	of	community	power	could	be	developed	was	a	direct	recognition	and	outgrowth	of	Jesse	Gray’s	decade	of	radical	grassroots	organizing	in	Harlem.	Though	Gray	may	not	have	organized	the	first	rent	strike	of	1963,	he	had	meticulously	tilled	the	soil	from	which	it	grew.	In	addition	to	sparking	a	mass	mobilization	around	tenants’	rights	in	the	city,	the	birth	of	the	rent	strike	on	8th	Avenue	proved	an	immediate	boon	for	the	NSM	in	Harlem.	In	Cherry,	NSM	found	the	indigenous	leader	they	were	looking	for	to	jump-start	a	local	movement	around	housing.	“He	was	articulate,	he	was	committed,	he	was	a	hard	worker,	he	was	willing	to	take	initiative,	and	distribute	leaflets	and	talk	to	people,”	Schechter	later	recalled.27	Although	HEP	organizers	had	earlier	proven	
																																																								26	Joel	Schwartz,	“The	New	York	Rent	Strikes	of	1963-1964,”	Social	Science	
Review	57,	no.	4	(December	1983):	548-49.		 27	Gold,	When	Tenants	Claimed	The	City,	120.	
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successful	in	fostering	productive	relationships	with	community	leaders	like	Chick	Bradley	on	the	Neighborhood	Commons	project,	they	saw	in	Cherry’s	tenant	council	the	potential	for	building	a	much	broader	social	movement.	“The	real	significance	of	this	project,”	the	NSM	News	reported	that	fall,	“is	that	it	indicates	that	the	NSM	philosophy	of	community	action,	community-led,	is	workable.”28	Toward	this	goal	of	expanding	their	involvement	in	community-led	struggle,	Cherry’s	emergence	as	an	indigenous	leader	gave	the	NSM	“a	kind	of	legitimacy,”	Schechter	said,	“somebody	in	the	neighborhood.”29	While	the	tutorial	programs	had	earned	HEP	a	reputation	for	their	community-service	in	Harlem,	their	involvement	with	the	burgeoning	rent	strike	movement	provided	stronger	social	capital	in	the	context	of	Harlem’s	surging	grassroots	militancy	by	the	summer	of	1963.		With	this	more	formidable	neighborhood	presence,	Cherry	and	NSM	staff	moved	quickly	to	establish	a	new	group	dedicated	to	the	grassroots	community	action	that	the	rent	strikes	exemplified.	Within	a	few	short	weeks,	the	ranks	of	Cherry’s	tenant	council	had	grown	to	include	a	volunteer	secretary	and	fieldworker,	with	plans	to	recruit	greater	involvement	in	the	neighborhood.	In	mid-October,	Cherry	announced	that	the	council	would	be	opening	an	office	at	307	W.	147th	Street	“to	continue	and	broaden	the	fight.”30	Located	near	the	Neighborhood	Commons,	the	storefront	office	would	become	the	home	of	the	Harlem	Action	Group	(HAG),	an																																																									28	“Successful	Rent	Strike	Rocks	Harlem,”	NSM	News,	December	1,	1963,	Box	76,	Meier	Papers.		 29	Gold,	When	Tenants	Claimed	The	City,	120.		 30	Fred	Gilman,	“Harlem	Strike	Makes	City	Act	On	a	Slumlord,”	Daily	Worker,	October	15,	1963.	
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organization	under	the	umbrella	of	the	Northern	Student	Movement	dedicated	to	community	organization	and	political	action.		In	the	following	weeks,	HAG	staffers,	including	Bob	Knight,	QR	Hand,	Jim	Finch,	and	Julian	Houston,	used	the	momentum	generated	by	Cherry’s	strike	to	expand	their	grassroots	organizing	efforts	and	bring	more	tenants	into	the	fold	of	the	rent	strike.	Going	door-to-door	in	the	neighborhoods	surrounding	the	HEP	and	HAG	offices,	HAG	workers	distributed	hundreds	of	leaflets	to	inform	tenants	of	Cherry’s	recent	victory	against	his	landlord.	Featuring	newspaper	coverage	of	Cherry’s	success	alongside	a	photograph	of	a	Black	woman	holding	her	young	daughter	in	a	crumbling	apartment—a	familiar	scene	for	residents	in	many	of	the	buildings	they	canvassed—the	HAG	flyers	read,	“2560	8th	pays	$1	a	month	rent	so	can	you.”31	By	the	end	of	the	month,	HAG	workers	had	helped	Mary	King	and	Rita	Jackson	to	organize	their	buildings	to	formally	join	the	rent	strike.		
“What	we	want	is	action”:	The	CCH	Joins	the	Strikes		While	HAG,	CORE	chapters,	and	other	community	organizations	in	New	York	began	to	focus	their	energies	on	tenant	organizing,	Gray	and	the	CCH	worked	feverishly	to	capitalize	on	the	sudden	widespread	attention	on	housing	that	their	ten	years	of	groundwork	had	finally	wrought.	Though	the	CCH	had	not	yet	declared	a	rent	strike,	Gray	and	his	small	but	committed	group	of	organizers	used	the	momentum	from	Cherry’s	strike	to	organize	more	buildings	in	their	Lower	Harlem	neighborhood.	At	the	same	time,	the	CCH	leveraged	this	increased	attention	to	make																																																									31	Harlem	Action	Group	Flyer,	1963,	Box	31,	Folder	17,	Metropolitan	Council	on	Housing	Records,	Tamiment	Library	and	Robert	F.	Wagner	Labor	Archives,	New	York	University	Libraries	(henceforth	referred	to	as	MCH	Records).	
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more	expansive	and	immediate	demands	upon	the	city’s	power	structure.		As	the	rent	strike	on	8th	Avenue	was	underway	in	mid-September,	Gray	escalated	his	plans	for	a	mass	march	on	City	Hall	the	following	month	to	demand	that	the	Mayor	“either	order	the	courts	to	mete	out	stiffer	penalties	or	invoke	the	receivership	law”	to	rectify	the	rampant	abuses	of	Harlem	slumlords.32		To	drum	up	support	for	the	march,	the	Pittsburgh	Courier	reported,	members	of	the	CCH	conducted	a	month-long	“house-to-house	canvas	of	every	building	from	110th	to	118th	Streets	from	Park	Avenue	to	Morningside	Avenue	to	discuss	with	tenants	the	problems	they	face	as	a	result	of	the	neglect	of	landlords.”33	This	diligent	organizing	work	was	necessary	to	not	only	mobilize	support	for	the	march,	but	also	to	help	tenants	overcome	apprehensions	about	taking	action	against	their	landlords.	In	a	city	with	a	housing	vacancy	rate	around	1%,	many	tenants	had	good	reason	to	be	wary	of	crossing	their	landlords	and	risking	eviction.		Although	some	tenants	were	hesitant	to	get	involved,	others	were	anxious	to	take	action.	At	a	meeting	of	the	CCH	in	early	October,	the	Pittsburgh	Courier	reported,	tenants	of	buildings	on	116th	Street	and	146th	Street	“voted	not	to	pay	rent	to	the	landlords	until	all	violations	were	removed.”34	Gray,	however,	remained	focused	on	coordinating	that	month’s	march	and	claimed	that	tenants	in	over	100	buildings	had	been	organized	to	take	their	complaints	to	City	Hall.	That	Gray	was	
																																																								32	“Tenants	Picket	Landlord,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	October	19,	1963.		 33	“March	Protesting	Slum	Conditions	Will	Be	Staged	By	Tenants,”	Pittsburgh	
Courier,	October	12,	1963.		 34	Ibid.	
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hesitant	to	launch	a	rent	strike	in	early	October	despite	calls	from	CCH	members	and	the	tempting	press	coverage	received	by	Granville	Cherry	is	indicative	of	his	larger	strategy	at	the	time.	Rather	than	attempting	to	force	slumlords	to	repair	their	buildings	in	piecemeal	fashion,	Gray	sought	to	coordinate	a	mass	tenant	movement	to	compel	the	City	to	undertake	a	mass	rehabilitation	of	Black	and	Puerto	Rican	communities.		Through	his	decade	of	experience	in	tenant	organizing,	Gray	understood	the	inherently	limited	scope	of	targeting	individual	landlords	for	building	repairs.	These	fights	required	long,	diligent	organizing	efforts	to	wrangle	shiftless	landlords	and	apathetic	city	agencies	and	seldom	achieved	tangible	victories,	let	alone	systemic	change.	For	a	radical	organizer	with	visions	of	broader	societal	transformation,	systemic	problems	required	systemic	solutions.	Thus,	by	the	fall	of	1963	Gray	increasingly	focused	his	rhetoric	and	organizing	on	City	Hall,	rather	than	slumlords.	“The	Harlem	tenants,”	Gray	told	reporters	in	mid-October,	“hold	Mayor	Wagner	primarily	responsible	for	the	court’s	asserted	coddling	of	slum	owners.”	35	By	targeting	the	Mayor,	Gray	effectively	challenged	tenants	in	Harlem	to	develop	a	more	systemic	critique	of	the	broader	power	structure	in	New	York	City	by	personifying	a	complex	system.	In	addition	to	promoting	a	more	radical	popular	consciousness,	Gray’s	systemic	critique	also	brought	some	action	from	City	Hall.	A	week	before	the	planned	march,	Mayor	Wagner	issued	an	alarming,	if	unsurprising,	report	on	a	recent	wave	of	housing	inspections	conducted	by	the	Department	of	Buildings.																																																									35	“Tenants	Picket	Landlord,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	October	19,	1963.	
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During	what	Commissioner	Harold	Birns	described	as	the	first	“cellar-to-roof	inspections	in	which	every	building	on	a	block	was	visited,”	the	Department	found	40,000	violations	in	2,647	buildings	Harlem,	Bedford-Stuyvesant,	and	the	South	Bronx.	Of	these	buildings,	833	were	referred	for	court	action,	357	were	recommended	for	rent	reductions,	and	50	were	referred	to	the	city’s	receivership	process.36	Whereas	previous	inspections	in	these	same	neighborhoods	had	only	found	4,000	violations,	the	dramatic	increase	in	this	new	report	revealed	the	severity	of	the	housing	crisis,	along	with	the	insufficiency	of	city	resources	dedicated	to	inspections	and	code	enforcement.		Furthermore,	the	report	gave	greater	leverage	to	tenant	organizers	in	these	predominantly	Black	and	Puerto	Rican	neighborhoods	who	understood	that	inspections	alone	would	not	bring	about	any	immediate	improvements	as	winter	neared.		With	the	housing	crisis	as	a	matter	of	political	fact,	Gray	and	the	CCH	demanded	that	the	Mayor	“cut	rents	on	buildings	where	there	are	violations,	take	over	those	buildings	immediately	and	make	repairs	of	the	violations,”	all	while	bringing	stiffer	punishments	upon	recalcitrant	landlords.	Additionally,	Gray	told	reporters	that	the	CCH	would	ask	the	Mayor	to	establish	a	“non-biased,	three-man	arbitration	board”	to	handle	tenants’	cases	and	to	enforce	the	1962	receivership	law	to	order	the	takeover	of	slum	buildings	“for	rehabilitation	at	once.”37	Although	the	mass	inspections	marked	a	partial	fulfillment	of	Gray’s	demands	years	earlier	for	a	
																																																								36	“Tenants	Unimpressed	By	Mayor’s	Housing	Report;	Still	Plan	March,”	New	
York	Amsterdam	News,	October	26,	1963.		 37	Ibid.	
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housing	and	code	enforcement	program	that	operated	not	on	a	reactive	complaint	basis,	but	rather	on	proactive	inspection	basis,	by	this	point	he	and	the	CCH	understood	that	inspections	did	not	translate	into	repairs.	For	Gray,	the	expansion	and	swift	enforcement	of	the	receivership	law	was	key	to	expediting	repairs	and	improvements,	as	well	as	bringing	about	the	systemic	transformation	of	housing	policy	in	the	long-run	through	collective	ownership	of	low	and	middle-income	housing.	While	working	toward	this	longer-range	program,	Gray	also	told	reporters	after	the	Mayor	issued	his	inspection	report	that	“what	we	want	is	action.	Now.”38		Unimpressed	by	the	Mayor’s	inspection	report,	Gray	led	the	planned	march	on	City	Hall	a	week	later.	Though	for	the	past	two	months	he	had	predicted	2,000	tenants	would	join	in	the	protest,	only	200	tenants	showed	up	on	a	rainy	Monday	afternoon.	The	protestors	who	braved	the	weather	spent	three	hours	outside	City	Hall,	where	they	distributed	leaflets	listing	the	110	buildings	in	lower	Harlem	that	they	demanded	action	on.	More	specifically,	the	tenants	called	upon	the	city	to	take	over	every	single	building	on	117th	Street	from	Fifth	Avenue	to	Madison	Avenue.39		Despite	the	relatively	weak	turnout,	the	protest	served	notice	to	City	Hall	that	tenants	in	Harlem	made	no	distinction	between	tenants	rights	and	political	power	in	the	city.	While	Gray	met	with	the	Mayor’s	Executive	Assistant	inside	City	Hall	to	present	their	demands,	protestors	outside	chanted	“No	action	in	’63,	no	votes	in	’64,”	sounding	the	call	to	Mayor	Wagner	that	they	were	prepared	to	take	their	
																																																								38	Ibid.		 39	“150	Harlem	Tenants	Picket	City	Hall	in	Slum	Protest,”	New	York	Times,	October	29,	1963.	
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protests	to	the	polls	in	the	upcoming	election	year.40	Returning	to	the	ranks	after	his	meeting,	Gray	made	the	point	more	explicit.	“The	Wagner	Administration	has	proved	that	it	is	unable	to	handle	the	housing	problem	and	we	don’t	want	him	to	come	to	Harlem	next	year	to	ask	for	votes.”41	Later	that	week,	Gray	announced	plans	for	another	demonstration	at	the	City	Housing	and	Redevelopment	Board	to	continue	pushing	the	CCH’s	demands	for	the	city	takeover	of	all	buildings	on	117th	Street,	as	well	as	the	formation	of	an	arbitration	board.	“We’re	tired	of	inspections.	That’s	all	they	do	in	Harlem,”	Gray	said	at	a	meeting	at	the	Dunlevy-Milbank	Community	Center	on	W.	118th	Street.	“We	don’t	want	inspectors.	We	want	action!”42	As	City	Hall	floundered,	tenants	took	action	just	days	later	when	November	rents	were	due.	On	the	first	of	the	month,	HAG	organizers	announced	that	36	tenants	in	the	two	buildings	Mary	King	and	Rita	Jackson	organized	across	the	street	from	Granville	Cherry’s	apartment	had	gone	on	strike.43	Further	downtown	in	the	Lower	East	Side,	NYU	CORE	announced	that	110	tenants	in	six	buildings	had	gone	on	strike	after	months	of	fighting	for	repairs	through	city	agencies	and	the	courts.44	
																																																								40	Lipsky,	Protest	In	City	Politics,	58-59;	“Only	200	At	City	Hall	Rally,”	New	
York	Amsterdam	News,	November	2,	1963.		 41	“Only	200	At	City	Hall	Rally,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	November	2,	1963.		 42	Ibid.		 43	“110	Tenants	Begin	Rent	Strike	Here,”	New	York	Times,	November	2,	1963.		 44	“Harlem	Boycott	On	Rents	Spreads,”	New	York	Times,	November	5,	1963;	“110	Tenants	Begin	Rent	Strike	Here,”	New	York	Times,	November	2,	1963.	Though	
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Three	days	later,	45	tenants	in	three	buildings	that	neighbored	the	CCH	storefront	on	E.	117th	Street	announced	that	they	too	had	gone	on	strike.		Though	the	CCH-backed	rent	strikes	began	with	meager	numbers,	Gray	predicted	rapid	growth.	By	the	following	weekend,	Gray	claimed,	12	more	buildings	would	be	on	strike	and	by	December	the	total	number	of	buildings	participating	in	the	rent	strike	would	eclipse	100.45	The	basis	for	these	claims	rested	upon	the	years	of	groundwork	that	the	CCH	had	already	laid	in	these	buildings,	along	with	the	extensive	organizing	campaign	for	the	march	that	summer.	Furthermore,	Gray	had	his	finger	on	the	pulse	of	the	community	and	felt	that	the	people	were	ready	to	move.	According	to	Mark	Naison,	it	was	the	“growing	militancy”	of	the	CCH’s	rank-and-file	at	meetings	and	protests	over	the	previous	weeks	and	months,	which	prompted	Gray	to	finally	launch	the	strike	in	early	November.46		
The	Emergence	of	the	Rent	Strike	Movement	Bolstered	by	the	participation	and	leadership	of	the	CCH,	the	rent	strikes	quickly	evolved	from	scattered	tenant	revolts	to	a	coordinated	movement	by	the	beginning	of	December.	Though	more	buildings	had	been	on	strike	in	the	Lower	East	Side	in	early	November,	the	organizational	strength	of	the	CCH	and	the	rousing																																																																																																																																																																						the	RRA	had	already	cut	rents	in	the	Eldridge	Street	buildings	by	33	to	50%	that	July,	the	landlord	failed	to	undertake	any	major	repairs	on	the	410	violations	and	demonstrations	continued	throughout	the	summer.	After	a	court	appearance	on	November	1st	to	bring	charges	against	the	landlord,	the	predominantly	Puerto	Rican	tenants	announced	that	they	would	be	giving	their	rentals	to	NYU	CORE	for	deposit	in	an	escrow	account.		45	“Harlem	Boycott	On	Rents	Spreads,”	New	York	Times,	November	5,	1963.		 46	Mark	Naison,	“The	Rent	Strikes	in	New	York,”	Radical	America	1,	no.	3	(November-December	1967):	18-19.	
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rhetoric	of	its	leader	quickly	established	Harlem	as	the	epicenter	of	the	rent	strikes	as	tenants	there	joined	the	strike	in	droves.	Inspired	by	these	Harlem	tenants,	civil	rights	organizations,	housing	advocates,	and	civic	groups	throughout	the	city	moved	to	organize	their	own	communities	to	engage	in	rent	strikes.	Flyers	distributed	by	the	Metropolitan	Council	on	Housing	were	illustrative	of	this	rent	strike	fever	that	was	spreading	throughout	the	city:	“IT’S	TIME	FOR	US	TO	STRIKE	BACK!	Harlem	tenants	organized	rent	strikes	and	are	getting	results.	WE	CAN	DO	THE	SAME.”47		Within	a	week	of	the	CCH’s	involvement,	the	rent	strikes	had	also	drawn	the	support	of	CORE’s	national	office.	“The	rent	strike	has	proven	an	effective	weapon,”	James	Farmer	told	the	Amsterdam	News	in	early	November,	urging	that	“more	of	them	should	be	employed	by	tenants	having	problems	with	indifferent	slumlords.”48	Uptown,	NY	CORE’s	new	chairman	Marshall	England	threw	his	chapter’s	support	behind	the	strikes.	“We	have	talked	with	landlords,	begged	landlords	and	have	met	with	a	number	of	city	agencies,”	England	said	in	early	December,	“so	far	the	result	has	been	nil.”	Calling	for	“massive	rent	strikes”	in	Harlem	and	Bedford-Stuyvesant,	England	argued	that	only	“when	the	landlord	is	faced	with	no	rents,	then	we	get	some	action.”49		Heralding	the	emergence	of	“a	new	and	major	weapon	in	the	civil	rights	fight,”	the	New	York	Times	reported	on	December	1st	that	16	buildings	were	on																																																									47	“Fed	Up	Tenants	Say	To	Slumlords:	‘No	Repairs?’	No	Rent!,”	Box	31,	Folder	17,	MCH	Records.		 48	Naison,	“The	Rent	Strikes	in	New	York,”	18.			 49	Martin	Arnold,	“Rents	Withheld	By	Slum	Tenants,”	New	York	Times,	December	1,	1963.	
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strike	in	Harlem.	At	a	community	meeting	called	by	the	CCH	at	the	Milbank	Center	later	that	day,	tenants	in	36	more	buildings	announced	they	would	be	joining	the	strike,	bringing	the	total	number	of	striking	tenants	in	Harlem	up	to	585	in	over	50	buildings,	according	to	Gray.50		One	of	the	tenants	in	these	newly	organized	buildings	was	Mrs.	Elizabeth	Evans,	a	mother	of	eight	who	spent	her	nights	guarding	the	crib	of	her	three-month	old	daughter	from	rat	attacks	in	their	W.	118th	Street	apartment.51	Mrs.	May	Robinson,	building	leader	of	the	rent	strikers	at	54	W.	117th	Street,	also	announced	the	participation	of	the	tenants	in	her	building	at	the	meeting.	The	tenants	in	Robinson’s	building,	including	her	next-door	neighbor	Elise	McGee,	complained	of	a	terrible	rat	infestation	amongst	myriad	other	health	and	safety	violations.	“There	are	more	rats	in	this	building	than	people,”	Miss	McGee	said.	“I’m	here	having	tea	and	there	they	sit,	looking	me	straight	in	the	face.”	Other	buildings	on	the	street,	like	15	E.	117th	Street,	had	no	lock	on	the	front	door	and	had	been	without	heat	and	hot	water	for	months.	Tenants	of	the	building,	like	Muriel	Jackson	and	building	leader	Doris	Roper,	had	resorted	to	gathering	their	children	around	their	gas	stoves	to	keep	warm	at	night,	and	heating	up	gallons	of	water	on	the	stove	each	morning	so	that	their	children	could	bathe	before	school.52	
																																																								50	Ibid.		 51	Homer	Bigart,	“Rent	Strike	Gains	Momentum	Here,”	New	York	Times,	December	18,	1963.		 52	Ibid.	
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At	the	meeting,	Jesse	Gray’s	right-hand-man,	Major	Williams,	announced	that	3,000	more	tenants	were	ready	to	join	the	strike.	“We	should	move	those	landlords	out	of	Harlem,”	Williams	told	the	130	tenant	representatives	in	attendance.	“It’s	up	to	the	younger	people	to	keep	up	the	fight	for	good	living	conditions.”	While	calling	upon	the	civil	rights	generation	to	join	in	the	fight,	Williams	also	spoke	directly	to	the	daily	tribulations	women	like	Elizabeth	Evans	suffered	through.	“Every	week	we	have	some	child	bitten	by	a	rat,”	Williams	decried,	“this	must	stop.”53		After	Williams	addressed	the	meeting,	Gray	laid	out	the	program	for	the	rent	strikes	in	the	following	weeks.	First,	the	CCH	would	urge	the	chief	justice	of	the	Civil	Court	to	refuse	to	grant	“slumlords	the	right	to	dispossess	tenants	when	there	are	violations.”	With	such	a	meager	vacancy	rate	in	the	city,	Gray	sought	to	ensure	legal	safeguards	for	tenants	against	the	possibility	of	landlords	evicting	them	in	lieu	of	completing	repairs.	Second,	to	dramatize	the	realities	of	their	living	conditions	in	these	tenements	and	solicit	sympathy	through	the	courts,	tenants	would	show	up	to	all	future	court	cases	with	rubber	rats	tied	around	their	necks.	Lastly,	Gray	announced	plans	to	picket	the	Department	of	Buildings	to	again	demand	cellar-to-roof	inspections	throughout	lower	Harlem.54	While	laying	out	the	legal	side	of	the	CCH’s	rent	strike	organizing	program,	Gray,	Williams,	and	the	building	leaders	were	also	working	out	their	strategies	for	dealing	with	landlords	and	city	housing	policies.	Two	days	later,	the	CCH	held	a	
																																																								53	Martin	Gansberg,	“Tenants	in	34	Tenements	Join	Growing	Rent	Strike	in	Harlem,”	New	York	Times,	December	2,	1963.		 54	Ibid.	
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landlord-tenant	meeting	on	West	116th	Street,	where	thirty	tenants	directed	their	demands,	as	well	as	their	frustrations,	at	the	two	landlords	who	accepted	the	invitation	to	attend.	Tenants	seized	upon	the	opportunity	to	lambast	their	intransigent	landlords,	but	the	two	bold	enough	to	attend	passed	the	blame	for	building	conditions	along	to	drug	addicts	in	the	neighborhood,	a	lack	of	capable	superintendents,	and	the	tenants	themselves.		It	is	doubtful	that	an	organizer	of	Gray’s	experience	had	any	illusions	about	landlords	willingly	making	repairs	upon	their	buildings.	If	anything,	by	inviting	slumlords	to	meet	with	their	tenants	face-to-face,	Gray	helped	to	empower	and	embolden	striking	tenants	by	providing	a	forum	to	directly	confront	their	oppressors.	In	essence,	the	meeting	served	notice	to	evasive	landlords	that	their	tenants	were	learning	their	identities	and	would	no	longer	allow	them	to	remain	in	the	shadows.	Recognizing	the	futility	of	relying	upon	slumlords	to	hold	themselves	accountable,	however,	Gray	also	redoubled	his	calls	for	the	city	to	take	over	the	striking	buildings	en	masse	under	the	receivership	law	as	a	first	step	toward	“a	mass	rehabilitation	of	this	ghetto.”	In	essence,	the	meeting	evinced	to	both	the	city	and	the	landlords	that	tenants	would	be	waging	their	fight	on	two	fronts.	While	pressuring	the	city	to	act	swiftly	and	programmatically	upon	the	receivership	law,	Gray	made	it	clear	that	they	would	take	their	fight	to	the	landlords	to	demand	immediate	repairs	in	the	meantime.55	
																																																								55	Fred	Gilman,	“Rent	Strike	Spreading	in	Harlem,”	The	Worker,	December	8,	1963.	
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In	such	a	multifaceted	struggle,	coalition	building	was	imperative	to	meeting	the	organizational	demands	of	dealing	with	city	and	state	officials,	city	agencies,	and	landlords,	while	also	growing	the	rent	strike.	With	tenants	in	more	buildings	represented	by	HAG	and	the	CCH	engaging	in	rent	strikes	throughout	November,	the	two	organizations	joined	forces	to	form	a	working	coalition	in	Harlem.	The	coalition	was	brokered	by	Danny	Schechter,	who	was	introduced	to	Gray	through	a	mutual	connection	in	the	old-Left	circles	he	had	become	familiar	with	as	a	high	school	student	in	New	York.	“I	went	over	there,	and	we	said,	‘Look,	we’re	doing	these	rent	strikes,	we	want	to	help	organize	and	help	you,”	Schechter	later	recalled.	“He	said,	‘Great.’…and	suddenly	the	thing	started	taking	off	in	the	winter.”56	By	December,	HAG	and	CCH	had	developed	a	working	relationship,	sharing	resources,	organizers,	and	a	common	vision	for	grassroots	political	empowerment	in	Harlem.		The	experience	and	expertise	of	Gray	and	the	CCH	was	a	boon	for	HAG	organizers	who	were	still	green	in	the	fields	of	community	organizing	and	tenants	rights.	“I	thought	everybody	should	be	behind	something	like	rent	strikes,”	HEP	and	HAG	organizer	QR	Hand	said.	“I	didn’t	come	into	this	with	a	really,	what	you	call,	radical	orientation,	I	just	figured	that	there	were	problems	that	had	to	be	met	and	there	oughta	be	people	out	there	taking	care	of	the	problems.”57	NSM	organizers	like	
																																																								56	According	to	Roberta	Gold,	as	a	student	at	DeWitt	Clinton	High	School,	Schechter	became	friends	with	Paul	Yergan,	son	of	the	well-known	Black	Communist	and	close	associate	of	Paul	Robeson,	Max	Yergan.	“Through	Yergan,”	Gold	notes,	“Schechter	met	other	black	leftists,	and	when	he	found	himself	organizing	rent	strikes	in	Harlem	in	1963,	an	acquaintance	from	that	network	invited	him	to	meet	with	union-activist-turned-tenant	leader	Jesse	Gray.”	Gold,	
When	Tenants	Claimed	The	City,	121.		
		412	
Hand,	Schechter,	and	Bob	Knight,	as	well	as	national	director	Bill	Strickland,	who	had	been	inspired	by	the	organizing	ethos	of	SNCC	in	the	South,	quickly	developed	strong	ties	and	a	close	identification	with	the	grassroots	organizing	tradition	that	Gray	and	the	CCH	embodied.	“I	learned	something	very	important	from	Jesse	and	the	rent	strikes,”	Strickland	later	recalled,	“which	was	that	the	secret	to	real	organizing	is	to	get	people	to	organize	themselves.”58		Other	NSM	staffers,	however,	were	skeptical	of	Gray	and	his	motives	for	organizing	tenants.	At	a	community	organizing	training	session,	NSM	mentor	Stanley	Aronowitz	suggested	the	Gray	may	be	using	the	rent	strikes	as	a	means	to	build	a	base	for	his	personal	political	ambitions.	“Is	he	really	concerned	about	developing	leadership	among	the	tenants,”	Aronowitz	queried,	“or	is	he	interested	in	building	a	large	following?”59	Though	Aronowitz’s	concerns	were	primarily	with	Gray’s	penchant	for	waging	campaigns	for	political	office,	his	recognition	of	Gray’s	broader	ambitions	to	build	a	grassroots	political	movement	were	perceptive.	The	concern	was	rational,	given	Gray’s	well-crafted	public	image,	flair	for	dramatic—if	half-baked—campaign	announcements,	and	proximity	to	politicians	over	the	years.	Aronowitz’s	skepticism,	however,	did	little	to	sway	the	formative	influence	that	Gray’s	brand	of	grassroots	organizing	had	upon	aspiring	organizers	and	civil	rights	
																																																																																																																																																																					57	Militant	Labor	Forum,	“The	Harlem	Hate-Gang	Scare,”	May	29,	1964,	Moving	Image	and	Recorded	Sound	Division,	Schomburg	Center	for	Research	in	Black	Culture.		58	Bill	Strickland	interview	with	author,	October	20,	2017.		 59	“Outline-	Talk	by	Stanley	Aronowitz	For	Community	Organizing	Training	Session,”	January	13,	1964,	Box	27,	Meier	Papers.	
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workers	in	New	York	City	as	the	rent	strikes	coalesced	into	a	movement	by	mid-December.		On	December	15th,	the	CCH	called	a	mass	rent	strike	rally	at	the	Milbank	Center	to	demonstrate	surging	popular	support	and	to	encourage	more	tenants	in	Harlem	to	withhold	their	rents	when	the	New	Year	came.	Leaflets	for	the	rally	distributed	throughout	Harlem	exhorted	tenants	to	take	action	against	their	landlords	by	joining	the	ranks	of	the	58-building	rent	strike.	“We	are	not	going	to	pay	rent	for	rats	to	eat	our	children,	no	heat	and	no	hot	water,	stopped-up	toilets,	leaking	ceilings,	or	any	other	violation,”	the	leaflet	read.	Demonstrating	an	effort	to	build	a	broad	political	coalition	around	the	rent	strikes,	the	speakers	invited	to	the	rally	included	politicians,	clergy,	civil	rights,	and	labor	leaders,	including	former	Borough	President	Hulan	Jack,	State	Assemblyman	Lloyd	Dickens,	Congressman	Adam	Clayton	Powell,	Jr.,	President	of	the	NY	branch	of	the	NAACP	Rev.	Richard	Hildebrand,	and	Local	338	leader	L.	Joseph	Overton.60		While	tenants	were	drawn	to	the	rally	by	leaflets	that	targeted	their	landlords,	the	speakers	at	the	rally	laid	the	blame	for	the	city’s	housing	crisis	squarely	upon	City	Hall,	demonstrating	a	growing	frustration	with	the	slow-pace	of	meaningful	housing	reform.	At	a	meeting	earlier	that	month,	35	city	and	state	officials	agreed	to	expand	efforts	for	building	inspections	on	117th	and	118th	Streets	and	asked	the	Mayor	to	dedicate	more	personnel	and	resources	to	expediting	
																																																								60	“Mass	Rent	Strike	Rally,”	December	15,	1963,	Box	31,	Folder	17,	MCH	Records.	
		414	
receivership	proceedings	in	the	city.61	Angered	by	the	Mayor’s	knack	for	excluding	grassroots	community	leadership	from	such	meetings,	Gray	fired	off	a	letter	to	Wagner	the	following	week	criticizing	what	he	saw	as	weak,	piecemeal	responses	to	a	dire	systemic	problem.	Criticizing	the	Mayor’s	vow	to	expedite	rent	reductions	where	buildings	were	found	to	be	in	violation	of	code,	Gray	argued	“this	does	not	put	heat	and	hot	water	in	a	cold	building.”	In	his	analysis,	the	City	had	the	legal	power	to	rectify	the	housing	crisis,	yet	lacked	the	courage	and	sense	of	duty	to	act	meaningfully	on	behalf	of	its	most	marginalized	residents.	“The	rent	strikers	will	not	accept	tokenism,”	Gray	explained	to	reporters.	“They	are	determined	and	prepared	to	continue	the	rent	strike	as	long	as	it	is	necessary	to	rid	the	homes	of	rats,	to	achieve	elementary	services	dictated	by	law	and	to	eliminate	all	violations	in	existence	on	the	buildings.”62	To	both	Gray	and	the	New	York	Times	alike,	such	limited,	status	quo	responses	from	City	Hall	were	little	more	than	“a	move	to…stop	the	rent	strike	from	spreading.”63	As	City	Hall	continued	to	offer	token	reforms	to	the	systemic	housing	problem	facing	Black	and	Puerto	Rican	residents,	a	rent	strike	movement	began	to	take	shape	inside	the	crowded	basement	of	the	Milbank	Center	on	December	15th.	
																																																								61		According	to	an	official	in	the	Department	of	Buildings,	since	mid-July	only	39	buildings	had	been	under	investigation	in	the	vicinity	of	117th	and	118th	Streets,	and	only	14	of	these	were	in	receivership	proceedings.	Martin	Gansberg,	“City	To	Reinspect	Slum	Tenements,”	New	York	Times,	December	6,	1963.		62	“Harlem	Rent	Strike	Tenants	Push	Early	City	Hall	Action,”	Pittsburgh	
Courier,	December	14,	1963.		 63	“Powell	Urges	City	Hall	March	To	Support	Harlem	Rent	Strike,”	New	York	
Times,	December	16,	1963.	
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With	a	bare	cinder	block	wall	as	his	backdrop,	Adam	Clayton	Powell	spoke	fervently	and	nostalgically	to	the	200	tenants	who	gathered	just	down	the	block	from	the	CCH	office.	“If	the	City	of	New	York	doesn’t	take	over	the	buildings,	then	I	say	we	should	have	a	march	on	City	Hall,”	Powell	declared.	“Let’s	give	Harlem	the	old	spirit	it	used	to	have!”64		After	informing	those	in	attendance	that	tenants	in	35	more	buildings	had	pledged	to	join	the	strike	by	New	Year’s	Day,	Gray	doubled-down	on	Powell’s	targeting	of	City	Hall	by	calling	for	a	boycott	of	the	Democratic	Party	writ-large	if	the	city	failed	to	immediately	cut	rents	and	take	receivership	of	the	buildings.	In	an	exciting	bit	of	political	theatre,	Powell	seconded	Gray’s	calls,	declaring	that	he	would	“dump	the	Democratic	Party”	if	no	action	was	immediately	taken	to	improve	housing	conditions	in	Harlem.65	The	mood	was	electric	and	the	various	invited	leaders	in	attendance	quickly	fell	in	line	to	back	the	surging	rent	strikes.	Hulan	Jack,	along	with	Assemblymen	Lloyd	Dickens	and	José	Ramos-Lopez	all	pledged	their	support	for	the	rent	strike	and	Rev.	Hildebrand	pledged	legal	support	from	the	NAACP.66	At	the	end	of	the	meeting,	Gray	announced	that	a	representative	committee	would	soon	be	established	to	coordinate	the	expansion	of	the	strike.67		
																																																								64	Ibid.		 65	Though	certainly	bluffing,	this	type	of	political	rhetoric	from	Powell	was	golden	material	for	publicizing	the	strike.	George	Todd,	“Blame	City	Hall,”	New	York	
Amsterdam	News,	December	21,	1963.			 66	“Powell	Urges	City	Hall	March	To	Support	Harlem	Rent	Strike,”	New	York	
Times,	December	16,	1963.		 67	Lipsky,	Protest	In	City	Politics,	62.	
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The	convergence	of	political,	labor,	religious,	and	civil	rights	leadership	at	the	Milbank	rally	was	momentous	for	not	only	the	rent	strikes,	but	for	grassroots	Black	Freedom	Struggles	in	Harlem	as	well.	The	fervor	stirred	up	by	the	rent	strikes	by	mid-December	led	the	Hartford	Courant	to	conclude	two	days	after	the	rally	that	there	was	“a	storm	gathering	in	Harlem.”68	The	Courant	proved	perceptive,	and	by	the	end	of	that	week,	the	Rent	Strike	Coordinating	Committee	had	brought	together	a	coalition	of	representatives	from	the	CCH,	HAG,	NAACP,	CORE,	HARYOU-ACT,	several	block	clubs	and	community	groups,	and	several	Harlem	Assemblymen	and	Democratic	district	leaders.69		Formed	under	the	premise	of	coordinating	a	city-wide	rent	strike	to	force	“a	mass	rehabilitation	of	the	ghettos,”	70	the	coalition	marked	the	emergence	of	the	rent	strikes	at	the	vanguard	of	Black	Freedom	Struggles	in	the	city.	“The	great	power	blocs	of	the	Harlem	Community,	the	ministers	and	the	politicians,	were	lining	up	behind	the	strike,”	Mark	Naison	noted,	“and	CORE	groups	in	Brooklyn	and	the	Lower	East	Side	were	already	beginning	to	organize	their	locales.”71	Joining	NYU	CORE	in	the	Lower	East	Side	was	Mobilization	For	Youth	(MFY),	which	retooled	its	housing	clinics	into	tenants’	councils	to	foster	tenant	leadership	while	converting																																																									68	“There	Is	a	Storm	Gathering	in	Harlem,”	The	Hartford	Courant,	December	17,	1963.		 69	Lipsky,	Protest	In	City	Politics,	62;	Homer	Bigart,	“Rent	Strike	Gains	Momentum	Here,”	New	York	Times,	December	18,	1963;	“Rent	Strike	Plan	Pushed	In	Harlem,”	New	York	Times,	December	23,	1963.		 70	Homer	Bigart,	“Rent	Strike	Gains	Momentum	Here,”	New	York	Times,	December	18,	1963.		 71	Naison,	“The	Rent	Strikes	In	New	York,”	21.	
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“the	service	role	as	quickly	as	possible	into	direct	action	techniques,	rent	strikes,	et	cetera.”72	Additionally,	the	nascent	movement	was	also	beginning	to	spread	across	the	nation,	with	groups	of	tenants	in	Providence,	Chicago,	and	Cleveland,	all	engaged	in	rent	strikes	by	mid-December.73	The	decade	of	grassroots	tenant	organizing	that	Gray	and	the	CCH	had	undertaken	in	Harlem	was	finally	showing	the	makings	of	a	mass	movement	in	New	York	City.	
“Power	is	something	that	one	must	organize”	At	the	inaugural	meeting	of	the	Rent	Strike	Coordinating	Committee	on	December	22nd	at	the	Mount	Morris	Presbyterian	Church	on	122nd	Street,	the	group	laid	out	plans	to	recruit	tenants	in	hundreds	of	other	buildings	in	Harlem	with	a	goal	of	expanding	the	rent	strike	to	1,000	buildings	by	early	January.	Representatives	from	seven	organizations	pledged	field	staff	to	distribute	50,000	leaflets	throughout	Harlem	in	a	door-to-door	campaign	to	instruct	tenants	how	to	organize	their	buildings	and	join	the	strike.74	The	goal	was	ambitious,	but	the	campaign	was	illustrative	of	the	extensive	organizing	efforts	necessary	for	building	a	grassroots	movement.	Despite	the	promise	the	fledgling	coalition	held,	however,	few	of	the	participating	organizations	had	much	experience	with	grassroots	tenant	organizing.	Thus,	at	its	inception,	as	one	student	organizer	noted,	the	Committee	“is	at	present	
																																																								72	Carroll,	Mobilizing	New	York,	53.		73	“R.I.	Slum	Dwellers	Plan	Rent	Strike,”	Chicago	Defender,	October	17,	1963;	“Westsiders	Wage	Rent	Strike,	Picket	Bldg,”	Chicago	Defender,	December	7,	1963;	Allen	Howard,	“Hough	Citizens	Blast	City’s	Housing	Policy,”	Cleveland	Call	and	Post,	December	21,	1963.		 74	“Rent	Strike	Plan	Pushed	In	Harlem,”	New	York	Times,	December	23,	1963.	
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little	more	than	a	list	of	supporters.”75	Though	the	NSM’s	national	office	brought	in	ten	field	secretaries	to	work	as	full-time	organizers	with	HAG	on	the	rent	strikes,	the	bulk	of	the	organizing	work	fell	upon	Gray	and	the	CCH.76		The	grassroots	organizing	that	the	CCH	undertook	to	build	the	rent	strikes,	as	well	as	the	analyses	and	ideologies	guiding	their	actions,	are	worth	examining	in	detail	for	the	insights	they	offer	to	the	inner-workings	of	a	grassroots	social	movement.	While	the	strikes	that	fall	had	emerged	from	the	militancy	of	the	grassroots,	Gray’s	decade	of	organizing	in	his	lower	Harlem	neighborhood	had	primed	tenants	there	for	organized	action.	“The	Community	Council	had	regular	meetings	every	Wednesday	to	discuss	the	problems,	organize	demonstrations,	and	so	on,”	Major	Williams	said.	“At	these	meetings	the	people	come	out	with	their	problems,”	ranging	from	issues	with	landlords	to	the	sanitation	department,	and	beyond.77			Through	his	tireless	advocacy	for	some	of	the	most	marginalized	communities	in	New	York	City,	Gray	had	earned	his	reputation	in	the	community	as	the	man	people	when	to	when	they	had	problems	with	city	agencies.	“There	were	buildings	in	Central	Harlem,”	Naison	noted,	“where	the	name	‘Jesse	Gray’	would	open	any	door.”78	The	impacts	of	this	groundwork	was	evident	in	how	rapidly	the	
																																																								75	Joel	Edelstein,	“Rent	Strike:	What,	When,	How,”	January	1964,	Box	76,	Meier	Papers.		76	“Rent	Strikes	Rocks	Harlem:	The	People	Take	The	Lead,”	January	28,	1964,	Box	76,	Meier	Papers.		 77	Halstead,	et	al.,	Harlem	Stirs,	52.		
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rent	strikes	spread	within	its	first	weeks.	In	the	six	weeks	since	the	CCH	announced	their	participation	in	the	rent	strike,	the	number	of	CCH-organized	buildings	on	strike	had	grown	from	three	to	a	reported	58	by	December	15th.79	“The	only	limit	on	the	speed	of	organization,”	Naison	noted,	“seemed	to	be	the	time	that	was	required	to	explain	the	mechanics	of	the	strike.”80	Though	hardly	bureaucratic,	the	“mechanics	of	the	strike”	did	include	a	process	for	organizing	buildings	that	required	extensive	human	and	material	resources	for	mobilizing	and	organizing	community	power.	“I	think	power	is	something	that…the	Black	community	must	organize,”	Gray	later	explained,	“block-by-block,	house-by-house,	apartment-by-apartment.”81	For	a	rent	strike	to	be	successful	in	changing	housing	policies	and	practices,	Gray	believed	the	Black	community	would	need	to	be	organized	into	a	united	front	capable	of	exerting	power	over	slumlords	and	the	various	levels	of	city	government.	As	a	local,	grassroots	organization	of	poor	and	working-class	tenants,	however,	the	resources	necessary	for	such	expansive	organization	were	often	in	short	supply.	When	the	strikes	began,	as	Naison	notes,	the	CCH	“teetered	on	the	edge	of	bankruptcy”	and	depended	on	membership	dues	and	private	donations	from	“wealthy	radicals”	to	cover	operating	costs.	The	Council’s	leadership	consisted	of	four	men,	including	Gray	and	his	“lieutenant,”	Major	Williams,	who	were	the	only	two	full-time																																																																																																																																																																						78	Naison,	“The	Rent	Strikes	in	New	York,”	19.		79	Lipsky,	Protest	In	City	Politics,	62.		 80	Ibid.		 81	Jesse	Gray	interview	with	Katherine	M.	Shannon,	July	26,	1967.	
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organizers	on	staff	and	drew	meager	subsistence	salaries	from	the	organization.82	With	such	paltry	resources	at	their	disposal	to	build	an	organization	and	a	movement,	fostering	indigenous	leadership	was	not	only	a	guiding	philosophy,	but	also	an	organizational	imperative.		The	membership	structure	of	the	CCH	reflected	its	dedication	to	empowering	grassroots	involvement	and	leadership	in	social	movements.	“Each	member,	upon	joining,	is	required	to	be	active	in	his	own	behalf,”	Ebony	reported	in	1964.	Unlike	the	tedious,	bureaucratic	membership	policies	of	many	CORE	chapters,	the	requirements	for	CCH	membership	were	primarily	action-based.	“This	is	one	group	where	just	signing	up	won’t	do	a	bit	of	good,”	one	member	said,	“you’ve	got	to	pull	your	own	weight	if	you	want	to	get	out	of	this	mess.”	Members	were	also	required	to	pay	monthly	dues	of	$1,	which	guaranteed	legal	advice	and	representation	during	rent	strikes.	Though	the	dues	were	laxly	enforced	in	a	neighborhood	where	economic	means	were	extremely	limited,	one	of	the	intangible	benefits	of	membership,	as	Ebony	reported,	was	the	“sense	of	security	that	springs	from	the	knowledge	that	they	are	no	longer	alone	in	their	fight	against	negligent	landlords	and	rats.”83		Pulling	one’s	own	weight	in	the	CCH	meant	the	refusal	to	pay	rent,	the	forming	of	house	meetings,	and	active	participation	in	weekly	strategy	meetings.	To	bring	new	members	into	the	fold,	the	CCH	placed	a	heavy	emphasis	on	leafleting	neighborhood	blocks,	building-by-building,	door-by-door.	“I	went	around	to	houses																																																									82	Naison,	“The	Rent	Strikes	in	New	York,”	19.		83	“Rent	Strike	in	Harlem,”	Ebony,	April	1964.	
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trying	to	get	people	to	participate	in	the	rent	strikes,”	organizer	Peter	Bailey	recalled,	“trying	to	get	people	to	understand	the	rent	strike,	how	the	effective	use	of	the	rent	strike	could	really…bring	about	changes.”84	When	tenants	expressed	interest,	they	were	instructed	to	hold	a	building	meeting	where	a	building	captain	would	be	elected	to	serve	as	their	representative	in	the	CCH.	“The	organizers	are	all	volunteers,”	Major	Williams	said,	“they	live	in	the	slums	and	know	what	the	people	are	up	against.	They	know	what	it’s	like	to	go	to	the	bathroom	with	an	umbrella	because	the	plumbing	leaks.”85		The	building	captain	was	then	responsible	for	attending	weekly	strategy	meetings,	where	plans	for	the	upcoming	week	would	be	formulated	in	a	participatory	manner.86	“He	would	have	a	weekly	or	nightly	meetings—either	emergency	ones	or	ones	planning	what	he	was	going	to	do	the	following	week—where	maybe	one	or	200	people	could	sit	and	talk	and	discuss	it,”	Gloria	Richardson	Dandridge	recalled.87	An	occasional	visitor	to	Harlem	while	engaged	in	her	own	militant	struggles	in	Cambridge,	Maryland,	Dandridge	became	a	close	comrade	of	Gray	and	a	regular	around	the	CCH	office	and	meetings	in	1964.	“He	was	very	good	as	a	speaker,”	Dandridge	said	of	Gray’s	leadership	style	at	these	meetings	of	CCH	
																																																								84	Peter	Bailey	interview	with	Robert	Martin,	September	4,	1968,	Ralph	Bunche	Oral	History	Collection,	Moorland-Spingarn	Research	Center,	Howard	University.		 85	Halsted,	et	al.,	Harlem	Stirs,	52.		 86	Joel	Edelstein,	“Rent	Strike:	What,	When,	How,”	January	1964,	Box	76,	Meier	Papers.		 87	Gloria	Richardson	Dandridge	interview	with	author,	April	19,	2018.	
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building	captains.	“You	listened	and	you	understood	that	he	was	going	to	act	or	he	was	asking	you,	did	you	agree	to	join	him	and	act	on	it?	Whether	it	was	a	demonstration	or	whether	it	was	some	fight	with	the	city	government…and	what	he	intended	to	do	about	that	and	what	may	or	may	not	happen.”88	Through	these	meetings,	tenant	leaders	not	only	received	a	political	education	from	veteran	organizers	like	Gray	and	Richardson,	but	also	took	active	part	in	shaping	organizational	policies	and	actions.	
Black	Women	Leadership	in	the	Rent	Strike	Movement	While	the	central	leadership	of	the	CCH	consisted	exclusively	of	men,	however,	Black	women	carried	out	the	bulk	of	the	organizing	work.	According	to	scholars	Ronald	Lawson,	Stephen	Barton,	and	Jenna	Weissman	Joselit,	“the	strike	in	Harlem	was	run	on	a	day-to-day	basis	by	two	women—Florence	Rice	and	Anne	Bradshaw—and	women	were	numerically	predominant	on	the	city-wide	strike	coordinating	committee.”89	Though	little	information	has	come	to	light	about	Bradshaw’s	background	prior	to	working	with	the	CCH,	as	Roberta	Gold	notes,	she	was	responsible	for	bringing	her	friend	Florence	Rice	into	the	organization.	After	working	in	defense	manufacturing	during	World	War	II,	Rice	found	work	in	a	unionized	garment	shop	and	became	a	staunch	advocate	for	Black	and	Latinx	women	laborers	in	the	International	Ladies’	Garment	Workers’	Union	(ILGWU).	“That’s	when	I	began	to	understand	how	economics	works,”	Rice	later	recalled,	“And																																																									88	Ibid.		 89	Ronald	Lawson,	Stephen	Barton,	and	Jenna	Weissman	Joselit,	“From	Kitchen	to	Storefront:		Women	in	the	Tenant	Movement,”	in	New	Space	for	Women,	ed.	Gerda	R.	Wekerle,	et	al.	(Boulder:	Westview	Press,	1980),	263.	
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once	I	began	to	understand	economics,	that’s	when	I	realized	that	I’d	have	to	fight	about	it.”90		It	was	through	this	background	in	labor	organizing	that	Rice	entered	the	fold	of	radical	labor	movements	in	Harlem.	In	the	fall	of	1961,	Rice	was	part	of	A.	Philip	Randolph’s	Emergency	Committee	For	Unity	On	Social	And	Economic	Problems	which	was	organized	in	the	wake	of	another	“near	riot”	to	demand	a	broad	platform	of	policy	initiatives	to	rectify	racial	inequality	in	employment,	housing,	education,	and	policing	in	Harlem.	After	working	alongside	the	likes	of	Bayard	Rustin,	Malcolm	X,	James	Haughton,	Bill	Epton,	Selma	Sparks,	and	Calvin	Hicks	on	the	Emergency	Committee,	Rice	joined	Haughton,	Epton,	and	NMU	veteran	Josh	Lawrence	in	a	struggle	for	control	of	the	Negro	American	Labor	Council	(NALC)	to	build	a	more	militant,	“fighting”	labor	organization.91		By	the	time	the	rent	strikes	were	underway	that	fall,	many	of	these	same	connections	were	throwing	their	support	behind	the	nascent	movement.	In	mid-December,	Haughton	pushed	the	militant	Labor	and	Industry	Committee	of	the	NAACP’s	NY	branch	to	organize	regular	fundraising	events	for	the	CCH.	Lawrence,	a	comrade	of	Gray’s	from	the	NMU,	had	been	working	with	Gray	in	tenant	organizing	over	the	years	while	also	being	active	in	labor	organizing	through	his	Carpenters	Union	#2162.	By	early	1964,	Malcolm	X	would	also	lend	his	support	to	the	rent																																																									90	Gold,	When	Tenants	Claimed	The	City,	132-33.	For	more	on	Florence	Rice	see	Gerda	Lerner,	ed.,	Black	Women	In	White	America:	A	Documentary	History	(New	York:	Pantheon	Books,	1972),	275-288.		 91	For	more	on	the	Emergency	Committee	and	Rice’s	involvement	in	the	“Fighting	NALC”	struggle,	see	Box	2,	Folder	5	and	Box	3,	Folder	10,	Haughton	Papers.	
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strikes	and	forge	a	close	relationship	with	Gray	and	Gloria	Richardson	to	form	the	radical	organization	ACT,	as	well	as	his	Organization	of	Afro-American	Unity	that	spring.		While	it	is	unclear	if	Rice	knew	Gray	personally	prior	to	her	involvement	in	the	rent	strikes,	there	was	extensive	overlap	in	the	radical	political	circles	that	the	two	veteran	labor	organizers	occupied.	Furthermore,	the	political	thought	of	both	Rice	and	Gray	emphasized	the	importance	of	independent	grassroots	leadership	for	radical	movement	building.		“I	find	myself	fighting	many	of	the	leaders	who	are	supposedly	representing	us,”	Rice	said	in	an	interview	for	“The	Harlem	Temper”	in	the	fall	of	1963.	“I	would	also	like	to	see	our	leaders	speak	more	accurate[ly]	what	the	Black	people	in	the	community	feel	and	not	what	the	white	power	structure	sets	up—to	speak	for	us.”92	While	Rice,	Bradshaw,	and	Gray’s	close	associate	Maxine	Green	handled	most	of	the	day-to-day	operations	of	the	rent	strikes,	the	Black	and	Puerto	Rican	women	who	comprised	most	of	the	building	leaders	were	in	the	streets	ensuring	that	“what	the	Black	people	in	the	community	feel”	was	translating	into	organized	action.	Building	leaders	like	Mary	King,	Rita	Jackson,	May	Robinson,	Doris	Roper,	Marjory	Cruz,	and	Inocencia	Flores	were	primarily	responsible	for	mobilizing	and	organizing	tenants	to	participate	in	the	rent	strike	in	Harlem.	While	Gray	received	the	majority	of	the	media	spotlight	during	the	strikes	and	scholarly	attention	thereafter,	these	women	building	leaders	have	gone	underappreciated	for	the	impacts	that	their	labor	had	upon	the	emergence	and	evolution	of	the	rent	strikes.	By	Gray’s	standards,																																																									92	CBS,	“The	Harlem	Temper,”	December	11,	1963.	
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at	least	75	percent	of	tenants	in	a	building	had	to	be	on	board	before	any	collective	action	could	be	taken.	With	58	buildings	on	strike	by	mid-December	with	an	average	of	15	tenants	per	building,	according	to	Gray’s	calculations,	this	meant	that	the	cadre	of	building	leaders	primarily	comprised	of	Black	and	Puerto	Rican	women	were	responsible	for	organizing	over	650	families	to	engage	in	the	rent	strikes.93		As	the	cold	of	winter	set	in	and	the	Christmas	holiday	approached,	these	women	leaders	found	unlikely	allies	in	the	city’s	major	newspapers.	Aided	by	Gray’s	widely	publicized,	yet	unsuccessful	calls	for	the	Red	Cross	to	declare	lower	Harlem	a	disaster	area	in	late-December,	reporters	jumped	at	the	chance	to	cover	the	heart-wrenching	stories	of	families	without	heat	and	hot	water	on	Christmas	Day.	While	the	city	floundered	in	its	enforcement	of	the	rampant	housing	violations,	the	New	
York	Times	carried	stories	of	families	in	Harlem	huddled	around	their	gas	stoves	to	stay	warm	on	Christmas	Day.94	“This	is	the	worst	Christmas	we’ve	had	here,”	Mrs.	Harrison	Nelson	told	a	reporter,	“no	heat	or	hot	water,	but	plenty	of	roaches	and	rats.”	The	only	source	of	heat	in	the	apartment	Mrs.	Nelson	shared	with	her	husband	and	two	daughters	at	18	E.	117th	Street	was	the	kitchen	stove.	“We	got	a	Christmas	tree	set	up	in	the	front	room	but	we	can’t	enjoy	it	‘cause	it’s	colder	than	the	North	Pole	in	here,”	Mrs.	Nelson	told	reporters.	Across	the	street,	rent	strike	leader	Doris	Roper	said	that	her	building	had	gone	months	without	heat,	hot	water,	and	a	superintendent.	Additionally,	the	building	that	Mrs.	Roper	lived	in	with	her	four																																																									93	Community	Council	on	Housing,	“Rent	Strike!!,”	December	1963,	Box	5,	Folder	9,	Haughton	Papers.		 94	Homer	Bigart,	“Rent	Striker	Bids	For	Red	Cross	Aid,”	New	York	Times,	December	25,	1963.	
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children	had	broken	windows	on	every	floor	and	hallways	cluttered	with	debris	and	fallen	plaster.	“I’ve	had	this	oven	on	for	the	last	two	nights,”	Mrs.	Roper	said,	“and	I	guess	it	will	stay	on	until	someone	decides	to	do	something	about	this	building.”95		Though	not	often	considered	as	such,	these	kinds	of	media	exposés	represented	additional	labor	and	contributions	to	the	rent	strike	movement	from	its	women	leaders	who	routinely	opened	their	homes	to	reporters	and	inspectors.	Focused	almost	exclusively	on	Black	and	Puerto	Rican	mothers,	these	stories	that	frequently	occupied	the	front	pages	of	several	New	York	newspapers	throughout	December,	elicited	popular	empathy	and	support	for	the	burgeoning	movement	through	its	gendered	coverage	of	the	tenants	who	made	up	the	strike.	Homer	Bigart,	a	Pulitzer	Prize	winning	reporter	for	the	New	York	Times	who	covered	many	of	these	stories,	was	said	to	have	come	out	of	one	of	the	buildings	on	E.	117th	Street	“quivering	with	anger”	over	the	conditions	he	witnessed	inside.	“This	is	the	worst	thing	I’ve	seen	in	all	my	years	of	reporting,”	he	told	a	publicity	manager	for	the	CCH	that	month,	“I’ll	write	anything	you	want.”96	Aided	by	this	type	of	press	coverage,	which	also	included	regular	television	and	radio	appearances	for	Gray,	and	fueled	in	large	part	by	poor	and	working-class	Black	and	Latinx	women,	the	rent	strike	movement	became	the	premier	political	issue	in	New	York	City	and	“the	cause	celebre	of	the	civil	rights	movement	in	the	North”	by	the	end	of	1963.97	
																																																								95	Theodore	Jones,	“Bleak	Day	Spent	By	Rent	Strikers,”	New	York	Times,	December	26,	1963.		 96	Naison,	“The	Rent	Strikes	in	New	York,”	22.		 97	Ibid.	
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The	City	Responds	to	the	Rent	Strike	Movement	As	pressures	mounted	from	the	Rent	Strike	Coordinating	Committee	and	the	news	media	throughout	December,	token	responses	from	City	Hall	were	becoming	increasingly	untenable.	According	to	Mark	Naison,	a	“leading	housing	attorney”	claimed	that	the	rent	strikes	had	driven	City	Hall	into	“a	state	of	complete	and	utter	panic”	by	the	year’s	end.98	Recognizing	the	potential	political	force	of	a	city-wide	rent	strike	movement	in	an	election	year	amidst	evolving	national	Black	Freedom	Struggles,	city	agencies	scrambled	to	churn	out	proposals	to	address	housing	ills	and	therefore	curb	the	anger	undergirding	the	strikes.		Earlier	that	month,	three	city	agencies	announced	joint	plans	to	develop	350	units	of	low-income	housing	through	a	massive	slum	clearance	project	on	117th	and	118th	Streets.	“The	ancient	rat-ridden	tenements	to	be	cleared	under	this	proposal	make	up	one	of	the	worst	slum	blocks	in	the	city,”	Borough	President	Edward	Dudley	declared.	While	quality,	low-income	housing	was	certainly	needed	in	Harlem	and	throughout	the	city,	the	proposed	development	would	have	only	exacerbated	the	housing	shortage	by	displacing	500	families	to	build	350	units.99	Furthermore,	such	proposals	flew	in	the	face	of	the	demands	of	the	CCH	and	many	of	the	striking	tenants	who	favored	rehabilitation	over	renewal.	Reflecting	a	broader	vision	of	community	empowerment,	rent	strike	leaders	like	Inocencia	Flores	balked	at	the	
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idea	of	being	relocated,	asserting	she	would	rather	“stay	here	and	change	the	system.”		At	the	same	time,	city	agencies	also	sought	to	defang	increasingly	potent	critiques	of	the	systemic	nature	of	housing	inequality	in	the	city	by	shifting	the	blame	to	the	offending	landlords	in	lower	Harlem.	Just	days	after	Harlem	tenants	spent	the	Christmas	holiday	huddled	around	their	kitchen	stoves	for	heat,	Health	Department	officials	released	the	names	of	six	landlords	who	they	had	been	unable	to	serve	with	summonses	for	building	code	violations.	Despite	the	condemnatory	rhetoric	used	in	describing	such	landlords	as	“determined	to	bleed	these	buildings	and	spend	their	time	trying	to	avoid	prosecution,”	the	public	shaming	of	landlords	did	little	to	instill	any	confidence	in	the	traditional	inspection-summons	procedures.100	Such	maneuverings	evidenced	the	influence	that	the	rent	strikes	were	having	upon	city	power	structures,	but	remained	merely	piecemeal	responses	to	increasingly	systemic	critiques.		While	city	officials	floated	this	hodgepodge	of	housing	reform	initiatives,	thirteen	striking	tenants	from	16	and	18	E.	117th	Street	were	preparing	for	an	appearance	in	Civil	Court	for	nonpayment	of	rent.	Though	rarely	analyzed	as	such,	the	rent	strikes	to	this	point	had	represented	a	mass	display	of	civil	disobedience	in	that	the	withholding	of	rent	was	a	punishable	offense	in	Civil	Court.	The	risk	of	eviction	or	monetary	penalties	inherent	in	rent	strikes,	therefore,	had	served	as	a	prohibitive	factor	for	many	who	may	have	otherwise	felt	compelled	to	join	the	
																																																								100	“City	Seeks	6	Owners	Of	Strike	Buildings,”	New	York	Times,	December	27,	1963.	
		429	
strike.	The	court	hearing	of	these	thirteen	striking	members	of	the	CCH,	scheduled	for	December	30th,	represented	the	first	legal	test	for	the	burgeoning	movement.		As	the	striking	tenants	were	preparing	for	their	court	appearance,	the	Wagner	administration	was	working	feverishly	to	develop	a	comprehensive	plan	to	head	off	the	strikes,	which	Gray	predicted	would	expand	to	upwards	of	200	buildings	by	the	first	of	the	year.	The	night	before	the	court	date,	Rent	Administrator	Hortense	Gabel	announced	that	City	Hall	would	soon	present	a	“bold	plan	to	deal	with	the	Harlem	problem.”101	Reporting	on	the	announcement	the	next	day,	the	New	
York	Times	declared	that	Mayor	Wagner	was	“forging	new	weapons	to	combat	the	slum	conditions	that	have	prompted	Harlem’s	spreading	rent	strikes.”	Though	details	were	scarce,	the	Times	reported	that	these	“new	weapons”	would	likely	include	stiffer	penalties	for	offending	landlords,	greater	expediency	of	the	city’s	receivership	program,	more	frequent	inspections,	broader	outreach	efforts	to	inform	tenants	of	their	rights	and	duties,	and	a	housing	program	to	present	to	the	State	Legislature.		Although	the	rent	strikes	had	forced	the	city	to	acknowledge	and	formulate	plans	to	act	upon	the	housing	crisis	in	Harlem,	city	officials	continued	to	defend	their	present	course	of	action.	After	Gray	criticized	the	Wagner	administration	on	live	television	the	night	before	the	trial	for	“its	failure	to	intervene	effectively	to	correct	slum	conditions,”	Buildings	Commissioner	Harold	Birns	praised	the	rash	of	inspections	that	his	department	had	undertaken	over	the	previous	weeks	and	months.	The	37,000	violations	that	the	inspections	turned	up,	Birns	argued,																																																									101	Lipsky,	Protest	In	City	Politics,	63.	
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indicated	due	diligence	on	behalf	of	the	city	to	correct	its	housing	problems.102	For	Gray	and	the	striking	tenants	in	Harlem,	however,	the	inspections	were	too	little	and	too	late.	“We’re	the	most	investigated	and	inspected	people	in	the	world,”	Gray	said,	“but	it	seems	the	only	reason	they	send	inspectors	up	here	is	to	find	out	if	we’re	still	black.”103	To	the	CCH	and	the	hundreds	of	striking	tenants,	counting	violations	was	one	thing,	but	acting	upon	them	was	another	entirely.			 On	the	day	of	the	trial,	tenants	were	prepared	to	take	their	mounting	protests	against	horrid	living	conditions	in	Harlem	into	the	courtroom.	Having	previously	found	little	recourse	through	the	courts,	which	many	tenant	leaders	harangued	as	being	controlled	by	the	interests	of	landlords,	the	CCH	sought	to	use	the	platform	provided	by	the	trial	to	wage	a	dramatic	demonstration.	Beginning	the	previous	week,	Gray	and	the	CCH	had	urged	the	thirteen	tenants	to	save	every	rat	they	killed	in	their	apartments	to	bring	into	the	courtroom	as	evidence	against	their	landlords.	Though	officers	confiscated	some	of	the	dead	rodents	outside	the	courtroom	after	learning	of	the	plan	through	the	newspapers,	the	tenants	managed	to	smuggle	in	five	rats	under	their	coats.104		The	stunt	received	widespread	media	coverage	in	the	following	days,	but	the	rats	were	never	submitted	as	evidence,	as	the	attorney	for	the	landlords	conceded	
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the	conditions	in	the	buildings.	While	the	rats	provided	spectacular	imagery	for	the	proceedings	and	marked	the	emergence	of	the	rat	as	a	potent	protest	symbol	for	the	rent	strikes,	the	major	significance	of	the	court	proceedings	lay	in	the	ruling	of	Judge	Guy	Ribaudo.	Basing	his	decision	on	a	1930	law	that	permitted	tenants	in	seriously	neglected	units	to	deposit	their	rents	with	the	court,	Ribaudo	ruled	that	the	tenants	were	within	their	rights	in	withholding	rent	for	units	where	such	“shocking”	conditions	existed.105	According	to	Roberta	Gold	and	Michael	Lipsky,	Ribaudo	was	alerted	to	the	seldom-used	law	by	Columbia	University	law	professors	allied	with	MFY.	After	deliberating	with	Gray,	the	tenants’	legal	team	(including	Attorney	Bruce	Gould),	and	the	landlord’s	attorney,	Ribaudo	declared	that	landlords	could	withdraw	the	court-deposited	rent	money	to	make	repairs	“only	after	the	tenants’	representative	had	approved.”106	As	Gold	perceptively	notes,	the	Ribaudo	decision	essentially	established	“a	de	facto	receivership—court-controlled	spending	of	rent	money	for	repairs,”	which	could	achieve	more	immediate	repairs	than	the	sluggish	process	of	the	city’s	receivership	law.107			 Though	Ribaudo	announced	in	court	that	he	did	not	condone	the	rent	strikes,	his	decision	nonetheless	granted	legal	sanction	that	empowered	the	rent	strike	movement.	Outside	the	courtroom,	Gray	declared	the	ruling	a	victory	for	the	rent	strikers	and	reiterated	his	pronouncement	that	the	movement	would	grow	to	300																																																									105	Samuel	Kaplan,	“Slum	Rent	Strike	Upheld	By	Judge,”	New	York	Times,	December	31,	1963;	Gold,	When	Tenants	Claimed	The	City,	124-25;	Lipsky,	Protest	In	
City	Politics,	63-64.		 106	Ibid.		 107	Gold,	When	Tenants	Claimed	The	City,	124-25.	
		432	
buildings	within	the	next	two	days.	“This	gives	us	the	push	our	campaign	needs,”	Gray	told	reporters,	“the	tenants	now	know	they	don’t	have	to	pay	rent	to	landlords	who	do	nothing	for	them.	No	services,	no	payment.”108	Seizing	quickly	upon	the	opportunity	presented	by	the	legal	victory,	Gray	led	a	march	of	a	dozen	tenants	and	organizers	to	the	nearby	offices	of	Hortense	Gabel.	Joined	by	Danny	Schechter,	Anne	Bradshaw,	and	Bruce	Gould,	Gray	requested	that	Gabel	reduce	rents	to	$1	in	the	buildings	Ribaudo	ruled	upon,	arguing	that	tenants	should	not	pay	full	rent	while	awaiting	repairs—regardless	of	where	the	rent	was	paid	to.	Though	Gabel	was	hesitant	to	reduce	rent	on	the	two	buildings	in	question,	she	did	agree	to	immediately	reduce	rents	on	seven	other	CCH-organized	buildings,	demonstrating	the	heightened	political	leverage	that	the	CCH	wielded	following	the	Ribaudo	ruling.109		 Just	days	after	the	landmark	decision,	Mayor	Wagner	formally	announced	his	action	plan	for	addressing	the	city’s	housing	problems.	As	part	of	a	platform	he	described	as	a	“pocketbook	attack	on	the	slumlord,”	Wagner	urged	the	creation	of	special	housing	courts,	increased	building	inspections,	higher	fines	and	jail	sentences	for	landlords,	a	more	streamlined	process	for	verifying	violations,	and	city	support	for	a	state	bill	to	legalize	rent	strikes.110	Later	that	week,	Wagner	followed	
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up	on	his	initial	statement	by	announcing	additional	plans	for	a	$1	million	“anti-rat”	program,	which	would	be	carried	out	by	148	new	employees	of	the	Health	Department	and	reimbursed	in	part	by	billing	landlords	for	the	services.111		As	Lipsky	points	out,	this	barrage	of	new	city	initiatives	served	two	clear	political	purposes.	First,	the	programs	were	“distinct	responses	to	basic	tenant	complaints,”	which	the	city	finally	felt	compelled	to	act	upon	after	years	of	pressure	from	the	grassroots	had	reached	a	point	where	political	action	was	unavoidable.	As	one	City	Commissioner	explained	to	Lipsky,	“the	feeling	was—we	have	to	do	something…we	felt	it	was	real	political	power	at	the	grass	roots.	And	we	even	talked	about	the	revolutionary	impact”	of	the	strikes.112	As	the	Commissioner	attested	to,	the	radical	fervor	fostered	by	the	city’s	increasingly	militant	Black	Freedom	Struggle	made	the	Mayor’s	actions	less	a	matter	of	political	obligation	or	goodwill	than	a	conscious	attempt	to	curb	radical	political	movements	in	the	city	through	addressing	the	most	visible	struggle	at	that	time.	The	second	function	of	these	“highly	dramatic	programs,”	as	Lipsky	argues,	was	the	“manipulation	in	the	communications	media	to	influence	public	opinion	in	ways	favorable	to	city	departments.”113	The	editorial	board	of	the	New	York	Times	proved	a	ready	ally	in	promoting	such	a	friendly	narrative,	having	just	weeks	earlier	taken	the	position	that	“the	answer	to	better	housing	conditions	is	not	the	anarchy	and	lawlessness	implied	in	a	rent	strike	but	the	strict	enforcement	of	the	Building																																																									111	Lipsky,	Protest	In	City	Politics,	66.		 112	Ibid,	90-91.		 113	Ibid,	89.	
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Code.”114	As	the	Times	editorial	suggested,	the	narrative	that	the	Wagner	Administration	pushed	in	this	regard	was	that	tenants	ought	to	place	their	faith	in	City	Hall	to	address	their	housing	complaints	rather	than	resorting	to	independent	grassroots	action	which	had	the	undesirable	potential	to	flow	into	broader	struggles	for	rights	and	power.		The	Mayor’s	proposed	broadside	attack	on	slum	conditions	was	met	with	decidedly	mixed	reactions	from	city	officials,	tenant	organizers,	and	some	members	of	the	press.	Though	many	city	officials	were	concerned	about	the	potential	power	the	rent	strike	movement	wielded,	many	also	embraced	the	impetus	they	provided	for	prioritizing	housing	reform.	“Part	of	it	was	fear,	part	of	it	was	relief,”	one	member	of	the	Mayor’s	Housing	Executive	Committee	said,	“finally	it’s	out	in	the	open—now	we	can	do	something.”115	Jesse	Gray	also	cautiously	welcomed	the	influx	of	political	attention	finally	being	paid	to	the	city’s	housing	crisis.	“We	are	impressed	with	the	Mayor’s	talk,”	the	CCH	leader	announced	in	a	press	release,	“however	talk	does	not	give	heat	and	hot	water.”116		While	Gray	offered	lukewarm	support,	other	housing	advocates	were	less	reserved	in	their	response	to	the	proposed	actions.	R.	Peter	Straus,	the	head	of	radio	station	WMCA	who	had	spearheaded	the	women-led	“Call	to	Action”	call-in	tenant	advocacy	service,	called	the	Mayor’s	proposal	“a	lot	of	hot	air”	and	argued	that	the	
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city	already	had	“plenty	of	authority	to	make	improvements	under	present	laws.”117	As	if	to	prove	Straus’s	point	the	following	day,	New	York	Telegram	and	Sun	reporter	Woody	Klein	called	attention	to	the	Mayor’s	dismal	track	record	of	promises	made	and	routinely	broken	regarding	housing	reform.	After	describing	15	proposals	for	housing	reform	during	the	Mayor’s	decade	in	office,	Klein	described	the	January	1964	program	as	“nothing	more	than	a	warmed-over	version	of	past	promises,	with	the	possible	exception	of	legalizing	rent	strikes.”	To	further	illustrate	his	point,	Klein	concluded	the	article	with	a	quote	from	a	conversation	he	had	with	the	Mayor	six	years	prior	that	shed	light	upon	the	Mayor’s	personal	views	on	housing	reform.	“There’s	nothing	you	can	do	about	the	slums,	you	know	that,”	Wagner	explained	to	Klein.	“They’re	always	going	to	be	that	way.”118	Despite	the	bombast	and	tepid	support	that	accompanied	the	Mayor’s	most	recent	declaration	of	war	on	slumlords,	his	track	record	did	little	to	instill	confidence	in	Harlem	tenants	that	City	Hall	would	take	meaningful	action	to	address	the	city’s	rampant	housing	crisis	without	sustained	pressure	from	tenants	and	civil	rights	organizations.	
Local	Struggle,	National	Movement		 Buoyed	by	the	Ribaudo	decision	and	another	ruling	in	Brooklyn	in	early	January,	the	rent	strike	movement	gained	the	kind	of	momentum	necessary	for	applying	sustained	pressure	upon	the	city’s	power	structures.	Just	days	after	the	Mayor	unveiled	his	legislative	program,	Judge	Fred	Moritt	ruled	that	five	tenants	in																																																									117	Naison,	“The	Rent	Strikes	in	New	York,”	24;	Lipsky,	Protest	In	City	Politics,	66.		 118	Woody	Klein,	“Through	The	Years:	How	Not	To	Fight	Slumlords,”	New	
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Red	Hook	represented	by	Brooklyn	CORE	“could	live	rent-free	for	as	long	as	landlords	failed	to	correct	housing	evils	that	menaced	health	and	safety.”	Taking	Ribaudo’s	earlier	ruling	a	step	further,	and	echoing	the	CCH’s	demands	for	sweeping	rent	reductions	pending	repairs,	Moritt	declared	from	the	bench	“that	the	landlord	in	extreme	cases	is	not	entitled	to	any	rent	until	the	conditions	are	remedied.”	Whereas	Ribaudo	had	refused	to	condone	the	rent	strikes,	Moritt	was	less	reserved	in	his	rebuke	of	slumlords	and	the	sluggish	enforcement	of	building	violations	and	repairs.	“Some	of	the	buildings	are	not	fit	for	pigs	to	live	in,”	Moritt	told	the	court,	adding	“if	it	takes	the	landlord	two	years	to	make	the	repairs,	he	gets	no	rent	for	two	years.	Period.”119	With	the	backing	of	the	city’s	judiciary,	the	rent	strike	movement	spread	rapidly	throughout	the	city.			 Just	days	after	the	Moritt	ruling,	MFY	brought	together	a	broad	coalition	of	tenants,	civil	rights,	and	labor	organizations	in	the	Lower	East	Side	to	establish	the	Lower	East	Side	Rent	Strike	Committee.120	“Harlem	led	the	strikes,”	an	MFY	newsletter	that	month	declared,	“Now	a	Lower	East	Side	Rent	Strike	organization	has	alerted	our	area!	The	strike	is	growing.”121	To	help	coordinate	and	energize	the	committee,	the	MFY	staff	invited	Jesse	Gray	to	participate	in	one	of	its	initial	meetings.	“It	was	a	very	exciting	coalition,”	Lower	East	Side	activist	Frances	Goldin	
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said	of	Gray’s	convergence	with	the	committee,	which	also	included	NYU	and	Downtown	CORE,	Puertorriqueños	Unidos,	the	Metropolitan	Council	on	Housing,	and	several	other	groups.	“He	brought	a	kind	of	a	gutsiness	to	the	struggle	[that]	I	don’t	think	we	would	have	had	otherwise.”122	With	Gray’s	guidance	and	inspiration,	the	LES	Rent	Strike	Committee	quickly	organized	tenants	in	60	LES	buildings	to	join	the	city-wide	rent	strike,	which	also	spread	to	90	more	buildings	in	the	Bronx	and	Bedford-Stuyvesant	by	February	1st.123	In	the	following	weeks,	Gray	would	collaborate	with	LES	activists,	including	Jose	Fuentes	and	Genoveva	Clemente,	to	lead	a	torchlight	parade	of	200	tenants	downtown	and	a	mass	demonstration	at	hotly	contested	rent-control	hearings	at	City	Hall.124	Meanwhile,	organizations	uptown	were	actively	discussing	the	potentials	that	the	rent	strike	movement	had	for	igniting	the	type	of	broader	mass	movement	that	Gray	had	envisioned	all	along.	When	the	NSM	City-Congress	met	that	month,	the	rent	strikes	were	the	predominant	topic	of	conversation	in	the	confab	attended	by	Bayard	Rustin,	QR	Hand,	Peter	and	Joan	Countryman,	and	Bill	Strickland.	After	Rustin	spoke	about	the	broader	meanings	of	the	rent	strikes	for	the	national	Civil	Rights	Movement,	as	Elizabeth	Tobierre	notes,	Hand	explained	to	the	group	that	
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there	was	a	“possibility	that	the	[rent	strikes]	were	the	first	movement	in	the	North	that	is	not	all	middle-class.”125		Hand’s	appraisal	of	the	surging	grassroots	movement	closely	resembled	the	class	analysis	that	guided	Gray’s	organizing	in	poor	and	working-class	Black	communities.	“I’m	one	that	believes	that	there	can	be	an	all-class	unity	in	the	Black	people’s	movement,”	Gray	later	said,	“I	believe	that	once	the	black	masses	from	the	back	streets	start	to	move,	they’ve	forced	the	black	middle	class	to	go,	whether	they	want	to	go,	or	not.”126	To	Strickland,	the	recent	successes	of	the	rent	strike	had	the	profound	impact	of	awakening	these	Black	masses	to	the	power	that	they	held	in	their	communities.	This	power,	in	turn,	could	be	mobilized	for	a	more	expansive	political	and	social	movement.	“The	radical	change	in	the	mental	attitude	of	the	people,”	Strickland	suggested,	could	provide	the	impetus	for	a	“multi-issue,	cross-racial,	and	cross-class	lines	movement.”127	Over	the	next	several	weeks	and	months,	organizers	from	NSM,	CCH,	CORE,	and	several	labor	and	nationalist	organizations	would	work	fervently	to	translate	this	grassroots	power	revealed	through	the	rent	strikes	into	a	radical	movement	center	in	Harlem.		As	the	rent	strikes	emerged	at	the	vanguard	of	Black	Freedom	Struggles	in	New	York	City,	a	new	generation	of	young	organizers	was	drawn	into	the	zeitgeist	of	the	movement.	One	such	organizer	was	Peter	Bailey,	an	Army	veteran	and	Howard																																																									125	Elizabeth	Tobierre,	“Black	Power	Does	Not	Come	Out	of	the	Sky’:	The	Emergence	of	Black	Power	Politics	in	the	Northern	Student	Movement,	1961-1968,”	(BA	thesis,	Duke	University,	2014),	65.		 126	Jesse	Gray	interview	with	Katherine	M.	Shannon,	July	26,	1967.		 127	Tobierre,	“Black	Power	Does	Not	Come	Out	of	the	Sky,”	65.	
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University	student	from	Tuskegee,	Alabama,	who	had	taken	a	leave	from	college	to	join	in	the	Black	Freedom	Struggle	in	Harlem.	Once	in	Harlem,	Bailey	became	a	regular	at	Malcolm	X’s	street	rallies	at	116th	Street	and	Lenox	Ave.	and	participated	in	the	Harlem	Hospital	and	Downstate	Medical	Center	protests	in	the	summer	of	1963	as	a	member	of	NY	CORE.	When	the	rent	strike	movement	took	off,	however,	Bailey	quickly	joined	the	ranks	of	the	Rent	Strike	Coordinating	Committee.	“I	went	from	CORE	to	Jesse	Gray	because	I	thought	that	he	was	doing	something	more	immediate	to	the	people,”	Bailey	recalled.128		For	Bailey	and	many	others	of	his	generation	who	had	grown	increasingly	disillusioned	with	the	goal	of	integration	that	guided	the	efforts	of	most	civil	rights	organizations	to	this	point,	the	rent	strikes	provided	a	bridge	between	integration-oriented	civil	rights	and	the	radical	nationalism	that	was	coming	to	characterize	the	Black	Freedom	Struggle	in	Harlem.	Through	tenant	organizing,	such	activists	gained	experience	in	building	a	movement	not	for	integration,	but	for	community	power	and	self-determination—central	tenets	of	Black	Nationalist	thought	which	would	later	define	the	Black	Power	movement.	The	“rent	strike	fever”	that	sparked	this	new	direction	in	political	activism,	as	Naison	explained,	instilled	in	young	activists	“an	extraordinary	sense	of	exhilaration	and	even	of	historic	destiny	that	drew	people	to	the	movement	as	the	initiator	of	a	new	stage	in	the	civil	rights	movement.”129		
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The	peak	of	this	excitement	over	the	transformative	potential	the	rent	strikes	were	believed	to	hold	came	January	12th	at	a	major	rally	called	by	the	Rent	Strike	Coordinating	Committee.	Coming	the	day	after	the	LES	Rent	Strike	Committee	announced	its	formation,	“rent	strike	fever”	was	in	the	air	in	the	crowded	gymnasium	of	the	Milbank	Center.	As	600	Harlem	residents,	civil	rights	workers,	and	representatives	from	tenants	organizations	throughout	the	city	filed	into	the	room,	Jesse	Gray	sat	alongside	a	broad	array	of	influential	Harlem	leaders,	including	John	O.	Killens,	James	Baldwin,	Anna	Arnold	Hedgeman,	Hulan	Jack,	Bill	Strickland,	SNCC	Chairman	John	Lewis,	Congressman	William	Fitts	Ryan,	Councilman	Paul	O’Dwyer,	Assemblyman	José	Ramos-Lopez,	and	union	leaders	Leon	Davis	and	Cleveland	Robinson.		Addressing	the	crowd	from	behind	a	table	clad	with	posters	sardonically	depicting	the	Republican	and	Democratic	Party	mascots	as	rats,	the	speakers	took	turns	declaring	their	support	for	the	rent	strike	and	denouncing	the	racism	that	undergirded	housing	inequality	in	Harlem.130	After	once	again	taking	aim	at	city	officials	like	Hortense	Gabel,	who	he	declared,	“acts	just	like	any	other	slumlord	and	has	got	to	go,”	Gray	took	the	opportunity	to	announce	another	march	on	City	Hall	at	the	end	of	month	to	demand	the	extension	of	rent-control	protections	that	were	set	to	expire,	as	well	as	“to	demand	that	he	City	jail	all	slumlords.”131	Gray	also	
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announced	that	plans	were	in	place	to	form	a	city-wide	rent	strike	coalition	to	bring	the	full	weight	of	Black	and	Puerto	Rican	renters	upon	City	Hall.	While	Gray	laid	out	the	program	for	the	rent	strikes	in	the	weeks	to	follow,	the	most	rousing	speeches	of	the	evening	came	from	John	Lewis	and	James	Baldwin.132	Rising	from	his	seat,	Baldwin	spoke	“as	a	witness”	to	the	intrinsic	relations	between	housing	inequality	in	Harlem	and	institutional	racism	in	the	United	States.	“This	is	a	revolution,”	Baldwin	explained	to	the	attentive	crowd,	“it	is	going	to	be	harder	and	harder	and	harder	because	the	revolution	has	got	to	revise	the	entire	system	in	order	for	us,	as	Negroes,	to	live	and	in	order	for	the	country	to	survive.”	In	this	assessment,	Baldwin	gave	voice	to	the	revolutionary	analysis	that	informed	Gray’s	housing	activism,	yet	was	often	muted	in	public	addresses	that	were	consumed	by	the	daily	rigors	of	tenant	organizing	and	dealing	with	various	levels	of	city	government.	Broadening	his	analysis	to	challenge	Harlem	residents	to	locate	their	rent	strikes	within	the	context	of	global	struggles	for	Black	liberation,	Baldwin	went	on	to	declare	that	this	revolution	“connects	with	the	condition	of	black	and	dark	people	all	over	the	world.	One	must	be	bold	enough	to	see	and	say	this.”	As	his	address	came	to	a	climax,	Baldwin	urged	Harlem	residents	to	bring	this	analysis	into	their	daily	organizing	work	with	the	rent	strikes	to	build	a	broader	movement	for	confronting	and	overthrowing	Jim	Crow	society	in	America.	“Things	
can	be	corrected	but	only	if	we	force	them	to	act,”	Baldwin	charged,	“we	know	that	
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the	situation	in	the	South	was	precipitated	by	the	Negro	people	in	the	streets…it	is	because	the	people	couldn’t	wait	for	Mr.	Charley	to	give	them	their	freedom.”133	While	Baldwin	issued	an	inspirational	and	forceful	challenge	to	Harlem	residents	to	engage	in	revolutionary	struggle,	John	Lewis	focused	his	remarks	on	the	impacts	that	the	rent	strikes	were	having	upon	national	Black	Freedom	Struggles.	Lewis	began	his	address	by	telling	the	crowd	he	had	spent	the	previous	night	in	a	jail	cell	in	Atlanta,	Georgia,	but	bucked	the	usual	trend	of	refusing	bail	in	order	to	make	it	to	Harlem	that	morning.	The	rent	strikes	represented	to	Lewis	“something	very	new	and	meaningful,”	not	only	to	New	York,	but	also	to	the	national	Movement.	“Those	of	us	who	live	and	work	in	the	Deep	South	have	been	following	the	struggle	here	in	Harlem	with	great	interest,”	Lewis	explained,	flipping	the	popular	perceptions	of	northern	movements	following	in	the	wake	of	those	in	the	South.	“Some	of	us	have	been	saying	all	along,”	he	continued,	“that	when	the	masses	get	moving	in	Harlem,	the	masses	in	the	whole	nation	will	move.”		With	the	landmark	March	on	Washington	well	in	the	rearview	mirror	and	the	promise	of	a	Civil	Rights	Act	looming	just	over	the	horizon,	Lewis	acknowledged	that	new	directions	must	be	found	and	implemented	to	realize	the	fundamental	goal	of	Black	liberation.	“If	all	over	this	nation,	if	during	the	next	two	weeks	and	February	there	is	born	a	general	rent	strike	you	will	see	something	very	beautiful,”	Lewis	predicted.	“You	will	make	1963	look	very	petty	and	1964	will	be	the	year	of	the	civil	
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rights	revolution.”134	The	weight	of	Lewis’s	prophetic	speech	was	not	missed	by	the	600	residents	and	activists	in	attendance,	who	cheered	his	remarks	with	a	standing	ovation	and	stirring	rendition	of	“We	Shall	Overcome.”135	After	nearly	a	decade	of	active	grassroots	struggle	in	Harlem,	Black	and	Puerto	Rican	residents	and	activists	were	finally	made	to	feel	as	though	they	were	in	the	vanguard	of	the	Black	Freedom	Struggle,	rather	than	playing	second	fiddle	to	the	highly-visible	struggles	raging	in	the	South.	“At	this	meeting,”	one	CORE	leader	expressed,	“everyone	caught	the	fever—Rent	Strike…it	seemed	like	the	thing	to	do.”136	Lewis	was	hardly	filling	the	room	with	hot	air	when	he	told	the	crowd	that	“the	whole	nation	will	move”	once	the	Black	masses	in	Harlem	were	in	motion.	By	the	time	Lewis	made	these	remarks,	rent	strikes	were	already	underway	in	Providence,	Chicago,	and	Cleveland,	with	others	in	the	works	in	Los	Angeles,	New	Orleans,	Milwaukee,	New	Haven,	Pittsburgh,	Hartford,	and	Washington,	D.C.,	where	SNCC	launched	its	first	rent	strike	later	that	month.137		Although	the	hyper-visibility	provided	by	constant	national	news	coverage	helped	to	introduce	the	concept	of	rent	strikes	to	Black	communities	across	the																																																									134	A	transcript	of	Lewis’s	address	can	be	found	in	Halstead,	et	al.,	Harlem	
Stirs,	64.		 135	“Jim	Baldwin	Sparks	Harlem	Rent	Strike,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	January	18,	1964.		 136	Naison,	“The	Rent	Strikes	in	New	York,”	28.		 137	“Harlem	Rent	Strike	Seeks	‘Push’	From	Rights	Groups,”	Pittsburgh	Courier,	January	18,	1964;	“NECAP	Is	Considering	Harlem	Type	Rent	Strike,”	The	Hartford	
Courant,	January	6,	1964;	Dan	Day,	“Capitol	Spotlight:	Rent	Strike	Is	New	Civil	Rights	Weapon,”	Atlanta	Daily	World,	January	7,	1964;	Rasa	Gustaitis,	“Tenants	Start	First	‘Rent	Strike’	In	District,”	The	Washington	Post,	Times	Herald,	January	25,	1964.	
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United	States,	Jesse	Gray	was	also	actively	assisting	various	groups	in	coordinating	and	launching	strikes	in	their	own	cities.	“Jesse	was	frequently	a	resource	person,”	Howard	University	student	Phil	Hutchings	recalled.	As	a	member	of	the	SNCC-affiliated	Nonviolent	Action	Group	(NAG),	which	nurtured	the	political	development	of	widely-influential	leaders	including	Kwame	Ture	(Stokely	Carmichael),	Ekwueme	Michael	Thelwell,	Ed	Brown,	and	Courtland	Cox,	Hutchings	regularly	made	contact	with	Gray	in	both	Harlem	and	Washington,	D.C.	“We	were	playing	with	this	idea	of	housing	strikes,	and	thought	who	better	to	tell	us	and	has	experiences	with	housing	strikes	than	Jesse	Gray?,”	Hutchings	said,	“you	just	shot	up	the	turnpike	and	you’re	in	New	York,	or	bring	him	down	to	interact	and	get	[his]	message.”138		Furthermore,	the	grassroots	militancy	the	rent	strikes	had	helped	to	cultivate	was	now	flowering	in	other	struggles	in	New	York	City	and	beyond.	In	the	years	since	the	school	boycott	led	by	Mae	Mallory	and	the	Harlem	Nine,	little	meaningful	change	had	been	brought	to	bear	upon	the	racial	inequalities	entrenched	within	the	city’s	public	school	system.	As	civil	rights	groups	struggled	to	eke	out	any	concessions	from	the	Board	of	Education	or	City	Hall	over	those	years,	frustrations	mounted	and	plans	for	action	escalated.	By	the	winter	of	1963,	a	massive	city-wide	school	boycott	was	in	the	works,	with	the	efforts	spearheaded	by	the	militant	Brooklyn	clergyman	Rev.	Milton	Galamison	who	had	been	at	the	frontlines	of	major	civil	rights	struggles	in	New	York	City	for	over	a	decade.	Drawing	from	the	same	grassroots	base	as	the	rent	strikes	(Inocencia	Flores	was	also	an	active	supporter	of	
																																																								138	Phil	Hutchings	interview	with	the	author,	January	26,	2017.	
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the	school	boycott),	the	planned	boycott	reflected	the	same	impatience	with	racial	liberalism	that	fueled	the	rent	strike	movement.139	This	grassroots	militancy	embodied	in	the	rent	strikes	and	looming	school	boycott	in	New	York	City	converged	in	the	hours	before	the	rally	at	the	Milbank	Center,	when	a	group	of	radical	leaders	from	across	the	country	convened	in	Harlem	to	discuss	plans	for	coordinating	similar	direct	action	campaigns	on	a	national	level.	Having	learned	of	the	rent	strikes	and	planned	school	boycott	through	the	Chicago	
Defender,	Chicago	Friends	of	SNCC	leader	Lawrence	Landry	set	up	a	meeting	with	Galamison	to	discuss	the	possibility	of	launching	a	nationwide	school	boycott.	Joining	the	two	civil	rights	leaders	and	education	activists	that	day	were	Noel	Day,	Boston	civil	rights	leader	and	husband	of	Harlem-native	and	activist	Peggy	Trotter	Dammond;	Ruth	Turner,	leader	of	Cleveland	CORE	who	had	actively	supported	Mae	Mallory	during	her	extradition	fight	and	coordinated	rent	strikes	in	the	city;	Stanley	Branche,	chairman	of	the	Committee	For	Freedom	Now	in	Chester,	PA;	James	Bevel,	a	leader	of	the	Nashville	Student	Movement,	SNCC,	and	the	SCLC;	John	Lewis,	and	Jesse	Gray.140		
																																																								139	Gold,	When	Tenants	Claimed	the	City,	135-36.	For	more	on	the	1964	school	boycotts	in	New	York	City,	see	Clarence	Taylor,	Knocking	At	Our	Own	Door:	Milton	A.	
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During	the	day-long	session,	this	impressive	collective	of	leading	grassroots	organizers	hammered	out	plans	for	the	nationwide	school	boycott,	which	resulted	in	over	one	million	students	boycotting	schools	in	32	cities	the	following	month.	Though	unbeknownst	at	the	time,	this	summit	also	marked	the	first	meeting	of	a	new	radical	grassroots	coalition	known	as	ACT	(not	an	acronym),	which	in	the	following	months	would	grow	to	include	Harlem	Parents	Committee	leader	Isaiah	Robinson,	comedian	and	activist	Dick	Gregory,	Cambridge	Nonviolent	Action	Committee	co-chair	Gloria	Richardson	Dandridge,	Washington,	D.C.	CORE	leader	Julius	Hobson,	Negro	American	Labor	Council	secretary	Nahaz	Rogers,	and	a	newly-independent	Malcolm	X.		By	February,	it	was	becoming	clear	that	the	grassroots	base	of	poor	and	working-class	Black	and	Puerto	Rican	Harlemites	mobilized	through	the	rent	strike	movement	was	making	far	greater	contributions	to	the	evolution	of	the	Black	Freedom	Struggle	than	many	could	have	imagined	when	they	took	the	first	step	of	withholding	their	rent.	Jesse	Gray’s	vision	for	building	a	radical	political	movement	through	tenant	organizing	appeared	on	the	verge	of	becoming	a	reality.	
The	Landlords	and	City	Fight	Back		 As	the	winter	stretched	on	in	January	and	February,	the	rent	strike	movement	expanded	in	size	and	scope.	Bolstered	by	the	addition	of	scores	of	buildings	in	the	Lower	East	Side,	Bedford-Stuyvesant,	and	the	Bronx	joining	the	rent	strike	by	February,	the	CCH	boldly	declared	that	450	buildings	were	now	on	strike	
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across	the	city.141	Though	the	numbers	were	likely	inflated,	the	rent	strike’s	continued	growth	demonstrated	that	the	city’s	Black	and	Puerto	Rican	tenants	had	little	faith	in	the	Mayor’s	January	vow	to	“step	up”	the	city’s	“pocketbook	attack	on	the	slumlord.”142		In	addition	to	their	swelling	ranks,	the	tenor	and	tactics	of	the	rent	strikers	evinced	a	grave	disillusionment	with	the	continued	impotence	of	City	Hall	to	restore	heat	and	hot	water	and	make	repairs	in	their	buildings.	On	January	23rd,	Gray	and	the	CCH	led	tenants	from	Harlem	and	the	Lower	East	Side	in	demonstrations	at	City	Hall	to	demand	the	extension	of	rent	control	legislation.	While	300	picketing	women,	men,	and	children	circled	the	building	wearing	rubber	rats	pinned	to	their	lapels	and	carrying	signs	reading	“Wagner	Stop	Talking	Start	Acting,”	Gray	led	a	contingency	of	tenants	inside	to	make	their	voices	heard	in	the	hearing	taking	place.143	The	scene	inside	the	City	Council	Chamber	was	bedlam,	with	landlords	and	tenants	alike	removed	from	the	room	by	police	after	waging	disruptive	protests.	Gray	himself	was	ejected	from	the	hearing	after	grabbing	for	the	microphone,	before	later	storming	back	into	the	Chamber	to	declare	the	proceedings	“a	rigged	hearing”	and	leading	the	remaining	tenants	in	a	walk-out.	While	Gray	was	outside,	another	woman	tenant	squared	up	with	a	landlord	who	had	assaulted	an	elderly	tenant	
																																																								141	“Rent	Strike	Due	To	Double	In	Size,”	New	York	Times,	February	1,	1964.		 142	Robert	F.	Wagner,	Press	Release,	January	6,	1964,	CORE	Papers.		 143	Halstead	et	al.,	Harlem	Stirs,	80-87.	
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when	he	rose	to	address	the	Council,	forcing	a	recess	to	be	called.144	These	confrontations	at	City	Hall,	Fred	Halstead	wrote,	“convinced	tenants	that	they	must	resist	the	landlords	by	all	means.”145	At	the	same	time,	that	the	City	Council	voted	to	extend	rent	control	for	another	two	years	showed	tenants	that	their	protests	were	capable	of	winning	tangible	victories.		 The	militancy	displayed	at	City	Hall	escalated	uptown	just	days	after	the	hearing,	when	Harlem	tenants	clashed	with	the	city	marshal	over	the	eviction	of	a	rent	striker	for	nonpayment.	Although	Gray	and	the	CCH	had	secured	a	stay	on	the	24-hour	eviction	notice	presented	to	Elizabeth	Brown,	the	city	marshal	entered	the	apartment	she	shared	with	her	16-year-old	son	and	moved	all	of	their	belongings	onto	the	sidewalk.	When	Mrs.	Brown	found	her	things	on	the	sidewalk	and	her	apartment	padlocked,	she	called	Jesse	Gray,	who	quickly	assembled	ten	members	of	the	CCH	to	break	the	lock	and	move	the	belongings	back	into	the	apartment.146	The	anti-eviction	struggle	resulted	in	a	confrontation	with	the	marshal,	Reginald	Thorpe,	who	Gray	charged	“roughed	me	up	and	one	of	his	men	punched	me	in	the	mouth”	while	a	police	officer	on	the	scene	“turned	his	head.”147	After	the	patrolman	refused	
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to	arrest	Thorpe	for	assault,	Gray	led	a	small	protest	at	the	nearby	precinct	with	demonstrators	chanting,	“The	police	must	go”	and	“Brutality	must	go.”148		Like	the	dramatic	anti-eviction	campaigns	waged	in	Harlem	by	the	Communist	Party	and	community	leaders	like	Queen	Mother	Audley	Moore	during	the	Great	Depression,	Gray’s	confrontation	with	the	city	marshal	aroused	the	ire	of	Harlem	tenants	against	slumlords	and	the	police	alike.	For	the	next	two	weeks,	the	anti-eviction	campaigns	would	continue,	with	members	of	the	CCH	and	HAG	battling	city	marshals	and	the	NYPD	to	prevent	entry	to	apartments	for	carrying	out	evictions.		Just	days	after	the	first	confrontation	at	Elizabeth	Brown’s	apartment,	members	of	the	NYPD	attempted	to	aid	the	city	marshal	in	once	again	entering	her	apartment	despite	an	order	staying	the	eviction.	After	returning	home	from	renewing	the	stay	at	Civil	Court,	16-year-old	Christopher	Brown	found	police	“trying	to	break	through	the	back	wall	of	the	apartment”	while	members	of	the	CCH	barricaded	the	door	from	the	inside.	“There	is	no	law	for	the	people	up	here,	the	police	work	only	for	the	landlords,”	Gray	told	reporters	on	the	scene.	Announcing	a	series	of	pickets	at	police	headquarters	to	protest	the	NYPD’s	complicity	with	slumlords,	Gray	predicted,	“Blood	is	going	to	flow	if	something	isn’t	done.”149		 If	this	initial	clash	between	rent	strikers	and	the	police	failed	to	mobilize	the	anger	of	tenants	to	oppose	the	NYPD,	another	anti-eviction	confrontation	the	following	week	tipped	the	scales.	On	February	7th,	the	city	marshal	showed	up	at	the																																																									148	“Eviction	Causes	Harlem	Scuffle,”	New	York	Times,	January	30,	1964.		 149	“Rent	Strike	Due	To	Double	In	Size,”	New	York	Times,	February	1,	1964.	
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apartment	of	rent	striker	Luther	Brown	(no	relation	to	Elizabeth	Brown),	accompanied	by	police	and	a	crew	of	laborers	to	carry	out	an	eviction	order.	Over	the	past	months,	Brown	had	frequently	complained	to	his	landlord	about	violations	in	the	apartment	he	shared	with	his	sister	and	her	five	children	on	W.	118th	Street	with	no	avail.	While	CCH	members	scrambled	to	get	a	judge	to	issue	a	stay	of	the	eviction	ordered	the	previous	night,	Gray,	Major	Williams,	QR	Hand,	and	others	from	the	CCH	and	HAG	joined	Brown	in	physically	barricading	the	apartment	until	the	stay	of	eviction	could	be	obtained.		While	Ebony	photographer	Don	Hogan	Charles	snapped	pictures,	the	police	“chopped	down	the	door	of	the	apartment	and	broke	down	the	barricade”	to	enter	the	apartment	and	arrest	everyone	inside.	“You	should’ve	seen	all	the	cops,	man,”	HAG	leader	QR	Hand	said,	"they	came	just	out	of	nowhere,	they	had	big	paddy	wagons	out	there,	four	or	five	patrol	cars.”150	This	time,	rather	than	putting	the	Browns’	possessions	in	the	street,	the	marshal	loaded	their	belongings	into	a	moving	van	to	prevent	the	CCH	and	HAG	from	moving	them	back	in.	The	move	was	calculated,	with	the	marshal	and	NYPD	having	learned	from	the	previous	week’s	confrontations	with	the	CCH.	The	rent	strikers	learned	from	the	experience	too,	and	adjusted	their	analyses	and	strategies	accordingly.	From	a	jail	cell,	Gray,	Williams,	Hand,	and	the	other	rent	strikers	worked	out	plans	for	protests	that	would	“turn	the	tables	on	the	police	and	expose	them	as	the	slumlords’	tools.”151	
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The	following	day,	the	CCH	and	HAG	led	picketers	in	demonstrations	outside	the	28th	Precinct	in	Harlem	and	police	headquarters	downtown.	From	their	jail	cell,	the	rent	strikers	had	drafted	up	a	leaflet	for	the	rally	with	a	damning	indictment	of	the	NYPD	that	surely	resonated	with	Black	and	Puerto	Rican	communities	throughout	the	city.	“When	the	slumlords	are	guilty	of	no	heat,	no	hot	water,	and	the	rats	biting	our	children,	the	police	department	does	nothing,”	the	leaflet	read.	When	tenants	are	being	robbed,	or	when	apartments	are	broken	into,	where	are	the	police?	Somewhere	drunk?	In	some	woman’s	apartment?	In	a	garage	asleep?	Collecting	graft	and	payoffs	from	prostitutes?	Payoffs	from	number	men	or	dope	peddlers?	But	when	it	is	time	to	illegally	evict	a	tenant	for	a	slumlord,	the	whole	police	department	acts	with	great	speed.152			Each	of	these	scenarios	represented	a	common	complaint	lobbied	against	the	NYPD	by	Harlem	residents	over	the	years	and	revealed	a	sharp	contrast	with	the	forceful	police	presence	in	Luther	Brown’s	apartment	just	hours	after	an	eviction	notice	was	issued.	Furthermore,	the	racial	undertones	of	the	leaflet	were	impossible	to	ignore,	with	the	majority	of	landlords	and	police	officers	being	white	and	the	majority	of	Harlem	tenants	Black	or	Puerto	Rican.	Calling	for	the	dismissal	of	the	officers	who	arrested	the	rent	strikers	inside	Luther	Brown’s	apartment,	members	of	the	CCH,	HAG,	and	their	community	supporters	walked	the	picket	lines	with	signs	reading,	“Slumlord	Cops	Must	Go”	and	“Arrest	City	Marshal	Thorpe	and	his	Slumlord-Supporting	Goons.”	Later	that	evening,	Gray	and	the	house	leaders	of	the	CCH	
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convened	at	the	Mount	Morris	Presbyterian	Church	to	discuss	plans	for	increasing	pressure	upon	the	NYPD,	as	well	as	strategies	for	continuing	the	rent	strike.153				
“The	cops	are	all	over	the	place”:	Police	Repression	and	the	Rent	Strikes	Though	the	protests	outside	the	28th	Precinct	and	police	headquarters	achieved	little	in	terms	of	concessions	from	the	NYPD,	the	anti-eviction	confrontations	revealed	more	fully	to	many	tenants	the	repressive	role	of	the	police	within	the	city’s	power	structure.	While	much	of	Gray’s	organizing	and	rhetoric	to	this	point	had	been	dedicated	to	promoting	a	more	systemic	critique	of	housing	inequality	in	the	city,	he	had	spent	relatively	little	time	confronting	the	role	of	the	police	within	this	analysis	he	was	propagating	at	the	grassroots.	Certainly,	few	Harlem	residents	had	any	illusions	about	the	NYPD,	an	overwhelmingly	white	department	that	many	saw	as	a	corrupt,	often	abusive,	occupying	force	in	Harlem.	“Rare,	indeed,	is	the	Harlem	citizen…who	does	not	have	a	long	tale	to	tell	of	police	incompetence,	injustice,	or	brutality,”	James	Baldwin	wrote	in	a	1960	essay.	“They	represent	the	force	of	the	white	world,	and	that	world’s	real	intentions	are,	simply,	for	that	world’s	criminal	profit	and	ease,	to	keep	the	black	man	corralled	up	here,	in	his	place.”154	Coming	at	a	period	of	heightened	political	consciousness	and	action,	the	anti-eviction	confrontations	brought	the	true	role	of	the	NYPD	into	sharp	relief	for	many	Harlem	residents	who	were	rapidly	coming	to	see	the	police	as	the	enforcement	arm	of	white	supremacy	in	the	city.																																																										153	Ibid,	88-100;	Bernard	Stengren,	“Police	Are	Picketed	Over	Slum	Eviction,”	
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For	QR	Hand,	coming	face	to	face	with	the	NYPD	that	day	after	several	months	of	witnessing	police	harassment	and	intimidation	of	rent	strikers	radicalized	his	political	perspective.	“I	didn’t	come	into	this	with	a	really…radical	orientation,”	Hand	said	that	spring,	“but	all	of	a	sudden,	you	get	out	there	and	you’re	trying	to	do	something	and	the	cat’s	on	your	back.”	Hand	had	carefully	observed	the	increasingly	repressive	measures	meted	out	to	Harlem	tenants	by	the	NYPD	as	the	rent	strikes	progressed	since	the	fall.	Speaking	alongside	Malcolm	X	at	the	Militant	Labor	Forum	later	that	spring,	Hand	recalled	a	run-in	with	the	police	at	Granville	Cherry’s	apartment	building	that	illustrated	his	point.		One	day	that	fall	when	Cherry	was	leaving	his	building,	he	was	visited	by	the	King	Cole	Trio—a	notorious	group	of	Black	officers	known	for	their	heavy-handed	administration	of	“law	and	order.”155	“These	are	the	cats	who	go	into	one	of	the	corner	bars…and	they	get	their	cut	and	they	don’t	say	anything	at	all,”	Hand	said	of	the	group’s	penchant	for	graft	and	extortion,	“but	all	of	a	sudden,	this	cat	who	wasn’t	doing	nothing,	they	decided	to	rough	him	up.”	As	Cherry	descended	the	stairs,	Hand	recounted,	one	of	the	plainclothes	officers	grabbed	him	while	the	other	two	kept	lookout.	“The	guy	worked	Cherry	over	a	little	bit,	[and	the	officer]	says,	‘why	don’t	you	cut	this	stuff	out,	we	don’t	want	any	trouble.”	The	aggressive	thinly	veiled	threat	against	Cherry,	a	“happy-go-lucky,	good	cat,”	who	was	merely	trying	to	improve	his	
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family’s	housing	situation,	signaled	to	Hand	that	the	problems	they	were	dealing	with	extended	far	beyond	housing	policies.156			 The	increasingly	repressive	involvement	of	the	NYPD	in	the	rent	strikes	was	part	of	the	one-two	punch	that	characterized	liberal	governance	under	the	Wagner	Administration	in	New	York	City.	With	his	left	hand,	the	Mayor	promised	to	investigate	and	deliver	legislative	reforms	to	address	demands	for	equality	and	justice	in	the	city.	By	dressing	up	minor	concessions	as	major	policy	advancements,	the	Mayor	sought	to	appease	protestors	and	subvert	demands	for	systemic	change.		With	his	right	hand,	the	Mayor	dispatched	the	NYPD	to	curb	protest	and	civil	unrest	through	the	surveillance,	criminalization,	and	physical	repression	of	activists	and	organizers.		The	position	of	the	NYPD	in	this	regard	was	made	clear	in	early	March,	when	Police	Commissioner	Michael	Murphy	declared	at	a	meeting	of	6,000	officers	that	he	would	not	allow	civil	rights	leaders	to	“turn	New	York	City	into	a	battleground.”	Singling	out	Jesse	Gray,	Malcolm	X,	and	Bronx	CORE	leader	Herbert	Callender,	Murphy	charged	that	these	“extremist”	leaders	“see	the	struggle	for	[civil	rights]	only	as	a	means	to	a	personal	end	or	as	the	weapon	to	create	chaos	in	our	community	and	weaken	the	structure	of	government.”157	Interestingly,	it	was	these	three	Black	leaders	who	had	been	among	the	most	vocal	about	police	corruption,	
																																																								156	Militant	Labor	Forum,	“The	Harlem	Hate-Gang	Scare,”	May	29,	1964,	Moving	Image	and	Recorded	Sound	Division,	Schomburg	Center	for	Research	in	Black	Culture.		157	Emanuel	Perlmutter,	“Murphy	Says	City	Will	Not	Permit	Rights	Violence,”	
New	York	Times,	March	16,	1964;	Lipsky,	Protest	In	City	Politics,	71-72.	
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brutality,	and	political	repression	in	the	several	weeks	prior.	Thus,	not	only	did	the	Police	Commissioner	rally	his	rank-and-file	against	leaders	of	the	Black	Freedom	Struggle—he	also	attempted	to	delegitimize	these	leaders	along	with	their	legitimate	claims	against	NYPD	and	City	Hall.		Coming	after	several	months	of	confrontations	between	police	and	activists	throughout	the	city,	Murphy’s	remarks	did	little	to	dispel	increasingly	common	perceptions	that	the	NYPD	was	waging	a	war	against	Black	and	Puerto	Rican	freedom	fighters.	As	the	rent	strikes	were	getting	underway	that	fall,	clashes	between	the	NYPD	and	peaceful	protestors	from	NYC	CORE	chapters	raised	the	specter	of	police	repression	of	civil	rights	activists	in	the	city.	While	protesting	the	appearance	of	the	segregationist	Alabama	Governor	George	Wallace	and	President	Kennedy	in	midtown	Manhattan	on	two	consecutive	days	in	early	November,	CORE	members	charged	that	police	officers	“waded	into	the	picket	lines	on	horseback	wielding	nightsticks	and	stomping	defenseless	people.”158	During	the	two	protests,	NY	CORE	leader	Marshall	England	and	eight	other	CORE	members	were	injured,	including	a	pregnant	woman	who	was	struck	in	the	stomach	and	a	16-year-old	girl	who	was	trampled	by	a	police	horse.159	Demanding	that	police	horses	be	kept	in	stables	“where	they	belong”	and	“that	the	police	department	be	reminded	that	their	responsibility…is	to	enforce	the	laws	and	not	to	break	up	demonstrations	that	they	
																																																								158	“Copy	of	Telegram	Sent	to	Mayor	Robert	F.	Wagner	City	Hall	NYC,”	November	1963,	BOSS	Records.		 159	New	York	CORE	Newsletter,	December	1963,	BOSS	Records.	
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don’t	like,”	CORE	leaders	threatened	a	program	of	civil	disobedience	that	would	“put	to	shame	everything	that	CORE	has	done	up	to	now	in	NYC.”160		Coming	in	the	wake	of	that	summer’s	confrontational	direct	action	protests	at	construction	sites	throughout	the	city,	CORE	leaders	read	this	type	of	police	behavior	as	clear	repression	of	civil	rights	activity.	In	a	letter	to	Deputy	Police	Commissioner	Walter	Arm,	attorney	and	CORE	supporter	Mark	Lane	charged	the	NYPD	with	having	carried	out	an	“unprovoked	and	organized	attack	by	police	officers	against	persons	who	had	peacefully	assembled	to	demonstrate	for	civil	rights.”161	To	Lane	and	other	CORE	leaders,	these	police	actions	in	early	November	were	hardly	an	anomaly.	“The	fact	of	the	matter	is,”	NY	CORE’s	December	newsletter	contended,	“that	virtually	every	CORE	picket	line	during	the	past	few	weeks	has	been	the	object	of	either	outright	brutality	or	unnecessary	harassment	by	the	police.”162	In	response,	leaders	of	CORE	chapters	throughout	the	city	filed	legal	complaints	against	the	NYPD	and	launched	a	series	of	direct	action	protests	throughout	the	month	of	November.		On	November	19th,	nearly	100	members	of	various	CORE	chapters	picketed	police	headquarters	to	protest	police	brutality	and	political	suppression.	Led	by	Blyden	Jackson,	Gladys	Harrington,	Jim	Peck,	Mark	Lane,	Tina	Lawrence,	and	CCH	member	Leroy	McRae,	protestors	carried	signs	that	read,	“Convict	the	Attackers”	
																																																								160	“Copy	of	Telegram	Sent	to	Mayor	Robert	F.	Wagner	City	Hall	NYC,”	November	1963,	BOSS	Records.		161	Letter	from	Mark	Lane	to	Walter	Arm,	November	18,	1963,	BOSS	Records.		 162	New	York	CORE	Newsletter,	December	1963,	BOSS	Records.	
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and	“Protect	Us,	Not	Attack	Us.”163	Though	CORE’s	campaign	against	police	brutality	was	subsumed	by	the	burgeoning	rent	strike	movement	that	fall,	the	organization	sounded	the	alarm	about	police	repression	that	would	be	heard	more	clearly	by	the	spring.	The	responses	from	City	Hall	and	the	NYPD	to	CORE’s	allegations	of	police	brutality	and	repression	that	fall	were	indicative	of	the	Wagner	Administration’s	brand	of	racial	liberalism.	The	City	not	only	failed	to	engage	in	meaningful	discussions	with	CORE	leaders	to	resolve	their	complaints,	but	also	made	use	of	the	myriad	resources	available	to	the	NYPD	in	its	battle	against	the	Black	Freedom	Struggle	in	New	York	City	to	discredit	and	criminalize	the	civil	rights	activists.	Calling	CORE’s	allegations	“blind	assertions	[that]	constitute	hypocrisy	and	hate-rousing	of	the	lowest-type,”	Murphy	explained	in	a	press	release	that	such	criticisms	of	the	NYPD	were	“aimed	at	destroying	respect	for	law	and	order	and	are	in	effect	calculated	mass	libel	of	police.”164		While	fighting	to	control	the	narrative	and	stoke	public	fear	of	civil	disorder,	Murphy	also	tasked	the	department’s	counterintelligence	agency—the	Bureau	of	Special	Services	(BOSS)—with	conducting	surveillance	and	investigations	of	the	CORE	members	involved.165	The	day	after	CORE’s	demonstration	at	police	
																																																								163	Memo	from	Edwin	B.	Cooper	to	Commanding	Officer,	BOSS,	November	19,	1963,	BOSS	Records.		164	New	York	Police	Department	Press	Release,	November	19,	1963,	BOSS	Records.		 165	Mayor	Wagner	was	an	avid	supporter	of	the	BOSS	unit.	Having	been	involved	with	combat	intelligence	during	his	military	service	in	World	War	II,	
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headquarters,	BOSS	ordered	an	“Investigation	of	C.P.	[Communist	Party]	Affiliations	Within	CORE	and	of	Potential	‘Trouble	Makers’	Within	CORE.”	A	BOSS	lieutenant	was	asked	to	report	on	a	perceived	faction	within	CORE	that	“advocates	dropping	the	‘non-violent’	approach	and	adopting	instead	‘an	eye	for	an	eye-a	tooth	for	a	tooth’	approach.”	Named	in	the	report	as	members	of	a	“militant	group”	in	CORE	were	Blyden	Jackson,	Tina	Lawrence,	Velma	Hill,	and	Arthur	Johnson,	whom	a	Lieutenant	Mulligan	claimed	were	being	“pushed	by	Bayard	Rustin.”166	It	was	hardly	a	coincidence	that	Jackson	and	Lawrence	were	among	those	leading	protests	against	the	police	just	days	before	the	investigation	was	opened.	Over	the	next	several	months,	BOSS	detectives	used	surveillance	techniques	and	informants	within	CORE	to	compile	profiles	of	each	of	these	individuals	and	others	who	were	attacked	by	police	at	the	November	protests.	When	the	case	came	before	the	Civilian	Complaint	Review	Board	in	early	January,	BOSS	detective	Henry	Taylor	sent	a	memo	to	the	police	oversight	board	with	detailed	information	about	each	of	these	activists,	including	Mark	Lane	and	Arnold	Goldwag,	to	cast	doubt	upon	the	allegations	of	brutality.	Using	rhetoric	characteristic	of	Cold	War	era	political	repression,	the	memo	detailed	the	“radical	views”	held	by	the	activists,	along	with																																																																																																																																																																						Wagner	developed	a	keen	interest	in	“what	the	police	did	here”	in	terms	of	surveillance	and	counterintelligence.	Speaking	of	BOSS	surveillance	of	the	Nation	of	Islam	and	other	civil	rights	organizations	during	an	oral	history	interview	in	1979,	Wagner	described	BOSS	as	“a	very	key	part	of	the	department,	they	keep	check	on	all	sorts	of	different	groups	and	infiltrate…they	keep	in	touch	with	some	of	the	radical	movements—all	of	them,	the	Communist	movement.”	See	“Reminiscences	of	Robert	Ferdinand	Wagner,	1979,”	Columbia	Center	for	Oral	History,	Columbia	University	Libraries.		166	Memo	from	Anton	Weidinger	to	Lt.	Mulligan,	November	20,	1963,	BOSS	Records.	
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their	alleged	links	to	“ultra-liberal”	groups	and	the	Communist	Party,	as	evidence	of	“the	degree	of	responsibility”	they	held	in	the	confrontation	with	police.167		Amounting	to	a	calculated	character	assassination,	such	BOSS	involvement	demonstrated	the	depths	of	police	power	in	the	city	that	could	be	used	to	subvert	any	movement	to	check	or	reform	their	abusive	and	repressive	practices.		
“Nowhere…have	we	so	closely	approached	a	police	state”	 	Coupled	with	CORE’s	November	demonstrations,	the	NYPD’s	complicity	in	repressing	rent	strike	activities	had	helped	to	sharpen	popular	understandings	of	the	police	as	the	enforcement	arm	of	white	supremacy	in	the	city.	Building	upon	decades	of	protests	against	police	brutality	in	Harlem,	CORE’s	campaign	that	fall	laid	the	groundwork	for	a	broader	struggle	against	police	brutality	and	repression	that	emerged	in	March	1964	in	the	wake	of	Gray’s	arrest.	The	analyses	of	Gray,	Lane,	Baldwin,	and	Hand	in	this	regard	exemplified	the	three	“interrelated	grievances”	that	Black	and	Puerto	Rican	communities	had	with	the	NYPD:	corruption	and	inefficiency,	repression	of	activists,	and	mistreatment	and	brutality.168		Compounding	these	highly	combustible	issues,	state	legislators	moved	in	early	1964	to	expand	police	powers	by	pushing	two	highly	controversial	bills	through	the	legislature	as	part	of	a	major	anticrime	package.	With	the	active	support	of	Mayor	Wagner,	the	“no-knock”	and	“stop-and-frisk”	bills	were	signed	into	law	on	
																																																								167	Memo	from	Henry	Taylor	to	Civilian	Complaint	Review	Board,	January	16,	1964,	BOSS	Records.		168	Themis	Chronopoulos,	“Police	Misconduct,	Community	Opposition,	and	Urban	Governance	in	New	York	City,	1945-1965,”	Journal	of	Urban	History	(April	2015):	16.	
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March	3rd	over	the	vocal	opposition	of	Black	democrats,	civil	rights	organizations,	and	bar	associations.169	Under	the	“no-knock”	bill,	a	police	officer	in	possession	of	a	search	warrant	was	granted	the	power	to	break	into	a	home	without	knocking	or	announcing	him	or	herself	as	police.	The	now	infamous	“stop-and-frisk”	bill	went	even	further,	empowering	officers	to	stop,	question,	and	search	any	individual	on	the	grounds	of	“reasonable	suspicion.”	Spurred	in	large	part	by	a	dramatic	increase	in	crime	rates	reported	by	the	NYPD	since	June	1963,170	the	two	bills	represented	an	effort	to	take	the	gloves	off	of	the	city’s	police	officers	in	their	war	on	crime	and	suspected	“criminals.”		Despite	rosy	descriptions	of	the	bills	in	the	New	York	Times	as	having	been	designed	to	“protect	policemen	from	surprise	attack,”171	most	Harlem	leaders	understood	this	expansion	of	police	powers	as	a	direct	attack	on	the	city’s	Black	communities.	Pointing	out	the	blatant	racial	disparities	in	police	treatment	in	the	city,	Amsterdam	News	editor	James	Hicks	condemned	the	new	legislation	as	giving	a	“green	light”	to	“abuse	by	bigoted	or	sadistic	police.”172	Echoing	another	rebuke	of	the	legislation	from	the	State	Bar	Association,	Harlem	Congressman	William	Fitts	Ryan	warned	that	the	bills	would	create	“a	police	state”	and	likened	their	passage	to	
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the	act	of	a	“demagogue	or	dictator.”173	More	concerning	for	Liberator	columnist	Robert	Arnold,	was	the	opportunity	that	these	new	laws	presented	for	law	enforcement	to	suppress	radical	political	activity.	“The	experience	of	the	Rent	Strike	and	the	reaction	of	officialdom	to	militant	grass	roots	protest	in	New	York	has	again	demonstrated,”	Arnold	contended,	“that	when	push	comes	to	shove	the	police	are	on	the	side	of	the	slumlords	and	others	who	seek	to	exploit	minorities	and	not	the	people	and	their	legitimate	protests.”	Giving	voice	to	the	concerns	of	most	Harlem	residents	and	activists,	Arnold	predicted	that	“what	we	can	expect	to	see	is	a	series	of	unprovoked	raids,	similar	to	the	attack	on	the	Muslim	Temple	in	Los	Angeles,	which	will	further	inflame	the	already	tense	racial	situation.”174	With	demands	for	police	reform	and	oversight	in	New	York	City	having	been	ignored	for	nearly	a	decade,	it	now	appeared	as	though	the	police	abuse	and	repression	of	Black	and	Puerto	Rican	New	Yorkers	had	won	an	official	endorsement	from	the	Mayor	and	the	State.			With	the	masses	already	in	motion	in	Harlem,	civil	rights	organizations	and	community	leaders	were	quick	to	mobilize	opposition	to	the	legislation.	Just	days	before	Rockefeller	signed	the	bills	into	law,	representatives	from	twenty	Harlem	
																																																								173	“New	Police	Laws	Scored	At	Rally,”	New	York	Times,	March	8,	1964.	Shortly	before	Rockefeller	signed	the	anticrime	laws,	a	unit	of	the	State	Bar	Association	issued	a	statement	declaring,	“Nowhere	in	the	history	of	Anglo-Saxon	jurisprudence	have	we	so	closely	approached	a	police	state	as	in	this	proposal	to	require	citizens	to	identify	themselves	to	police	officers	and	‘explain	their	actions’	on	such	a	meager	showing.”	Layhmond	Robinson,	“Bar	Group	Urges	Crime-Bill	Veto,”	New	York	Times,	February	26,	1964.		174	Robert	Arnold,	“Rockefeller’s	Police	State,”	Liberator	4,	no.	6	(June	1964):	4-5.	
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organizations,	including	the	NAACP,	CORE,	and	CCH	formed	the	Ad	Hoc	Committee	for	Fair	Police	Practice	to	coordinate	a	direct	action	campaign	to	compel	a	veto	or	repeal	of	the	two	bills.	After	pickets	outside	the	Governor’s	Manhattan	apartment	failed	to	sway	his	opinion	on	the	anticrime	package,	the	Ad	Hoc	Committee	organized	a	mass	rally	at	Speakers	Corner	to	publicly	denounce	the	new	legislation.	Speaking	to	the	crowd	of	300	gathered	at	125th	St.	and	7th	Ave.	on	March	7th,	William	Fitts	Ryan	described	the	legislation	as	“clearly	unconstitutional,”	while	State	Senator	Jerome	Wilson	declared	“a	man	must	be	free	to	walk	down	the	street	and	not	be	subject	to	arrest	and	detention	on	mere	suspicion.”	In	explaining	these	new	laws	to	the	crowd,	Attorney	Paul	Zuber	derisively	pointed	out,	“a	lot	of	us	folks	in	Harlem	thought	that	was	the	law	already	because	they’ve	been	doing	it	that	way	for	years.”175		The	most	impassioned	address	delivered	at	the	rally	came	from	Jesse	Gray,	who	channeled	the	frustrations	and	anger	of	the	poor	and	working-class	Black	and	Puerto	Rican	Harlem	residents	who	were	likely	to	be	the	most	deeply	impacted	by	expanded	police	power.	Furthermore,	that	these	bills	made	it	through	the	State	Legislature	that	winter	while	code-enforcement	bills	to	aid	Harlem	tenants	were	shot	down	was	a	particularly	egregious	offense	to	Gray.176	Charging	the	NYPD	with	
																																																								175	Martin	Arnold,	“NAACP	and	CORE	to	Fight	Bills	Increasing	Police	Powers,”	
New	York	Times,	February	29,	1964;	“Governor	Picketed	by	Foes	Of	Search	and	Seizure	Bills,”	New	York	Times,	March	2,	1964;	Douglas	Dales,	“Rockefeller	Signs	Bills	Increasing	Powers	Of	Police,”	New	York	Times,	March	4,	1964;	“NAACP	Pickets	Rocky,”	New	York	Amsterdam	News,	March	7,	1964.		 176	As	Roberta	Gold	notes,	“Most	code-enforcement	bills	introduced	in	Albany	that	winter	went	down	in	defeat.”	Gold,	When	Tenants	Claimed	The	City,	128.	
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being	“rotten,	corrupt,	and	degenerate,”	Gray	directed	much	of	his	fury	at	the	25	uniformed	officers	assigned	to	the	rally,	before	calling	for	the	creation	of	a	civilian	review	board	as	a	check	on	police	power	and	abuses	in	Harlem.177		Though	the	new	laws	to	expand	police	powers	had	passed	through	the	State	Legislature	with	relative	ease,	the	swift	organizational	responses	to	what	amounted	to	a	direct	attack	on	Black	and	Puerto	Rican	communities	ensured	that	such	legislation	would	not	be	implemented	in	New	York	City	without	a	fight.	In	the	weeks	and	months	before	the	new	laws	went	into	effect,	police	corruption,	brutality,	and	repression	would	become	the	most	pressing—and	explosive—issues	for	the	Black	Freedom	Struggle	in	Harlem.	
The	Decline	and	Impacts	of	the	Rent	Strike	Movement	While	school	boycotts	and	struggles	against	police	abuses	gained	traction	in	Harlem	that	February,	the	rent	strike	movement	began	to	lose	steam.	Jesse	Gray	and	the	CCH	continued	the	rent	strikes	throughout	the	spring,	but	as	the	weather	warmed	the	problems	of	heat	and	hot	water	became	less	acute	and	the	newspapers	began	to	lose	interest.	The	last	major	initiative	of	the	rent	strike	movement	came	in	early	March,	when	Gray	and	the	CCH	joined	a	coalition	of	civil	rights,	labor,	and	tenant	leaders,	including	James	Farmer,	Bayard	Rustin,	and	Dorothy	Height,	for	a	march	on	the	state	capitol	in	Albany.		Joining	forces	with	A.	Philip	Randolph’s	Committee	for	a	$1.50	Minimum	Wage	and	the	National	Association	for	Puerto	Rican	Civil	Rights,	the	coalition	charted	buses	from	New	York	City	to	demand	a	legislative	program	that	reflected																																																									177	“New	Police	Laws	Scored	At	Rally,”	New	York	Times,	March	8,	1964.	
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the	joint	economic	and	housing	concerns	of	many	of	New	York’s	Black	and	Puerto	Rican	residents.	These	demands	included:	the	establishment	of	a	$1.50	minimum	wage;	a	massive	construction	program	for	low-rent	public	housing;	passage	of	emergency	legislation	to	compel	proper	building	code	enforcement;	legislation	legalizing	rent	strikes;	and	substantial	state	aid	for	educational	equality	and	school	desegregation.178	Though	3,000	demonstrators	from	across	the	state	braved	snow	and	sleet	to	march	on	the	state	capitol,	the	Governor	was	largely	unmoved	by	the	protest	and	its	leaders	left	disappointed.	Speaking	at	a	rally	following	the	march,	CORE	leader	Norman	Hill	told	the	thousands	gathered	that	“only	if	we	light	fires	all	over	the	state,	only	if	we	disrupt	and	dislocate	in	a	creative	way,	will	we	get	what	we	want.”179		The	disappointment	of	the	March	on	Albany	served	as	an	inglorious	conclusion	of	the	rent	strike	movement’s	prominence	in	New	York	City	politics.	By	that	point,	as	Mark	Naison	notes,	“the	aura	of	the	cataclysmic	power	that	had	surrounded	the	rent	strike	in	its	early	days	had	largely	faded	away.”180	Several	factors	contributed	to	the	decline	of	the	movement’s	meteoric	run	in	New	York	City.	First,	despite	the	media	spotlight	and	strong	grassroots	support	Gray	and	the	CCH	had	garnered	for	the	rent	strikes,	the	movement	was	unable	to	win	the	active	
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support	of	other	civil	rights	and	community	organizations.	Though	the	fifteen	organizations	that	comprised	the	Rent	Strike	Coordinating	Committee	provided	some	funding,	publicity,	and	legal	assistance	for	the	movement,	the	bulk	of	the	extensive	organizing	work	needed	to	build	a	mass	movement	fell	upon	the	limited	staff	of	the	CCH	and	NSM.181	Such	lack	of	support	frustrated	Gray,	who	blamed	the	rent	strike	movement’s	failure	to	reach	his	projected	building	totals	on	a	lack	of	“adequate	support	from	local	civil	rights	organizations.”182		Even	when	the	local	branches	of	national	civil	rights	organizations,	most	notably	CORE,	were	actively	involved	in	organizing	the	rent	strike	movement,	they	received	scant	support	from	the	national	office.	Although	James	Farmer	had	advocated	for	rent	strikes	when	they	emerged	in	November,	the	national	CORE	leader	distanced	himself	from	the	strikes	completely	once	the	movement	became	identified	with	Jesse	Gray.	In	a	likely	attempt	to	create	separation	between	national	CORE	and	the	Communist	background	of	Gray,	Farmer	refused	to	make	any	public	comment	regarding	the	strikes	and	lent	little	if	any	institutional	support.183		
																																																								181	Ibid,	26.		 182	“Harlem	Rent	Strike	Seeks	‘Push’	From	Rights	Groups,”	Pittsburgh	Courier,	January	18,	1964.		 183	Naison,	“The	Rent	Strikes	in	New	York,”	26-27.	Like	Farmer,	NAACP	executive	secretary	Roy	Wilkins	essentially	shunned	the	rent	strike	movement.	Though	the	NY	branch	under	the	leadership	of	Rev.	Richard	Hildebrand	did	provide	some	legal	support	for	the	strike,	the	main	contributions	of	the	NY	branch	came	through	minor	donations	that	its	more	militant	Labor	and	Industry	Committee	contributed	from	fundraising	events.	For	documentation	on	the	Labor	and	Industry	Committee’s	involvement	with	the	rent	strikes,	see	James	Haughton	Papers,	Schomburg	Center	for	Research	in	Black	Culture.	
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With	such	meager	staffing,	financial	resources,	and	organizational	support,	the	CCH	lacked	the	institutional	strength	necessary	to	keep	up	with	the	rigors	of	tenant	organizing	while	concurrently	navigating	and	applying	pressure	upon	landlords	and	the	vast	network	of	city	and	state	agencies	involved	in	housing	policy.	Though	the	CCH	had	for	a	short	while	collaborated	with	larger	tenant	organizations	in	the	city,	including	the	Metropolitan	Council	on	Housing,	fundamental	differences	between	the	organizations’	visions	for	tenant	organizing	hampered	any	long-term	coalition.	While	Gray	and	the	CCH	were	attempting	to	“build	a	tenant	movement	that	is	trying	to	empower	itself,”	as	Gray’s	comrade	Jack	O’Dell	later	explained,	the	CCH	viewed	the	Met	Council	as	more	of	“a	social	service	thing.”184		Without	the	backing	of	such	tenant	or	civil	rights	organizations,	the	CCH	was	dependent	upon	a	small	office	staff,	a	handful	of	volunteer	attorneys,	and	its	network	of	building	leaders	to	wage	a	fight	against	powerful	public	entities	and	private	landlords.	While	organizers	were	busy	dealing	with	the	courts,	city	agencies,	and	politicians,	as	Naison	notes,	little	time	was	left	for	street	rallies,	leafleting,	and	organizing	buildings,	which	had	provided	the	genesis	for	the	movement	by	“shak[ing]	the	slum	population	out	of	its	apathy.”185	Even	when	the	CCH	scored	a	major	victory	with	the	Ribaudo	decision	that	December,	the	legal	procedure	established	by	the	ruling	was	“difficult	to	employ,	time	consuming,	and	involved	constant	attention	of	volunteer	or	unpaid	lawyers,”	thereby	limiting	its	impacts	for	a	
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cash	and	resource-strapped	grassroots	organization.186	Though	some	progress	had	been	made	by	March,	frustrations	largely	remained	over	slum	conditions	in	Harlem	as	City	Hall	had	made	only	minor	concessions	to	piecemeal,	rather	than	systemic	demands	for	housing	reform.		Though	scholars	have	aptly	pointed	out	how	the	rent	strike	movement	became	so	bogged	down	in	dealing	with	city	agencies	and	the	courts	that	the	CCH	more	closely	resembled	a	housing	clinic	than	a	radical	social	movement	by	the	spring	of	1964,	the	impacts	of	the	rent	strike	stretched	far	beyond	the	realm	of	housing.187	When	compared	to	Gray’s	professed	mission	of	forcing	a	mass	rehabilitation	of	Black	and	Puerto	Rican	communities	by	transferring	residential	buildings	from	private	to	public	ownership,	the	successes	of	the	strikes	in	forcing	housing	repairs,	rent	deductions,	and	new	legal	and	judicial	policies	must	be	considered	marginal	gains.	However,	while	falling	short	of	its	lofty	ambitions	for	housing	reform,	the	contributions	of	the	rent	strike	movement	to	the	Black	Freedom	Struggle	were	profound.	NSM	rent	strike	organizer	Danny	Schechter’s	appraisal	of	these	impacts	are	worth	quoting	at	length:	For	the	first	time,	[the	rent	strikes]	have	involved	deprived	slum	dwellers	in	a	movement	for	substantive	change.	They	have	also	expanded	the	political	consciousness	of	the	ghetto	community	and	channeled	frustrations	into	a	socially	effective	response.	By	involving	the	‘welfare	poor’	in	a	movement	for	change,	rent	strikes	have	given	thousands	new	dignity,	self-respect,	and	a	sense	of	empowerment…As	an	organizing	technique	the	rent	strikes	help	
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nurture	indigenous	leadership	and	build	organizations	that	can	get	involved	in	other	activities	(school	boycotts,	selective	patronage,	etc.).”188		By	the	spring	of	1964,	the	model	of	grassroots	organizing	that	Jesse	Gray	had	developed	over	more	than	a	decade	had	pushed	local	and	national	civil	rights	organizations	to	embrace	a	militant	grassroots	approach	to	building	Black	community	power	in	Harlem	and	beyond.	The	involvement	of	NYC	CORE	chapters	in	the	rent	strikes	marked	the	culmination	of	a	move	away	from	a	middle-class	integrationist	focus	and	toward	the	empowerment	of	poor	and	working-class	Black	communities.	“We	really	have	to	step	up	our	militancy,”	NY	CORE	rent	strike	coordinator	William	Reed	said	that	spring.	“We	have	to	step	it	up…in	organizing	the	Black	people	because	our	struggle	is	there	for	the	Black	people	in	the	community.”189		For	the	NSM,	participation	in	the	rent	strikes	prompted	a	major	shift	from	the	social	service	basis	of	the	earlier	tutorial	projects	to	the	transformative	possibilities	of	community	organizing.	“The	people	who	were	administering	the	tutorials	realized…there	would	be	change	only	if	the	community	organized	itself	to	create	change	of	its	own,”	national	NSM	staffer	Chuck	Turner	pointed	out	that	spring.	“We	started	looking	for	ways	the	people	in	the	community	could	be	brought	together.	In	New	York,	we	did	this	through	rent	strikes.”	Furthermore,	Turner	noted	that	the	rent	strikes	served	as	an	important	vehicle	for	political	education,	as	NSM																																																									188	Danny	Schechter,	News	Dissector:	Passions,	Pieces,	and	Polemics,	1960-
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was	able	to	“bring	people	together	with	different	problems	and	the	people	see	that	those	problems	are	interrelated.”190	For	both	CORE	and	the	NSM,	the	radical	grassroots	ethos	of	the	rent	strikes	would	serve	as	a	model	for	their	own	campaigns	for	Black	empowerment	and	self-determination	in	New	York	City	and	beyond.	And	this,	precisely,	was	the	fundamental	goal	of	Gray’s	tenant	organizing—to	organize	the	basis	for	a	revolutionary	grassroots	movement	for	Black	liberation	and	Black	power	in	the	nation’s	cities.	“People	ask	me	why	I	spend	all	my	time	on	heat	and	hot	water,”	Gray	explained	later	that	year,	“and	I	say	heat	and	hot	water	is	the	biggest	organizing	tool	we	have;	it	may	even	kick	off	the	revolution	in	the	ghetto.”191	In	early	March,	when	Malcolm	X	split	with	the	Nation	of	Islam	after	a	three-month	suspension,	the	revolutionary	groundswell	fostered	by	the	rent	strikes	began	to	coalesce	into	a	radical	grassroots	movement	center	in	Harlem.	
Jesse	Gray,	Malcolm	X,	and	the	Birth	of	a	National	Radical	Grassroots	
Movement	On	March	9th,	the	New	York	Times	broke	the	news	that	Malcolm	X	was	leaving	the	Nation	of	Islam.	In	the	months	since	Malcolm	made	his	infamous	remarks	about	the	Kennedy	assassination	as	a	case	of	“chickens	coming	home	to	roost,”	it	had	become	increasingly	clear	that	Elijah	Muhammad	had	no	intention	of	reinstating	his	top	minister.	Malcolm’s	national	celebrity	and	mounting	insistence	on	political	action,	alongside	his	knowledge	of	Muhammad’s	extramarital	affairs,	had	put	him	on																																																									190	Fred	Powledge,	“Rights	Activists	Expanding	Goals,”	New	York	Times,	March	28,	1964.		 191	“Jesse	Gray	Tells	Plans	In	New	York:	The	rent-strike	season	is	on,”	
National	Guardian,	November	11,	1964.	
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the	wrong	side	of	the	Nation’s	leadership	in	Chicago	and	made	his	departure	all	but	certain	that	winter.	In	an	interview	with	reporter	M.S.	Handler,	Malcolm	explained	that	he	could	no	longer	be	constrained	by	the	Nation’s	restrictions	on	political	action	and	engagement	with	the	Black	Freedom	Struggle.	“It	is	going	to	be	different	now,”	Malcolm	X	declared,	“I’m	going	to	join	in	the	fight	wherever	Negroes	ask	for	my	help,	and	I	suspect	my	activities	will	be	on	a	greater	scale	than	in	the	past.”	The	immediate	activities	that	Malcolm	had	planned	included	the	formation	of	a	“black	nationalist	party”	in	New	York	that	promoted	self-defense	and	emphasized	“black	nationalism	as	a	political	concept	and	form	of	social	action	against	oppressors.”192			 After	having	been	silenced	by	Muhammad	for	three	months,	Malcolm	X	had	much	to	say	and	Harlem	was	anxious	to	learn	of	his	plans.	At	a	press	conference	at	the	Park	Sheraton	Hotel	three	days	after	the	story	broke,	Malcolm	officially	announced	the	formation	of	his	new	organization,	Muslim	Mosque,	Inc.	While	the	MMI	was	a	religious	organization,	Malcolm	explained	that	the	group’s	political,	economic,	and	social	programs	would	encourage	the	active	participation	of	non-Muslim	Blacks.	As	an	organization	with	a	political,	economic,	social,	and	cultural	emphasis	on	“black	nationalism,”	the	MMI	was	designed	to	promote	indigenous	Black	leadership	in	the	service	of	achieving	self-determination	in	Black	communities.		While	speaking	to	the	long-range	plans	of	building	independent	Black	political	power,	Malcolm	also	asserted	the	right	to	self-defense	to	protect	Black	
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communities	in	the	meantime.	“In	areas	where	our	people	are	the	constant	victims	of	brutality,”	he	explained,	“we	should	form	rifle	clubs	that	can	be	used	to	defend	our	lives	and	our	property	in	times	of	emergency.”193	Taken	as	a	whole,	the	new	organization	that	Malcolm	explained	in	his	address	resembled	a	synthesis	of	the	major	trends	of	grassroots	Black	freedom	struggles	in	Harlem	over	the	past	decade.	By	extending	an	olive	branch	in	his	address	to	other	leaders	he	had	disparaged	in	the	past,	Malcolm	hoped	to	bring	together	the	array	of	individuals	and	organizations	involved	in	these	radical	struggles—locally	and	nationally—into	a	Black	united	front.	 Just	two	days	after	the	press	conference,	such	a	united	front	appeared	to	be	in	the	making	when	Malcolm	X	attended	a	conference	in	Chester,	PA	called	by	the	leaders	of	the	fledgling	organization	ACT.	Malcolm’s	introduction	to	the	leaders	of	the	national	grassroots	organization	came	through	an	interesting	convergence	of	local	strands	of	the	national	Black	Freedom	Struggle	with	Harlem	as	a	fulcrum.	Malcolm	was	invited	to	join	the	organization	by	Gloria	Richardson,	leader	of	the	Cambridge	Nonviolent	Action	Committee,	who	first	met	Malcolm	X	in	Detroit	after	he	delivered	his	landmark	“Message	to	the	Grass	Roots”	address	the	previous	fall.194	Malcolm	X,	in	turn,	was	highly	impressed	by	the	militant	armed	struggle	that	Richardson	and	the	SNCC-affiliated	CNAC	had	been	waging	for	over	two	years	in	the	coastal	Maryland	town.	Stanley	Branche,	ACT	member	and	chairman	of	the	Chester	
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Committee	For	Freedom	Now,	had	also	been	impressed	by	the	Cambridge	Movement,	and	had	spent	time	there	supporting	the	struggle.	Providing	an	introduction	between	Malcolm	X	and	fellow	ACT	member	Jesse	Gray	was	Bill	Strickland,	national	director	of	the	NSM,	who	had	grown	up	around	Malcolm	in	Roxbury	and	knew	Gray	through	their	active	cooperation	in	the	rent	strike	movement.195	To	bring	things	full	circle,	Gray	had	called	Richardson	shortly	after	an	armed	confrontation	broke	out	in	Cambridge	and	she	then	became	involved	in	the	rent	strike	movement	that	spring	after	moving	to	New	York	City.196	Through	these	connections,	the	groundwork	was	laid	for	a	dynamic	national	network	of	radical	grassroots	leaders	beyond	the	South.	The	impetus	for	the	March	14th	meeting	in	Chester	was	to	evaluate	the	national	school	boycotts	the	collective	had	coordinated	the	month	prior,	the	most	notable	being	the	one	led	by	Milton	Galamison	in	New	York	City.	Joining	Stanley	Branche	in	his	hometown	just	south	of	Philadelphia	were	60	representatives	from	various	northern	organizations,	including	Lawrence	Landry,	Gloria	Richardson,	Malcolm	X,	Nahaz	Rogers,	and	Dick	Gregory.	As	the	Chicago	Defender	reported,	it	was	there	in	Chester	that	a	“third	force”	in	the	Black	Freedom	Struggle	was	formed,	“composed	of	the	most	militant	leaders	in	the	Negro	Revolution.”197		
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Landry,	who	was	elected	chairman	of	ACT	at	the	conference,	explained	that	“the	sole	qualification	for	membership”	in	the	new	organization	was	that	“one	must	act	or	utilize	direct	action	to	resolve	civil	rights	disputes.”198	The	purpose	for	the	formation	of	this	coalition	was	to	provide	a	national	network	of	active	support	between	local	struggles	for	Black	rights	and	power.	In	many	ways,	this	loose	federation	was	organized	as	a	direct	response	to	one	of	the	problems	that	limited	the	successes	of	the	rent	strike	movement—the	abandonment	of	militant	local	struggles	by	national	civil	rights	organizations.	“The	national	organizations,	you	know,	they	were	just	nothing,”	Gloria	Richardson	Dandridge	recalls,	“so	five	or	six	of	us	decided	we	were	going	to	carry	on,	right	or	wrong,	the	way	we	thought,	and	that's	what	ACT	came	out	of.”199	Coming	out	of	this	meeting,	ACT	resolved	to	establish	an	“all-for-one	and	one-for-all	type	of	national	support”	to	the	otherwise	independent	local	struggles	being	waged	in	Black	communities	throughout	the	North	and	Midwest.	The	Chester	conference	was	held	just	two	days	before	a	second	school	boycott	organized	by	Milton	Galamison	in	New	York	City,	which	would	provide	the	fledgling	organization’s	first	test.	After	the	major	civil	rights	supporters	of	the	February	boycott,	including	the	NAACP,	CORE,	Urban	League,	and	the	National	Association	for	Puerto	Rican	Rights,	all	shunned	its	second	iteration,	ACT	took	the	lead	in	coordinating	and	drumming	up	support	for	the	protest.	Calling	the	desertion	
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of	the	mainstream	civil	rights	organizations	an	act	of	“sabotage,”	Galamison	declared	on	the	eve	of	the	boycott	that	“the	people	have	been	failed	by	some	of	their	leaders.”		While	the	mainstream	leadership	faltered,	however,	grassroots	leadership	in	Harlem	helped	take	the	reigns.	The	day	before	the	boycott,	Jesse	Gray	called	a	mass	rally	at	the	Milbank	Center	with	Malcolm	X	to	encourage	their	large	collective	base	to	support	the	school	boycotts.	Exercising	his	newfound	freedom	to	engage	in	organized	direct	action,	Malcolm	explained	to	the	crowd	the	he	was	“aligned	with	everyone	who	will	take	some	action	to	end	this	criminal	situation	in	the	schools.	I	don’t	care	what	kind	of	action	it	is.”200	The	following	day,	Malcolm	X,	Jesse	Gray,	Lawrence	Landry,	Stanley	Branche,	and	Adam	Clayton	Powell,	Jr.	were	all	on	site	at	Galamison’s	Siloam	Presbyterian	Church	in	Brooklyn	to	coordinate	protest	actions	the	day	of	the	boycott.	In	spite	of	its	abandonment	by	mainstream	civil	rights	leadership,	the	school	boycott	succeeded	in	organizing	nearly	275,000	students	to	stay	out	of	school,	including	50%	of	students	in	predominantly	Black	and	Puerto	Rican	communities	and	92%	of	students	in	Harlem.201	Though	an	impressive	total,	this	number	represented	only	half	of	those	students	citywide	who	had	stayed	out	during	the	first	boycott.	While	the	president	of	the	Board	of	Education	took	this	as	a	sign	that	school	boycotts	were	“regarded	with	markedly	diminishing	favor,”	Galamison	described	
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the	protest	as	“formidable”	and	threatened	to	takeover	the	Board	of	Education	building	the	next	time	if	their	demands	weren’t	met.202		More	significantly,	however,	ACT’s	success	in	supporting	a	major	protest	campaign	in	opposition	to	the	civil	rights	mainstream	signaled	to	the	organization’s	leaders	that	a	long-awaited	shift	had	finally	taken	place	in	the	national	movement.	“This	day	marks	the	end	of	the	big-name	civil	rights	leaders,”	Powell	declared,	“they	boycotted	us	today,	and	we’re	going	to	boycott	them	tomorrow.”203	Riding	the	wave	of	the	boycott,	Gray	predicted	that	these	leaders	would	eventually	fall	in	line	with	their	grassroots	insurgency,	“because	we	are	organizing	the	people	below	the	top	leaders,	and	when	the	people	from	down	below	are	organized,	those	on	top	will	get	with	it.”	With	such	a	groundswell	pushing	the	national	organizations	to	embrace	more	militant	action,	Gray	predicted	that	their	leaders	would	“either	join	the	bandwagon	or	it	will	roll	over	them.”204	The	school	boycott	created	a	showdown	between	national	civil	rights	organizations	and	the	groundswell	of	militant	grassroots	organizations	in	New	York	City	that	were	now	part	of	their	own	national	coalition.	With	several	CORE	chapters,	including	Brooklyn	and	newly-formed	East	River	CORE	openly	defying	the	national	
																																																								202	Leonard	Buder,	“School	Boycott	Is	Half	As	Large	As	The	First	One,”	New	
York	Times,	March	17,	1964.		 203	“Boycott:	Split	Down	Middle—In	Leadership	and	Support,”	Pittsburgh	
Courier,	March	21,	1964.		 204	Martin	Arnold,	“Galamison	Sees	Boycott	Success,”	New	York	Times,	March	16,	1964.	
		476	
organization	by	joining	the	protest,	the	boycott	revealed	that	the	winds	were	changing	in	New	York’s	Black	Freedom	Struggle.		
The	Struggle	for	Police	Reform	and	the	Emergence	of	a	Radical	Grassroots	
Movement	Center	In	the	wake	of	the	school	boycott,	Gray	returned	to	the	lingering	rent	strike	movement	and	swelling	struggles	against	police	brutality	with	the	added	support	of	Malcolm	X	and	a	national	network	of	militant	leaders	ready	to	aid	in	the	struggle.	While	the	rent	strikes	waned,	the	organizing	efforts	of	its	primary	leadership,	the	CCH	and	NSM,	began	to	show	an	embrace	of	what	Bayard	Rustin	described	that	winter	as	“the	package	deal.”205	Reflecting	a	collective	analysis	that	racial	inequality	in	housing,	education,	employment,	and	policing	were	all	interrelated	within	a	larger	system	of	racial	oppression,	Harlem	organizers	in	the	spring	of	1964	moved	away	from	single-issue	organizing	in	an	effort	to	coordinate	a	collective	attack	on	systemic	racism	in	New	York	City.		Consequently,	such	a	systemic	analysis	revealed	the	insufficiency	of	the	popularly	accepted	lexicon	and	strategies	that	previously	characterized	the	Black	Freedom	Struggle	in	Harlem.	“It	is	becoming	increasingly	evident	that	‘civil	rights’	is	no	longer	either	an	adequate	term	or	an	accurate	description	of	the	quest	for	full	freedom	which	is	now	challenging	our	society,”	Bill	Strickland	asserted.	“It	is	also	evident	that	an	institutionalized	system	of	disadvantage	provokes	just	as	dangerous	a	reaction	in	the	overcrowded	and	under-resourced	northern	ghetto	as	it	does	in	the	
																																																								205	Bayard	Rustin,	“From	Protest	To	Politics:	The	Future	Of	The	Civil	Rights	Movement,”	Commentary	39,	no.	2	(February	1965).	
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more	publicized	and	tragic	South.”206	Through	their	active	struggles	over	the	past	months	and	years,	local	people	in	Harlem	had	reached	similar	conclusions,	and	by	the	spring	of	1964,	they	set	their	sights	on	the	most	visible	indicator	of	this	systemic	racial	oppression—the	police.	Throughout	the	months	of	March	and	April,	Malcolm	X	and	Jesse	Gray	appeared	together	at	a	number	of	mass	meetings	and	rallies	to	organize	resistance	to	police	brutality	and	repression	as	part	of	a	broader	effort	to	build	a	radical	grassroots	movement	center	in	Harlem.	At	a	series	of	rallies	in	Harlem	in	the	days	following	Police	Commissioner	Murphy’s	target	attack	upon	Gray,	Malcolm	X,	and	Herbert	Callendar	in	March,	the	leaders	redoubled	their	demands	for	the	Commissioner’s	ouster,	asserted	the	rights	of	Black	communities	to	defend	themselves,	and	demanded	the	creation	of	a	civilian	review	board.		At	the	same	time,	Gray	and	Malcolm	X	were	couching	their	campaign	against	police	brutality	and	repression	within	a	broader	analysis	of	Black	liberation	and	self-determination.	At	a	rent	strike	rally	at	the	Milbank	Center	on	March	22nd,	Gray	issued	demands	for	Murphy’s	dismissal	alongside	a	call	for	all	Harlem	residents	to	stop	paying	rent	“until	we	get	better	education	for	our	children.”	Gray	also	denounced	Governor	Rockefeller	for	not	supporting	the	$1.50	minimum	wage	demanded	by	the	March	on	Albany	weeks	earlier.	In	his	address,	Malcolm	affirmed	his	support	for	Gray’s	demands	while	re-asserting	the	rights	of	Black	communities	to	practice	self-defense	when	the	government	proved	unable	or	unwilling	to	protect	
																																																								206	“Speech	given	by	NSM	Executive	Director—William	Strickland	at	a	College	Conference	at	Columbia,	October	25,	1963,”	Box	76,	Meier	Papers.		
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their	interests.	“I	am	indicting	the	government	for	not	defending	us,”	Malcolm	proclaimed,	“if	the	government	can’t	do	it	then	let	us	do	it	ourselves.”	Malcolm	hardly	needed	to	make	any	specific	reference	to	the	recent	police	legislation	and	uptick	in	police	brutality	and	repression	for	the	250	Harlem	residents	in	attendance	to	understand	the	premise	of	his	comments.207	That	same	night,	Malcolm	X	held	a	mass	rally	at	the	Rockland	Palace	at	115th	Street	and	8th	Ave	to	protest	the	Southern	filibuster	of	the	pending	Civil	Rights	Act.	At	the	outset	of	the	rally,	Malcolm	introduced	Jesse	Gray	and	Rev.	Nelson	C.	Dukes	of	the	Fountain	Springs	Baptist	Church	as	“strong	Black	Nationalists,”	and	promised	to	hold	rallies	every	Sunday	night.	In	the	course	of	this	speech,	which	many	described	as	among	the	best	he	ever	gave,	Malcolm	laid	the	ideological	groundwork	for	his	nascent	nationalist	movement.208	In	this	resounding	address,	Malcolm	X	urged	the	nearly	22	million	“so-called	Negroes”	across	the	country	to	join	any	Black	Nationalist	organization	that	taught	people	to	“take	over	their	own	communities,	politically	and	economically.”209	It	was	here	that	Malcolm	also	elucidated	what	would	become	one	of	his	most	iconic	political	analyses—the	ballot	or	the	bullet.	“We	had	3,000	people	at	that	rally,”	Malcolm	told	reporters	afterward,	“and	they	all	
																																																								207	George	Todd,	“Malcolm	X	Explains	His	Rifle	Statement,”	New	York	
Amsterdam	News,	March	28,	1964.		 208	George	Breitman,	Malcolm	X	Speaks,	23.	As	Breitman	notes,	the	central	tenets	of	the	speech	Malcolm	gave	at	this	rally,	along	with	three	others	held	that	month,	provided	the	basis	for	an	early	April	talk	in	Cleveland,	titled	“The	Ballot	Or	The	Bullet,”	which	is	remembered	as	one	of	his	most	iconic	public	addresses.		209	Edward	Murrain,	“Angry	At	Filibuster	in	Senate:	Malcolm	X	Launches	Drive	‘Boycott	Democratic	Party,”	Pittsburgh	Courier,	March	28,	1964.	
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supported	my	call	for	ballots	or	bullets,	as	the	only	way	of	emphasizing	to	the	government	that	we	mean	business.”210	Though	Malcolm	had	coupled	his	call	for	“ballots	or	bullets”	with	plans	for	a	massive	voter	registration	drive	in	the	urban	North	“to	determine	who	will	sit	in	the	White	House,	and	who	will	sit	in	the	dog	house,”	the	true	significance	of	“ballots	or	bullets”	stretched	beyond	the	confines	of	electoral	politics.	Malcolm	presented	the	looming	threat	of	armed	insurrection	in	the	United	States	as	a	logical	consequence	of	the	continued	resistance	of	an	oppressive	government	that	refused	to	concede	the	demands	of	22	million	Black	Americans	for	human	rights.		Though	Malcolm	located	this	analysis	within	national	and	global	contexts,	it	was	particularly	well-received	in	Harlem	in	light	of	the	city’s	repressive	responses	to	the	recent	rent	strikes,	school	boycotts,	and	protests	at	construction	sites.	For	over	a	decade,	grassroots	activists	had	grown	dangerously	disillusioned	with	the	repressive	limitations	of	racial	liberalism	in	New	York	City	amidst	rising	demands	for	self-determination	and	Black	power.	To	Malcolm	X,	it	was	this	collective	disillusionment	that	made	“ballots	or	bullets”	an	inevitable	conclusion	in	Harlem	and	beyond.	After	several	more	weeks	of	mass	rallies	and	direct	action	protests	against	police	brutality,	corruption,	and	repression,	which	drew	the	cooperation	of	a	cross-section	of	civil	rights,	religious,	labor,	and	community	organizations,	these	issues	came	to	a	head	in	Harlem	on	April	17th.	That	afternoon,	police	stormed	onto	Lenox	Avenue	between	128th	and	129th	Street	where	a	group	of	children	had	been																																																									210	Ibid.	
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throwing	fruit	from	an	upturned	stand	at	each	other.	As	the	four	patrolman	chased	after	the	children,	they	were	met	with	jeers	from	the	crowd	that	had	begun	to	gather,	prompting	the	officers	to	call	for	reinforcements.	The	backups	soon	flooded	the	block,	swinging	their	clubs	indiscriminately	and	drawing	their	guns	upon	people	on	the	sidewalks	and	on	the	rooftops	of	overlooking	buildings.		In	the	bedlam,	police	mauled	and	arrested	a	group	of	three	teenagers	and	two	adults	who	had	dared	to	intervene,	or	even	question,	the	callous	beatings	of	Black	children.	Of	those	beaten	and	arrested	was	Frank	Stafford,	a	31-year-old	father	and	salesman	in	Harlem,	who	had	asked	why	two	officers	were	beating	a	child.	The	beatings	continued	inside	the	28th	Precinct,	where	for	hours	35	officers	brutally	beat	the	five	who	remained	in	handcuffs.	As	a	result	of	these	beatings,	which	the	officers	carried	out	while	calling	the	men	“niggers,	dogs,	animals,”	Stafford	spent	over	a	month	in	the	hospital	and	lost	his	right	eye.211	To	literally	add	insult	to	injury,	Stafford	and	the	others	were	charged	with	assaulting	the	police	officers,	among	other	charges.	In	addition	to	being	callous,	this	brutal	police	treatment	was	also	partially	calculated.	The	arrests	of	Daniel	Hamm	and	Wallace	Baker,	James	Baldwin	explained	in	a	1966	report	on	the	case,	were	in	retaliation	for	an	earlier	run-in	with	the	police,	when	the	two	teenagers	stood	their	ground	against	a	group	of	officers	who	tried	to	unlawfully	search	and	detain	them.	“Their	exhibition	of	the	spirit	of	’76	marked	
																																																								211	Themis	Chronopoulos,	“Police	Misconduct,	Community	Opposition,	and	Urban	Governance	in	New	York	City,	1945-1965,”	Journal	of	Urban	History	1,	no.	26	(April	2015):	16;	James	Baldwin,	“A	Report	From	Occupied	Territory,”	The	Nation,	July	11,	1966.	
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them	as	dangerous,”	Baldwin	wrote	of	the	precarious	position	the	teenagers	were	placed	in	because	they	had	asserted	their	rights	in	the	face	of	the	type	of	oppressive	policing	that	was	set	to	become	legally	sanctioned	in	July.	The	retribution	escalated	ten	days	later,	when	Hamm,	Baker,	and	four	other	teenagers	beaten	by	police	during	the	so-called	“Fruit	Stand	Riot,”	were	arrested	for	the	murder	of	a	white	storeowner	in	Harlem—an	act	they	almost	certainly	had	nothing	to	do	with.212		The	first-degree	murder	charges	brought	against	the	group	of	teenagers,	who	came	to	be	known	as	The	Harlem	Six,	were	severe,	and	at	that	time,	meant	the	possibility	of	death	in	the	electric	chair.	Again,	the	teenagers	were	brutally	beaten	by	police	while	in	custody,	in	an	apparent	attempt	to	coerce	confessions	for	a	crime	that	there	was	no	real	evidence	they	had	committed.	In	the	court	of	public	opinion,	such	brutality	and	blatant	suppression	of	civil	rights	experienced	by	these	teenagers	was	evidence	that	Harlem	was	suffering	under	the	rule	of	an	occupying	force.	“It	is	axiomatic,	in	occupied	territory,”	Baldwin	contended,	“that	any	act	of	resistance,	even	though	it	be	executed	by	a	child,	be	answered	at	once,	and	with	the	full	weight	of	the	occupying	forces.”		With	swelling	opposition	to	police	power	in	Harlem	as	a	backdrop,	the	brutality	of	the	“Fruit	Stand	Riot”	and	the	persecution	of	The	Harlem	Six	fueled	opposition	to	police	power	in	Harlem	and	spurred	a	wave	of	organized	action	to	check	police	abuses	and	reform	the	department.	The	mothers	of	The	Harlem	Six	quickly	organized	a	committee	to	fight	what	many	saw	as	an	attempt	at	the	legal	
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lynching	of	their	sons.	“We	mothers	stopped	feeling	sorry	for	ourselves	when	we	saw	that	our	children	were	being	railroaded,”	Mildred	Thomas	wrote.	“We	decided	to	join	together	and	fight	back,	even	though	none	of	the	rich	organizations	came	to	their	aid	or	defense.”213	Though	mainstream	civil	rights	organizations	were	unwilling	to	put	their	reputations	on	the	line	for	a	seemingly	unwinnable	murder	case,	the	Mothers’	Defense	Committee	enlisted	the	support	of	radical	civil	rights	attorneys	William	Kunstler	and	Conrad	Lynn,	who	had	been	actively	involved	in	the	legal	efforts	to	aid	the	Monroe	Defendants	over	the	past	three	years.		The	Mother’s	Defense	Committee	also	drew	the	support	of	Mae	Mallory,	who	had	recently	returned	to	Harlem.	After	a	nearly	three-year	legal	battle	against	the	kidnapping	charges	she	faced	in	Monroe,	NC,	Mallory	had	been	convicted	in	late	February	and	sentenced	to	16-20	years	in	prison.214	With	bond	having	been	posted	by	the	Monroe	Defense	Committee	pending	an	appeal,215	Mallory	returned	to	Harlem	and	resumed	organizing	in	the	community.	Just	days	after	being	released	from	a	Monroe	jail,	Mallory	shared	the	stage	with	Malcolm	X	at	an	evening	forum	at	the	Audubon	Ballroom.	During	this	homecoming	of	sorts,	attended	by	a	crowd	of	500,	Malcolm	cited	the	type	of	rampant	racist	violence	throughout	the	country	that	Mallory	had	fought	against	as	evidence	in	accusing	the	United	States	government	of																																																									213	Mildred	Thomas,	“Harlem	Mothers	Organize	to	Save	Their	Sons,”	Liberator	4,	no.	8	(August	1964):	10.		 214	“Mae	Mallory,	Monroe	N.C.	Four	To	Appeal	Lengthy	Jail	Sentences,”	
Philadelphia	Tribune,	March	3,	1964.	For	more	on	Mallory	and	the	Monroe	Defendants,	see	Chapter	Five.		 215	“Release	N.C.	Kidnap	Prisoners	On	Bail,”	Chicago	Defender,	March	23,	1964.	
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genocide.	Echoing	Mallory’s	own	analysis	of	systemic	racism	cultivated	during	her	years	of	organizing	in	Harlem,	Malcolm	insisted	that	the	Black	Freedom	Struggle	now	needed	to	shift	its	demands	from	“civil	rights”	to	“human	rights.”216	Although	Mallory	kept	a	low	profile	following	this	forum,	she	played	an	active,	if	quiet,	role	in	supporting	the	Mother’s	Defense	Committee.217	In	the	following	months,	Mallory	would	continue	her	fight	for	The	Harlem	Six	with	her	Organization	of	Militant	Black	Women	as	part	of	a	radical,	multi-issue	platform	“to	be	free	by	any	means	necessary.”218	While	mainstream	civil	rights	leadership	had	abandoned	The	Harlem	Six	in	their	legal	defense,	the	gross	brutality	of	the	police	melee	during	the	“Fruit	Stand	
																																																								216	Manning	Marable,	Malcolm	X:	A	Life	of	Reinvention	(New	York:	Viking,	2011),	305.			 217	Though	scant	documentation	exists	regarding	Mallory’s	involvement,	her	personal	archives	located	at	the	Walter	P.	Reuther	Library	at	Wayne	State	University	include	literature	on	the	case	of	The	Harlem	Six.	Additionally,	the	very	name	of	the	Mother’s	Defense	Committee	bears	an	unmistakable	likeness	to	the	Monroe	Defense	Committee,	in	which	Mallory	played	a	formative	role.	Lastly,	the	rhetoric	and	analysis	presented	in	a	letter	written	by	one	of	the	mother’s	of	the	Harlem	Six,	Mildred	Thomas,	and	published	in	the	Liberator,	is	suggestive	of	Mallory’s	involvement	in	coordinating	the	mothers’	opposition.	“We	mothers	stopped	feeling	sorry	for	ourselves	when	we	saw	that	our	children	were	being	railroaded.	We	
decided	to	join	together	and	fight	back,	even	though	none	of	the	rich	organizations	
came	to	their	aid	or	defense.	We	knew	that	if	we	were	to	save	our	children	that	we	had	to	go	out	and	work	at	it.	We	formed	the	Mothers’	Defense	Committee	and	began	telling	our	side	of	the	story.	We	want	to	tell	our	side	of	the	story	about	the	frame-up	
of	our	children	and	the	slander	that	is	being	committed	against	our	community	[emphasis	added].”	Mildred	Thomas,	“Harlem	Mothers	Organize	to	Save	Their	Sons,”	
Liberator	4,	no.	8	(August	1964):	10.	It	is	also	worth	noting	that	Conrad	Lynn,	who	was	actively	involved	in	the	legal	efforts	to	aid	the	Monroe	Defendants,	served	as	legal	counsel	to	the	Harlem	Six,	along	with	William	Kunstler.		218	Letter	from	Mae	Mallory	to	Sister,	September	1964,	Box	2,	Folder	20,	Mae	Mallory	Papers,	Walter	P.	Reuther	Library,	Wayne	State	University.	
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Riot”	spurred	local	and	national	organizations	to	greater	action	in	the	fight	for	police	reform	in	New	York.	This	outrage	was	only	compounded	the	following	week	when	police	“pulled	out	all	stops”	against	CORE-led	protests	to	block	vehicular	and	subway	traffic	to	the	opening	of	the	World’s	Fair	in	Flushing,	Queens.	219	In	a	telegram	sent	to	Mayor	Wagner	earlier	that	month,	Brooklyn	CORE	had	threatened	a	“stall-in”	on	the	bridges	and	subways	leading	to	Queens	unless	the	Mayor	developed	and	implemented	a	plan	to	“end	police	brutality,	abolish	slum	housing,	integrate	the	construction	and	brewery	industries,	and	provide	integrated,	quality	education	for	all.”	Citing	the	recent	arrest	of	Jesse	Gray	and	Police	Commissioner	Murphy’s	targeted	attacks	on	radical	Black	leaders,	the	telegram	pointed	out	the	contradictions	of	City	Hall’s	active	persecution	of	civil	rights	demonstrators	while	perpetrators	of	discrimination	were	treated	with	kid	gloves.220	As	if	to	prove	this	point,	the	Mayor	ignored	CORE’s	demands	and	the	NYPD	arrested	dozens	of	motorists	on	the	bridges	leading	to	Queens,	while	giving	“merciless	beatings”	to	even	more	during	protests	in	the	subways.221	The	Fair	became	a	symbol	of	the	contradictions	of	white	opulence	in	the	face	of	Black	oppression	that	spring,	particularly	as	the	city	claimed	economic	hardship	when	it	came	to	exercising	its	receivership	law,	yet	managed	to	extend	a	$40	million	loan	to	the	World’s	Fair	Corporation	which	would	provide	few	lasting	economic	
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benefits.	As	James	Farmer	pointed	out	in	a	stern	rebuke	of	the	City’s	Real	Estate	Commissioner,	who	had	earlier	argued	that	the	receivership	law	was	fiscally	irresponsible,	the	cost	of	removing	violations	from	1,000	buildings	at	$20,000	per	building	would	have	been	$20	million—half	of	the	amount	provided	to	the	World’s	Fair	and	a	fraction	of	a	percent	of	the	city’s	budget.222	In	a	press	release	on	the	opening	day	of	the	Fair,	Jesse	Gray	charged	the	Mayor	“with	practicing	a	double	standard	of	justice	against	Negroes”	for	his	swift	recriminations	meted	out	against	protestors	involved	in	the	stall-in.	Gray	argued	that	the	same	laws	that	the	city	used	to	prosecute	the	stall-in	protestors,	which	prohibited	“acts	injurious	to	the	public	health,	or	the	commission	of	a	public	nuisance,”	should	have	instead	been	used	to	arrest	slumlords	and	brutal	police	officers.223		The	following	month,	ACT	would	also	utilize	the	platform	of	the	World’s	Fair	to	call	attention	to	these	same	contradictions	through	a	public	exposé	of	the	socio-economic	conditions	that	existed	in	Harlem	compared	to	the	lavish	Fair	taking	place	across	the	Triborough	Bridge.	Sardonically	advertising	their	walking	tours	of	Harlem	as	the	“World’s	Worst	Fair,”	Gray,	Gregory,	Richardson,	and	Branche—with	the	support	of	James	Baldwin,	Abbey	Lincoln,	Max	Roach,	and	A.	Philip	Randolph—emphatically	declared,	“We	Don’t	Need	a	World’s	Fair,	We	Need	a	Fair	World!”224	
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Resistance	and	Repression:	The	Struggle	for	a	Civilian	Review	Board	
	 By	May,	the	contradictions	between	the	rhetoric	of	racial	liberalism	and	the	brutal	realities	of	racial	oppression	in	Harlem	had	become	too	clear	to	ignore.	The	uptick	in	police	brutality	and	repression	that	spring	had	tipped	the	hand	of	City	Hall	and	demonstrated	to	Harlem	residents	the	two	sides	of	the	Wagner	Administration’s	liberal	governance.	As	James	Baldwin	pointed	out	in	his	later	report	on	the	“Fruit	Stand	Riot,”	the	seemingly	endless	and	escalating	atrocities	committed	against	Harlem	residents	under	a	liberal	democratic	administration	had	put	people	“in	the	impossible	position	of	being	unable	to	believe	a	word	one’s	countrymen	say.”225	Fueled	by	oppression	and	channeled	by	radical	grassroots	organizers,	this	analysis	led	many	Harlem	residents	to	challenge	the	very	legitimacy	of	the	city’s	government	and	to	search	for	alternative	means	of	achieving	redress	for	their	grievances.			Community	campaigns	against	police	brutality	found	a	central	rallying	point	that	month,	when	formal	debate	began	on	a	bill	introduced	by	City	Councilman	Theodore	Weiss	to	create	a	civilian	review	board.	If	signed	into	law,	the	Weiss	Bill	would	have	established	a	police	review	board,	comprised	entirely	of	civilians,	to	investigate	allegations	of	police	brutality	and	misconduct	and	recommend	punishments.	The	bill	was	designed	to	replace	the	existing	civilian	complaint	review	board,	an	internal	body	of	the	NYPD	in	operation	since	1953,	which	simply	reviewed	
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reports	from	commanding	officers	and	recommended	actions	to	the	Police	Commissioner	on	the	basis	of	the	reports	they	received.226		The	Weiss	Bill	was	a	direct	response	from	a	“reform	Democrat”	to	the	rising	demands	of	Black	leaders	throughout	the	city	that	spring	for	police	oversight	and	an	independent	review	board.	In	their	demands	for	such	police	reform,	local	and	national	leaders	alike	made	it	clear	to	the	Wagner	Administration	that	much	was	riding	on	this	particular	issue.	In	a	meeting	with	Michael	Murphy	at	the	end	of	April,	James	Farmer	warned	the	Police	Commissioner	that	he	was	“concerned	about	the	summer,	and	that	one	of	the	key	issues	will	be	police	brutality.”227	For	the	remainder	of	the	spring,	police	reform	and	the	civilian	review	board	became	the	central	issue	for	the	city’s	major	civil	rights	organizations	and	generated	wide	support	throughout	Harlem.	In	early	May,	the	Ad	Hoc	Committee	For	Fair	Police	Practice	expanded	its	program	to	repeal	the	“no-knock”	and	“stop-and-frisk”	laws—which	would	go	into	effect	July	1st—to	include	demands	for	the	passage	of	the	Weiss	Bill.		 In	an	attempt	to	coerce	support	for	the	bill	in	the	City	Council,	the	Ad	Hoc	Committee	established	an	independent	community	review	board	that	would	serve	as	a	model	and	hear	complaints	of	police	brutality	submitted	to	CORE.	The	board	was	comprised	of	ten	representatives	of	various	community,	religious,	labor,	and	civil	rights	organizations,	including	Farmer,	ACLU	founder	Roger	Baldwin,	former																																																									226	James	R.	Hudson,	“Police	Review	Boards	and	Police	Accountability,”	Law	
and	Contemporary	Problems	36,	no.4	(1971):	523. 	 227	Fred	Powledge,	“Farmer	and	Murphy	Discuss	Complaints	Board,”	New	
York	Times,	April	28,	1964.	
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judge	and	educational	activist	Hubert	Delany,	and	NSM	national	director	Bill	Strickland.228	After	hearing	several	cases	of	police	brutality	during	a	simulated	courtroom	session	in	early	June,	the	community	review	board	ruled	“the	time	has	come	for	the	Police	Department	to	cease	being	its	own	prosecutor,	its	own	judge	and	its	own	jury.”229	Coupled	with	a	series	of	direct	action	protests	at	City	Hall	and	police	headquarters	that	month	to	demand	the	passage	of	the	Weiss	Bill,	these	proceedings	demonstrated	to	Harlem	residents	what	a	more	just	system	of	police	oversight	could	look	like	and	spurred	greater	involvement	in	protest	action.	At	the	same	time	this	cross-section	of	Harlem	organizations	were	fighting	for	police	reform	through	the	Ad	Hoc	Committee,	Malcolm	X	was	working	to	build	a	revolutionary	movement	with	a	campaign	against	police	brutality	as	its	opening	salvo.	After	returning	to	Harlem	from	his	hajj	to	Mecca,	which	lasted	from	April	13th	through	May	21st,	Malcolm	began	meeting	in	secretive	sessions	with	a	close-knit	group	of	intellectuals	and	activists	to	develop	a	new	organization.	In	a	motel	at	153rd	Street	and	8th	Avenue,	Malcolm	met	with	Lynn	Shifflet,	John	Henrik	Clarke,	Peter	Bailey,	John	O.	Killens,	Muriel	Gray,	and	members	of	the	MMI	to	develop	ideological	positions	and	programs	in	response	to	crucial	areas	of	concern	in	the	community,	including	policing,	housing,	education,	and	self-defense.230		
																																																								228	Thomas	Buckley,	“Unofficial	Citizen	Panel	to	Study	Accusations	of	Police	Brutality,”	New	York	Times,	May	23,	1964.		 229	Martin	Gansberg,	“CORE	Sets	Up	Panel	to	Hear	Police	Charged	With	Brutality,”	New	York	Times,	June	5,	1964.		230	William	W.	Sales,	Jr.	From	Civil	Rights	to	Black	Liberation:	Malcolm	X	and	
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While	working	out	a	long-range	program	of	Pan-African	revolutionary	nationalism,	the	initial	meetings	of	the	fledgling	organization	emphasized	the	need	“to	find	the	one	issue,	housing,	jobs,	police	brutality—whatever	it	may	be,	that	the	community	is	concerned	with	most	and	wage	a	resolute	struggle	around	it	in	order	to	galvanize	the	masses.”231	By	early	June,	this	impressive	collective	of	veteran	thinkers	and	organizers	in	Harlem	had	concluded	that	“immediate	action	is	necessary	in	Harlem.	The	‘No	Knock’	law	and	police	brutality	are	prime	issues.”	As	the	group	worked	through	its	program	that	spring,	it	attracted	the	following	of	other	local	radical	intellectuals	and	organizers,	including	Jesse	Gray,	Jack	O’Dell,	Gloria	Richardson	Dandridge,	Bill	Epton,	Conrad	Lynn,	William	Worthy,	Ossie	Davis,	Ruby	Dee,	Bill	Strickland,	Abbey	Lincoln,	and	Ora	Mobley,	all	of	whom	had	played	formative	roles	in	shaping	the	emergence	and	evolution	of	radical	grassroots	freedom	struggles	in	Harlem	over	the	past	decade	or	more.232	At	the	end	of	June,	Malcolm	X	would	officially	announce	the	formation	of	this	new	force	in	the	Black	Freedom	Struggle	as	the	Organization	of	Afro-American	Unity	(OAAU).	
“The	time	has	come”:	Harlem	Confronts	the	Limits	of	Racial	Liberalism	With	such	an	array	of	individuals	and	organizations	involved	in	the	Black	Freedom	Struggle	in	Harlem	converging	upon	the	issue	of	police	reform,	Police	Commissioner	Murphy	and	the	NYPD	characteristically	dug	in	their	heels	and	
																																																								231	Garrett	Felber,	“Harlem	Is	The	Black	World’:	The	Organization	of	Afro-American	Unity	At	The	Grassroots,”	The	Journal	of	African	American	History	100,	no.	2	(Spring	2015):	203.		 232	Sales,	From	Civil	Rights	To	Black	Liberation,	99-132;	Felber,	“Harlem	Is	The	Black	World,”	199-225.	
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prepared	for	a	fight.	In	his	dogged	resistance	to	any	modicum	of	police	reform,	Murphy	waged	a	battle	on	two	fronts.	In	the	wake	of	the	“Fruit	Stand	Riot,”	the	NYPD	escalated	its	presence	in	Harlem	as	a	show	of	force	to	fasten	down	the	lid	on	any	further	unrest.	For	the	remainder	of	the	spring,	as	Michael	Flamm	notes,	the	NYPD	dispatched	members	of	its	highly	militarized	Tactical	Patrol	Force	(TPF)	to	patrol	Central	Harlem	in	pairs.233	Known	pejoratively	in	Harlem	as	the	“riot	squad,”	the	TPF	had	been	established	under	the	orders	of	Mayor	Wagner	nearly	five	years	earlier	as	a	response	to	the	1959	“near	riot”	in	Harlem.234	With	the	possibility	of	massive	racial	unrest	looming	large	that	summer,	Wagner	had	moved	quickly	to	ensure	that	the	NYPD	would	be	prepared	and	empowered	to	contain	and	suppress	any	political	uprising.		Comprised	of	physically	imposing	officers	with	special	training	in	martial	arts	and	riot	suppression,	the	TPF	in	Harlem	provided	a	highly-visible	reminder	of	the	will	of	the	city	administration	to	violently	curb	any	unrest.	In	addition	to	patrolling	the	streets,	as	one	officer	recalled,	the	TPF	“went	into	the	alleyways,	the	basements,	onto	the	rooftops,	through	the	tenement	hallways,”	in	an	ever-present,	aggressive	occupation	of	Harlem.	“They	saw	it	as	an	invasion	of	their	neighborhood,”	TPF	officer	Robert	Leuci	recalled,	“back	then,	I	didn’t	understand	the	rage	I	saw	in	their	faces,	the	contempt.”	While	Leuci	claimed	in	his	memoir	that	he	thought	the	TPF	was	“there	to	help,”	other	officers	were	more	candid	in	appraising	their	motives	for	joining	the	squad.	In	expressing	his	excitement	over																																																									233	Flamm,	In	the	Heat	of	the	Summer,	77.		 234	See	Chapter	Three	and	Four.	
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being	selected	to	join	the	TPF,	officer	Jim	O’Neil	remembered	that	he	“couldn’t	wait	to	get	started”	as	a	member	of	“an	elite,	ass-kicking,	crime-fighting,	gut-busting	squad.”235	With	such	an	escalation	of	aggressive,	militarized	police	presence	came	the	predictable	result	of	increased	claims	of	mistreatment	and	abuse.	In	the	three	months	immediately	following	the	“Fruit	Stand	Riot,”	Bill	Epton’s	Harlem	Defense	Council	reported	that	their	organization	had	recorded	300	cases	of	police	brutality	in	Harlem	alone.236		At	the	same	time,	Murphy	continued	his	campaign	to	control	the	popular	narrative	about	demands	for	police	reform,	routinely	misrepresenting	legitimate	demands	for	reform	as	calculated,	baseless	attacks	on	the	NYPD	and	upon	“law	and	order”	in	the	city.	“Charges	that	the	people	of	this	city	fear	and	hate	the	police	are	without	substance,”	Murphy	declared	that	spring.	“We	must	not	let	false	cries	of	propaganda	merchants	split	the	people	from	their	police	force.”	While	the	ridiculous	irony	of	Murphy’s	attack	on	civil	rights	organizations	as	“propaganda	merchants”	was	obvious	to	Black	communities	in	the	city,	such	rhetoric	resonated	with	white	New	Yorkers	across	the	political	spectrum	who	had	grown	tired	of	the	constant	agitation	of	a	decade-long	struggle	for	human	rights	waged	by	Black	communities	throughout	the	city	and	across	the	nation.		Bronxville	resident	Rita	C.	Tlamsa	gave	voice	to	this	white	backlash	in	the	city	in	a	letter	to	Michael	Murphy	that	spring	supporting	his	vocal	opposition	to	
																																																								235	Flamm,	In	the	Heat	of	the	Summer,	61-63.		 236	Black	Liberation	Commission	of	the	Progressive	Labor	Party,	“The	Plot	Against	Black	America,”	(Harlem:	American	Press,	1966),	2,	in	author’s	possession.	
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rising	demands	for	a	civilian	review	board.	“The	[civilian	review]	boards	are	intended	to	scare	our	policemen	out	of	doing	their	duty,”	Tlamsa	declared,	“and	thus	leave	the	Communists	unhindered	in	promoting	virulent	lawlessness.”237	By	routinely	presenting	legitimate	demands	for	police	reform	as	calculated	attacks	on	police	authority	waged	by	outside	agitators,	Murphy	not	only	sought	to	delegitimize	the	broader	aims	of	the	Black	Freedom	Struggle,	but	also	helped	to	foment	a	racist	backlash	in	the	city	that	would	drive	support	from	white	voters	for	heightened	police	power.			 In	this	battle	for	control	of	the	popular	narrative	around	police	brutality	and	reform,	the	Wagner	Administration	and	NYPD	were	given	ammunition	from	an	explosive	story	by	New	York	Times	reporter	Junius	Griffin	at	the	end	of	May.	In	his	highly	contested	article,	Griffin	reported	that	a	new	gang	had	emerged	in	Harlem	known	as	the	“Blood	Brothers,”	which	was	responsible	for	a	wave	of	violent	crimes	that	spring	and	had	expressed	plans	to	target	whites	and	law	enforcement	for	retributive	violence.	In	this	shocking	report,	Griffin	quoted	from	alleged	interviews	with	members	of	this	“hate	gang”	who	he	claimed	were	influenced	in	large	part	by	the	rhetoric	and	ideologies	of	Malcolm	X.238	While	the	story	was	widely	refuted	from	a	cross-section	of	Black	leaders	and	organizations	in	Harlem	and	beyond,	the	story	
																																																								237	Letter	from	Rita	C.	Tlamsa	to	Michael	Murphy,	March	1964,	BOSS	Records.		 238	Junius	Griffin,	“Whites	Are	Target	Of	Harlem	Gang,”	New	York	Times,	May	3,	1964.	
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raised	the	specter	of	retributive	Black	violence	in	the	city	and	put	the	NYPD	on	high	alert	for	the	next	several	months.239		At	a	panel	discussion	on	the	“Harlem	Hate-Gang	Scare”	hosted	by	the	Militant	Labor	Forum	at	the	end	of	May,	Malcolm	X	explained	the	dangers	of	any	further	escalation	of	police	presence	and	repression	in	Harlem	resulting	from	the	“Blood	Brothers”	story.	“Police	Commissioner	Murphy	is	a	dangerous	man,”	Malcolm	explained,	“because	what	he’s	doing	is	creating	a	situation	that	can	lead	to	nothing	but	bloodshed.”240	Joining	Malcolm	X	on	the	panel	was	QR	Hand,	who	cited	his	experiences	with	police	repression	during	the	rent	strikes	as	evidence	that	systemic	forces	were	at	work	to	violently	prevent	Black	liberation	in	Harlem.	“There’s	a	particular	reason	uptown	why	the	cops	have	to	get	their	special	tactical	force	up	there,”	Hand	asserted.	“It	comes	down	to	the	fact	that	there	are	an	awful	lot	of	groups,	not	together	as	of	yet,	who	are	deciding,	well	we	can’t	take	this	any	longer.	We	can’t	take	the	bad	housing,	the	rats,	the	roaches,	the	inferior	schools…we	can’t	take	this	any	longer.”	Hand	may	as	well	have	been	speaking	for	the	masses	in	Harlem	when	he	argued	that	the	increasingly	repressive	presence	of	the	NYPD	and	its	TPF	in	Harlem	that	spring	was	a	direct	response	to	the	recognition	of	a	looming	political	insurgency	in	Harlem.	“You	wanna	start	talking	about	hate-gangs	in	the	
																																																								239	For	more	on	the	controversy	surrounding	the	“Blood	Brothers”	report,	see	Flamm,	In	the	Heat	of	the	Summer,	70-73.		 240	Breitman,	Malcolm	X	Speaks,	67.	
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city,”	said	in	conclusion,	“let’s	talk	about	the	police	department,	the	real	hate	gang.”241	Each	panelist	at	the	forum,	including	Malcolm	X,	QR	Hand,	SWP	presidential	candidate	Clifton	DeBerry,	and	NY	CORE	rent	strike	leader	William	Reed,	predicted	that	violence	would	soon	erupt	in	Harlem	if	City	Hall	continued	on	its	present	course	of	violently	suppressing	Black	demands	for	human	rights	and	self-determination.	Rather	than	lamenting	these	predictions	as	a	foregone	conclusion,	however,	each	panelist	encouraged	Harlem	residents	to	take	action	to	defend	themselves	and	secure	their	liberation	from	an	illegitimate	government	by	any	means	necessary.	“I	think	the	time	has	come	when	the	community	must	organize	itself	to	be	prepared	that	when	something	happens	to	any	individual	in	the	community	they	should	turn	out	and	be	prepared	to	defend	it…to	demand	that	the	law	enforcement	officers	enforce	the	law	instead	of	breaking	it,”	DeBerry	charged.	“We	would	call	it	self-defense,	but	Commissioner	Murphy	and	Mayor	Wagner	would	call	it	‘hate-gang.”	While	Malcolm	X	had	avoided	explicitly	calling	for	self-defense	against	police	violence	in	his	numerous	addresses	that	spring,	DeBerry	made	plain	what	many	Harlem	residents	had	already	deduced	from	Malcolm’s	rhetoric.		In	this	two-hour	forum,	this	cross-section	of	Black	political	thought	in	Harlem	painted	a	stark	picture	of	an	impending	crisis	that	had	been	over	a	decade	in	the	making.	By	the	time	summer	arrived,	the	contradictions	between	the	rhetoric	of	racial	liberalism	and	practice	of	racial	oppression	in	New	York	City	had	become	too																																																									241	Militant	Labor	Forum,	“The	Harlem	Hate-Gang	Scare,”	May	29,	1964,	Moving	Image	and	Recorded	Sound	Division,	Schomburg	Center	for	Research	in	Black	Culture.	
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clear	to	ignore	in	Harlem,	setting	the	stage	for	a	dramatic	confrontation	over	Black	demands	for	human	rights,	self-determination,	and	a	more	progressive	form	of	urban	governance.	Fueled	by	years	of	hostile	and	violent	resistance	to	such	demands	from	city,	state,	and	federal	levels	of	government,	this	widely-predicted	looming	confrontation	represented	a	collective	rejection	of	liberal	governance	in	New	York	City	as	incapable	and	unwilling	to	guarantee	the	human	rights	of	its	Black	and	Puerto	Rican	residents.	Nurtured	for	over	a	decade	by	radical	organizers	and	intellectuals	in	Harlem,	this	popular	analysis	that	was	flowering	at	the	grassroots	made	a	confrontation	with	the	enforcement	arm	of	the	white	status	quo	nearly	inevitable	by	the	summer	of	1964.	In	concluding	his	address	at	the	Militant	Labor	Forum,	Malcolm	X	offered	a	dire	warning	to	those	in	the	audience.	Comparing	the	violent	conditions	of	racial	oppression	in	Harlem	to	those	that	spawned	an	armed	revolutionary	struggle	in	Algeria,	Malcolm	predicted	that	America	would	soon	witness	the	same	type	of	guerilla	revolt	in	Harlem	that	transpired	in	Algeria.	“People	will	realize	that	it’s	impossible	for	a	chicken	to	produce	a	duck	egg…it	can	only	produce	according	to	what	that	particular	system	was	constructed	to	produce,”	Malcolm	allegorized.	“The	system	in	this	country	cannot	produce	freedom	for	an	Afro-American…it’s	impossible	for	this	system,	as	it	stands,	to	produce	freedom	right	now	for	the	black	man	in	this	country.”242	It	was	with	this	kind	of	analysis	in	mind	that	Harlem	residents	took	to	the	streets	less	than	two	months	later	when	a	white,	off-duty	NYPD	lieutenant	fatally	shot	15-year-old	James	Powell	in	broad	daylight.	After	more	than	a																																																									242	Breitman,	Malcolm	X	Speaks,	66-69.	
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decade	of	active	grassroots	struggle	for	rights	and	power,	the	Black	and	Puerto	Rican	residents	of	Harlem	sent	a	resounding	message	to	the	City	of	New	York	and	the	nation	that	July:	“America,	we	have	found	you	out.”	
v 		 As	day	broke	upon	New	York	City	on	July	20,	1964,	the	Monday	morning	sun	reflected	off	shattered	glass	coating	the	sidewalks	of	Central	Harlem.	In	the	days	following	the	police	killing	of	James	Powell,	the	heavy-handed	presence	of	the	NYPD	at	nonviolent	demonstrations	against	police	brutality	prompted	Harlem	residents	to	unleash	their	collective	fury	upon	the	myriad	individuals,	businesses,	and	institutions	that	represented	the	systemic	forces	of	oppression	the	community	had	fought	against	for	over	a	decade.	Amidst	the	flurry	of	articles	and	photographs	on	the	so-called	“riots”	that	lined	the	pages	of	the	New	York	Times	that	morning	was	another	particularly	jarring	article	written	by	Junius	Griffin.	Under	the	headline,	“Guerilla	War’	Urged	In	Harlem,”	Griffin	reported	on	a	Saturday	night	rally	at	the	Mount	Morris	Presbyterian	Church	where	Jesse	Gray	had	allegedly	called	for	“100	skilled	black	revolutionaries	who	are	ready	to	die”	in	the	fight	against	police	brutality	in	Harlem.243			 Months	later,	after	rebellions	had	erupted	throughout	the	Northeast	in	Harlem’s	wake,	Gray	revisited	these	remarks	during	a	speech	in	Rochester,	NY.	When	the	Black	community	there	had	rebelled	against	police	violence	and	systemic	racial	oppression	just	days	after	Harlem	had	done	the	same,	the	masses	in	the	
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streets	of	western	New	York	had	cried	out,	“Don’t	give	us	[Martin	Luther]	King,	give	us	Jesse	Gray.”244	Having	spent	weeks	clarifying	his	remarks	in	New	York	City	to	avoid	criminal	prosecution,	Gray	took	the	opportunity	in	Rochester	to	set	the	record	straight.	After	reiterating	claims	that	he	was	exhorting	Black	communities	to	fight	back	against	racist	terrorism	in	Mississippi	rather	than	New	York,	Gray	explained	the	revolutionary	analysis	that	undergirded	his	calls	for	armed	self-defense.	“I	said	in	New	York	City	that	revolution	is	an	art…and	therefore,	if	revolution	is	an	art,	then	the	revolutionaries	must	go	into	the	community	and	organize	that	community	for	change.”245		Revolution	was	a	common	theme	in	Gray’s	addresses	that	fall	and	winter,	but	it	was	not	purely	for	the	sake	of	protecting	himself	from	legal	persecution.	The	Harlem	rebellion	had	provided	Gray	with	an	elevated	platform	that	he	then	utilized	to	explain	the	revolutionary	analysis	he	had	developed	over	nearly	two	decades	of	radical	organizing.	“Real	revolutionaries	are	out	in	the	streets	organizing	people	around	their	day-to-day	problems,”	Gray	explained	at	a	conference	that	fall.	“Those	who	are	revolutionist	in	theory	must	go	down	to	the	streets	and	organize	the	people,	if	they	are	to	be	revolutionaries.	Only	if	we	do	this	can	we	organize	the	masses	toward	independent	political	struggle.”246	Far	from	inflammatory	rhetoric,	
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Gray’s	analysis	of	a	grassroots	revolutionary	movement	had	been	forged	in	the	same	crucible	of	Black	radical	thought	that	had	shaped	the	development	of	some	of	the	leading	intellectuals	and	organizers	of	the	Black	Freedom	Struggle,	including	Ella	Baker,	Mae	Mallory,	and	Malcolm	X,	amongst	many	others.		By	the	summer	of	1964,	this	emphasis	on	radical	grassroots	organizing	had	come	to	characterize	struggles	for	Black	liberation	and	empowerment	in	Harlem	and	beyond.	Weaving	together	the	various	strands	of	radical	political	thought	and	action	over	the	past	decade	in	Harlem,	the	rent	strike	movement	that	winter	provided	a	blueprint	for	engaging	poor	and	working-class	Black	and	Puerto	Rican	communities	in	a	radical	social	movement.	Furthermore,	through	participation	in	the	rent	strikes,	thousands	of	New	Yorkers	developed	a	more	radical	analysis	of	the	city’s	power	structures	by	coming	face	to	face	with	the	very	agencies	charged	with	maintaining	the	racial	status	quo	in	the	city.		Though	the	revolution	that	Jesse	Gray,	Malcolm	X,	and	Mae	Mallory	envisioned	had	not	yet	come	to	pass,	this	radical	grassroots	milieu	in	Harlem	had	effectively	demonstrated	the	ways	in	which	the	latent	political	power	of	poor	and	working-class	Black	communities	in	the	urban	north	could	be	mobilized	and	organized	for	social	transformation.	While	the	spontaneous	rebellion	that	summer	should	not	be	confused	with	organized	revolutionary	action,	it	nonetheless	signaled	to	the	city	and	to	the	nation	that	any	further	attempts	to	suppress	the	demands	of	Black	communities	for	human	rights	and	self-determination	would	be	met	with	dire	consequences.	From	the	streets	of	Harlem	came	the	rainbow	sign,	and	the	long,	hot	summers	of	the	1960s	had	officially	begun.	
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CHAPTER	8	
CONCLUSION	As	the	smoke	began	to	clear	in	Harlem	and	Bedford-Stuyvesant,	newspapers	across	the	country	carried	article	after	article	covering	the	“riots”	spreading	throughout	the	northeast.	Alongside	dramatic	photographs	of	broken	windows	and	people	running	from	the	police	ran	columns	in	which	reporters,	politicians,	police,	and	civil	rights	leaders	offered	their	explanations	of	the	recent	unrest	in	the	nation’s	cities.	Ranging	from	condemnations	of	“looters”	and	“rioters”	who	had	no	regard	for	“law	and	order,”	to	explanations	of	the	“hopelessness”	and	“despair”	that	created	a	powder	keg	in	the	ghetto,	scarce	was	the	person	who	did	not	have	an	opinion	on	the	cause	of	the	uprisings.	Despite	the	range	of	explanations	or	characterizations,	there	was	general	agreement	that	action	needed	to	be	taken	in	Harlem	and	elsewhere	to	address	the	demonstrably	explosive	symptoms	of	systemic	racial	oppression.	The	disagreement	lay	in	what	was	to	be	done	about	the	situation.	In	many	ways,	the	disagreements	that	emerged	between	City	Hall	and	Harlem	residents	in	the	wake	of	the	rebellion	were	characteristic	of	the	Wagner	Administration’s	general	position	toward	the	Black	Freedom	Struggle	over	the	previous	decade.	In	a	televised	address	delivered	as	the	uprising	began	to	ebb,	Wagner	stuck	close	to	the	well-worn	script	defined	by	his	one-two	punch	of	liberal	governance.	With	his	left	hand,	the	Mayor	explained	to	Harlem	residents	that	he	empathized	with	their	“needs	and	problems	in	regard	to	housing	and	jobs	and	discrimination	and	the	education	of	your	children”	and	promised	to	“go	all	out	to	remedy	injustice”	and	“reduce	inequality.”	On	the	other	hand,	Wagner	declared	“the	
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mandate	to	maintain	law	and	order	is	absolute,	unconditional	and	unqualified,”	while	casting	blame	for	the	unrest	upon	the	“tough	young	ones”	who	were	“ready	for	violence…and	full	of	resentment	and	hate.”	Furthermore,	the	Mayor	warned	that	“illegal	acts,	including	defiance	of	or	attacks	upon	the	police”	would	not	be	tolerated	and	that	the	city	would	not	be	“browbeaten	by	prophets	of	despair,	or	by	peddlers	of	hate.”1		To	Harlem	residents,	the	message	was	abundantly	clear—the	Mayor	was	once	again	providing	lip	service	and	promises	of	minor	concessions	to	Black	communities	while	misrepresenting	and	criminalizing	their	legitimate	demands	for	equality	and	empowerment	in	order	to	maintain	the	racial	status	quo.	“There	was	nothing	new	in	Wagner’s	statement,”	NY	NAACP	president	Rev.	Richard	Hildebrand	observed,	while	reiterating	demands	for	a	civilian	review	board	over	the	Mayor’s	expressed	objections.2	“We	have	just	gone	through	a	summer	where	the	New	York	City	administration	has	completely	overlooked	some	basic	demands	of	the	people,”	Jesse	Gray	concurred	in	an	address	later	that	year.3		To	Gray,	this	continued	rejection	and	suppression	of	demands	for	human	rights	and	self-determination	in	Harlem,	even	in	the	wake	of	a	major	urban	rebellion,	was	a	clear	sign	that	new	directions	had	to	be	sought	in	the	Black																																																									1	“Text	of	Wagner’s	Radio-TV	Appeal	for	Restoration	of	Law	and	Order	in	City,”	New	York	Times,	July	23,	1964,	12.		 2	Michael	Flamm,	In	the	Heat	of	the	Summer:	The	New	York	Riots	of	1964	and	
the	War	on	Crime	(Philadelphia:	University	of	Pennsylvania	Press,	2017),	180.		3	Jesse	Gray,	“The	Black	Revolution—A	Struggle	For	Political	Power,”	Keynote	Address	at	the	Federation	For	Independent	Political	Action	Conference,	December	19,	1964,	Box	15,	Folder	6,	Haughton	Papers.	
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Freedom	Struggle.	Explaining	that	the	“sit-ins,	wade-ins,	walk-in,	sleep-ins”	had	failed	to	“move	the	black	masses,”	Gray	argued	that	any	leader	interested	in	truly	confronting	the	power	structures	of	the	city	and	the	nation	needed	to	establish	a	base	in	poor	and	working-class	Black	communities	of	the	urban	North.	“Wagner	will	never	truly	respect	the	ghetto,”	Gray	proclaimed,	“unless	we	are	able	to	organize—independent	of	any	outside	force—our	politics,	our	culture,	and	our	education,	so	that	our	community	organization	develops	and	its	impact	is	felt	throughout	this	city.”4	What	Gray	was	describing,	Black	community	control	over	the	social,	political,	cultural,	and	economic	institutions	within	Black	communities,	would	later	become	a	hallmark	of	the	Black	Power	Movement.		While	profound,	the	ideas	that	Gray	was	talking	about	that	fall	were	hardly	novel.	In	fact,	they	comprised	much	of	the	ideological	basis	for	the	powerful	grassroots	struggles	for	human	rights	and	self-determination	in	Harlem	over	the	past	ten	years	or	more.	To	be	certain,	the	roots	of	this	political	milieu	were	firmly	planted	in	the	political	soil	tilled	by	Marcus	Garvey,	Queen	Mother	Moore,	Adam	Clayton	Powell,	Jr.,	Ella	Baker,	Jack	O’Dell,	and	countless	others	in	the	early	20th	Century	through	the	post-World	War	II	era.	However,	it	was	through	the	political	thought	and	organizing	of	Jesse	Gray,	Malcolm	X,	Mae	Mallory,	the	Northern	Student	Movement,	NY	CORE,	and	the	rank-and-file	in	Harlem	from	1954-1964	that	this	grassroots	Black	Power	began	to	blossom	throughout	the	city,	state,	and	nation.	By	focusing	their	political	analysis	and	praxis	on	developing	indigenous	leadership	and	community	empowerment	in	service	of	achieving	Black	self-determination,	these																																																									4	Ibid.	
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leading	activists	and	organizations	brought	local	people	and	national	leaders	alike	to	the	realization	that	any	radical	or	revolutionary	movement	must	be	able	to	mobilize	and	organize	the	“mass	reservoir	of	black	power”	in	Harlem	and	elsewhere.5	Beyond	a	general	disillusionment	with	the	limitations	of	liberal	governance	for	delivering	economic,	social,	and	political	justice	for	Black	communities,	there	were	several	defining	characteristics	of	this	emergent	grassroots	Black	radicalism,	which	Gray	referred	to	as	“black	power.”	Through	this	decade	of	grassroots	activism,	radical	leaders	in	Harlem	had	nurtured	a	popular	political	consciousness	that	centered	on	Black	self-determination,	community	control	of	political,	social,	and	economic	institutions,	a	broader	focus	on	human	rights	over	civil	rights,	Black	indigenous	leadership	of	organizations,	cultural	nationalism,	an	identification	with	Pan-African	freedom	struggles,	and	a	disavowal	of	nonviolence	as	an	ideology.	When	analyzed	within	this	dynamic	ten-year	period,	the	evolution	of	this	radical	political	milieu	offers	profound	insights	into	the	emergence	of	grassroots	Black	Power	in	the	urban	north	and	its	ideological	and	tactical	components	at	the	advent	of	the	long,	hot	summers.		In	many	ways,	the	threads	that	comprised	the	tapestry	of	grassroots	Black	Power	in	Harlem	during	this	era	were	woven	together	in	the	Organization	of	Afro-American	Unity	shortly	before	rebellions	broke	out	that	summer.	With	a	broad	membership	that	included	some	of	the	most	influential	radical	thinkers	and	grassroots	organizers	in	Harlem	over	the	past	decade	or	more,	including	Malcolm	X,																																																									5	Ibid.	
		503	
Jesse	Gray,	Jack	O’Dell,	Gloria	Richardson	Dandridge,	John	Henrik	Clarke,	John	O.	Killens,	Bill	Epton,	Conrad	Lynn,	William	Worthy,	Ossie	Davis,	Ruby	Dee,	Bill	Strickland,	Abbey	Lincoln,	and	Ora	Mobley,	the	OAAU’s	formation	on	June	28,	1964	held	the	promise	of	a	long-awaited	Black	radical	united	front	in	Harlem	and	beyond.6		By	the	summer	of	1964,	however,	this	proliferation	of	radical	grassroots	action	marked	the	Black	Freedom	Struggle	in	Harlem	for	heightened	governmental	repression	through	the	New	York	Police	Department.	As	the	NYPD	responded	to	Black	demands	for	rights	and	power	in	increasingly	repressive	ways	as	the	spring	progressed,	greater	numbers	of	Harlem	residents	came	to	embrace	Malcolm	X’s	indictment	of	the	city	government	for	not	only	failing	to	protect	the	interests	of	its	Black	citizens,	but	for	actively	subverting	their	demands	for	equality	and	justice.	If	the	government	was	morally	bankrupt	and	politically	corrupt,	as	Malcolm	contended,	then	there	was	no	reason	for	its	Black	residents	to	operate	through	its	prescribed	channels	in	seeking	redress	for	their	grievances.	By	July	1964,	many	felt	that	the	ballots	hadn’t	worked,	and	that	it	was	time	for	the	bullets.	For	all	the	ink	spilled	by	city	officials	in	scrambling	to	counter	the	proliferation	of	this	radical	analysis	with	flowery	rhetoric	and	liberal	promises,	the	active	presence	of	grassroots	intellectuals	and	organizers	in	Harlem	from	1954-1964	had	pulled	back	the	curtain	and	brought	forth	a	popular	analysis	in	Harlem	that	delegitimized	City	Hall	and	made	a	confrontation	with	the	white-dominated	
																																																								6	Sales,	From	Civil	Rights	To	Black	Liberation,	99-132;	Felber,	“Harlem	Is	The	Black	World,”	199-225.	
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power	structure	all	but	inevitable	by	the	summer	of	1964.	This	is	not	to	suggest	that	violent	conflict	was	unavoidable,	predetermined,	or	calculated,	however.	Had	the	Wagner	Administration	prioritized	the	demands	of	its	Black	and	Puerto	Rican	constituents	for	equality	and	justice	over	the	heavy-handed	maintenance	of	the	racial	status	quo	during	its	decade	in	power,	the	popular	critique	of	City	Hall	and	liberal	governance	that	emerged	by	that	summer	would	have	gained	far	less	traction.	Though	it	was	a	spontaneous	act	of	police	brutality	provided	the	impetus	for	the	1964	Harlem	Rebellion,	the	radical	and	revolutionary	analyses	that	were	inspiring	mass	mobilization	in	Harlem	and	throughout	the	city	compelled	thousands	to	take	to	the	streets,	in	recognition	of	this	police	violence	as	a	symptom	of	the	systemic	oppression	entrenched	in	the	political,	social,	and	economic	structures	of	the	city,	state,	and	nation,	and	with	the	knowledge	that	justice	was	surely	not	forthcoming	for	yet	another	Black	victim	of	white	State	violence.		The	fatal	shooting	of	James	Powell	on	July	16th,	then,	served	as	a	singular	example	of	the	force	of	the	white	world	pressing	down	upon	a	rising	Black	nation.	Through	rebelling	against	the	white	power	structure	and	its	many	faces	in	the	days	following	the	killing	of	James	Powell,	Harlem	residents	professed	their	allegiance	to	a	challenge	that	Mae	Mallory	had	thrown	down	three	years	prior:	“the	task	of	unleashing	this	Black	power	until	the	world	is	rid	of	White	domination	and	exploitation.”7	As	city	after	city	exploded	in	the	weeks,	months,	and	years	that	followed,	it	was	clear	that	Harlem	residents	were	not	alone	in	their	task.	
																																																								7	Letter	from	Mae	Mallory	to	Sir,	February	1961,	Box	2,	Folder	10,	Mallory	Papers.	
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The	importance	of	documenting	and	analyzing	these	histories	of	grassroots	struggles	for	rights	and	power	in	Harlem	and	elsewhere	during	this	formative	era	stretches	beyond	challenging	meta-narratives	that	have	either	marginalized	or	distorted	the	histories	of	northern	Black	Freedom	Struggles.	These	local	struggles	against	institutional	racism	in	the	urban	North	offer	vital	lessons	for	present	and	future	generations	of	activists	and	organizers	in	the	ongoing	fight	against	institutional	racism	and	for	human	rights,	economic	justice,	political	power,	and	social	transformation.	In	her	perceptive	and	powerful	historical	analysis	of	the	#BlackLivesMatter	movement,	Keeanga-Yamahtta	Taylor	suggests	that	“today’s	activists	are	grappling	with	questions	similar	to	those	Black	radicals	confronted	in	the	Black	Power	era,	questions	bound	up	with	the	systemic	nature	of	Black	oppression	in	American	capitalism	and	how	that	shapes	the	approach	to	organizing.”8	In	our	collective	efforts	to	resolve	these	questions	while	building	effective	organizational	structures,	analyses,	and	strategies,	many	lessons	can	be	derived	from	the	struggles	waged	by	poor	and	working	class	Black	communities	in	Harlem	in	the	decade	preceding	the	1964	Rebellion.		By	analyzing	school	boycotts,	rent	strikes,	campaigns	for	affirmative	action	in	hiring,	and	protests	over	police	brutality	in	Harlem	within	their	proper	context	of	a	broader	struggle	for	radical	social	transformation,	activists	and	organizers	can	evaluate	the	successes	and	shortcomings	of	past	strategies,	tactics,	and	analyses	to	not	only	develop	effective	organizing	praxis,	but	to	envision	and	implement	more	
																																																								8	Keeanga-Yamahtta	Taylor,	From	#BlackLivesMatter	to	Black	Liberation	(Chicago:	Haymarket	Books,	2016),	167.		
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assertive,	imaginative,	and	radical	political	analyses	and	praxis.	For	pressing	questions	that	remain	in	current	struggles	over	interracial	organizing,	single-issue	and	intersectional	organizing,	class	analyses	in	racial	justice	campaigns,	the	roles	and	relationships	of	local	people	and	national	organizations,	gender	roles	in	social	movements,	promoting	personal	and	collective	political	consciousness,	internationalism	and	global	solidarity,	and	the	dynamic	relationships	between	reformist	and	revolutionary	analyses	and	demands,	there	is	much	to	be	learned	from	the	histories	of	Mae	Mallory,	Malcolm	X,	Jesse	Gray,	the	Northern	Student	Movement,	NY	CORE,	and	the	broader	radical	grassroots	political	milieu	in	Harlem	from	1954-1964.	For	within	these	recent	histories	lie	powerful	and	transformative	narratives	and	lessons	of	how	some	of	the	most	marginalized	communities	in	New	York	City,	through	participation	in	local	organizing	efforts	to	improve	living	conditions	and	combat	institutional	racism,	developed	a	radical	critique	of	urban	and	national	power	structures	that	challenged	the	very	legitimacy	of	an	inherently	oppressive	society.	In	addition	to	providing	powerful	lessons	for	current	organization	and	movement	building,	an	analysis	of	this	decade	of	grassroots	Black	radicalism	is	essential	for	explaining	the	outbreak	of	urban	uprisings	in	the	1960s	not	as	“race	riots,”	but	as	rebellions	against	American	Apartheid	in	the	nation’s	cities.	To	challenge	these	entrenched	perceptions	of	civil	unrest	in	response	to	State	violence	in	the	1960s	is	to	provide	vital	space	for	developing	a	more	critical	framework	for	understanding	their	recurrence	in	the	21st	Century.	As	Taylor	poignantly	notes	in	her	analysis	of	the	2014	police	murder	of	18-year-old	Mike	Brown	and	the	resultant	
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uprising	in	Ferguson,	Missouri,	a	new	generation	of	young	activists	and	organizers	are	“beginning	to	politically	generalize	from	the	multiple	cases	of	police	brutality	and	develop	a	systemic	analysis	of	policing.”	Furthermore,	Taylor	notes	that	many	in	this	new	generation	of	freedom	fighters	have	begun	to	“articulate	a	much	broader	critique	that	situated	policing	within	a	matrix	of	racism	and	inequality	in	the	United	States	and	beyond.”9	Taylor’s	assessment	of	the	political	analysis	generated	by	grassroots	activists	in	2014	bears	a	striking	resemblance	to	those	generated	by	radical	organizers	and	local	people	in	Harlem	in	the	early	1960s	and	demonstrates	the	continued	need	for	a	more	critical	analysis	of	the	relationships	between	institutional	racism,	political	consciousness	and	action,	and	urban	rebellions	in	the	United	States.		To	honestly	reckon	with	the	outbreak	of	rebellions	in	Harlem	and	elsewhere	in	the	mid-to-late	1960s	requires	a	thorough	analysis	of	the	preceding	periods	of	organized	grassroots	resistance	to	the	white	State	violence	that	begat	such	civil	unrest.	Such	an	analysis	is	an	historical	imperative	to	supplant	the	problematic,	yet	popularly	accepted	narrative	that	explains	urban	rebellions	as	consequences	of	an	oppressive	societal	“powder	keg”	with	a	framework	that	centers	the	conscious	political	agency	to	Black	communities	which	sought	to	resist	oppression	and	reform	government	in	the	years,	months,	and	days	leading	up	to	these	uprisings.	This	former	type	of	popular	analysis	has	historically	served	to	delegitimize	the	inherently	political	nature	of	urban	rebellions	by	obscuring	the	causal	relationships	between	grassroots	Black	radicalism,	popular	disillusionment	with	the	repressive																																																									9	Ibid,	162.	
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manifestations	of	racial	liberalism,	and	the	outbreak	of	urban	rebellions.	When	urban	rebellions	are	delegitimized	and	depoliticized	as	senseless	acts	of	lawlessness	and	violence,	history	has	shown	that	these	narratives	have	given	rise	to	even	greater	physical	and	political	repression,	as	evidenced	by	the	devastating	national	legacies	of	the	War	on	Crime	and	the	bloody	wake	left	by	the	FBI’s	COINTELPRO.	Furthermore,	by	denying	conscious	political	agency	to	those	who	engaged	in	righteous	rebellion	against	American	Apartheid,	this	type	of	narrative	has	effectively	resulted	in	a	popular	backlash	against	legitimate	demands	for	equality	and	justice,	the	retrenchment	of	the	more	repressive	elements	of	racial	liberalism,	and	the	reification	of	a	State	monopoly	on	“violence.”	While	changing	the	narrative	of	urban	freedom	struggles	and	rebellions	will	certainly	not	be	sufficient	in	and	of	itself	for	fomenting	systemic	change	in	the	nation’s	oppressive	social,	economic,	and	political	structures,	it	is	an	imperative	aspect	of	this	multifaceted	and	expansive	ongoing	struggle	for	human	rights,	self-determination,	and	radical	social	transformation.			 	
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